University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1981

The Potosi Mita under Hapsburg administration : the seventeenth
century.
Jeffrey A. Cole
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1

Recommended Citation
Cole, Jeffrey A., "The Potosi Mita under Hapsburg administration : the seventeenth century." (1981).
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1387.
https://doi.org/10.7275/z0em-dx54 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1387

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

THE POTOSI MITA UNDER HAPSBURG ADMINISTRATION
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

A Dissertation Presented
By

JEFFREY AUSTIN COLE

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May

19 81

Department of History

Jeffrey Austin Cole

1981

All Rights Reserved

International Communication Agency
P.L. 87-256/ The Mutual Educational
and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961
Obligation Number 1110219

THE POTOSI MITA UNDER HAPSBURG ADMINISTRATION.
THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

A Dissertation Presented
By

JEFFREY AUSTIN COLE

Approved as to style and content by:

Robert A. Potash^ Chairman of Committee

Jane M. Loy, Member

Miriam

U.

Chrisman, Member

Donald A. Proulx, Member

Department of History

for Marilyn

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEiMENTS

The writing of a doctoral dissertation is at once a

very gratifying and maturing experience.

I

set out,

nearly three years ago, with a much-inflated impression of

myself and with great pretensions.

Those feelings were

only enhanced by the receipt of an ICA research fellowship
and the accompanying status of being a "Fulbright Scholar."

Very quickly, however,

I

learned that my own work would

depend, ultimately, upon the efforts of librarians,

archivists, government officials, colleagues, friends and
my wife, Marilyn.

completed,

I

Thus, now that the thesis is nearly

have many, many people to thank.

Professor Nina M. Scott, Fulbright Advisor for the

University of Massachusetts, herded me through the

compilation of the grant proposal and championed my cause
thereafter.

I

also thank Professors Jerome King, George

Armelagos and Donald Black, who served on the University's
Fulbright Screening Committee.
was
Professor Emeritus Lewis Hanke taught me what it

that
like to be a mitayo during the three years
as his assistant.

I

served

He is also reponsible for pointing me

me with
toward the Potosi mita as a topic, providing

v

copies of many important publications and offering me

continual encouragement.

Dr. Pauline Collins, Latin

American Bibliographer for the University of Massachusetts
Library, is a godsend.

She located many obscure sources,

sent me notices of recent publications and she kept me

abreast of the uncertain fate of the Library tower while
I

was in Bolivia.

Professor Peter J. Bakewell, of the

University of New Mexico, provided many helpful comments
on my project at its inception and advice on conducting

research in Sucre and Potosl.

Archival research in South America would have been
impossible had it not been for the assistance, spiritual
as well as financial, offered by the Fulbright and USICA

offices there.

I

am especially grateful to Mrs. Cecilia

C6rdova, CAO Dr. Peter DeShazo and ACAO Dr. John Dwyer
of USICA/La Paz.

John and Rosa Dwyer invited Marilyn and

me for a weekend, and then supported us for nearly two

weeks during the golpe of November

1,

1979.

In Lima,

CAO Dr. Frank P. Florey and Fulbright Director Marcia

Paredes were most helpful during our brief visit to Peru.
of
In Argentina, we received the aid and the friendship
of
Ana Maria Carossino, and Mirta and Domingo Berreuta,

the beleaguered Fulbright Commission.

Archive de La
Dr. Alberto Crespo R., Director of the
Mayor San Andrgs,
Paz and the Biblioteca de la Universidad
home for an
was gracious enough to invite me to his
VI

afternoon of lively conversation about the mita, and to
provide me with bibliographic aids that greatly facilitated

my investigation in Bolivia.

Mario Chac6n Torres, Director

of the Archivo Historico de PotosI, was a warm host on both
of our visits to the Villa Imperial.

Inge Marie Harman and

Roger Rasnake, of Cornell University and veteranos of the

Bolivian campaign long before we arrived, saved us from

many pitfalls with their advice and counsel.
J.

Dr. Carlos

Diaz Rementeria, of the Universidad de Sevilla, was our

guardian angel in Sucre and later shared his 2- habitaci6n
He is a very good

apartment with us in Buenos Aires.
friend.

Dr. Gunnar Mendoza L., Director of the Archivo Nacional

de Bolivia and the Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia, is a

light in the archival darkness.

The ANB and the BNB are

by far the best-run and best-organized repositories of

documentation that
because

I

I

have worked in.

I

must confess that,

worked in Sucre first,

I

did not immediately

But

I

am now a devoted fan,

appreciate my good fortune.
and

I

look forward to my next visit.

a cordial host to

Marilyn and me.

I

Dr. Mendoza was also

would like to thank

everyone at the ANB and the BNB, and especially the
Subdirectora, Martha Mendoza.
of the
In Peru, Graciela Sanchez Cerro, Director

Nacional, and
Oficina de Investigaciones in the Biblioteca
del Archivo
Mario Cardenas, Director of the Oficina
vii

Hist6rico in the Archive General de la Naci6n, were both
very kind to make their collections available when we

descended on Lima unannounced.

In Argentina,

I

thank

Dr. C§sar A. Garcia Belsunce, Director of the Archive

General de la Naci6n, and the entire staff of that

institution for their assistance and patience.
I

would also like to acknowledge the support and

encouragement offered by Frank H. McCracken, Jr.,
Marilyn's employer.

Not only did Frank allow her a

year's leave to accompany me to South America, he has

tolerated the impact that the last two months have had
on both of us.
My dissertation committee has held in their despite
my monthly barrages of chapters and notes, and my

whirlwind trips to Amherst.

"Professors Jane M. Loy,

Miriam U. Chrisman and Donald A. Proulx have survived
three drafts of this thesis, and they have made important

contributions to its form and content.

They have offered

me only their encouragement and assistance.

Professor Robert A. Potash has shown an unusual

willingness to explore new territory by directing a

dissertation that concerns neither nineteenth century
Mexico nor twentieth century Argentina.

His greatest

contribution, however, came in the years preceding the
high
thesis, when he instilled the self -discipline and
volume.
standards that were necessary to produce this huge
viii

But the most credit must go, inevitably, to Marilyn.
She has supported me this last year, and thus has allowed

me to devote all of my time to writing.

fourteen-hour plane, train and
panza

;

She tolerated the

— especially — bus

trips;

Buenos Aires in the heat and humidity of February;

and the "slings and arrows" of Spanish and Latin American

male chauvinism.

To leave her position as a respected

systems analyst to become "la mujer de Jeff" required

understanding beyond the call of duty.

This is, therefore,

our dissertation.

Concord Massachusetts
April 24, 1981
,

ix

ABSTRACT
The Potosi Mita under Hapsburg Administration.

The Seventeenth Century.
1981)

(May,

Jeffrey Austin Cole, B.A., The University of Connecticut
M.A.

,

The University of Connecticut

Ph.D., The University of Massachusetts

Professor Robert A. Potash

Directed by:

The mita was a draft Indian labor system that Viceroy

Francisco de Toledo developed in 157 3 for the silver
industry at Potosi (in colonial Upper Peru; current-day
Bolivia)

For a brief period the mita served, in

.

combination with the introduction of amalgamation
technology, stockpiles of previously unrefinable ore and
a
(

large capital investment by the mine and mill owners

azogueros

)

to cause a boom in production.

By 1600, however, the stockpiles of ore had been

exhausted and the boom had given way to decreasing levels
of silver production at Potosi.

serving in the mita

(

mitayos

)

The Indians who were

had become more important to

means of
the industry, because they were now the principal

obtaining ore, but their condition had deteriorated.
X

As

their own profits fell, the Indians began to flee from

Potosi and from the provinces that were subject to the
mita.

Their migration^ which was caused by tribute

requirements and other labor obligations as well, disrupted
the social, economic and political order that the Spanish

were trying to impose upon the Indians.

Their method of

resisting the invaders was passive, but the Indians were

neither conquered nor submissive victims of the mita.
The group that was caught between the continuing demand
for mitayos at Potosl and the decreasing number of Indians
in the provinces was the caciques

(Indian nobles)

They

.

were the key to the entire system, because they delivered
the Indians to the mines and the mills.

At first the

caciques were able to meet their quotas by abridging the
legal restrictions on the recruitment of the mitayos

.

But

in the early seventeenth century they found themselves

fined for the growing number of Indians that they were

unable to deliver, and a new form of mita service was
founded:

service in silver, ostensibly to hire substitutes.

By 1630, between one-third and one-half of the total

delivery of mitayos to Potest was made in money.

The

azogueros used some of the silver they received from the
caciques for operating funds, rather than to hire laborers.
The mita therefore became a capital subsidy as well as

forced labor system.
The Hapsburg government of colonial Peru opposed the
xi

new form of mita service because it was an unauthorized

arrangement between the azogueros and the caciques to which
it was not a party.

The crown's ability to counter the de

facto mita was restricted, however, by its isolation in
Spain, by the time that was consumed by trans-Atlantic

correspondence and by its own bureaucracy.

The viceroys

who were stationed in Lima were plagued by similar problems,
and they depended upon the President of the Audiencia de

Charcas and the Corregidor de Potosi to administer the mita
on a daily basis.

A constant interplay of personal and

professional jealousies among these officials, the
viceroy's reluctance to innovate and the contradictory
orders that were issued from Lima and Madrid complicated
the government's efforts to reform the mita to the point
of near-total ineffectiveness.
In 1670, the Viceroy Conde de Lemos determined that the

system could not be purged of the azogueros

*

misuse of mita

service in silver and the other abuses that stemmed from
it,

and he proposed that the system be abolished.

The

crown was reluctant to accept the loss of revenue that such
an act would have entailed, and instead it ordered a total

reformation of the mita

.

That program was executed during

the 16 80s, under the Viceroy Duque de la Palata.

It too

failed, because it was based on an untenable premise:

that

the Toledan mita could be re-established despite 110 years
of economic, political and demographic change in Peru.
xii
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The mita was a draft labor system developed by Viceroy

Francisco de Toledo in 1573 to meet the labor requirements
of the silver mining center at Potosi.

Indians from the

far reaches of Upper Peru were compelled to travel to

Potosi and serve a year working in the mines and refining

mills there.

The system continued, with various

modifications, until it was abolished by the Cortes de
CSdiz in 1812.

This study concerns the mita during the

seventeenth century, when Potosl was a jewel in the

Hapsburg

crown."'"

Toledo designed the mita to meet the specific needs
and goals of his viceroyalty, including the consolidation
of royal dominion in a rebellious realm and the protection

of the crown's economic interests.

Over the next century

and a quarter the Peruvian economy diversified, the

realities of silver production altered, and the demographic
landscape changed.

In concert with those developments the

mita evolved, most often through local, extralegal,
adaptations.
that of 1580.

The mita of 1680 bore little resemblance to

The story of its metamorphosis, and of the
1

2

Hapsburg government's efforts to administer the system,
shed an interesting light on the history of seventeenth

century Peru.

Historiography
Bitter debate swirled about the mita during most of its
239-year history.

The system was identified by its enemies

as a form of servitude worse than slavery, and was accused

of depopulating the provinces subject to it.

The mita 's

supporters denied that it was responsible for the

demographic decline in Upper Peru

and defended draft labor

on the premise that the Spanish Empire depended upon PotosI

silver for its survival.

Despite its importance to the Black Legend-White Legend
controversy, the mita has not received the careful

historical analysis it requires. 2

Too often modern essays

have merely parroted the contemporary debates waged during
the colonial period.

Only a few objective articles have

been written on the mita, and although some larger studies
have considered the system, no monograph has yet been

produced on the subject.

Modern study of the mita began with Jorge Basadre's
19 37 article,

"El Rggimen de la Mita."

Basadre scanned

the history of the system from 1573 to 1812 in forty short

pages.

The PotosI mita, moreover, was only one of many he

discussed, for mitas were also established for other

enterprises that required large contingents
of Indian
labor.

While it was a pioneering study, therefore,

Basadre's article could offer only a glimpse of
the
institution at Potosi."^

Basadre made a number of very important points.

He

argued, for example, that the mita was merely one of many

factors that contributed to the depopulation of Upper Peru

during the colonial period.

He also demonstrated that

Toledo did not create the mita, but institutionalized
labor practices which were extant upon his arrival in Peru.

Finally, Basadre showed a keen appreciation for the

difference between law and reality in his discussion of the
services the Indians performed for encomenderos

.

But when

he described the PotosI mita, Basadre's argument became

rigid and considerably weaker.

Evidence from the sixteenth,

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was interspersed,
implying that the mita

'

s

form was static.

Basadre relied

almost exclusively upon the Recopilaci6n de las leyes of
168 0 and viceregal memoirs for his information on the

mita.

The use of those official sources resulted in a

sketch that was more of a blueprint than a portrait. 4

Many of the shortcomings of Basadre's "Regimen" were
overcome by Alberto Crespo Rodas in his 1955 article, "La
'Mita' de Potosi."

Crespo was the first to limit his study

to the mita at Potosi, and he further confined his scope to

the institution during the seventeenth century.

Using

manuscript documentation from the Archive General
de Indias
(AGI)

in Sevilla, Crespo began to add flesh to
the "bare

bones" description that Basadre had presented some
eighteen

years earlier.^

Crespo concluded that Basadre had been correct in

asserting that the population decline in Upper Peru was not
caused by mitayo death in the mines at Potosl.

Instead, he

argued that the mita contributed to the social and economic

disruption of the region.

Aware that this view might be

construed by some as an apology for the system, Crespo was
quick to point to the abuses
endemic to the mita

.

— corporal

and financial

He argued, however, that the Indians

did not tolerate mistreatment and non-payment of their
wages, but fled from the mita, leaving their caciques to

bear the brunt of abuse.

Crespo therefore introduced the

concept that the Indians were active opponents of the mita,
rather than passive victims of it.

Crespo has said that his research base was

minimal;

that he used only enough documentation to suggest the form
of the seventeenth century mita

.

Nevertheless, his

investigation of the de facto mita, including the means
used by the Indians to protect themselves from abuses, was
an important contribution.

The Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress on

Mining (Le6n, 1970) included many valuable short studies on
the mita, or subjects closely related to it.

Of particular

interest are Alberto Crespo's article on the
recruitment
of mitayos Juan Pgrez de Tudela
y Bueso's essay
on the

;

moral issues raised by the mita; and Ram6n
Ezquerra

Abadla's survey of the problems that plagued the
system
during the eighteenth century.^
Crespo's study reinforced the concepts that he had set
forth in his 1955 article.

His comments on the provinces

from which the mitayos came, however, added a little more
detail to that earlier description.

Crespo noted that the

provinces included in the seventeenth century mita were all

altiplano regions, sharing Potosl's high altitude and cold
climate.

He argued that their selection by Viceroy Toledo

had been based on a contemporary understanding that changes
in altitude had very negative effects on the Indians'

health.

9

This would suggest that Toledo designed the mita

with an eye toward minimizing its impact on the Indian
population.

Juan P§rez de Tudela differed sharply with that
conclusion.

He accused the Spanish crown of premeditated

cruelty in subjecting the Indians to mita service at
Potosl.

Focusing on the sixteenth century, P^rez argued

that the demographic disaster in the Caribbean should have

been sufficient to convince the crown that mining was

deadly for the Indians

.

Forced Indian labor was permitted

in Peru, he said, because the crown pushed aside questions
of conscience in favor of riches.

Hapsburg kings merely

pretended innocence by emitting lofty
proclamations for the
conservation of the Indians, and later decrying
any failure

to comply with their "wishes."

Meanwhile, P§rez argued,

they assured non-compliance with their
proclamations by
forfeiting real decision-making to local government

officials; they knew that their representatives
in Peru
would yield to the pressures exerted upon them
by the

mining interests there.
Pgrez de Tudela's article is an example of the recent

studies that have failed to escape the polemics of the

colonial debate over the mita.

He is heir to a long line

of quasi-historians who have argued that there was a

conspiracy between the crown and its colonists to profit
from the extermination of the Indians.

The conspiracy

approach is unrealistic, for reasons that will become
apparent below, and has been attacked with equal hyperbole
by David Pereyra and others ;

Such studies are not the

products of objective investigations, and should not be
the bases of future scholarship.

They do, however, suggest

topics worthy of greater attention:

a)

the relative power

of the crown and colonists to affect local practice;

b)

the

gap between legal ideals and reality, and the reasons for
it; and c)

the relationship between government officials in

Spain and those in America.
Ram6n Ezquerra Abadla touched upon these topics in his
survey of the problems that were characteristic of the

eighteenth century mita.

In a prefatory discussion of the

1600s, he described the mid-century battle
between Hapsburg

officials and the azogueros (mine and mill
owners) at PotosI
over abuses that had appeared in the mita—
mistreatment of

^^^^Y^s and indios de faltriguera (money that the Indians
sent to PotosI to hire substitutes in their place,
but used

by the azogueros for their own purposes)

.

Ezquerra blamed

the deterioration of the mita on the effects of time and
the continual exploitation of the cerro.

The azogueros

,

he

said, had mistreated mitayos and engaged in fraud in a vain

attempt to protect their profits.

The Indians, in turn, had

responded to the increased pressure on them by running
away

12

According to Ezquerra, a conflict over the mita was
also waged within the ranks of Hapsburg government.

Most

officials believed that production at PotosI had fallen,
and abuses had appeared, because of mismanagement; that the

mita and production could both be restored to earlier levels
if government administration of the system were improved.

By the mid-seventeenth century, however, other officials
had come to argue that the mita was fatally flawed, or

obsolete, and should be abolished.

The most serious effort

to extinguish the mita, led by the Viceroy Conde de Lemos
in 1670, was defeated by the crown's reluctance to live

without PotosI silver, and its belief that the system could
be revitalized.

An attempt to regenerate the mita followed.

8

under the direction of the Viceroy Duque de la
Palata.

it

too was unsuccessful, overcome by the opposition
of

economic interests that were hurt by Palata 's reforms
and
the lack of a consensus within the government

.

'"^

Clearly,

there was no colonist-government conspiracy to kill off
the

Indians

While there has been no monograph on the mita
been treated within larger studies.

,

it has

One of the earliest

was Gwendolin Ballantine Cobb's dissertation, "Potosi and

Huancavelica.

Economic Bases of Peru, 1545-1640"

(University of California, Berkeley, 1947)

.

Cobb briefly

considered the mita systems at both mining centers within
the larger context of silver and mercury production.

Because she conducted her research during World War II,
Cobb had to rely entirely upon secondary literature and

published primary sources.

As a summary of that material

her dissertation is useful, but it is uncomfortably vague
at many junctures and includes some basic mistakes.

For

example, Cobb said that "because of the weight of

unaccustomed heavy mine work the native population
declined."

14

This is undoubtedly true, but the degree to

which it is correct, and other factors that contributed to
depopulation, should have been noted.

She also said that

the 1578 repartimiento de la mita for Potosi was Toledo's
"''^
first, when it was actually his third.

These weaknesses

are understandable given the early date of the dissertation

and the circumstances under which it
was written,

it is

unfortunate that they were not corrected before
the work
was published in Bolivia in 1977. '^
One of the better, longer, works on the
question of
Indian labor at Potosl is Garrick Wilson Holmes'
M.A.

thesis, "The Indian Miner in Colonial Potosl.
a Study of Urbanization in the Andes"
1959)

.

Sketch for

(Columbia University,

As an anthropologist. Holmes was concerned with the

reasons why a mining proletariat did not develop at Potosl,
and why Indians there did not work any harder than their

immediate survival required.
"^inqa

(volunteer)

He explored both mita and

labor in his search for the reason why

the latter did not supplant the former.

Holmes' focus was

on urbanization and acculturation as phenomena, but he

conceded that both processes would eventually have to be
studied within a chronological framework:

".

.

.

the

paradoxes of the process of Indian acculturation in Potosi
can be resolved only by relating that process to the

general historical evolution of this remarkable city." 17
Holmes' thesis, like Cobb's dissertation, was based on

secondary and published primary sources.

It was written,

however, with unusual imagination and insight.

One is

especially struck by his consideration of the Indian as an
active element; building upon the lead of Alberto Crespo,
Holmes argued that the Indians were knowledgeable of the
value of silver, adult and quick to exploit economic

opportunities or evade oppressive obligations.

His fresh

approach extended to the issue of population
decline as
well.
Holmes asked why the provinces failed to meet
their
mita quotas, not whether the mita had caused their
depopulation.

New questions always spark new answers, and

his investigation resulted in a long list of reasons;
the

mita was only a minor factor among many.

He postulated,

furthermore, that the lines of causality between the

failure to comply with mita quotas and depopulation ran in

both directions at the same

time."*"^

Regrettably, Holmes did not pursue the questions he

raised in his thesis in a doctoral dissertation.

His

little-known and under-utilized study was, nevertheless,
an important contribution to our understanding of Indian

labor at Potosi.

It is now the historian's responsibility

to investigate the themes and subjects the anthropologist

has identified for him.

There has been no monograph on the mita largely because
of the amount of source material available on the subject.

One of the authors who might have been expected to write

such a work is Alberto Crespo.

In his 1970 article,

however, he said that the volume of documentation was

simply too vast for him to consider a full-fledged assault
on the mita.

Crespo lamented that he would have to content

himself with accomplishing a little at a time.

19

Another historian from whom a monograph has been

11

expected is Marie Helmer.

Over the years Helmer has

published a number of documents and brief
articles about
PotosI, and she planned to write a comprehensive
work on
the mita.

Her outline proposed a thorough investigation

of the system for the entire colonial period.

The promised

study has not appeared; the enormity of the task
has

probably prevented its completion
Silvio Zavala has spent a lifetime compiling notes and

collecting documents on Indian labor in colonial Peru, and
he has published many books and articles on various aspects
of the Spanish-Indian relationship.

During the last three

years his research notes on forced labor in Peru have

appeared in a three volume work entitled El servicio
personal de los indios en el Peru

,

with one tome for each

of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries

Zavala has drawn together many useful sources from Spain,

Peru and elsewhere in an exhaustive collection of
"

extractos

.

"

The volumes do not represent the long-awaited

monograph, however, but rather a chronological presentation
of notes, with commentary and synthesis kept to a minimum.
The result is a hybrid

secondary source
tool

— something

— which

between a primary and a

is 'an extremely valuable research
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The seventeenth century volume holds some traps for the

unsuspecting investigator.

Zavala has employed a few

anonymous, undated, memoriales and relaciones in his section

on the 1601 and 1609 c§dulas that forbade
Indian personal
service.
The originals of some of those documents
are in
the Archivo General de Indias, dated and
signed fifty years
after the two cgdulas were issued.
Scholars who use the

Zavala volumes must, therefore, take care to check
the

ultimate source of the information they employ, especially

when the document in question has been dated by context.
The need for a monograph on the mita

,

and for more

study of all aspects of Potosl's history, was clear in
D. A.

Brading and Harry E. Cross' 1972 article, "Colonial

Silver Mining:

Mexico and Peru."^^

Brading and Cross

applied Mexican-derived concepts to the Peruvian case to

demonstrate our relative ignorance of the latter example,
and issued a clarion call for more research in the Andean
area

Brading and Cross were puzzled why repartimiento labor

mining was replaced by volunteer labor in Mexico after the
middle of the seventeenth century, but continued at Potosi.
They hypothesized that the reason probably lay with the

differences in geography, geology and the nature of the
Indians who lived in the two realms.

The authors also

noted that volunteer Indian labor did gravitate to Potosi
in the period before Toledo, and identified the mita as a

state subsidy that permitted silver production in Peru to
soar beyond that in Mexico.
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Like Holmes, however, they

could not understand why a class of Indian miners failed to
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develop at Potosi.^^
In the ten years since the Brading and Cross article,

Potosi and the mita have attracted the attention of a small

group of investigators.

Many of the themes suggested by

that essay, and earlier studies, have received in-depth

analysis, as scholars have begun to exploit the wealth of

documentation that is available.

Research has been greatly

facilitated by the appearance of bibliographic and archival
aids by Gunnar Mendoza L., Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodriguez,

Rene Arze Aguirre, Mario Chac6n Torres, Josi Vazquez

Machicado and others

.

These guides have been complemented

by recent editions of contemporary works by Bartolom^

ArzSns de Orsua y Vela, Luis Capoche, Juan de Solorzano
Pereira and Vicente Canete y Domlnguez. 27
In their approach to the manuscript documentation,

investigators have chosen either to write limited studies
based on a small part of the source material, or broad
essays based on a sampling of sources.

An example of the

first kind of study is the tesis de licenciatura by Teresa

Canedo-Arguelles Fabrega, "Efectos de Potosi en la
estructura de una provincia mitaya:
del siglo XVII"

Pacajes a mediados

(Universidad de Sevilla, 1976)

.

Using

manuscripts from the Escribania section of the Archive
General de Indias, Canedo-Arguelles delved directly into
the question of the mita

'

s

impact on the obligated provinces.

Like Crespo, she concluded that Indian flight, not death in

1
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the mines, was the principal effect of the
Potosi mita on
Pacajes.
Indian flight, in turn, caused economic and
social

disruption, and led to fundamental changes in the
political

institutions of the province.
Of special interest is Canedo-Arguelles

the caciques

'

role in the mita

.

'

description of

The azogueros held them

responsible for delivering mitayos to Potosi, both in
person and in silver.

The latter form of service, she

said, grew out of the fines levied by the azogueros when

caciques proved unable to meet their quotas in persons.

Mita service in silver was caused, in part, by the

depopulation of the province, for which the mita was

partially responsible. 29

In the case of Pacajes, therefore,

Holmes' suggestion that falling compliance with mita quotas

and depopulation were linked by causal ties in both

directions seems to have been true.

Canedo-Arguelles offered her thesis as one case study
from which questions and themes could be drawn for future

investigations.

She noted that more such limited studies

would be necessary to construct a mosaic portrait of the
mita as a whole.

An example of the second kind of study is NicolSs

Sanchez-Albornoz
Peru.

3

'

1978 volume, Indies ^ tributes en el Alto

The Potosi mita was discussed only briefly, but

the author made a valuable contribution by incorporating

source material from pleitos

,

inf ormaciones and testimonies

in which Indians were witnesses.

However altered by

translators and the form of questioning,
these sources are
the closest we will come to the
Indians' own story of life
under the mita and similar labor
requirements
One of
.

the most important sources was included
by SSnchez-Albornoz
as an appendix:
the questioning of capitanes enteradores
de la mita in 1690 by the Conde de Canillas,
Corregidor de
Potosi.^^

SSnchez-Albornoz approached the issue of depopulation
in Upper Peru from a quantitative angle.

He compared the

results of the 1573 and 1683 general censi conducted by

Francisco de Toledo and the Duque de la Palata,
respectively.

Ten provinces were included in both counts,

and SSnchez-Albornoz
a net

'

comparison of the two censi suggested

population loss within them of 40 per cent, which he

considered modest.

He said his findings lent credence to

Noble David Cook's conclusion that the southeastern section
of modern Peru, which included some of the more populous
niita

provinces, suffered less population loss during the

colonial period than the remainder of the realm.

"^^

S^nchez-

Albornoz' quantitative investigation shared the problems

inherent in numerical studies.

Most importantly, he could

not adequately compensate for Indian migration within or

without the ten provinces.

Fortunately, he understood the

limitations of his comparison, and cautioned the reader that
his findings were highly tentative.
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The studies described here have all touched
upon the
PotosI mita or some aspect of it. Most have
been concerned
with the demographic ramifications of the system.
They

have also suggested a number of themes worthy of
future

attention.

For one, it seems evident that the mita did not

perform as it was designed, but changed with time,
interacting with developments at PotosI and in the
provinces.

Second, there was no conspiracy between the

Hapsburg government and the colonists to exterminate the
Indians.

On the contrary, the colonists and the

government competed with one another, and within their
ranks, for control of Indian labor.

The Indians, moreover,

were as active as any group in protecting their interests.

With the number of interested groups involved in the
mita, the importance of considering the system both at

PotosI and in the provinces, and the amount of documentation

available on the subject, it is clear that no one study
could adequately address all of the issues involved for
the entire colonial period.

Indeed, the most valuable

studies to date have been those that have limited their
scope and their conclusions to the materials upon which
they were based.

Fortunately, a number of investigations are either

currently in progress or have recently been completed.
Peter Bakewell is engaged in an overview of Potosi from
1545 to 1650, and will discuss the mita in an extensive
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chapter on Indian labor.

Brian M. Evans is applying his

skills as a demographer to an investigation
of the general
census of 1683, and the concomitant issues
of depopulation
and Indian migration.
Enrique Tandeter has just completed
a dissertation on the late-eighteenth
century mita, from an
economic perspective.^^ Catherine J. Julien is
involved

with the "Re-use of Inca Recruitment Practices in
the
Potosi Mita."^^ Finally, Ann Zulawski has begun
work on a
dissertation that will consider competition for Indian
labor between PotosI and other sections of the Peruvian

economy during the seventeenth century.

These studies,

by scholars from various fields, employing their respective
skills, give promise that a mosaic history of the Potosl

mita will soon be available.
Goals

,

Sources and Methods

Where does this dissertation fit into the mosaic?

I

hope that it will serve as the framework upon which the

pieces for the seventeenth century will be hung, or at
least as a guide to how they should be arranged.

At the

same time, because this study covers a large segment of the

colonial period

— it

includes a background chapter on the

sixteenth century as well

— it

represents the first monograph

on the Potosl mita.

My research began with two very general goals:

determine what the mita was really like; and

b)

a)

to

to discover
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the role of the Hapsburg government
in its history.

The

seventeenth century was chosen for a
pair of reasons. The
first was the quantity and quality
of available source
material. Eight legajos of expedientes
on the mita, from

the period 1633-1700, were available on
microfilm in the

University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Library
(AGI, Charcas
266-273)

Other major collections, principally the

records of the Audiencia de Charcas and the Cabildo
de
PotosI, were accessible in the Archive Nacional
de Bolivia
(ANB)
o
Sucre.

and the Biblioteca Nacional de Bolivia (BNB) in
42

Manuscript materials were also consulted in the

Archive Hist6rico de PotosI (AHP)
la Nacian, Buenos Aires

Nacion, Lima (AGNP)

Lima (BNP)
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.

;

(AGN)

;

;

the Archive General de

the Archive General de la

and the Biblioteca Nacional del Peru,

Not only was there a sufficient amount of

documentation, it was diverse enough to permit a

multi-dimensional investigation.

The microfilm was

particularly strong with regard to official correspondence,
and it revealed the processes by which government policy was

determined.

The Archive Nacional de Bolivia held similar

material for the period 1600-1633, and the Archive General
de la Naci6n, Buenos Aires for the mid-1640s.

American archives also contained the pleitos

,

The South

testimonies

and infermaciones that provided insights into the mita as it

actually functioned, not as it was intended to function.
Silvio Zavala's volumes were another important source of
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information, for he summarized documents
from the
Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid that I
would not otherwise
have had available.
The second reason this dissertation
is limited to
the seventeenth century is my desire to
present the

multi-dimensional view of the mita that the
documentation
permits. To attempt such a study for the entire
colonial
period was unrealistic, given the amount of
material,
so

the period for which the sources were strongest
was

selected.

The time frame— a century—is still large

enough to allow the formulation of general conclusions
about the PotosI mita.
I

have employed qualitative methodology almost

exclusively.

Quantitative history serves best to test

the traditional view of a subject, and to raise new

questions.
to modify,

written.

In this instance there was no traditional view
for the qualitative history had yet to be

Moreover, it became clear very early in my

research that the quantitative data produced during the
seventeenth century were highly biased.

The groups and the

officials who produced the statistical material manipulated
it to enhance their own positions.

The biases of those

who produced the figures had to be determined before the
data could be used.

The quantitative evidence is abundant,

and available, and when it is used carefully it will add to

our knowledge of the mita.
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But the qualitative history

had to come first, and although it
may be out of fashion,
it was the goal of the present
dissertation.
As the preceding discussion suggests,

I

hold no

illusions that this study will be the final
word on the
PotosI mita.
I intend to continue working on
the subject,

including use of the quantitative data.

I

expect, however,

that this thesis will prove useful to other
investigators

who are interested in a particular period in PotosI
's
history, or some aspect of the mita

.

I

have, therefore,

taken great pains to document my sources.
possible,

I

Whenever

have included a summary of the manuscript

materials in the notes (see Table

1

abbreviations employed in them)

The summaries are based,

.

for a list of the

in the case of the ANB and BNB,' on the MC catalogue

(described in Table

1)

;

those for the AGNP, AHP and BNP

are from the card catalogues in those institutions; and

those for the AGI and AGN are taken directly from the

documents themselves (usually a secretary's abstract, on
the envelope).

It is my hope that these citations will

aid other researchers in locating primary source materials
for their own investigations.

The notes are an important part of this study, but they
are also very long and detailed.

I

have chosen, therefore,

to include them at the end of each chapter.

The casual

reader will not be distracted from the narrative, but the

more interested, or doubting, reader will still have them
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close at hand.
The chapters that follow are divided
by chronological
period, so that the metamorphosis of the
mita may be
followed, as well as the Hapburg government's
response to
its changing form.
A summary is provided at the end of
each chapter. Chapter VIII ("Conclusions") will
offer

general comments on the mita as a whole, and discuss
the

implications of this dissertation for the history of
PotosI and of the Hapsburg dynasty's efforts to
administer
its American colonies.

.

.

.

..

. ,
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TABLE

1

ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THE CHAPTER
NOTES
AGI

AGN

Archive General de Indias, Sevilla,
Spain.
Archive General de la Naci6n, Buenos
Aires,
Argentina.

'

AGNP

Archive General de la NaciSn, Lima, Peru.
C

AHP

Archive Hist6rice de Petes!
CR

ANB

Petesi, Belivia

,

Cajas Reales.

Archive Nacienal de Belivia, Sucre, Belivia.

ACh.LA
C

CRC
EC

M
RC

BNB

Cuaderno.

Audiencia de
Audiencia de
Audiencia de
Cepiader
Audiencia de
Minas
Audiencia de

Charcas
Charcas.
Charcas.

Libres de acuerdos
Cerrespondencia
C^dulas reales.

Charcas.

Expedientes.

Charcas.

Reales c§dulas.

.

Biblieteca Nacienal de Belivia, Sucre, Belivia.

CPLA
MSS

Celeccienes particulares de manuscrites
Riick, Cabilde de Potesi.
Libres de
acuerdes
Celeccienes particulares de manuscrites,
Riick, Manuscrites de Pedre Vicente
Canete

BNP

Biblieteca Nacienal del Peru, Lima, Peru

MC

Mendoza L. Gunnar.
"Gula de documentes en el
Archive Nacienal de Belivia y la Biblieteca
Nacienal de Belivia para el estudie de la
mineria en Belivia durante el coleniaje, anos
1549-1825." Unpublished typescript. Sucre, 1962

MOM

Mendeza L., Gunnar.
"Gula de decumentes en el
Archive Nacienal de Belivia y la Biblieteca
Nacienal de Bolivia para el estudie de la mane
de ebra minera durante el coleniaje, anos
1549-1825." Unpublished typescript. Sucre, 1962

,
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exaggeration in general; and on
paaes
pages 22
22 and 25 he comments on the tendencies
of the
azogueros in particular. Marie Helmer,
"Un tipo social^^t^^^:" 85-86, says that miners habitually
uax^y
lamlnt^r?h
lamented their condition.

.

CHAPTER
BACKGROUND:

II

THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

Before embarking on a discussion of the
mita in the
seventeenth century, it is important to understand
why the
system was established, what function it was
designed to
perform, and how it actually worked during the
sixteenth
century.

The original mita is more than a point of

departure; it also serves as a backdrop against which
the

changes of the subsequent one hundred years may be kept
in perspective.

When Francisco de Toledo founded the Potosl mita in
1573, it reflected the realities of the time.

For a brief

period the system served, together with a new technology,
a

massive capital investment and an abundance of high grade

ore, to cause a production boom at Potosl.

Thereafter the

realities of silver mining changed for the worse, and the
nature of the mita began to change.

By the turn of the

seventeenth century it was already very different from the
system that Toledo had established twenty-seven years

earlier

29
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Origins

When silver mining began at Potosl in
1545, the Spanish
experience in America was already fifty years
old.

in the

Caribbean, Mexico, and then Peru, conquest
had quickly
given way to a struggle between the crown
and colonists for
control of Indian labor. The Indies had proven
more easily

conquered than colonized; royal sovereignty was more
easily
claimed than exercised
Spanish kings and their officials had rewarded the

victorious conguistadores with grants in encomienda

.

The

encomenderos received royal tribute in exchange for their
military, religious and jurisdictional supervision of the
natives.

In the Caribbean they had forced the Indians to

work in their mining ventures.

The crown responded in 1512

with the Laws of Burgos, restricting such activities, but
the royal prohibitions had little effect.

Excessive work

combined with epidemic disease and other factors to
decimate the native population. 2

With the conquest of Mexico, and later Peru, the Spanish
crown was provided with another chance at colonization.

Chastened by the Caribbean fiasco, and determined not to
repeat it, Charles

I

issued a royal cedula in 1526 that

prohibited forced Indian labor in mining, "because our
principal intention has always been, and continues to be,
that the Indians be spared such work so that they might be

^

.
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conserved

...

and converted to our Catholic faith.

Royal protection of the Indians was
based on more than
humanitarian concern for their survival and
their souls.
Legal restrictions on the encomenderos
use of the Indians
were also meant to protect the crown's
economic and
'

political interests.

Indian labor was the key to economic

gain in the colonies, and the encomenderos
were busily

establishing themselves as feudal lords, with the
Indians
as their serfs."* when Charles I identified
the Indians

as

his free christian vassals he hoped to discredit
and

frustrate the encomenderos

'

efforts to monopolize access

to their labor.

The crown was isolated temporally as well as

geographically by the Atlantic Ocean.

It lacked both

armed force and the ability to respond to

events quickly.

The use of legal sanctions was one of the few means at its

disposal in the battle with the encomenderos

.

Another

method it employed was the encouragement of divisions
between soldados and encomenderos
ecclesiastical interests.

,

and between secular and

Intra-colonist conflict meant

recourse to the king's courts, and a role for royal
officials
Thus, despite their ineffectiveness, c^dulas concerning

Indian labor continued to appear.

In 1536 Charles

I

reiterated his earlier stand on the treatment of the Indians
in his orders for the Adelantado of Peru, Francisco

H

^

Pizarro.^

Pizarro had warned, a year before,
that the
encomenderos would not give up the
services performed for
them by the Indians, and bluntly
suggested that royal
efforts to enforce earlier edicts would
lead to armed
resistance.^ The King was not disuaded.
His Queen
encouraged the Bishop of Cuzco to champion
the Indians'

cause, and when Crist6bal Vaca de Castro
was sent to

govern Peru in 154 0, Charles

I

ordered him to ensure that

the Indians did not work in the mines against
their will.

A year later Vaca de Castro received yet another
directive confirming the contents of the 1526 cedula

,

and

urging him to enforce that order.
Royal orders against forced Indian labor in the mines

did not mean that the crown wanted mining to stop.

It was

very much interested in the continuation of mining
operations, for it received a percentage of production in
the quinto real

(royal fifth)

Thus, Vaca de Castro was

also instructed:
In those towns that are under our control, where
there are gold or silver mines, you are to determine,
with the governor and other government officials, how
best to exploit them, in a manner that will enrich
the royal treasury without burdening the natives.
This should be accomplished with all appropriate
diligence, as it is a matter of great concern to the
royal cause.

Charles

I

had a penchant for lofty goals and universal

dicta, but his directives were more than idealistic dreams.

They were also part of his government mechanism. 12

Because
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he was so far from Mexico
and Peru, Charles could not
hope
to rule them as he did
Castilla.^^ Leaving the day-to-day
decisions to his representatives
in America-and providing
them with the requisite authority-was
necessary in a

pragmatic sense.

Because he was removed from a direct

administrative role, the King had to make
his orders more
forceful, even exaggerated, so they
would have an impact
even after they were modified by local
government officials.
In many cases, therefore, the original
cgdulas took on the
outward appearance of inconsistency; orders
for the
protection of the Indians were issued concurrently

with

orders for increased mining output. '"'^

Juggling these diverse orders was the responsibility
of
government officials in America. Their task was to
determine the true intentions of their king, and act
accordingly.

For Vaca de Castro and his successors in

Peru, it was clear that protection of the Indians was

secondary to increased mineral production.

The problem

was how to work the mines without forced Indian labor,

either by some means of persuasion short of force, or

through the use of imported Black slaves. "'"^

Vaca de Castro

interpreted his orders to mean that encomienda Indians
could voluntarily work in the mines of encomenderos other
than their own, as long as they were well-treated and

received food and shelter.
The New Laws of 1542 were another attempt by the crown

to limit the exploitation
of the Indians by Spanish

colonists.

Indian personal service-tribute
obligat ions
met in labor— for encomenderos
was banned outright. The
encomenderos had come to enjoy the
services of Indians in
their homes, while traveling and
in any number of economi c
enterprises. The language contained
in the New Laws wa s
bold and straightforward, a sign that
the crown was
worried about the advances made by the
encomenderos and
aware that its previous directives had
been ineffective.
As with other legislation, the enforcement
of the New Laws
was left to government officials stationed
in
Lima.^"^

By the time the New Laws arrived in Peru,
Potosi had

been discovered, in 1544.

The new mining center presented

a unique set of circumstances which required
administration

tailored to its realities; lessons learned elsewhere would
have little meaning there.

Potosi differed from other

mining zones primarily in geography and climate.

Situated

4,000 meters above sea level on the Andean altiplano

,

the

cerro was 1,000 kilometers from any large pre-hispanic

population center, and more than twice that far from Lima.
The countryside was barren, with little vegetation for

twenty-five kilometers in any direction."''^

Water was

scarce nine months of the year and torrential rains plagued
the remaining three.

thunderstorms

— was

Extreme weather

commonplace.
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— cold,

heat, wind and

Indeed, the environment

was so inhospitable that had it not been for the discovery

.

of silver, PotosI would
have remained a desert. ^0

Geographical and meterological
extremes were overcome
because the cerro held the largest,
purest, silver lode in
history. 21 The Spaniards' craving
for the metal was so
keen that they were drawn to
Potosi like bees to honey. ^2
Indians arrived in even larger
numbers; they were no less
appreciative of the value of silver.
A year after its
discovery, a boomtown at the base of
PotosI held 170
Spaniards and 3,000 Indians. Two years
later, when the
villa of PotosI was officially founded,
it residents
numbered 14,000 (the population of a European
city of the
day)

For its sustenance, Potosi depended upon
outlying valley
regions, such as Chuquisaca.
Goods brought in from 100 or
150 kilometers away commanded astronomical prices,
but the

profits of the early years made them nonetheless
affordable.
As the villa

's

population grew toward 100,000 souls,

transport and agriculture developed into lucrative support
industries

24

During the early years at Potosi, the Indians

dominated every phase of silver production, as they did at
Porco.

25

Spanish efforts at smelting failed; their

European methods were frustrated by the altitude.
Conversely, Indian technicians using the pre-hispanic

guayra (wind oven) skillfully coaxed molten silver from
the rich tacana ore. 26

At one point there were as many as

36

27
15,000 guayras in operation/^

in part, by

Indian labor was provided,

yanaconas— Indian artisans who had been

displaced by the conquest and were
free to come to PotosI.^S
Hatunrunas -rural Indians who provided
personal service in
lieu of tribute— worked in the mines
as well.^^ other
Indians were sent by their caciques or
encomenderos to earn
enough silver to pay their village's
tribute quota.
This
practice was eventually halted when the
Indians failed to
return home after their period of service
was completed.
Indian laborers at PotosI usually worked for
Spanish

mine-owners in exchange for a percentage of the silver
they
produced.
The Spaniards' contribution to production
was

therefore limited to their legal ownership of the mines,
and their determination to profit by them.^"^

Legal title

was no small factor, however, for in practice only the

Spaniards were able to fend off legal challenges and protect
their claims against interlopers in the courts.
The inhabitants of Potosl would come to be known not

only for their number, but for their bellicosity.

Many who

came into the silver producing region were soldados who had

not received an encomienda and had no other enterprise from

which to derive their livelihood.

These individuals

encouraged differences between rival groups of miners,

hoping to spark an armed confrontation during which they
could rob and plunder. 35

Developments at PotosI, and in Peru generally, ran

counter to the letter and the intent
of the New Laws. An
overzealous Viceroy Blasco NQfiez de
Vela (1544-1546) tried,
nevertheless, to implement them without
any modification
whatsoever. His actions provoked an
armed insurrection in
1546 led by Gonzalo Pizarro.
The Viceroy was killed, and
the realm lapsed into two years of
civil war.^^ PotosI
was plundered continually by factions
needing
funds;

Gonzalo Pizarro's field commander, Francisco
Carvajal,
took 700,000 pesos in just one raid.^^

m

the end, the

royalist forces were able to quell the uprising, and

Pizarro and his comrades were executed.
Peace was restored under the direction of Pedro de La
Gasca, President of the Audiencia de Lima.^^

Hapsburg

officials had weathered the civil war, but they now had to
cope with the aftermath.

The Indians had suffered death

and displacement, their agricultural activities had been

disrupted, and mange was epidemic among their llamas.
The condition of Peru demanded a cautious balancing of

royal intentions and local realities with regard to the

encomienda and Indian labor in the mines.

Unbridled

execution of a crown order had led to violence once, and

might well again.
La Gasca sent Juan Polo de Ondegardo to Charcas in 1549
to establish tribute quotas and do whatever he could to

limit the domination of the Indians by the encomenderos 40
.

The President ordered Polo to enforce the crown's order

that no encomienda Indians be
sent to the mines, and that
those who were already at PotosI
be sent home/^ when he
arrived in the villa. Polo found
seventy- two contingents
of sixty-five to seventy-five
hatunrunas working in the
cerro, most of them from the
altiplano
response to La
Gasca's order that they return home,
the Indians claimed
that they were not working at PotosI
against their will,
and that they would not return home.
Their caciques balked
when Polo suggested that they had been
manipulated by their
encomenderos in the formulation of their answers.
The
caciques argued that the Indians were working
at Potosi to
raise the money to pay their tribute, and that
they were
.

m

much better off than their counterparts at home/^
In 1550, the crown reiterated its order that the

Indians were not to serve at PotosI against their will,
and
that no encomienda Indians were to be sent to the mining
centers.

La Gasca had returned to Spain to argue against

the earlier cgdulas banning personal service.

Viceroy

Antonio de Mendoza (1551-1552) realized that enforcement of
such orders was virtually impossible.

He delayed action on

the 1550 edict until he could send his son Francisco to

Potosi to investigate the situation there, and then to

Spam

to argue against its execution.

When the Viceroy fell ill in 1552, the Audiencia de Lima

decided to comply with the crown's 1550 order.

It drew up a

decree and presented it to Mendoza for his signature.

He

refused, noting that La Gasca had gone
to Spain to argue
against such measures; until the crown
responded to his

positions, the Viceroy contended, no action
should be taken
Despite Mendoza's opposition, the Audiencia
published its
order, and just as the Viceroy had feared,
the realm

responded with overwhelming opposition.

Francisco

Hernandez Gir6n led a short-lived revolt that ended in
the deaths of 500 Spaniards and 2,000 Indians/"^

Antonio de Mendoza died in July of 1552, and the

Audiencia de Lima assumed command in his stead.

Shortly

thereafter it received another cedula ordering an end to

personal service, but having learned its lesson, the

Audiencia chose to suspend the order.

In 1554 the crown

conceded defeat and retracted its previous directives
against personal service. 45
The goals included in the New Laws and the other

cgdulas were not discarded.

They were put aside until

some future opportunity made their realization possible.

This shift in the crown's position is clear in the

instructions it provided the Marques de Cafiete in 1555.
As the new Viceroy of Peru, Cahete was ordered to do

whatever he could to end personal service and Indian labor
in the mines, but he was not to go so far as to provoke

another rebellion.
The crown yielded ground in other ways.

In 1551 it

agreed to allow volunteer Indian labor in the mines, as

.
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long as no encomendero -miner
employed his own Indians.
Each
encomendero was to divide his
Indians' tribute requirement
among their caciques on a
pro-rated basis. The caciques
would then muster the Indians
necessary to raise the silver
to pay their percentage.
They, or their representatives,
would take the Indians to Potosl,
where they would extract
the ore, refine it in their guayras
and return home with
^"^
the silver.
,

This alteration of royal policy may
seem minor, but it
carried important ramifications. First,
the crown permitted
Indian labor in mining for the first time,
overcoming its

earlier objections based on the Caribbean
experience.
Second, Indians working in the mines to meet
their tribute

quotas were no longer officially performing personal
service
and were thereby removed from the struggle between
the crown
and the encomenderos

.

Third, it was now the caciques

'

responsibility to force the Indians to work in the mines,
should force be required.

Finally, the crown had given

ground and thus would bargain from

a

weaker position in the

future

Another royal concession came in

a 1552 cedula that

permitted forced labor in activities which were in the
common interest.

This determination was based on reports

from Peru that the Indians were the natural enemies of
work.

The text of the order read:

Iridians of that province
[Peru] are prone
lr.\r'
to
vice and do not care to work.
Therefore they
lack means and are poor. Be
certain that

lAdian
officials perform their duties; that
those Indians
who have fields work them, others
are to be
compelled to work in public activities
in the
countryside and the cities, but only
with justice
P^^-^^on that the work shall be
'

moSrate!49

Mining was not included among the activities
in which the
Indians could be made to work, but since
the 1551 cedula
had already accepted Indian labor in
the mines—albeit with
various restrictions— once service in the
mines could be
construed to be in the common interest, then it
would take
only a minor shift to extend the 1552 order to
mineral
production.
Two other developments in the decade from 1555 to
1566
are important to note.

The first is the ascension to the

throne, in 1556, of Phillip ii.

The new King was more

concerned with royal finances than Charles

I

had been, and

less tolerant of those who questioned his sovereignty.

Charles may have allowed Bartolome de las Casas to publish
his Very Brief Account because of its usefulness in the

battle with the encomenderos

,

but it would only have

appeared while he was on the throne.
Second, the Audiencia de Charcas (also known as the

Audiencia de La Plata) was founded in 1559.

A high court

of appeals was placed within 170 kilometers of Potosi, the

realm's economic center of gravity.

With the Audiencia

's

establishment, the Corregidor de La Plata was transfered to

42

Potosi, bringing the villa under
direct royal administration
for the first time.
La Plata's dominion over Potosi
was
lessened, however, when the villa
's residents purchased
their administrative independence from
the crown for

79,000 assayed pesos

.

These developments were important because
Potosi silver
production began to suffer severe problems
during the
1560s, particularly from 1566 forward.

Phillip ii's

approach to forced labor, the location of his
government
officials, and his concern for royal revenue were
all to

affect the government's response to the production
crisis
at Potosl.

The high grade tacana ore, suitable for smelting in the

guayras, was depleted.

processing
1554

— developed

— failed

Attempts to introduce amalgamation
by Bartolome de Medina in Mexico in

at Potosi because of the altitude.

The

mines grew ever deeper, and the work done by the Indians
became more demanding.

One visitor described the work

inside the cerro this way:
the work of descending and ascending in the
mines is very great, as the Indians have to retrieve
the raw metal and discarded rock and bring it to the
surface.
There is no other way to extract the ore;
not in carts or any other fashion. All the weight
falls on the arms, because the ladders are made of
wooden bars joined with rawhide rope, and progress
is made from one bar to the next by pulling oneself
up by the arms.
It is not difficult, even for one
who has not seen it for himself, to appreciate how
excessive this work is. Nevertheless, the Indians
are exceptionally skilled at it, and seem to do it
quite easily and happily. 55
.

.

.

The Indians' happiness with their
tasks is questionable.
Their willingness to work in the mines
depended upon their
personal profits. Deeper mines meant less
ore produced in
a day and therefore less silver.
Because the Indians

worked for a percentage of production, that
meant less
profit for them. Many left Potosl to work
elsewhere;

others remained in the villa

other activities.

,

but occupied themselves in

President Juan de Matienzo of the

Audiencia de Charcas wrote the crown in 1561 that of
some
20,000 Indians living in Potosl, only 300 were working in
the

mines—a dramatic decline from the 5,000 hatunrunas

counted by Polo de Ondegardo a decade earlier.
Meanwhile, Hapsburg administrators had grown accustomed
to Potosl silver. 57

Official production for the first

twenty years had exceeded 76 million pesos

.

Royal guintos

were generally 300,000 to 400,000 pesos per year.

As

contraband consumed one-half to two-thirds of actual
production, total output was probably double or treble
that figure.
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By any measure, PotosI was the economic

backbone of Peru, and Peru was the most important financial
base of the Spanish Empire.

Therefore, when a shortage of

labor developed at PotosI, it was of major concern to the

government, as well as to the miners.
Labor shortages were met elsewhere with Black slaves.
In the Caribbean, Brazil and lowland Peru, Blacks filled a

labor vaccuum in activities from sugar production to gold

1
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mining. 5^

At Potosi they were not a viable
alternative.
The cost of their importation
would have had to have been
carried by the miners, who were
not economically prepared
to do so.
The slaves would have had to have
come from
Brazil via the Rio de la Plata and
TucumSn, an illegal
channel of contraband to Buenos Aires.
The crown did not
want to encourage traffic along that route.
Blacks were
also thought to be physically unprepared
to withstand the
rigors of Potosi 's altitude and climate,
let alone the

work of carrying ore out of the mines on their
backs.

Altiplano Indians, by contrast, were biologically
adapted
to the villa's environment.^^

As the tacana ore ran out, Spanish miners hoped to

compensate for less and lower quality ore with more Indians,
but the Indians no longer cared to work in the Potosi mines.

Harder work for less profit held as little attraction for
them as it did for anyone.

Their refusal to work was

portrayed by the miners, however, as laziness and a natural
aversion to gainful employment.
Government officials suggested various means to coerce
the Indians back into the mines.

La Gasca and Gabriel de

Rojas proposed that all tribute be demanded in silver,

thereby forcing the Indians to work in the mines to obtain
the metal.

6

The miners themselves, supported by President

Matienzo and others, pressed for some form of draft labor.
Matienzo noted that the crown had allowed for forced labor

45

in other endeavors by its
1552 cgdula.^^

Throughout the

realm tindarunas presented
themselves at city plazas to be
hired for public works and for
large agricultural
enterprises. The Indians called
their periods of service
"mitas," recalling the Inca m^ita.
Provisions for good
treatment and payment of the Indians,
Matienzo
argued,

removed their labor from the status of
personal service.
The President asked Phillip
to permit the

n

recruitment of tindarunas for the mines at
Porco and Potosl.
His proposal was prefaced by an unflattering
portrayal of
the Indians as lazy, stupid, enemies of
work.

Matienzo

said it was not only legitimate to compel them
to

work-

provided that they were paid and stayed close to home—the
crown and its officials were obligated to force them
to
work, for their own benefit and that of the public
good.
He dismissed any doubts based on the dangers of mining
with

promises that tunnels (then under construction) and new
ladders would improve conditions significantly.^"^

Matienzo suggested that one-tenth of the Indians in
Charcas, Chucuito and the Collao serve both at Potosi and
at Porco.

Some would work in the mines and receive three

tomines per day in wages; others would work in support

activities and earn less.

Because of the distance from

their homes to Potosi, the Indians would remain in the villa
for a year and then return home, to be replaced by another

contingent.

Some 1,500 Indians would be sent to Potosi, and

:
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another 800 to Porco.^^
The President of the Audiencia
de Lima, Lope Garcia de
Castro, sent a similar proposal
to the crown in 1565, after
the 1552 cgdula and another
edict of 1563 had softened the
crown's earlier opposition to
personal service and Indian
labor in the mines. He argued
that forced labor would only
be a temporary measure, and would
soon be unnecessary.
The
Indians could be made to work, he
added, as long as they
were treated well, and enjoyed a
profit.

Nevertheless, the crown turned down Matienzo's
request
for permission to import Indians from
Cuzco and Chucuito in
a 1566 cedula.
The distances involved, reports of harsh
working conditions in the mining centers, and
falling
silver production at Potosi may have been
responsible for
the denial.
The language of the order offered little

explanation
In reference to what you [Matienzo and the
Audiencia as a whole] say about the mines of PotosI
and Porco needing Indians and able persons to assist
in their exploitation; and that many Indians could
be
brought from the provinces of Cuzco and Chucuito,
which could be of great significance to the royal
quintos and the general good, of Spaniards and
Indians alike here it has appeared that it is not
convenient to do so, for it is against our royal
intention; therefore, you should guard and ensure
compliance with our previous cedulas and provisions
on the subject, without any novelty whatsoever 67

—

.

Whatever the reason for the crown's refusal to allow the
importation of Indian laborers from around Lake Titicaca,
the answer was "no."

The issue was not dead, however.
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AS a matter of fact, there
was already such a system
in place at Huamanga.
1562 Polo de Ondegardo ordered
the caciques of that province
to provide him with 700
Indians.
These were distributed among local
miners each
Monday, at a central plaza, for
periods of one week at a
time.
On Saturday the Indians were paid
directly by the
miners for their weeks' labors.

m

When Phillip II assembled a junta in
1568 to consider
means "to centralize royal authority
and make it more
effective, and to increase substantially
the flow of
revenue by stimulating the production of
precious metals,"
the question of draft labor for Potosl was
raised
again.

Francisco de Toledo was a member of that junta, and
soon
thereafter he was sent to Peru as Viceroy.

Viceroy Francisco de Toledo

•

Toledo arrived in Peru in 1569 with a clearly defined

mission:

to establish crown dominion in an unruly realm

and to organize all aspects of revenue production.

His

instructions concerning Indian labor in the mines read:

Presupposed that the mines of Peru cannot be worked
by Spaniards, for those who are there will not work
in them voluntarily; and it is said that slaves
cannot work in them either, owing to the nature and
coldness of the land; and thus it is necessary to
occupy Indians--while these are not to be forced
nor compelled, as had already been ordered, they
must be attracted with all just and reasonable
means, so that there will be the required number of
laborers for the mines. To this end, it appears
that great care must be given to the aggregation of
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°f Indians in nearby towns
and
^^""it
landholdings,
so that they might more
easily
eas??v apply
aoolv
themselves to the work involved.

The Indians were to be well-paid
and well-treated; they
were to work reasonable hours;
and they were not to be
detained once their shift had been
completed.
Good
conditions and ample profits would
ostensibly attract
the required number of Indian
laborers; the use of force
or compulsion was specifically banned.
The solution of Potosi's problems was
only one part of
a comprehensive viceregal program.
Central to Toledo's
effort was the final legitimization of the
Hapsburg claim
to sovereignty in Peru.

Indeed, the conquest was still

incomplete, for Manco Inca continued to hold out.

Not

until 1572 were the forces of Vilcabamba finally
overcome.

72

Toledo confirmed the crown's right to rule Peru with
a

three-pronged campaign.

composition of

a

"First, he inspired the

treatise against Las Casas; second, he

embarked upon an investigation of the justice of Inca rule
by collecting the so-called Inf ormaciones

;

and finally, he

arranged for the preparation of a 'true' history of Peru's
past by Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa."

The Incas were

deemed usurpers and tyrants; the conquest had freed the
Indians and brought them the true faith.

Divine

Providence, Sarmiento de Gamboa determined, had guided
Peru into the care of the Spanish crown. 74

.
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Concurrent with the consolidation
of Spanish
sovereignty was the replacement of
the Inca life-style with
a more hispanized existence.
A general census, conducted
by Toledo, found 1,067,696 Indians
within 614 ayllus
(excluding the areas of the Rio de
la Plata, Chile, Quito
and Tucuman)
Of these, 277,697 were able-bodied
men
subject to tribute. The Indians were
settled in new
villages to facilitate control, collection
.

of tribute, and

religious instruction.

Members of one or more ayllus

were settled in one of two parcialidades

hurinsaya

— and

— hanansaya

and

each parcialidad was governed by an Indian

gobernador and other caciques

.

The settlement of Indians in new villages had
been

proposed by La Gasca as early as 1550 and was underway by
1567, but under Toledo the program became extensive

This pattern was characteristic of his viceroyalty— the
use
of extant policies and practices in a larger, more organized

fashion.

Another of Toledo's goals was the eradication of the
encomienda

.

The crown continued to fret about the prospect

of feudal kingdoms headed by the encomenderos

Previous

.

efforts to control them had enjoyed very little success.

Toledo's approach centered on the direct administration of
the rural provinces with correqidores de indios

.

These

officials were assigned the administrative, jurisdictional
and fiscal duties previously left to the encomenderos.

The
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Viceroy Marques de Canete
(1556-1560) had been the first
to
try to introduce corre^idores
de indios, but the opposition
of the encomenderos had forced
him to recall all but
those

for Chucuito and Chincha.

m

1565, Governor Garcia de

Castro revived the idea, and despite
little headway, the
program was ongoing when Toledo arrived
in Peru.
Under his
leadership, corregidores were again sent
to all corners of
the realm.
Toledo named prominent soldados
to the

newly-created posts, thereby using the
encomendero -soldadn
rivalry to further the government's aims.^^
All of these programs were carried out
during Toledo's
entire viceroyalty. There was little doubt
that the crown
supported each of them. The solution of the labor
shortage
at Potosl was more troublesome.
Toledo, like his

predecessors, found himself faced with a dilemma:

the

crown wanted work in the mines to be voluntary and paid,

but the lack of Indians willing to hire themselves out
made force labor appear to be unavoidable.^^
of persuasion had not been sufficient.

Subtle means

In October,

1570,

the Viceroy called a junta in Lima to consider the pros and

cons of a forced labor system for Potosi.

In the group

were the Archbishop of Lima, Ger6nimo de Loaysa; the Dean of
Lima, Pedro Muniz; and President Juan de Matienzo.

It said

that legitimately, and without injury to the
Indians, His Majesty, and in his name his viceroy,
could compel the Indians, in a determined number,
to work in the mines at Potosi and elsewhere in
Peru, given certain provisions for their good
.

.

.
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anrSer^tf S!io^^"

^'^^'^^ compensation.

The junta's decision reflected
the terms of the crown's
earlier position on forced labor
for non-mining ventures.
The extension of its provisions
to Potosl may well have
been facilitated by Matienzo's
argument that the Indians
were already working in any number
of legal and illegal
activities for the colonists, and that
their labor would
better be employed in service to the crown.

Despite the junta's determination, Viceroy
Toledo
embarked upon a five year visita of Peru still
bothered
by doubts about forced labor.
At Huamanga
he found

Polo de Ondegardo's system going strong.

Impressed by its

success, he consented to its continuation, but
added

ordinances for good treatment, adequate payment, and
religious instruction of the Indians; and exaction of royal

quintos— to bring the system into line with the junta's
ruling.
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By the time he left Huamanga, therefore, Toledo

was not only armed with the junta's assurances that

draft labor at Potosi would be justified, he had also seen
a smaller system at work.

While Toledo was in Cuzco, developments at Potosi took
a dramatic turn for the better.

Pedro Fernandez de Velasco

perfected a patio (amalgamation) process that overcame the
difficulties presented by Potosi

's

elevation.

Toledo

called him to Cuzco to demonstrate his method; encouraged
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by the results, the Viceroy
moved on to PotosI, arriving
in December of 1572.^^
once in Potosi, Toledo's attention
was immediately
drawn to the large piles of
desmontes left by twenty-eight
years of mining. These were composed
of ore that had eluded
the 2ua^'s capabilities, but was
suitable for amalgamation
processing. Toledo believed that the
combination of
desmontes and quicksilver ensured the
rejuvenation of silver
production at PotosI. The potosinos were
not so certain.
Their reluctance to commit themselves and
their capital to
the construction of mercury-using mills
was linked to the
labor question.

Technological gains, and available

stockpiles of ore, were of little value unless there
were
Indians to work in the mines and mills.

Any remaining doubts that Toledo had about forced labor
were removed by the promise of fabulous production and
his
need to persuade the potosinos to build the requiste mills.
The Viceroy entered into a pact with them:

they would build

the mills at their own expense; he would provide mercury

and guarantee an Indian labor force, both at reasonable
cost.

For its part the government would receive one-fifth

of the silver produced, a profit on mercury sold in the

villa, and other tax revenues.

Mill and mine owners (who

would come to be known as azogueros
of production less costs.

)

would keep four-fifths

pr

Toledo assured the government a means of controlling

1

production at PotosI with a royal
monopoly on mercury.
He considered claiming exclusive
rights to the desmontes
but opted for mercury because he
felt it would

.

be more

easily monitored.

Royal orders to find mercury deposits

in Peru had followed the invention
of the amalgamation

method, and they had led to the
discovery and exploitation
of Huancavelica after 1566.
The Viceroy expropriated the
mines there and he prohibited the
production of mercury
elsewhere in Peru.^^

Toledo's guaranteed labor force meant the
establishment
of the mita at Potosl.
He did not create the system; nor
did he resurrect an Inca one.
Rather, he marshaled the
ideas and practices which were extant upon his arrival.

Toledo's mita was a descendent of the Inca m'ita

,

but via

the systems that required hatunrunas and tindarunas
to

work for the Spaniards.

The Viceroy's system followed

the proposals of Juan de Matienzo closely, and it resembled

the system founded at Huamanga by Polo de Ondegardo.

The first repartimiento de la mita for Potosl was

drawn up in 1573.

9

Toledo noted that the Indians had

been accustomed to serving one year shifts at Potosl, but
had stopped doing so when the tacana was depleted.

He

now obliged their caciques and corregidores to send them
once again, and he based each province's quota on its

pre-hispanic population.

Some 1,300 Indians were required

from the provinces around La Paz; 500 were to come from

.
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Chucuito; and various other amounts
for provinces as far
away as Canas y Canches, and as
close as Porco. The regions
so obligated shared Potosl's
altitude and climate. They
were the closest to the villa that
were also under crown
control.
other provinces that were on the frontier
with
unconquered Indians, or of lower elevation,
were spared.
A total of 4,300 mitayos were brought
to PotosI to swell
the ranks of 4,200 resident Indians, hatunrunas
who had not
returned home, and 900 yanaconas
Of the mitayos
.

,

3,738

were assigned to work in the mines and the mills,
in three
shifts of 1,430 at a time." in addition, the
Corregidor
de Potosi was empowered to assign up to 1,000 Indians

more to those who required their assistance, on the premise
that the profits generated by amalgamation processing would

cause them to work gladly.

The remainder were free to rest

or engage themselves in personal enterprise

Toledo then went to La Plata, where he drew together
and published his ordinances in 1574.

When he returned to

Potosi, he was confronted by caciques complaining that the

Corregidor was assigning more than the 1,000 Indians he
was permitted, and not on a pro-rated basis.

The azogueros

preferred some Indians to others, and while some groups

found themselves working constantly, others were left idle.
The caciques argued that the one-third fraction should be

strictly enforced, and that the number required from each

province should be based on the census conducted by Toledo

during his visita. 95
In response to the increased
demand for mitayos

the problems identified by
the caciques

,

,

and

Toledo devised a

second re partimiento de la mita
in 1575.
This time he drew
varying percentages of Indians,
based on his census, from
the provinces, depending upon
their distance from Potosl.
Seventeen per cent was required from
the region around
La Plata; 16 per cent from around
La Paz; 15 per cent from
the vicinity of Cuzco; and 13
per cent from Canas y Canches.
Within each of three shifts, 615 Indians
were assigned
to

labor in the mines and 2,498 to the
mills, either in
construction or refining.
Others, assigned to support
activities, brought the total to about
000.^"^
4,

Two years later, with some of the mills
having been

completed and others abandoned, some azogueros
required
more mitayos while others no longer needed them.
A third
repartimiento was drafted, this time in Lima.

Toledo based

the distribution of mitayos on information provided
by

local government officials and individuals, including
the

results of a thorough visita conducted by Matienzo in
1577.

98

The mita gruesa

(total)

grew to 14,296 Indians,

with three mitas ordinarias (shifts) of 4,426.

To meet

these larger numbers the provinces of Paucartambo,

Chumbibilcas and los Collaguas were added.

Uros were now

obligated to serve at 11 per cent, but with the provision
that two serve for every one assigned

— Uros

were very

.

.
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uncooperative.

Within each of the mitas ordinarias

1,119

.

Indians went to the mines; 3,073 went
to the mills; and the
remainder were assigned to deserving
soldados, most of them
at Porco.l°° The 1578 repartimiento
de la mita was revised
in 1580, after irregularities in the
distribution had
become apparent, but the changes were never
implemented

Toledo's priority was on providing ample numbers
of
Indians to work at PotosI, but he was also
concerned that
the mita be attractive to the Indians.

ordinances

governed almost every aspect of mita service.

Mitayos were

to serve one year, after which they would return
home.

While in the villa a mitayo would work one week and then
receive two weeks rest.

Each Monday those included in the

^^ta ordinaria were to present themselves at Guayna
smaller hill at the base of the cerro)

(a

for distribution.

That afternoon they would ascend to the mines or go to the
mills.

Work would then continue until Saturday evening,

when the mitayos would be paid their wages for the

week.''"^^

Indians in the mines would earn three and one-half reales
per day; those in the mills, two and three-quarters
reales. 104

No quotas were allowed. 105

Half -wages were to

be paid for every day of travel from the home province to

Potosi, based on a fixed number of leagues per day. 106
^

In

the villa

^

Indians were to live in their province's

rancher la

;

segregation was meant to protect them from the

designs of Spaniards

,

mestizos

,

Blacks and others

107
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Two veedores and an alcalde

de minas were to assist

a

eroteotor de naturales and capltanes
de la mita in
overseeing work in the ™ines and
mills, and ensuring that
the mitayos were not mistreated. "^^^
The Indians were provided with
other incentives. They
were taught the patio process;
and one-third of the ore
suitable for smelting in guayras
was to be distributed to
them, so the art would not be
lost and their profits would
be augmented.
The right of capcha permitted the
mitayos
to work the mines for their own
benefit from Saturday night
to Monday morning.

The ore they produced, and that which

they secreted out of the mines during
the week, was traded
in the 2hatu plaza.
This traffic in raw silver came to be

known as rescates and was the exclusive domain
of the
Indians. -"--^^
Mitayos from Cuzco or Chucuito had to travel for
two
months, and walk well over 1,000 kilometers, to
reach
Potosi.

They had willingly covered the distance in earlier

years, when great profits awaited the end of their trek.

Wages, travel allowances

(

leguas

)

,

capcha rights and

rescates were all meant to restore the economic incentive
for the Indians to come and work at PotosI

again."'""'""''

The responsibility for delivering a province's quota
of mitayos lay, according to Toledo's design, with the

corregidor of the province.

The Corregidor de PotosI, in

turn, was in charge of the overall entero

(delivery; also
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compliance)

m

practice, however, the correcridores
held
caciques accountable, for while
they had little real power
over the Indians, the caciques
were quite effective. The
occupied a focal position, where the
Spanish and
Indian republics intersected, and they
were the crucial
link in the mita 's delivery mechanism.
.

caci^

The importance of the caciques

communal nature of the mita.

'

job stemmed from the

it was the obligation of the

parcialidades and villages, not of individual
Indians.
As the size of the resident population
changed, usually

downward, the mita quota remained the same,
until the

viceroy could be persuaded to conduct

a

revisita

.

'

Thus,

when the number of Indians in a village declined,
the

pressure on the caciques in that village to meet their
obligations increased.

Throughout the 1570s, and especially after 1575, the

combination of desmontes

,

mercury and mitayos met all of

Toledo's expectations, and Potosi enjoyed a renaissance.

When Matienzo visited the villa in 1577, he marvelled at
the transformation that had taken place.

The Spanish

population of Potosi had increased ten-fold from 200 to
2,000; the number of Indians now exceeded 20,000.

azoqueros

,

The

the Indians and the crown were all making

handsome profits, thanks to the Toledan production
formula.

Despite the rebirth of Potosi, the mita was opposed

from the outset-by those who competed
with the mining
center for Indian labor. An increasing
number of Spaniards
in Peru combined with a declining
number of Indians to

create a fierce competition for their
services.
azogueros' competitors were the encomenderos
"^^^^^^^

.

Among the

priests,

obraje owners, and the same corregidores
and

caciques who were responsible for compliance
with mita
obligations. These groups were joined in their
opposition
to the mita by the Audiencias of Lima and
Charcas.
The

Lima court had been infuriated by Toledo's
expropriation
of Huancavelica, for its members had been interested

parties there.

The Audiencia de Charcas was involved in

agricultural activities in Chuquisaca and had been denied,
by Toledo, any interest in mining whatsoever

"'"'^
.

The voices of opposition, therefore, reached the crown

via official and private correspondence.

The evils of mita

service were exaggerated by its enemies, while its role in
the rejuvenation of PotosI was downplayed.

These

manifestations were effective enough to prevent confirmation
of the mita by the Council of the Indies and the crown,

despite Toledo's continual requests for approval.

The

Viceroy told the Council in 1576, after it had undertaken
an investigation of the system, that without the mita there

would be no

PotosI, and without Potosi no Peru.

In 1578

he challenged the crown to consider whether it was prepared
to do without the income it received from Potosi.

The

,

council never countermanded the
Viceroy, but it refused
to grant him royal affirmation
of his actions.
Toledo
reiterated his reasons for establishing
the PotosI mita
in his memoriales (1581)
:

It has been necessary on the one
hand
Indians work, so they will not be lazy to make the
... and
on the other to regulate and
increase their wages
and ensure the payment of them
... and to make
known who is to distribute the Indians
to these
labors.
In the past, audiencias, corregidores
treasury officials and alcaldes -a nd even thP Lm^
encomenderos who benefit from their service—
have
done this.
They have done so without title from
His Majesty
they have taken those they
desired, and paid what they liked—often
nothing
at all.
To end such practices it was necessary
for me to prohibit the assignment of Indians
by
anyone but the viceroy, in the name of His Majesty
To do this, a record was made in all the realm
and
cities of it, of the quantity of Indians in each
province, and those that could with the least
trouble come and serve in the cities and mining
.

.

.

centers.

Clearly, Toledo felt he was bound by the need for forced

Indian labor, but the sentiment that is strongest in this

statement is the belief, noted earlier with regard to
Matienzo, that forced labor was a reality, and one that

should be turned to the advantage of the crown

"'"'"^
.

The question arises whether the mita was necessary at
all.

Given the profits generated by mercury and desmontes

would enough volunteer labor have gravitated to Potosi as
it had earlier?

The mita was necessary, first as an

incentive and guarantee for potosinos

— so

they would build

the mills and commit themselves to silver production on a

long-term basis.

Second, one-third of the mitayos worked

in the mines as apiris,
producing ore to supplement the

desmontes; others were used to
build the mills, while
there were sufficient numbers
of Indians in Potosl before
Toledo arrived to meet the miners'
needs, they were not
willing to work as apiris for the
wages they received.
The mita served other functions
as well.
it was also
a recruiting mechanism.
As Indians came to Potosl
in the

mita, many found that the
opportunities for individual
profit had been restored and stayed on
after their year
of service was completed.
Others fell into debt and were
forced to continue working as debt-peons
The number
of mingas at Potosl was increased through
both these means.
.

^^^^yQ^ ^Iso brought products from their home provinces
to
sell or trade at Potosi.

The mita was therefore important

to the commerce of the villa

.

''""'^

The role that the mitayos increasingly came to play,

once the desmontes began to dwindle, was as apiris

.

Juan

de Matienzo observed that the desmontes were already
gone

when reported on Potosi in 1577.

The Indians were then

removing piles of discarded ore from within the cerro for
refining in the mills. 120

The one-third of the mitayos who

were originally assigned to the mines was gradually expanded

during the next two decades until nearly all of them were

compelled to work in the cerro

.

Mingas assumed their places

outside, but they refused to serve as apiris

1
.

?

1

The

seventeenth century would bring still more changes.

.
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Ten years after Toledo had first
set foot in Peru,
Potosi was an industrial center.
Everything from the

extraction of ore to the minting of silver
coins was
performed there.
introduction of amalgamation
processing had saved Potosi; the desmontes
mercury and
,

the mita had fueled a spectacular increase
in silver

production.

Industrialization gave birth to

of fundamental changes.

a

series

The first was the marriage of

Potosi with Huancavelica.

Silver production was now

dependent upon adequate supplies of quicksilver; and
a

mercury lifeline was created, overland from Huancavelica
to Chincha, by sea to Arica, and overland again to
Potosl.-'-^'^

Second, the azogueros were now interested in the Potosi

mines on a long-term basis. 125

They had invested

pesos in the construction of 132 mills.

"^^^

3

million

As property

owners, the azogueros were no longer low-investment,

low-risk miners, but businessmen with interests to
^
protect
4.

127

Third, production was now dependent on water, and

subject to vacillations in a climate notorious for its

all-or-nothing rainfall. 128

Reservoirs were built to

minimize the effects of nature, but these came at a high
cost:

300,000 pesos for Cari cari and San Pablo alone;

and 280,000 pesos for five other lagunas

129
.

Fourth, and the effect that is most significant.
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control of production was removed
from the Indians.
Despite all their perquisites, the
Indians were now merely
wage earners. Silver production
was now controlled by the
crown and the azogueros
Removed as interested parties,
the Indians were nevertheless
crucial to continued
production at Potosi. The crown and the
azogueros relied
on the caciques to deliver mitayo
laborers.
.

The Indians,

however, would cooperate only as long
as their wages,
capcha rights and rescates were sufficient
to compensate
them for their hard work, when the Indians'
profits fell
for a second time, they would have little
reason to comply
with their mita obligations. When that happened,
the
crown, the azogueros and even the caciques would
discover

just how difficult it was to force them to work.
1580 to 1600

;

The Mita after Toledo

The problems that plagued the mita in the seventeenth

century began during the 1580s and 1590s.

As soon as the

desmontes were exhausted, and the boom of the 1570s ended,

weaknesses in the mita
themselves. 131

'

s

design began to manifest

Silver production fell markedly and

compliance with the mita fell with it, each feeding on
the other.

The Indians and the azogueros reacted to the

changing circumstances by protecting themselves as best
they could.

Hapsburg officials, in turn, responded to

their actions in a vain attempt to maintain some degree of

.
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control over the situation.

Without the desmontes, the mills had
to rely entirely
on newly-mined ore. More and
more mitayos were forced to
enter the mines. The one-third
formula used by Toledo
yielded to three-quarters and more.^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
^
critical element in the production formula;
but
their

increased importance was accompanied by
worsening working
conditions
The mines plunged deeper, the work grew
respectively

harder, and accidents became more common.

Indians were

buried in cave-ins, they suffered broken limbs in
falls,
and a respiratory disease— pneumoconiocis--became an

occupational hazard. 133

Father Acosta described life

within the cerro this way:
They labor in these mines in perpetual darkness, not
knowing day from night. And since the sun never
penetrates to these places, they are not only always
dark but very cold, and the air is very thick and
alien to the nature of men, so that those who enter
for the first time get as sick as at sea which
happened to me in one of these mines, where I felt
a pain at the heart, and a churning in the stomach.
The miners [ apiris ] always carry candles to light
their way, and they divide their labor in such a
way that some work by day and rest by night and
others by night and rest by day. The ore is generally
hard as flint, and they break it up with iron bars.
They carry the ore on their backs up ladders made of
three cords of twisted rawhide joined by pieces of
wood that serve as rungs, so that one man can climb
up and another man down at the same time.
These
ladders are twenty meters long, and at the top and
bottom of each there is a wooden platform where the
men can rest, because there are so many ladders to
climb.
Each man usually carries on his back a load
of twenty-five kilograms of silver ore tied in a
cloth, knapsack fashion; thus they ascend, three at

—

.

^^^^t carries a candle
lild lo i-Mo
holding on with
both hLa. \l
^^^^ ^^^^^ distance, often
more ^han 300^L^'""^
"meters—
°?
a fearful thing,
the mere
^
k2 of which
thought
inspires dread. 134
'

Toledo had ordered a maximum of two
trips per day, but as
many as twenty-five were made. During
the 1590s the

common tarea (quota) was nineteen
montones (mounds) in a
day.
Quotas had also been prohibited by Toledo,

but they

were the rule rather than the exception

"'^^
.

Springs flooded many of the richer mines.

Some had

to be abandoned, but others were worked
by mitayos in

knee-deep water.

This practice was also illegal, but

continued nonetheless, and pneumonia struck the Indians

working under such conditions

.

''"'^^

Deteriorating working conditions were bad enough, but
Indians were further oppressed by their treatment at the
hands of mayordomos and pongos

.

Mitayos were whipped,

beaten, struck with rocks, made to carry heavy loads on

their backs, and forced to work day and night, and on
Sunday.

137

The Indians no longer received two weeks of

rest for every one they worked.

Of the mitayos who were

"resting" nearly a thousand were obliged to serve as meses

;

and offer their services in supply trains, reservoir

maintenance, and other support activities.

The one-to-three

relationship between the mita ordinaria and the mita gruesa
collapsed 138
,

Ill-treatment and increased pressures on the mitayos
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were caused by the azogueros

'

financial woes.

They were

squeezed by rising production costs
and less and
lower-quality ore. Many had over-extended
themselves by
pouring their profits into construction,
or had otherwise
spent the money they made during the
boom years.
The

azogueros now found themselves pressed for
capital, and
the cost of mercury was the principal reason.
The price
per quintal had not changed appreciably,
but more

of it was

needed to refine the less-rich ore.

Other elements— the

transport of ore from the mines to the mills, wood,
salt,
copper,

etc.— also cost

more; and volunteer labor commanded

nearly nine pesos per week by century's

end."''^^

The azogueros petitioned the government for more

mitayos, lower-priced mercury, and a reduction of the quinto
to the diezmo

(10 per

cent of production)

."^^^

Meanwhile,

they tried to compensate for rising production costs by

demanding more of the mitayos while paying them less.
Travel allowances were not paid, and wages were withheld in

part or in their entirety. 141

Capcha perquisites and the

rescates trade were attacked, as the azogueros charged that
the Indians were stealing the rich ore

— either

by sneaking

it out of the mines during the week or stockpiling it until

Sunday when they could take it for themselves
the mills with the inferior metales

— and

leaving

.

The pressure on the Indians may have been caused by the

azogueros

'

financial problems, but it was encouraged by

^

by the coimnunal basis of
the mita.
There was little reason
for an azo^uero to treat
his mitayos well, for if
one were
injured or died, he was soon
replaced with another.
Some azoc^ueros also balanced
higher production costs
by selling, or renting, a
portion of the Indians assigned
to them.
The best workers were selected
and kept; those
that were old, feeble or uncooperative
were sent to other
mines, chScaras, obrajes and
elsewhere. The demand for
Indian labor was such that these
Indians brought 150 pesos
apiece or more. Some azogueros produced
no silver at
all,

but lived off the income generated by
the sale and rental
of their mitayos ^
In response to the worsening conditions
in the mines,

the Indians used every available means to
avoid the mita.

Some evaded future service by staying in
Potosi once their

year's obligation had been met, for the villa was
exempted
from mita recruitment.

Others escaped to cities, chlcaras

,

distant valleys and other mining areas— Salinas and
Aullagas in particular.
their pueblos

.

Fewer than half returned to

''"'^^

Those who did go home found oppression similar to what
they had suffered in Potosi.

Indians living in the pueblos

were forced to work for caciques

,

corregidores and priests

in transport, agriculture, animal husbandry and small

industry.

They had to buy goods they did not need, and

pay taxes and tribute to boot.

They received little or
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nothing in return, and so fled
j-xeu to
ro avniri
avoid i-u^
the work required
in the pueblos and future
mita service
at Potosi.

Returning

mita^

often discovered that their
lands and
homes had been sold while they
were away, with little or
no property to bind them,
they were free to move to where
the work was better and their
responsibilities were fewer.
Some went completely outside the
colonized zone, and joined
the ranks of the unconquered
"inf idels ""''^^
.

Indian migration was unwittingly
encouraged by Toledo's
attempt to make the mita less burdensome
for the Indians.
He provided for two months' notice
to those selected for
the next mita contingent, so they could
put their affairs
in order.
The warning actually gave them time to
escape.

Once absent from his pueblo, moreover, an
Indian became

a

forastero— a non-landed outsider whose lack of property
freed him from mita, tribute and tax obligations—even
if
he moved from one mita province to another."'"'*^

Designed to lessen the weight of the mita on the
Indians, these provisions hampered its effectiveness.

As

the Indians fled from their pueblos, and failed to return
to them, those originarios who remained were obliged to

support their villages' responsibilities.

The increased

pressure on them encouraged them to join the exodus.

"""^^

At

Potosi, fewer mitayos arrived from the depleted provinces,

forcing those already there to serve longer, and causing

them to flee from the villa.

—

As the increased demand for
Indian labor at PotosI
was met with decreasing numbers
of mitayos, the azogueros
focused their wrath on the caciques
They were whipped,
beaten, imprisoned, humiliated
in public, and forced to
hire two mingas for every mitayo
they failed to deliver
To protect themselves, the caciques
forced their Indians to
serve more often than once every seven
years, denied them
rest, and brought older and younger men
than the draft
allowed.
The result was more pressure on the
mitayos
at Potosi and originarios in the provinces,
and thus the
.

acceleration of Indian flight.
The year 1590 brought yet another cause of the

downfall of the Toledan mita.
a series of

typhus.

The realm was visited by

epidemics—smallpox, measles, influenza and

Many pueblos were completely destroyed, and

Potosl—normally spared the effects of epidemic disease
because of its altitude and cold climate— was hit

hard."*"^^

By the end of the sixteenth century the original form
o f the mita had broken down completely.

Travel allowances

we re not paid, quotas were common, and wages were withheld.

Indians and their caciques were beaten, whipped and

otherwise abused.

The fractions employed by Toledo

one-seventh (for example) from

a province,

mita gruesa for the mita ordinaria

mitayos for the mines

— crumbled.

,

one-third of the

and one-third of the

Every provision for the

adequate payment and good treatment of the mitayos was

.

.
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routinely disobeyed.

At the same ti.e,
conditions in the
mines were worse and the
countryside was less able to
support mita recruitment "'•^^
.

Another technological
breakthrough was needed.
were raised when the
beneficio del hierro

Hopes

("iron method")

was invented by Carlos Corzo
in the late 1580s, but
mercury
interest groups were able to
delay crown approval for its
use by complaining that
their profits would be hurt.
But
even when the Corzo method was
introduced, in the last
years of the sixteenth century,
it could not reverse the
overall downward trend of PotosI
silver production
Hapsburg officials responded to the
mita's problems
in disjointed fashion, from
many different directions, and
clashed with one another over how
best to act. Corregidores
de Potosl were responsible for
overseeing compliance with
mita obligations, and maximizing
silver production. They
supported the azogueros in their quest
for a lower mercury
price and the exaction of the diezmo. They
also were
active in pressuring the caciques to deliver
their full

quotas of mitayos, and tried to subjugate
the provincial

corregidores, whom they blamed— along with the
caciques

—

for the failure to meet their mita obligations

The Audiencia de Charcas was charged by the crown
with

monitoring abuses, and ensuring that the mitayos were
treated well and received their wages. "^^^

Except for

Matienzo, the Audiencia opposed the mita from the start.

and it supported the agricultural
interests that competed
with Potosi for Indian labor.
The oidores viewed
the

^^^^^^^^^

haughty, unruly, greedy and
disloyal; and

they blamed them-their greed and
vicious treatment of the
indians-for the mita's failings.
The Audiencia tried
to win a lower mercury price for
Potosi, with the hope that
cheaper mercury would lessen the pressure
that the azogueros
exerted on the mitayos.^^^ It resisted
every effort by the
Corregidor to bring the mita under his
exclusive control.

Toledo's successors in the viceroy's position
pointed
to flaws in the mita 's design rather
than blame any one
group for its shortcomings. Viceroy Martin Enrlquez
(1581-1583)

felt that Toledo had over-stepped the bounds of

his instructions by establishing the Potosl mita .-'-^^

The

Viceroy Conde de Villar (1585-1590) and the second Viceroy
Marques de Canete (1590-1596) bemoaned Toledo's lack of
foresight. 161

Despite their belief that the mita was

flawed, these viceroys did not question its importance.

They understood that the future of Peru depended on Potosi,
and Potost depended on the mita.

They sought to repair or

replace those parts of the system that they believed were

responsible for its demise.

They tried, in essence, to

re-design the mita in light of contemporary realities

"''^^
.

Enrlquez hoped to overcome the difficulties presented
by Toledo's 1578 repartimiento de la mita
(1582)

.

His distribution

included 4,453 Indians in the mita ordinaria, of
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which 1,369 were assigned to the
mines, 2,047 to the mills,
and 222 to ore-washing facilities.
The remaining 195 were
lost when complaints led to
the lowering of quotas for some
provinces. Of those "resting,"
1,070 were obliged to serve
as meses in support activities
and public works.
Enrlquez
was careful to provide Indians
only to those who were
legitimately involved in silver production.

He turned down

the suggestion of Diego Lopez de
Zuniga, Alcalde de Lima,
that the mita gruesa be composed of only
two parts, so that
each mita ordinaria might cover all the
activities that

required Indian laborers

.

-^^^

When Martin Enriquez died in March of 1533, he
was
replaced with the Conde de Villar. The new Viceroy
convened
a junta in 1586 to discuss the crisis at
Potosi, and
particularly the difficulties with the mita

.

The junta's

members included Lopez de Zuniga, Father Acosta, and Martin
Garcia de Loyola.

It focused on the problems of increased

costs and the controversy surrounding rescates

.

It agreed

to recommend to the crown that the quinto be lowered to the

octavo or diezmo

,

and to lower the price of mercury by ten

pesos to seventy-five per quintal for the first 6,000 to
7,000 quintales used at Potosi each year.

But despite the

legitimacy of some of the arguments linking rescates and
capcha with the theft of ore by Indians, the junta ruled
that the ghatu

'

s

activities were necessary to keep an

Indian work force at Potosi.

As the mita was a necessary

evil, so too was the theft of
rich ore by the Indians for
sale in the ghatu plaza. "'^'^

The junta hoped to ease the pressure
on the mitayos by
adjusting other production elements.
The Conde de Villar
considered, meanwhile, a more extensive
alteration of the
mita.
The Audiencia de Charcas had suggested
that a

resident Indian labor force be created for
Potosl.^^^

The

Viceroy's instructions had allowed him to
implement such a
program if he believed it worthwhile
Proponents of the
.

idea argued that a resident labor force would
eliminate the

problems caused by shuttling the Indians back and forth
across the altiplano

,

and that it would end the disruption

caused by the recruitment of mitayos in the provinces.

Opponents argued that provisioning such a large resident

population would be difficult, and that the Indians chosen
to live and serve at Potos£ would be little more than

slaves.

The Viceroy finally decided against the idea, for

he felt that the Indians would be aggrieved

— and

run

away."*"^^

Thus, when the Conde published his repartimiento de la mita
in 1588, little had been changed from that of his

predecessor:

the mita ordinaria included 4,143 Indians,

and 13,016 made up the mita gruesa ."*"^^

Throughout the 1580s the crown refused to confirm the

establishment of the Potosi mita.
hesitant consent to other mitas
that at Potosi.

,

In 1584 Phillip II gave

but he withheld it from

His approval did not come until 1589,

.

.
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sixteen years after the system
was inaugurated. Villar was
then told to follow Toledo's
program for sending Indians to
work in the mines at Potosi; all
earlier cgdulas and
provisions to the contrary were
superseded.
Royal consent
for the mita was predicated on
the theraputic value of work
for the otherwise lazy and frivolous
Indians; and it was
contingent upon their good treatment,
religious instruction
and general conservation.
The crown's support really
came, however, in exchange for the
revenue generated by the
1570s boom.-'-'^^
The mita was assigned more than its fair
share of the

credit for the increase in silver production at
Potosl.
The desmontes, mercury and a huge capital infusion
were
more important. The mita was a part of the success

story,

but to assign it responsibility for Potosi's resurgence
was a gross overstatement.

It is ironic that royal support

for the mita came at a time when it was failing, and

government officials in Peru were scrambling to hold it
together

Phillip II

's

confirmation of the mita was followed in

1590 by the epidemics of that year and an acceleration of
the production crisis at Potosl.

Black slaves from Brazil

and a resident mitayo labor force received renewed interest
as alternatives to the mita.

Indeed, the crown granted

permission to import Blacks for Potosl on
experimental basis

a

limited and

Peru also received a new
Viceroy in 1590-the second
Marques de Canete. He wrote
the crown in 1592 that
he

believed that Toledo's mita
required a major reformation.
The Audiencia de Charcas had
called for the forced

resettlement of Indians in their
pueblos, and he agreed,
noting that many Indians were
absent

from their homes to

evade mita and other obligations.!^^

In 1593 the Viceroy

petitioned the crown to lower mercury
and food prices for
PotosI, and grant other concessions
that would return
profitability to silver production there.
Meanwhile, he
drafted fifty-five ordinances, to be
implemented
by

Oidor Juan Diaz de Lopidana of the Audiencia
de Charcas.
The Oidor had gone to Potosi at Canete s
behest,
to

•

determine whether a new repartimiento de la mita
was
needed, and to investigate the general situation
there.

The new ordinances were issued in response to his

recommendations.

Canete reiterated his predecessors'

prohibitions of the sale or rental of mitayos

,

their use

in other activities than those to which they were assigned,

and other means used by the azogueros to adapt the mita to

their personal needs.

He also banned the extraction of ore

from the cerro from Saturday evening to Monday morning,

effectively ending capcha

—a

of rich ore by the Indians

Canete

's

.

measure meant to halt the theft

''"^^

ordinances are impressive in their number and

scope, but they had little effect on the situation at
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Potosi.

By 1595 the Viceroy had given
up on the villa and
its residents.
He wrote the crown that the mines
were so
deep and the ore was so poor that
the government would do
better to promote other mining centers
instead.
The

azogueros

,

he reported, now forced the Indians
to work

beyond their physical limitations, in a
desperate attempt
to cover their production costs.
The government could

not

prevent the azogueros

'

abuse of the Indians; the more it

tried to govern PotosI the more ungovernable the
place

became

"'"^^
.

Viceroy Luis de Velasco (1596-1604) received his
instructions in 1595.

PotosI, he was told, was the "nervio

principal" of Peru and demanded his special attention. "'•'^^
The crown had not yet received Cafiete's assessment.

A year

later Velasco received a separate set of orders concerning
the royal treasury, in which mercury problems were the

central issue. 177

The use of quicksilver was down at

Potosi; the crown was not worried about the stockpile of

unsold mercury, but it missed the silver that could have
been produced with it.

Velasco was told to reduce the

price to sixty pesos per quintal
necessary.

,

with deferred payment if

He was also ordered to assign more Indians

to PotosI, but only to verified mine and mill owners. 178

The Viceroy's instructions called, nevertheless, for
the eventual abolition of the mita.

The crown supported

the Audiencia de Charcas' concept of a resident labor force,

and encouraged Velasco to settle
Indians in the vicinity of
Potosl by providing them with land
in nearby valleys.
The
transition to a resident labor force
was to be gradual
because of the difficulty of the task.
Direction of the
settlement program was to be entrusted
to the Corregidor de
PotosI; the Audiencia de Charcas was
not to interfere ^"^^
So while steps were to be taken to
increase silver
.

production in the short

run— primarily

a

reduction in the

price of mercury— the crown expressed its
hope that the
mita could eventually be phased out of
existence.

After an extensive investigation, including a
visita
and other information gathering, Velasco issued
his

repartimiento de la mita and a series of ordinances in
1599.

He included 4,634 Indians in the mita ordinaria

,

in

accordance with the crown's instruction that he assign more
Indians to Potosl. 180

His twenty-six ordinances focused on

the sale or rental of mines and mills; no such arrangements

were permitted, and in no way was an azoguero to receive in

money what was allotted to him in labor.

The Viceroy's

ordinances were added to those of Toledo and Cafiete and
superseded any that were not consistent with his

own."'"^"'"

Luis de Velasco was the last viceroy to rule Peru in
the sixteenth century, and the first to govern it during

the seventeenth.

No sooner had he published his

repartimiento and ordinances than the crown and Council of
the Indies responded to Canete

'

s

indictment of Potosi, and
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other complaints about the
mita, with a cgdula ordering
the abolition of the system.
Velasco's response to that
order and its impact on silver
production at PotosI will
open the story of the mita in
the seventeenth century.
Summary
For the first twenty years of
silver mining at

Potosi-the center's most productive
period-the mita was
unnecessary.

From 1545 to the 1560s, volunteer Indian
laborers flocked to PotosI; and once
there they dominated
every stage of production, from the mining
of
ore to

refining the silver in their guayras

.

The Spanish miners'

contribution was therefore limited to legal ownership
of
the mines and protection of their claims
against
interlopers.

The miners began to press for forced Indian

labor only after falling ore quality had lowered
the
Indians' profits, and they refused to work voluntarily.

The Spanish crown opposed forced Indian labor in mining
for a combination of reasons.

First, it did not want to

repeat the demographic disaster that had characterized its
initial colonization efforts in the Caribbean.

Charles

I

and Phillip II understood that the long-term value of their

American realms lay with their Indian vassals.

Second,

the crown was locked into a mortal struggle with its own

colonists for control of Indian labor, primarily with the

encomenderos

.

Clearly in the weaker position, the crown

ordered legal restrictions on the
colonists' access to
Indian labor to protect its econoir.ic
interests, as well as
the Indians themselves. While royal
directives were rarely
obeyed, they indirectly furthered the
crown's cause by
providing local government officials with
legal leverage
over the colonists. Meanwhile, the crown
ensured its

representatives use of that leverage by playing
groups of

colonists— soldados and encomenderos for example—against
one another.

Disputes were settled by government officials

or in the king's courts.
The crown's position in the colonization process was

analogous to the Spanish miners' position at Potosl.

Both

maintained a degree of control via legal channels, but in
truth the Indians were in charge at Potosi, and the

colonists in Peru (as far as the Indians permitted them to
be)

.

The economic crisis at Potosi in the 1560s created a

problem for the miners and the crown alike.

The miners'

profits fell, and they looked to restore their earnings
to earlier levels with forced Indian labor.

The

government had grown accustomed to receiving Potosi silver,
and had a vested interest in the future of the mining
center.

Draft Indian labor had proven necessary in other

sectors of the Peruvian economy, and had been permitted by
the crown.

Royal opposition to forced labor for the mines

was stronger, however, because the crown feared both the
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effect Of such a system on the
Indians and the concession
Of more power to the miners.
The risks simply outweighed
the potential benefits, and
the crown refused to permit
draft Indian labor at Potosl.
The relationship between the
risks and the potential
benefits changed soon after Viceroy
Francisco de Toledo

arrived in Peru.
Potosl

An amalgamation process suitable
to

unique environment was perfected that
made the
desmontes produced during the preceding
quarter-century
-s

bonanza of easily accessible ore.

a

The prospects for

spectacular levels of silver production at
Potosl— and thus
greatly increased guintos reales caused Toledo
to break
with the crown's position against forced labor

—

for the

mines.

The desmontes and amalgamation technology were
only

two parts of a four-part production formula,
however, and

labor and capital were still needed.

To convince the

potosinos to invest their capital in new refining mills—
to
secure the fourth element in the formula— the Viceroy had
to guarantee them a large Indian labor force.

The mita was

founded, therefore, not only as the third part of the

Toledan formula, but also as part of his agreement with the
potosinos to provide the fourth.
The crown withheld royal consent from the mita because
it was afraid that Toledo had created another privileged

interest group, like the encomenderos

,

and unsure that his

provisions for the protection of the mitayos would be
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sufficient.

When the boom of the 1570s
convinced

Phillip II that the Toledan formula
had worked, he put
aside his earlier doubts and
endorsed
the mita.

Unfortunately for all concerned, the
Toledan miracle
lasted only as long as the desmontes.
As the boom of the
1570s fizzled, the azogueros the crown
and

the Indians all

,

scrambled to protect their interests at
the expense of the
others.
The mitayos had enjoyed substantial
profits during
the boom, but they soon found themselves
forced to work in
the mines rather than in the mills, and
treated more
harshly. As their earnings fell, and mistreatment
became
more prevalent, the Indians began to flee from
PotosI and
from their pueblos to avoid mita service.

The remaining

Indians had to serve more often, increasing the pressure
on
the mitayos and contributing to more Indian flight.

Indian

migration and the decline of the mita fueled one another in
a vicious circle.

the mita.

The provinces were not depopulated by

Rather, the mita contributed to the demographic

disruption of the realm, and suffered by it as well.
The group that was caught between Indian flight and

increased azoguero demand for mitayos was the caciques

.

They were the key to the entire system, for they delivered
the mitayos to PotosI.

The caciques kept the mita going

throughout the 1580s and the 1590s, because they ignored
the guidelines established by Toledo

— to

the temporal reprisals of angry azogueros

spare themselves
.

By 1600 the mita had begun to
evolve, in concert with
developments at Potosi and in the
provinces. The vehicle
of that evolution was the caciques
As long as they were
able to appease the demands of
the azogueros and still
maintain control over the Indians, the
mita-the de facto
n^lta
could continue.
.

.

—

The crown could do very little to
prevent the

transformation of the mita.
over PotosI were very clear.

The limitations of its control

Government officials, however,

began to explore alternatives to the system,
and the crown
lent its support to the concept of a resident
labor force
to replace the mita.

But the crown had permitted the

creation of another privileged sector of Peruvian society—
the azogueros.

It would have to contend with them was well

as the encomenderos in any future efforts to limit the

colonists' access to Indian labor.

—
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M? su vJrey ? qoveriador
y capitan general de estos reinos Y Provinc^L
dirPeru
De todo lo obrado en el [revno
del PP^r-f,!
ttl^
f
senor Duque Como por los'de^as
^iiis?ro
entendieron en la numeracion general de keTuV^'lul'
los Yndios^del dho
reyno que en Virtud de Zedulas suias
Se hisso el^Lf pasado
^^^^^
la ^ha numeracion a
^L,,!
r%>~ en Veneficio
resultado
de su M. y de la causa oublica
l;,
reintegracion de la Mita de Yndios de la
?^vera y Minerales'
-tivo
que tubo
'
S^r^e
hLer
^^^^
written by Contador Pedro
A^Z^
Antonio
del Castillo, and will be noted
hereafter as
Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C)
"
^'
Brading and Cross, 558-560.
,

.

i

-j

*

*

"\

pLf

,

Zavala, Servicio personal

31.

,

I,

40,

43-45.

Capoche, 108-109.

32.

Holmes, 14, notes that motivation on the part
of
the Spaniards equalled a fierce compulsion
for riches.
33.

34.
Legally, Indians had equal rights with Spaniards
but
practice they could not compete. See Cobb, "Potosl
and Huancavelica," 8-9, for a discussion of the legal
rights of the Indians with regard to mining.

m

Ibid
iv-v, 16.
ArzSns' Historia and the Tales
of PotosI edition, are both replete with examples of
everyday violence at Potosl.
35.

.

,

,

Parry, The Spanish Seaborne Empire (New
York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 175-185; Padden, xvii;
ArzSns, Historia I, 46-62.
36.

J.

H.

,

Joseph Baquijano y Carrillo, "Historia del
descubrimiento del cerro de PotosI, fundaci6n de su
Imperial Villa, sus progresos y actual estado," Mercurio
Peruano VII, no. 211 (Lima, 10 de enero de 1793), 32.
37.

,

"

.
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?9^2r:i5;.^^

^^^^

^

Keen, "The Black Legend,"
703-711; Holmes, 25-27.
Holmes, 33.

39.
40.

Zavala, Servicio personal, I,
13; Holmes, 21-23.

41.

bas^^o/tiar;r;icle^24!57?'"
Servicio personal, I, 15-18; Capoche
^Rq^^^n ^u^'^i^'
159-160;
Hanke and Rodriguez, Los virreyes,
PerQ x,
37-38I
37-38;
Bl^r £eru
ArzSns, Historia, l, 73-74.
personal, I,
rel^ri^n^Sri^'
relaci6n of Fiscal Juan FernSndez of 20, based on the
the Audiencia
-^encia ae
de
Lima; ArzSns, Historia, I, 79-94.
Zavala, Servicio personal

45.

I,

,

18-19, 21.

46.

Ibid

47.

Holmes, 30-31; Cobb, "PotosI and Huancavelica,

03-64

.

,

21-22.
'

.

So noted by the Archbishop of Lima, about
48.
1551
(see Zavala, Servicio personal
I, 17)
,

Ibid.
18; Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 170, for a brief
discussion of Indian stoicism.
49.

,

Keen, "The Black Legend," 703-704.

50.

51.
Gunnar Mendoza notes that the Audiencia was
officially founded in 1561, but the cgdulas establishing
the court were issued in 1559 (ArzgniTluitoria I,
112,
note 1)
Cobb, "Potosl and Huancavelica," 21, uses the
,

.

1561 date.

Baquijano y Carrillo, 34, says 122,000 pesos
Hanke and Rodriguez, Los virreyes Peru I, 56-57, place
the figure at 79,000 assayed pesos
For another source
that says 79,000 pesos see ANB, M 3, no. 17, "Informacion
hecha ante esta Real Audiencia con motive de la solicitud
presentada por don Juan de Ayala y Figueroa, procurador de
Potos£, pidiendo que en merito a los servicios prestados
52.

;

,

.

,

,

88

por dicha villa al rev v a e^c.^-^^
'"^'^'^^^
y las labores de minas Lscaes?das
^^^^^^^
los
^
qumtos reales se
reduzcan al diezmn «i "^Z
Potosi, 1609-1610, 52 fs

C

??q"f^ '^LP^?" alcabalas,"

:S:^af??t^So^yi:--'^

put

Padden, xvii-xviii; Holmes,
45-47- ^^^ans,
Arz^nc
Historia, I, 108-111
c:;=.wo
53

'

55.

Benino, 368-369.

"P°tos£ and Huancavelica " 65M i
Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de
presidentei-v
oidores, ed. by Roberto Levillier
^
(3 v ol^.
MadriS
imprenta de Juan Pueyo, 1918-1922), I,
57.

TnJ

,

'

;

57.

Padden, xvii-xviii.

The 76 million peso figure began with Josg
de
Acosta, Historia natural y moral de las Indias
(Sevilla,
1590), as Diffie, 278-279, has sh^n7~Acosta s
Historia
IS included in Obras de P. Josg de Acosta
ed. hy
Mateos, Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles, no. 73
(Madrid:
Ediciones Atlas, 1954); the cited information is
on page 98.
The 76 million figure is reproduced in AGI
Charcas 268, no. 36, "Relacion o ressumen de las
rraciones
y pareceres que sse han dado sobre que sse quitte y cesse
la mitta forzada de yndios para las minas de
el Zerro de
Potossi=," by Relator Andr#s Miguel de Angulo, 3. V. 1673,
(hereafter "Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36)"); AGI,
9 fs.
Charcas 268, nos 69A & 69B, Propuesta
y parecer que hace
ofrece
al
Excelenti simo Senor Doctor Melchor de Lifiln~y
X
Cisneros
sobre el mejor cumplimiento de la cedula de
y
58.

'

,

.

.

.

.

,

,

—
89

Valera (AGI

,

Charcas 268, nos.'69A
""""^^^^

by Sebasiil^'d^ ^"'^

co^T^Pretensiines

69B)

°' ^^^^^

IpS'll^p^lMidiid^^^es?^
noted.
A

&

is

fnd Agi

")

manipulated

ff?r^ie^,^
housed
?L

'in the BNB
"^148?
"^^^-f^-^^^^velica
and Loh^anf'
Villena,
Vxl?;na°'"r'La mmerla," 640-642.
For official production
figures, see Peter J. Bakewell,
"Registered Silver
District, fssS^I^Ss!" 'j^Lbuch
fSr Ge^'h?
von
Staat,
Wirtschaft und Ges^lli^hfli^
llf^f^l^hichte
^emamer
lkas, Band 12 (KOlFlIHd-wIeS:ri
97577-5?^ For
estimates of contraband, see Baquijano
y Carrillo, ni
214
,

Huancavelica," 144.

wafabour

1

Zavala, Servicio personal, I, 56

T",

•

s-^mFThft-T^

priduckon

y^^^' ^ith royal quintos
i'-Ju
fH*?.^ of
worth on^
one-fifth
that amount.
Cobb, "PotosI and
^^^rles Acosta's estimate of 1.5 million
iTn?.r.t
C
in
quintos alone.
Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de
enero de 1793)
35, lists royal revenue in 1572 as 216!517
pesos, when silver production at Potosl had
fallen to a
pre-amalgamation low.
,

La Gasca, back in Spain, argued for the use
of
Black slaves in the Peruvian mines; he and Canete
both
asked that they be introduced for low-elevation
mines
(Zavala, Servicio personal
I, 20-21, 24-25).
59.

,

Black unfitness for work at PotosI was determined
early.
The Conde de Nieva and Garcia de Castro both said
they were physically unprepared (Zavala, Servicio pers
onal,
I, 34 and 39, respectively).
It is probably a myth, for
Blacks were used in large numbers in the royal mint during
the eighteenth century.
Logistical and financial problems
were probably the true reasons why the viceroys opposed the
Idea.
See Holmes, 17-20, for a biological profile of the
Andean Indian, and the suggestion that Blacks were capable
of working in the cerro
60.

.

61.

Zavala, Se rvicio persona l

,

I,

29; MSlaqa
Medina,
^

Zavala, Servicio personal

,

I,

18.

603-604.
62.

Holmes, 32-34; Basadre, "El Rggimen," 326-327,
sees this as the first of two steps, the second being the
establishment of the mita. M'ita is a Quechua word
63.

90

meaning shift, or time of service.
it
hatunrunas and tindarunas to designate was used bv th^
thiir work^erLds
Matienzo used the word "mita" in the
same way °zava!a
^^avaia,
Servicio personal I, 53-54).

^

,

64.

Juan de Matienzo, Gobierno del Peru
(1567)

?32-i!r°i38^5r

Zavala, Servicio personal,
55-56; n
Canete y Domlnguez, 100.
65.

ed hv
63^66,
51-52,

TLlirTHd^rTi7-1967T7

Zavala, Servicio personal

,

i,

I,

55-56.

Ibid
33-34, for the 1563 cgdula and pages 39-40
for a discussion of President Lope
Garcia de Castro's
letter to the crown of 15.1.1565.
;

Royal cgdula to the Audiencia de Charcas,
67.
Bosque
de Segovia, 1.X.1556, Audiencia de Charcas.
Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier), II, 464

—

.

Zavala, Servicio personal I, 30.
Some of the
Indians were assigned to non-mining aspects of production.
68.

,

Padden, xvii-xviii; Zavala, Servicio personal I,
69.
42 (the call for a junta also had to do with the Indians
,

taken prisoner in war and then enslaved)
and 63 (for a
discussion of the junta itself)
The quote is from page
xvii of Padden.
,

.

Lewis Hanke, "Viceroy Francisco de Toledo and the
Just Titles of Spain to the Inca Empire," The Americas
III (Washington, D.C., 1946), 3; Zavala, Servicio personal,
^
I, 63.
70.

,

Campo y de la Rynaga, 13-14; the quote is on page
It is also in Zavala, Servicio personal
II, 117.

71.
13.

,

John H. Rowe, "The Incas under Spanish Colonial
Institutions," The Hispanic American Historical Review
XXXVII (Durham, 1957), 155.
Rowe notes "the insecurity of
the Spanish hold on the native population." Many Indians,
the Chiriguanaes of Charcas for example, were not conquered
until later centuries.
72.

,

73.

Hanke, "Viceroy Toledo,"

5.

Gibson, The Inca Concept of Sovereignty 108-114,
likens Toledo to a second Pachacutec.
74.

75.

,

Parry, 188-189

91

Zavala, Servicio perso nal, I, 14-15

77.

for

r^c^r^^

189-190, offers an unflattering overvie
.J'^'^'^y'
^„
ew on
c2r£S2idores de Indies; Rowe, "The Incas unde?
Spanish
^ more'extensive
descrrpiion!'''"''°"''
Zavala, Servicio personal

79.

,

I,

64,

Campo y de la Rynaga, 15; Acosta was also
of this
opinion.
See Zavala, Servicio personal I, 68, for
the
80.

,

"Tnir.rt.lolir'
iQi^"'"*
1910,
edition,

'°

P-vldes

a

21-23, based on Matienzo (Buenos Aires,
30); Zavala, Servicio personal
I, 64-65.
,

Bakewell, "Technological Change," 60, says that
Toledo was hesitant but had been ordered in a
28. IX. 1568
royal letter to use forced labor. Canete
y Domlnguez,
100, agrees that he was so ordered, based on Sol6rzano
Pereira (Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles edition, I,
269).
82.

83.

Zavala, Servicio personal

,

I,

68-69.

Campo y de la Rynaga, 16; Capoche, 116; Bargall6,
136-137; Padden, xxi Brading and Cross, 553-554; Lohmann
Villena, "La minerla," 645; Cobb, "PotosI and
Huancavelica, " ii-iii (she says that Toledo was fortunate
that amalgamation came along when it did); ArzSns,
Historia I, 145-155, for all of Toledo's work at Potosl.
84.

;

,

85.

Bakewell, "Technological Change," 60-61, notes the

92

comparative economics. The investment
made in the
assurances that production wo^Jd be new
niiff/nr'-''^^
^^^^^^^^ ^^esmontes were exhausted.
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos.
Sr^ArT^'^rH
69A & 69B-see note 58)
^'
7, says labor had to be guaranteed.
^"^-^^
^^^^
lengthy
by the r^^^'
Gremio de azogueros, 1642-1643,^ 41 fs.; informaci6n
the cited
passage is on f 22v. Other provisions
the |ot2sinos including the guarantee were ^ade to entice
that they would no?
be jailed for debts. Alberto Crespo
R.
La guerr a entre
Vi£U|g^y Vascongados (Potosi,
-(Liirrigwf
,

)

M22-1625

"Cuando el virrey Toledo estuvo en Potosl
mmeros le manifestaron que s61o podrlan
afrontar los crecidos gastos que les demandaria
el cambio del metodo de fundici6n al
de azogue,
SI les eran acordadas especiales
facilidades.
El virrey accediS a las f undamentales la
de la
mita y la de reforzar la immunidad en caso de
deudas."
See Chapter III for the azogueros
efforts to protect the
latter right
the early seventeenth century.
los

,

m

'

Zavala, Servicio personal I, 70, for Toledo's
letter to the crown from Cuzco on 25. III. 1571. Toledo
had already decided that the mercury mines at Huancavelica
would have to be worked by mitayos
87.

,

.

Bakewell, "Technological Change," 66; Hanke and
Rodriguez, Los virreyes Peru I (no. 280)
145-147, for
Toledo's comments in his memoriales (see note 124).
88.

,

89.

Zavala, Servicio personal

,

,

I,

70.

90.
Holmes, 48.
For the irony of Toledo employing
an Inca system while discrediting the Inca claim to
sovereignty in Peru, see Hanke, "Viceroy Toledo," 18-19.

No subject, with reference to the mita, has caused
more confusion than the number and nature of the three
repartimientos de la mita conducted by Toledo himself.
Canete y Domlnguez, 100-101, notes that Valenzuela, Agia
and others were confused. Holmes, 52-53 (after Antonio de
Le6n Pinelo, El paraiso en el nuevo mundo 1650
ed. by
Raul Porras Barrenechea (2 vols.; Lima, 1943), II, 337)
identified all three:
the first conducted in 1573; the
second in 1575; and the third in 1578. Even the historical summary drawn together at the end of the seventeenth
century for the Council of the Indies (AGI, Charcas 273,
91.

(

)

,

.

93

no. 21, Madrid, l.ii ifiQ?

9p

-Po

\

u

^

.

uncertain about how many repartimiento"
^L'!\L^f and
when they were done. AGI Charcas
267. no
16
the
Archbxshop of Lima to the crown,
Lima / 3??ili!i 66??
^^^"^^
two Toledan
tf Zu"J^^
a
the first on 10. IV. 1573, includi repartimientos
ng 3,733 ^nSian s- and
i-ludLg'3,093 ^^diaAs!"'
Father ^LS^t?;""'''
concern
-^^^^^
the areas that were subiect
i
i
to the PotosI
mita, for those that were obligated
in tSe
seventeenth century were not necessarily
thole
involved
under Toledo (see note 92, below)
entire volume could be written about
the various
rout^
the mita through primary
anf
and secondary sources.
Rather than^^^e
where an author is mistaken, the reader each instance
is askeSto accept
this summary of two primary sources
that I believe to be
trustworthy:
a) the "caveza del rrepartimientto
xenera?
que hizo El senor Virrey Don francisSo
de ttoledo
copied by Escrivano Luis Maldonado in the
166 0s for
Superintendent of the mita Francisco de la Cruz
Charcas 266 no. 45J, "Testimjo oe los Indies qe (AGI
el sor Don frco de Toledo = num© lo - y testimjO Repartio
de los
excesses que reconocio en su execucion NQ 11," 12
fs
and b) a history of the mita written by Castillo
as a
preface to the tome on the Duque de la Palata's
general
census and repartimiento de la mita (AGI, Charcas
270, no.
33C see note 30)
,

)

•

—

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), 3-4v;
Capoche, 135.
Crespo, "Reclutamiento " 4 71, questioned
why Lipez was not included in the mita. The answer, I
believe, is that Lipez was a frontier province; the
exemption of regions on the fringe with unconquered
Indians is documented throughout two legajos from the
AGN:
a) Sala IX, 10-3-7, "Representaciones
y quejas de
las provincias. La Paz, Tomina, Pilaya, Mizque, Omasuyo,
1689-1690;" and b) Sala XIII, Legajo 73, "Representaciones
y quejas de las provincias, Porco, Chayanta, Tarija,
Paria, Carangas, 1689-1690." Both legajos resulted from
the inclusion of new areas under the mita, and other
reforms introduced by the Viceroy Duque de la Palata; see
Chapter VII for more on these complaints. The respondents
to a 7.x. 1660 cedula asking for information about the mita
noted that frontier provinces had been spared (AGI, Charcas
267, no. 16
see note 91; and no. 25, Bartolome de Salazar
to the crown, 8. IV. 1662, 12 fs.).
Gunnar Mendoza
contradicts ArzSns' statement that fourteen provinces were
obligated to the Potosi mita in ArzSns, Historia, II, 52,
note 4
92.

,

—

,

:

.

94
"^'

efimero aumento de provincias
mitarias hecho por el virrey
duque de la Pala^f
por su provisi6n de Lima,
1688. XII. 2 esas
provincias fueron, desde el
la extinci6n de la mita las establecImien?o hasta
16 siguJenJes
territlrios a^^iuales
rT,,-+-

=

deX??^if^^ tTrl?

Canchis, Carangas,
= K^''r''°;^u^^''^^ ^
rooh
Cochabamba,
Chayanta, Chichas, Chucuito Lampa
Facades, Paria, Paucarcolla, Porco,
Sicasica, Tinta, Umasuyo (actualmeAteQui^picancAi
OmasSySs?
(Mendoza, 'Mano de obra minera,'
no. 473, f! iviv)

Despite what Dr. Mendoza said, however,
the provinces th;=,iwere included in the Potosi mita
did
the two AGN legajos attest. "AH^ther cAange over ??me as
who
provinces is Manuel Ballesteros Gaibrois, iL^I the mita
DescubrLlinto
Peleg^c ian de Edicac^ on
wacionai, 1950) ^^.''^'^^"^IV
32.
He says the provinces obligated
^
were "Tarifa, Porco, Chayanta, Paria,
Carangas,
Cochabamba, Berenguela de Pacajes, Chucuyto,
Paucarcallo o
Puno, Lampa, Asangeto (o Azangaro
Canai y
y Asillo)
Cauches, Omasuyos, Carvaja
y Quipicauchi "
He bases his
list of fourteen on the "Curco histSrico
cronol6gico legal
estado
de las minas del cerro de PotosI,"
?^?^Pf°5^^so y
(Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Ms. 6225). The
division
of provinces in Map 3 is based on the map
in Crespo,
Reclutamiento," 481, and should be considered tentative.

L^^^lsU

,

,

.

93.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), llv.

94.

Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30),

'

3v.

95.

Ibid

.

,

4-4v.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), llv-12Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30), 5-6;'
ArzSns, Historia I, 157-158, says 4,000 Indians were
involved in the construction of mills in December of 1574,
and on page 171 he adds that mills and reservoirs were
already completed by 1577.
96.

,

97.

Zavala, Servicio personal

98.

Ibid.

,

I,

103.

Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30),
7-7v; the addition of three provinces would bring the total
to seventeen.
99.

95

as did the^Sci;SlIhop'of'£iS^(AGi°'^harcir267"
v^^-L/ t^narcas 267, no.
see note 91)

1575,.

16

—

.

101.

Canete y Domlnguez, 101.
""'^^ ^^^^^^^

insti;utS;""m.'"'"'

discussion of Toledo's ordinances in
The remainder of
118-122.
disflfSffSn^^M^'
'^^"^
compliance with
thfv^c^roy'f gSd^^^nls!''
Zaial^

tSf

Ghana;
(^nange,
105.

IttJ^^

1^5; Bakewell, "Technological
••^'An^^K'
65, on the intention of Toledo.

Cobb,

"PotosI and Huancavelica

,

"

71.

'Mita,'" 172-173, says five pesos
See Canete'^^
the eighteenth

.^^r^^'
were paid
for one month on the road.
^ 1°°^ ^^^^
cenJu?y!''

140-141; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see
.^i°^Q1^^^?°''^^'
note
yi;
7, says segregation was also used to distribute
priests for the religious instruction of the
Indians.
,

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45J (see note 91), 7v
Zavala, Servicio personal I, 89, for the
instructions
provided to veedores; and 103 for Matienzo's description
of how these officials were paid with money deducted
from
the Indians' pay. Matienzo's comments are included in
his
letter to the crown, PotosI, 23. XII. 1577, Audiencia de
Charcas.
Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier)
I, 455^65.
108.

,

,

Bakewell, "Technological Change," 65, for the
instruction of Indians in amalgamation processing; Zavala,
Servicio personal I, 159-160, for Garcia de Loyola's
1581 account, with mention of the distribution of rich
ore for the guayras
109.

,

.

Cobb, "Potosi
Frontier," 47; Basadre, "El
Regimen," 345-346; Holmes, 84-88; Cobb, "Potosi and
Huancavelica," 12-13, for the establishment of the mint
and theft of ore; Zavala, Servicio personal I, 85.
110.

.

.

.

,

Antonio de Ayanz, "Breve Relaci6n de los agravios
que reciven los indios que ay desde cerca del Cuzco hasta
111.

J

que la

ooScieLifde Su^MagllLrsele^^"^^

<^ro^ss^?tff^^."--^''

36-3?,.

^ haziendas y

'^^fk, ffffffii^fiiH^

112.

Crespo, "Reclutamiento /' 473-474,
for Soanish
re ixance on the caciques;
"La 'Mita,'" 179-?8ofSs,
95

113.

Parry, 188-189; MSlaga Medina,
611-612.

crown* Potos^^S!^fTT^7ry"°"^'uiuwn,
Fotosi, 23. XII. 1577 (see note 108). ^^^ienzo to the
Hanke, "Luis Capoche," 37, for Father
Rodrigo de
Loaysa's comment that Indians were like
Sardines-no? that
together, but that everyone wanted
them "T^.Tlf^t
Servicio personal, I, 64-65, for Toledo's
{?7n*iletter
ir^^^'
1570
noting all the activities that the Indians
worked m; and page 72 for the Church being
the worst
oppressor of the Indians. For the two Audiencias,
see
"^5''^''°^°^^''^^ Change," 64; and Capoche, 135.
n^^K^'^ii'.
^""^ Huancavelica," 66-67, discusses the
cause
?
Audiencia de Charcas' opposition; and on pages
43,
cn^ she delves
66-67,
into the reasons for the Audiencia de
Lima s unhappiness over the expropriation of
Huancavelica.
See Zavala, Servicio personal I, 101^ for a
letter of the
President of the Audiencia de Charcas expressing his
disapproval of the course of events at Potosi.
115.

,

116.
Zavala, Servicio personal I, 82, 93-94, 97-99
99-100 (1576 correspondence)
103-104 (1578 statement)
Campo y de la Rynaga, 17, quotes a 1575 letter from the
Council of the Indies giving encouragement:
"Para la claridad que pedis se haga de lo que aveis
proveido en la ocupacion de los Indies en las minas
por ser cotra lo que por nos estS mandado; y B. que
se OS respondi6 lo aula desproveido bien, se ha
hecho por la Cedula q os mand6 embiar por esta, que
es en conformidad de lo que tenemos proueido para
la Nueua Espana, y otras partes de las nuestras
Indias, hareis que se guarde como cosa que ha
parecido aca ser justificada, y de que no se seguirS
dano a los Indies. Y si otra cosa tuuieredes
entendido al contrario, no dareis auiso para que se
,

,

"

"

.
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Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia (ed. by Levillier)
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interfering ways.
180.
Valera
58), 8; Angulo

(AGI, Charcas 268, nos
(AGI, Charcas 268, no.

.

69B~see note
36~see note 58), 2
69A

&

Both sources simply list the number involved as 4,634
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CHAPTER

III

1600 TO 1633

The mita at PotosI had begun
to change within a decade
of its establishment by Viceroy
Francisco de Toledo. The
system was forced to evolve by
Indian migration in the
provinces and declining silver
production at Potosi, the
latter caused by the depletion of
the desmontes.

m

turn,

the mita contributed to Indian
flight from PotosI and the
obligated villages. Before 1600, the
mita's metamorphosis
was confined to the assignment of
more mitayos to the mines,
and the caciques and azogueros failure
to comply with
Toledo's restrictions on their recruitment
and treatment.
'

During the first third of the seventeenth
century a more
fundamental change in the mita would become
necessary.

Hapsburg government had been unable to prevent
the

transformation of the mita during the last years of the
sixteenth century.

in 1601 the crown responded to its

weakened position vis-a-vis the encomenderos and azogueros
by issuing a cgdula banning Indian personal service for
the
former and abolishing the mita.

Viceroy Luis de Velasco's

response to that order opens the history of the

government's seventeenth century struggle to control the
104
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de facto mita.

Viceroy Velasco and the 1601 Cedul

Viceroy Luis de Velasco was aware of the
vast
differences between Toledo's original design

and the de

facto mita.

He,

like his predecessors, hoped to close

that gap with more effective administration
of the system.
In the first years of the seventeenth century,
the Viceroy

sent detailed instructions to government
officials—from
the correqidores de indios in the provinces to the
veedores

and alcalde mayor de minas at PotosI~to do everything
in

their power to make the mita function as it was supposed
to."'"

These orders were to be as ineffective as the ones

they were meant to reinforce.

Meanwhile, the crown had grown toubled by the reports
it had received from Canete, Velasco and others about the

plight of Indian workers in Peru, and the growing

independence of the colonists.

On November 24, 1601

Phillip III responded with a cedula banning Indian personal
service, including the mita

.

Services rendered individuals

were flatly prohibited; the order was another volley in the
royal crusade against the encomenderos

2
.

The 1601 directive was less drastic where draft Indian

labor for public enterprises was concerned.

Those services

were to continue, but without the overt coercion of mita
obligations.

Thenceforward, Indians would be obliged merely
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to report to central locations
for employment, and they
would be joined there by indolent
Spaniards, Blacks,

mestizos, mulatos and zambaigos

.

^

To facilitate their

participation in public enterprises, the
crown ordered
that the Indians be settled near the
activities that
required their labor, so that travel to
and from work
would not be a burden on them/ Phillip

m's

call was

therefore for a resumption of the old system
of tindarunas
with the inclusion of non-Indians and elements

,

of the

resident labor force plan as well.
The mines received even greater dispensation.

The

crown conceded that gold, silver and mercury
production

were fundamental to the survival of the Spanish Empire,
and that some mines could not be worked by anyone but the
Indians.

Miners were therefore provided with one year to

acquire slaves or volunteer labor, including those who

would be compelled to report for hiring in the mining areas.
The edict also provided the means to continue mineral

production while the mining mitas were replaced.

At Potosi,

an inspection of the city and its vicinity would determine

whether there were 15,000 Indians available
comprise three shifts of 5,000 each.

— enough

to

If so, Velasco was

to assign them to labor in the mines for the transitional

year; if not, the mita could continue for that period.

The 1601 cedula included no major reforms of the mita

because the system was ostensibly to be abolished.

The
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provisions for mita labor that
were included in the order
Simply reiterated earlier
royal and viceregal directives:
only mine and mill owners were
to receive mitayos and
they were not to be rented,
sold or transfered in any way;
adequate wages, good treatment
and health care were to be
provided; travel allowances were to
be paid on the basis
of six leagues traveled in one
day; corregidores were
responsible for the delivery of mitayos
and caciques were
not to be punished for incomplete
quotas.^
,

;

Despite the language of the cgdula

expect to abolish the mita.

,

the crown did not

Rather, it hoped to keep the

colonists— both the encomenderos and the azogueros
— f rom
completely subjugating the Indians for their
personal
profit.
Indeed, the twenty-fifth and final chapter
of the
order instructed the Viceroy to consult with
experienced
and knowledgeable persons and make any modifications
that

he deemed necessary.

it was therefore less a directive

than a list of suggestions; a rough draft that Velasco
was
to edit into effective policy.

The cedula was also an

arsenal, from which the Viceroy would choose those weapons

that were necessary to battle the encomenderos and azogueros

while protecting the crown's economic interests.^
Velasco understood the intent behind the order, and he
also realized that any effort to enforce the cedula in full

would throw the realm into armed rebellion, and destroy any
chance of ever attaining the crown's objectives.

Thus, he

^

.
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.

suspended adoption of the order
in October of 1602, until
it could be studied by local
government officials. His
decision was in keeping with a
second royal order of
November 24, 1601 that counseled
against the enforcement
of the first if a violent
response was to be anticipated
The council of the Indies accepted
Velasco's suspension of
the cgdula in February of the
following year.^
.

In 1603 the Viceroy initiated an
enquiry into the

prospects for implementing various sections
of the 1601
order.
in the process he solicited the
advice of a number
of advisers, including Dean Pedro Muniz,
Father Miguel de
Agia, Jesuit Father Alonso Mesia Venegas,
Father Ger6nimo
Valera, Father Francisco de Sosa and Father
Feliciano de
Vega
The written opinions of Agia, Muhiz and Mesia
have

survived the centuries.

Because the Viceroy had been

afforded the power to modify the cgdula

,

these counselors

discussed each part of the edict separately.

They supported

those sections that they believed were valuable and rejected

others that they considered unrealistic or unadvisable.
Miguel de Agia broke his essay into three parts.

In the

first he considered the crown's intentions; in the second,
the cfdula's justness; and in the third, the Viceroy's

responsibilities with regard to its implementation.

He

argued that the crown wanted to halt the abuses suffered
by the Indians, not necessarily to abolish the Potosi mita

.
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and other forms of repartimiento
labor.

Personal services

for the encomenderos had been
rightfully banned, but draft
labor was necessary for many public
activities. Agia felt,

moreover, that the well-being of the
republic came before
that of the Indians, for unless they
worked the republic
could not be sustained; and the Indians
would not work
voluntarily.
The crown's requirement that the Indians
report to
public places for hiring was just, in Agia
s opinion,
•

because the Indians would be spared the evils
of laziness,
Spaniards and others were also included, and the
duties to
be performed were for the public good.

Furthermore, the

crown had the right to oblige its vassals to work.

German

princes, he noted, assigned their subjects to labor in
gold,

silver and copper mines, and nobody questioned their right
to do so

Agia said that Indian service in the mines at PotosI
was permissible because it was not mortally dangerous.

Mingas

,

he argued, would not have hired themselves out in

large numbers if it were.

The problems with the mita had

arisen from the distances that the Indians had to travel
to reach Potosi and the length of time they were away from

their pueblos.
the cgdula

,

The alternatives to the mita suggested by

however, were not viable.

If all Peruvian

mines were worked by slaves, 80,000 Blacks would be needed;
a resident labor force at Potosi would entail 40,000

—

.

,
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Indians and their families.

Provisioning that large a

population would be difficult, if
not impossible.
therefore urged the maintenance of
the PotosI

Agia

mita, with

modified resident labor force program
to ease the
problems created by travel to and
from the villa
Agia was less happy about the situation
at Huancavelica
for most of the Indians who were
assigned to the mercury
mines died. He tried to compare their
obligation to armed
service in wartime, but his argument in
support of the mita
at Huancavelica was half-hearted.
Indeed, after visiting
the main tunnel there in 1603 he issued a
retraction
a

.

of

that lukewarn affirmation.

Agia then called for an end to

all work in the main tunnel, and argued for
the exploitation

of other nearby mines in its place.

was not mentioned in that retraction

But the Potosl mita
.

-"-^

Pedro Muniz offered Velasco a very different point of
view.

He argued that no one—Indian or Black—should be

forced to labor in the mines against his will.

Black

slaves were actually less prepared to work in the mines than
the Indians, he said, and would die quickly if assigned to
them.

While Indian service in the mitas at Huancavelica

except the main tunnel

— and

Potosi was not fatal for all,

it was nevertheless reprehensible and unnecessary.

Potosi

silver was not indispensable, Muniz argued, for Spain had

carried on the war against heresy long before the cerro was

discovered

Ill

Alonso Mesia Venegas advised
the Viceroy to suspend the
c|dula indefinitely, for in his
view its execution would
cause more harm than the mita
itself.
He believed, unlike
Muniz, that the Empire-and
Catholicism in general-depended
upon Potosi, and Potosl upon the
mita.
The system needed
repair, he conceded, but its abolition
would bring
the

entire economic structure of the realm
to the ground; and
once lost it would be irrecoverable.
Like Agia, Mesia said
that no other labor procurement system
could take the place
of the mita.
Black slaves, volunteers and a resident
labor
force were all unrealistic:
Blacks would cost too much,
and the azogueros could not afford them; a
resident labor
force would be plagued by provisioning problems,
and the

Indians would run away anyway. '^'^

Mesia saw value in the selective application of specific
chapters of the 1601 cedula

,

and he argued that the

twenty-fifth chapter gave the Viceroy carte blanche to

modify the mita.

Velasco could therefore act to solve the

problems of travel, the non-payment of travel allowances,
high food prices and the excessive tribute the mitayos
paid, without destroying the economic foundation of the

Catholic world.
Velasco
closely.

's

subsequent actions followed Mesia 's counsel

Beginning in October, 1603, the Viceroy ordered

a series of reforms for the mita, most of them based on

sections of the 1601 order. 15

He decreed that travel
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allowances be paid on the bases of one
real and five leagues
per day. 16 He exempted the eldest
legitimate son of each
caci^ principal from tribute and the mita, and his
other
legitimate sons from the mita.^^ The number
of exempted
artisans in each village was narrowed down,
for positions
had been created simply to evade mita
service.
Once they
were in Potosl, the Indians were not to be
sold, loaned,

transfered in the sales or rentals of mines and
mills, or
in any other way.""-^ Finally, the Indians were
not to
be

used as beasts of burden.

Velasco also extended

a

1596 plan for mita deliveries

from Chucuito to other obligated provinces.

All the

mitayos from a province were now to come to PotosI as a
unit,

leaving from a designated place on the same day.

A

list of those included in the contingent was to be prepared
in triplicate, with the names, ages and ayllus of the

Indians specified.
a

A copy was to be carried to Potosi by

capitan enterador de la mita

,

selected by the corregidor

of the province to escort the year's contingent.

The

corregidores were held responsible for the despatch of the

mitayos

,

and the Corregidor de PotosI was provided with

powers over his provincial colleagues, so that he might

monitor their compliance with their mita obligations.
After a year in Potosi the entire squadron of mitayos was
to be sent home by the Corregidor de PotosI, again under

the capitgn enterador and accompanied by a list.

21
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The Viceroy hoped that these
reforms would relieve some
of the pressure on the Indians
and their caciques and
resolve the most troublesome aspect
of the Potosi mitatravel to and from the villa
More extensive alterations
were considered imprudent, given the
economic dependence
of Peru on Potosi, and the prospects
for violence should
Velasco attempt to enforce the 1601 cgdula
in its original
form.
,

.

The investigation of the mita that preceded
Velasco

's

reforms had reinforced the basic fact that
the mita was

crucial to the survival of Potosi silver production,
and so
to the future of the Hapsburg Empire.
The 1601 edict had

offered only time-worn alternatives to the mita, which
were
no more viable in 1603 than they had been in the
sixteenth

century.

The counselors who submitted written opinions on

the cgdula could offer no alternatives that were any more

realistic.

Had one existed, Toledo would not have been

forced to establish the mita in the first place.

— especially
1582 — had made

The

generation since its inauguration

with the

exhaustion of the desmontes by

it all the

more necessary.

Thus, the mita emerged from the Viceroy's

scrutiny more firmly entrenched than ever.
Silvio Zavala has likened the 1601 cgdula to the New
Laws of 1542.

He feels they were both unable to overcome

the fundamental contradiction between Indian liberty and

the need for forced Indian labor. 22

Juan Perez de Tudela
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agrees with the seventeenth
century jurist Juan de
Sol6rzano Pereira that the
contradiction was between
republicanism and despotism. ^3 On
the functional level,
however, there was no contradiction.
Phillip III and the
Council of the Indies employed
"Indian liberty" and "the
public good" to justify the abolition
of the services
performed by the Indians for the colonists
while preserving
those that benefited society as a
whole-and thus

the crown.

Access to forced Indian labor was thereby
declared to be a
state monopoly.
The legal foundation of the 1601 cgdula
was sound, but
it could not be implemented because of
the prevailing power
balance in Peru. Not only was the order opposed
by the

powerful encomenderos, but by the azogueros of
Potosl as
well.

Faced with the prospect of their united opposition,

Velasco chose limited gain over total defeat.

His inability

to make even his few reforms effective, however, is
clear

when one looks at the de facto mita.
The de facto Mita

While the crown drafted its 1601 cedula

Viceroy investigated the Potosi mita

,

,

and as the

the processes that

had begun in the late sixteenth century—the shifting of

mitayos from the mills to the mines, and the deterioration
of their working conditions

— continued.

Soon thereafter,

the mita began to change into a system that was totally
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different from anything that Toledo had
imagined.
At first glance the number of mitayos
working at
Potosi seems to belie the importance assigned
to them by
the crown and viceregal officials.
The mitayos were only
a small fraction of the total work
force at PotosI,

as

this anonymous 1603 description—quite possibly
from the

Velasco enquiry

— reveals:

4,000 mitayos worked in the mines of the cerro
6 00 mingas did the same
400 or more mingas were involved in cleaning
the ore young men wh9 earned one peso
per day
1,000 Indians (men and women) sorted the ore
at the mine entrances
600 mitayos worked in the mills
4,000 mingas worked in the mills, for seven
reales per day
3,000 Indians (men and women) refined lamas
for one peso per day
320 Indians worked with llamas, carrying the
ore from the mines to the mills
180 Indians brought salt to Potosi
1,000 mingas brought salt
1,000 Indian merchants brought wood
1,000 Indians brought firewood
500 Indians brought llama dung for fuel
200 Indians brought llama dung for fuel
for
use in melting the lamas
1,000 Indians made and brought charcoal
200 Indians made candles
19,000 Indians were therefore working in the larger
silver production industry

—

—

To these 19,000 should be added the 10,000 Indians who were

engaged in bringing food from Tomina, Cochabamba, Petantora,

Chuquisaca and elsewhere; families;
residents of Potosi. 24
the villa

—a

V7ell

and

30,000 other Indian

over 60,000 Indians lived in

1611 census counted 76,000.

25

Less than a

third were involved in any way with mining, and only
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one-quarter of those were mitayos
The

.

mita^

were more important, however,
than their
relative numbers suggested,
of the 4,600 mitayos
included
in the 1603 description,
4,000 worked in the
cerro.

As

apiris, they produced the ore
upon which the well-being of
everyone else depended. The
Indian labor problem at PotosI
was not caused by a lack of
Indians, but of those who were
willing to enter the mines and haul
silver ore up the long
rawhide ladders to the surface.
The 600 mingas who worked
in the mines demanded twelve
reales per day; skilled

pick-and-axe men commanded as much as
twenty-four reales
per day.
The mitayos were paid a paltry two
and one-half

£esos per week, from which a half-peso
was deducted to pay
the veedores and alcalde mayor de
minas
Thus, while the
mita was crucial to the extraction of ore,
it
.

was also an

important subsidy, saving the azogueros the
expense of
hiring mingas, less two and one-half pesos
per mitayo.^^
The increased importance of the mitayos was not

accompanied by a concomitant improvement in their status,
however.
worse.

Working conditions were bad and their treatment
Royal and viceregal orders, including Velasco's

mo St recent reforms, were constantly disobeyed.

Mitayos

we re forced to produce fixed quotas of montones or suffer

whippings, other physical abuse, extended service, or a
cut in pay. 27
rocks.

They were beaten with clubs, swords and

A case in point was Alonso Pucho, whose bag of ore
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sprung a leak while he was carrying
it to a mill.
He was
punished with blows to his head and
legs.
Another mitayo,
Juan Azero, was forced to work in
an unbuttressed
tunnel.

A cave-in smashed his leg and he died
in the hospital. ^8
Indians who were hurt while serving
in the mita

were

supposed to be paid two reales per day
while they were in
the hospital.
In truth, they were forced to hire
mingas to
take their place, even after the
Audiencia de Charcas ruled,
in 1615, that injured and dead mitayos
were not to be

replaced under any circumstances.

If they died, their wives

and children were forced to hire a substitute
or serve in
their stead. Hospitalized mitayos and their
families were

also preyed upon by priests, who charged exorbinant
sums
for religious services and demanded devastating
compensation
for funerals. 29

Food costs at Potosi were so high that the two pesos a

mitayo earned in a week were insufficient to cover his
needs.

Only by working as mingas during their occasional

weeks off could the mitayos hope to feed themselves and
their families.

Rescates were now illegal and suppressed,

and those Indians who were involved had to compete with

Spaniards and mixed-bloods.

The Protector de naturales

of Potosl sent petition after petition to Lima asking for

lower food prices, but his efforts were fruitless.

Desperate for food, the Indians often resorted to eating
30
n
their own llamas.
4-U

•
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Under circumstances such as
these it is hardly
surprising that the Indians continued
to flee from the
mita, either from PotosI or from
their villages. As in the
sixteenth century, however, the mita
was only one of the
reasons why the Indians abandoned
their pueblos. The
mistreatment of the Indians by their
caciques and
corregidores was also responsible for
their migration.
Disease took its toll on the natives as
well.
The Indians
were still recovering from the 1590s
epidemics when Cuzco
was struck by diphtheria in 1614, with
a serious loss of
32
^
lite.
Measles and smallpox made their way to PotosI
in
1

•

1619 and 1628, respectively.^^

As the number of originarios

in the villages fell, those who remained were
forced to meet

the obligations of those who had died or run away.^^

The extent to which the provinces were depopulated
was

clouded by the deception practiced by the caciques

corregidores

,

chacareros and others.

,

priests,

President Luis

Maldonado de Torres of the Audiencia de Charcas claimed
that nearly a third of the Indians in any province could be

hidden during a revisita.

Apparently that is what

happened in Sipe-sipe in 1606.

The Corregidor de Cochabamba

conducted a census that determined a severe population loss,
and he asked the viceroy to lower the mita obligation of
the pueblo accordingly.

The Corregidor de Potosi claimed

that the revisita had not reflected the true resident

population of the village, and argued against any adjustment
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Sipe-sipe's mita obligation

.

A 1619 memorial by Juan

Ortiz de Cervantes claimed that
the corregidores were
particularly adept at falsifying
population figures, but
his list of perpetrators was
long enough to cover anyone
living in the provinces.
The 1601 cgdula had been
correct when it asserted that everyone
depended upon the
Indians for their welfare. "^^
The Indians practiced the art of
deception as well.
When the Viceroy Principe de Esquilache
(1615-1621) looked
into the cause of an unusually high
female birth rate in
the obligated provinces, he discovered
that boys were being
baptized as girls to save them from future mita
service.
The number of forasteros living in the pueblos,
and on

rural chScaras, was rarely

— if

ever

— disclosed.

The number of Indians lost to the mita because of
death, flight or deception was as unclear at the time,

therefore, as it is now; and it was the subject of

continual controversy between provincial and potosino
interests.

The corregidores and caciques claimed that

there were not enough Indians to send to Potosi in the
mita.

The azogueros accused the provincial interests of

pure deception, and denied that there had been any

depopulation at all.

There was sufficient evidence on

both sides of the question to give both factions' claims
an air of credibility.

The controversy over the depopulation of the provinces

,
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reflected the competition for Indian
labor between PotosI
and those in the provinces who
needed
it as well.

Thus,

depopulation was not the real issue, but
the rhetorical
tool used by the provincial interests
against
the mita.

With the discovery of rich deposits of
silver at Oruro in
1606, PotosI was faced with a special kind
of competitor.
The initial purity of the ore at Oruro,
and the ease with
which it was extracted, attracted Indians from
all over
Upper Peru, including—according to the Cabildo
de PotosI

— some

runaway mitayos from PotosI.'*^

The Cabildo, which was controlled by the azogueros
and reflected their interests, claimed that mercury
and

Indians were being diverted from PotosI to support the new

mining center. 41
.

More specifically, the azogueros charged

that Oruro had been responsible for the failure of 560

mitayos to come from Pacajes and Omasuyos in 1609.^^

Competition from Oruro was
threat to PotosI.

a serious,

but short-term,

Hurt by the denial of mita labor and

mercury by the Viceroy Marques de Montesclaros (1607-1615)
the mines there were played out by 1612."^^

The battle for Indian labor pitted provincial interests

against the azogueros

,

and Oruro against PotosI.

The

caciques and corregidores were provincial interests who

were also responsible for delivering mitayos to PotosI.
The corregidores successfully evaded the efforts of the

viceroys and Corregidores de PotosI to hold them responsible

,
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for mita deliveries, and left
the cacicrues to deal with
the azoqueros at PotosI and
other economic interests in
the provinces.
The difficulties faced by the
caciques
are illustrated by a number of
examples from the period.
In 1608 the cacique principal
of Puna
(Porco)

Francisco Michaca, complained to the
Audiencia de Charcas
that Pedro Andrada Sotomayor was
retaining four Indians
from his village on a chScara, for
the purpose of renting
them at Potosl. A local judge had
ordered that the

Indians be returned to the cacique

,

but Andrada responded

with evidence that the four had lived on
his chacara for
thirty years. Velasco and the Viceroy
Conde de Monterrey
(1604-1606) had both ordered that an Indian who
was

resident in one place for ten years could not be
returned
to his original pueblo against his wishes.

Andrada denied

that he had any intention of renting the Indians.

Although the Audiencia 's decision is not known, the ability
of a chacarero to frustrate the efforts of a cacique is

quite clear.
The capitan enterador for the province of Pacajes,

Gabriel Fernandez Guarache, was frustrated in his attempt
to deliver the mita contingent for 16 34 by the Corregidor
de La Paz.

The cacique spent most of 1633 rounding up

Indians, identifying them with the help of other caciques

and holding them in a La Paz jail.

He acquired a

commission to conduct the reduccion and hired

a

Spanish

,

.
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^^^^^^^^ ^ith his own funds.

The Corregidor de La Paz,

however, refused to honor the commission
and set the entire
group of Indians free. Once they were
loose they fled to
even more remote areas. Fernandez Guarache
then asked that
he be allowed to resign.
The number of Indians available for shipment
to Potos£

was also restricted by the assignment of mitayos
to other
endeavors. The Jesuit colleges at Juli and Arequipa,
for

example, enjoyed the services of Indians on their
chacaras

.

They had obtained the rights to those Indians when lands

were acquired from private grantees.

Throughout the

seventeenth century the Jesuits won exceptions to royal
orders banning personal service and successfully fought
the efforts of caciques to include their Indians in Potosl

mita contingents 46
The caciques were willing to do legal battle over just
a few Indians,

such was the value of each.

Pedro Uychu of

Tinquipaya (Porco) complained in 1610 when he was obliged
to deliver four more Indians than Viceroy Velasco had

required.

Twenty-five Indians was the traditional quota

from his pueblo, with sixteen coming from his parcialidad
and nine from the other.

A revisita had determined

a total

population increase of nine Indians, warranting one more
mitayo from the village.

But when a new repartimiento de

la mita was published in 1610

Montesclaros)

,

(that of the Marques de

he found himself obligated to send twenty of
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the total of twenty-six

^"^
.

Uychu's case was unusual in that
his pueblo had
experienced an increase in population.
More common were
the villages that were only
lightly inhabited, their
residents either absent or having moved
away.
The Indians
were accustomed to traveling, with
economic enterprises
spread throughout various ecological
zones, and they
resisted any effort to keep them in one
place all year
round.
The obligations imposed on the Indians
by their
caciques and corregidores made life in the
pueblos even
less attractive.
Religious indoctrination by priests,
and their prevention of pre-hispanic sexual
practices,

were also very unpopular with the Indians.
One priest, Pedro Ramirez del Aguila, wrote the

Corregidor de PotosI in 1629 that his village of Tacobamba
was supposed to hold 200 Indians, but only he, a lieutenant
of the Corregidor de Porco, a few alcaldes and other

caciques lived there.

The Indians, he said, were all off

working lands, tending to livestock, or run away to distant
valleys and beyond.

48

Another priest, Luis de Vega, was

accused of burning the pre-hispanic village of Tolapampa
in 1616 to force its residents to live in his pueblo.

The difficulties involved in the delivery of mitayos

had earlier led to the abridgement of the Toledan

ordinances by the caciques

.

Indians who were too old or

too young were forced to serve in the mita

,

and some mitayos
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were kept at PotosI for years at
a time.
1600s even those abuses were unable

By the early

to fill the quotas

that the caciques were held responsible
for.
when they
could no longer meet their obligations
the Corregidor de
PotosI began to fine the caciques
At first nine, and
later seven and one-half pesos were
collected for every
rnitazo the caciques failed to deliver in
person, so a minga
could be hired in his place. The caciques
were also forced
to pay when the azogueros rejected the
Indians they did
deliver, as unfit for service. From these two
exactions
.

,

came a new form of mita delivery:

the entero en plata

,

or

mita service in silver.

President Maldonado de Torres noted in 1606 that the
azogueros were already accustomed to receiving service in
silver, and two years later he estimated that 20 per cent
of the mita was delivered in that

form.^-"-

Ramirez del

Aguila said, in 1629, that his village routinely "served
in silver."

He claimed that the caciques spent all their

time chasing Indians to collect the money with which to

make the payment.

The Corregidor de Potosi, Rafael Ortiz

de Sotomayor, lowered the sum from nine to seven and a

half pesos to force the azogueros to pay the mingas hired

with the money the same two and one-half pesos per week
that they paid the mitayos

.

Some azogueros had apparently

begun to reject Indians simply because receipt of service
in silver saved them the mitayos

'

wages for the week.

52
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The fraction of the mita that
arrived in Potosi in
the form of silver grew over
time to rather significant
proportions. A source from the second
decade of the

seventeenth century breaks the various
mita deliveries into
their component parts:
The pueblos of Machacopoata Aymaya
and others
^^^^"^ entirety, half in person
and half in silver with which to hire
replacements
for those who chose not to come.
2.
The
Asanaques, Uruquillas, Aullagas and Punas Quillacas,
come in
silver; only the Punas provide some in
person;
Uruquillas are lacking two-thirds because their the
villages are destroyed and the caciques have
no
control; the Quillacas fail to deliver a third.
3
The Carangas arrive in silver primarily, and
few
person; this province is destroyed by flight on
the part of the Indians, and the caciques spend
a
lot of time looking for Indians from whom to
collect
the silver necessary for the entero.
4.
The
Chayantas and Sacacas come in person; those of Santiago
del Paso and Tinquipaya comply in silver, and lack
one-half.
The Cochabambas Tapacaris y Casayas,
5.
Capmotas, Toledos and Cipicipis come in silver;
the
Cipicipis and Tapacaris lack one-half. 6. The
correqimiento of Umasuyo sends mostly persons, a
sixth or seventh in silver, and the pueblo of Pucarani
fails usually to send two-thirds.
7.
The Copacabanas
of the same correqimiento come in person, save for a
sixth or seventh in silver.
8.
The correqimiento
of Caracollo y Cicacica complies in person, and a
sixth or seventh in silver.
9.
The correqimiento
of Pacajes complies in person, and a seventh or
eighth in silver.
10.
The province of Chucuito
complies in person, save for a seventh or eighth in
silver.
The correqimiento of Cabana y Cabanilla
11.
comes mostly in silver; the pueblos of Cabana and
Cabanilla and Hicasio do not sent one for every six
that are obligated, and with an obligation of 300
they send less then 30.
12.
The correqimiento of
Paucarcolla comes half in silver, half in person,
save for the pueblo of Capachica which is in the
same condition as Cabana and Cabanilla, and that of
Puno usually fails to send one-third.
13.
The
correqimiento of Asangaro y Asillo complies in person,
less a sixth or seventh that comes in silver, and the
pueblo of Asangaro is losing population and that of
1.

,

m

,

126

^

Arapa is already broken down.
Hunoas (who although thev are in14.^ho The Orurnc
correqimi
of Cabsn;^
or
uaDana w
Cabanilla, because they a re of th^ ento
y r^u^^ATi
Canas nation, have their own
capitL rcomplv ?n
person two-thirds of the
time-Jd-the ?es? in silver
and they are always missing.
15.
Another fSur
pueblos of canas, in the sLe
corregJmlento but
in persgn/l iU a'fifth
or :L?rtha^ "'""'^
silver;
and in this way also
nLf
come those 2from the correqimiento
of Quispicancha
^ Canches'^comes
person leg^'r'"'^;!^°
^^''^''^^
^
P^^^ ^^^^ complies
in si?;eJ!
,

^

On the basis of this report, Silvio
Zavala estimates that
half of the effective mita was
delivered in silver and half
in person, while an eighth or ninth
was not delivered at
53
all.
A 1620 cgdula, responding to figures
submitted by

Contador Alonso Martinez de Pastrana, also
claimed that
over one-third of the mita arrived in Potosi
in the form
of silver. 54
in 1626 the crown asked the Viceroy Marques
de Guadalcazar (1622-1629) whether another
report that only
800 of 4,000 mitayos served in person was true.^^

Whatever the true fraction of the mita delivered in

silver— one-third

or one-half~the amount of money involved

was substantial.

A cacique who was obligated to deliver

twenty Indians each week would have to pay seventy-five
P^sos if half of them were delivered in silver.

One can

understand why Fernandez Guarache asked that he be allowed
to resign when it became clear that he would not be able to

meet his province's quota in persons.

Those who did comply

with their obligations requested prizes from the crown, for

accomplishing the impossible.

Other caciques responded
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to the news that they had been named to serve as capitanes
de la mita by joining the Indians in fleeing from their

home provinces.
Service in Silver and the Azogueros
The emergence of mita service in silver was encouraged

by developments at PotosI was well as in the provinces.

From 1600 to 1633, the azogueros suffered setbacks in
aspects of silver production that were outside their
control:

water and mercury.

There were minor technological

gains in 1602 and 1603 involving the use of small ovens and
copper, and an innovation in 1621 that reduced the number
of mingas required in the mills, but these discoveries were

unable to reverse the overall decline in the azogueros
fortunes.

57

'

The delivery of silver by the caciques to

meet their mita obligations provided the azogueros with
badly needed source of capital at

a time

a

when their own

reserves were exhausted.
The closing of the main tunnel at Huancavelica, in

accordance with the suggestions of Agia and others, had

aggravated an already tight supply of mercury.

Quicksilver

became scarce just as ore quality at Potosi took another
turn for the worse.
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The mercury shortage was then

joined, in 1608, by the effects of a severe drought.

59

azogueros again asked the crown to lower the price of

mercury and reduce the quinto to the diezmo

,

and warned

The

.

s
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that they were spending their personal fortunes
to keep
the mills in production; unless aid was
forthcoming— either
from God or the King— they would soon go bankrupt
and

Potosi would collapse.

While the azogueros clearly exaggerated their plight,
to convince the crown to grant them more assistance,
their

position had deteriorated.

The best indication of that

fact was their loss of control over capital to silver

merchants
(

aviadores

(

)

mercaderes de plata
.

)

and moneylenders

As early as 1602 many of the azogueros were

unable to repay the loans they contracted to allow them
to purchase mercury upon its arrival from Huancavelica

Although they were protected by Toledan and royal
provisions from imprisonment for debts, some of the
azogueros had renounced that right to secure an agreement

with a merchant or money lender.

As more and more of its

members found themselves jailed, the Gremio de azogueros

petitioned Velasco to extend their immunity to cases where
the right had been waived.

After considerable vacillation,

and interim decisions by the Corregidor de Potosi and his

lieutenants, the Viceroy ordered the extention of immunity
to cases where it was renounced, but he refused to make

the order retroactive.

Soon thereafter, he permitted the

royal treasury officials at Potosi to rent an azoguero

mills to satisfy his creditors.
the inclusion of the azogueros

'

The Viceroy agreed to

mitayos in the rental

'
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agreement.

There are other signs that the azogueros were
in dire
financial straits. In 1603, for example, Mesla
argued that
only eight of them had the means to buy Black slaves.

When the Gremio voted to construct new reservoirs and
aqueducts after the 1608 drought, many of the azogueros
failed to make their promised contributions.

The attempt

to collect those donations caused one of the few

intra-Gremio squabbles of the seventeenth century.
The glory years for the azogueros were clearly past.

Their battle for protection from imprisonment for debts was
a struggle to retain their privileged status in the face of

their diminished importance; the silver merchants and

moneylenders had replaced them as the financial backbone
of Potosl.

The azogueros could no longer base their claim

to privileges on Potosl's future production of silver.

they pointed to their past service and current need.

C

Now

A

When the Cabildo de Potosi sent Cristobal de Molina to
Lima in 1608 to argue against Oruro

'

s

request for mitayos

,

he asked Viceroy Montesclaros to grant a reduction in the

price of mercury and other concessions.

Molina was

followed in 16 09 by Diego Caveza de Vaca, who presented
the Viceroy with a statement outlining the azogueros

'

difficulties with water, mercury, poor ore and the mita.
The solution of problems with water and ore were obviously

beyond the Marques' capabilities.

Processions and prayers

—

.
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called upon heaven for rain, and
plans were made to bring
water from Tabaconuno. The royal
share of production,
the delivery of mitayos, and the
price and availability
of mercury, however, were all matters
that the Viceroy
could influence.

When the azogueros requested Montesclaros

•

permission

to send a procurador to Spain, he asked
them to consolidate

their position.

They responded with these seven points:

Their financial difficulties were now caused
past debts and production costs that outran by
profits
The burden of old debts needed to be lifted.
There were not enough mitayos
The corregidores
and priests conspired to strangle the mita ,~so
that the Indians would be free to work in their
enterprises
.

The Indians were spread far and wide, for the
co rregidores had failed to keep them in the pueblos.
The Viceroy's order that Oruro was not to divert
mitayos from Potosi had not been enforced, and
the failure to do so was dangerous for the future
of silver production at Potosi.

Mercury was absolutely crucial and had to be
readily available at Potosi. A reserve of
quicksilver was therefore necessary.
In recognition of the azogueros previous service
to the crown, the quinto should be lowered to the
diezmo as had been done in New Spain. Mercury,
moreover, should be distributed at Potosi at
cost.
'

,

The mitayos should work on feast days. The priests
preyed upon the Indians to collect money for their
festivals, which always ended in drunken spectacles.
It was better for the Indians to work than get drunk.

Lest the Viceroy or the crown take their arguments lightly,
the azogueros again warned that unless their needs were met
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silver production at Potosi would
come to an end. They
even threatened that the cerro might
fall into the hands
of the Protestants!^^
The threat that Potosl would collapse
without further
concessions was the key to the azogueros
bargaining
'

position.
ransom.

They were, to an extent, holding the cerro
for
The azogueros continued to apply pressure
for

more government assistance.

They sent yet another petition

to Lima in 1610, in which they asked that the
quinto be

reduced to the diezmo and that mercury be sold at cost.
They now called for the mitayos to work on Mondays rather
than on feast days, and added a request that alcabalas be
abolished.

67

In 1612 the Gremio sent Juan de Ibarra to

Spain to plead the azogueros

'

case before the crown and

the Council of the Indies; and in 1616 it despatched Juan
de Ayala to Lima.
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Finally, in 1617, the azogueros asked

the Principe de Esquilache to assist them in their efforts
to restore the mita, and the Toledan production formula in

general, to earlier levels. 69

Montesclaros was responsive to the azogueros

'

demand

that they retain exclusive access to mercury and mitayo
labor.

The Viceroy denied Oruro's request for mercury in

1608, and in 1612 he prohibited the assignment of mitayos
to new mining centers,

including Oruro.
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Thus, old

azoguero privileges were upheld, but despite the efforts
of a parade of Cabildo and Gremio procuradores

,

and threats
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that PotosI would collapse
without further aid, no new
concessions were granted.
The azogueros

use of mita service in silver
allowed

'

them to survive the production
crises of the early
seventeenth century despite their
failure to win the new
concessions. They not only used the
money the caciques
delivered to hire substitutes, but also
to pay operating
costs and their personal expenses.
Money that was not used
to hire a minga was called an "indio
de f altriquera "
,

"pocket Indian."

or

The azogueros claimed, in their petitions,

that they were spending more to produce
silver than they
gained in profits. While their profit margin
had grown
smaller, their claim that they were supporting
production

with their own fortunes was untrue.
a profit,

They were still making

but only via illegal means.

silver, the rental or sale of mitayos

Misuse of service in
,

and contraband were

the principal means the azogueros used to ensure that
their

costs remained less than their gross profits.

"^"^

The continued profitability of silver production for
the azogueros is demonstrated by their response to two

crises of the 1620s.

The first was a "civil war" between

the predominantly Basque azogueros and an alliance of other

Spaniards and Creoles

vicuna-skin hats.

— known

as the Vicunas because of their

The struggle had its roots in the late

sixteenth century, when the Basques had established
themselves as the largest single force within the Gremio
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de azogueros and the Cabildo de
Potosl.

Their political

control of PotosI was resented by the
Vicunas.

As their

economic fortunes declined in the early
years of the
seventeenth century, the Basque azogueros moved
to

monopolize the control of the larger mines at
the expense
of other groups. The Vicunas tried to block
their move
through a legal attack on the Basques' control
of
the

Cabildo and other legal means, but when those efforts
failed they resorted to force of arms.

Hostilities

smoldered from 1615 onward, bursting into violent

confrontation in 1622.

After three years of intermittent

warfare a fragile peace was finally re-gained only through
mutual exhaustion.

Because no victory had been won,

however, violence continued to flare from time to time."^^
No sooner had the "civil war" at Potosi calmed down

than the villa was inundated by a disastrous flood.

After

the droughts of the early 1600s, and with the construction
of new aqueducts and reservoirs, water had not been a great

problem.

But on March 15, 1626, the largest of the lagunas

Cari cari, collapsed.

villa

,

Water rushed down on the mills and

and the destruction was catastrophic.

With the

help of government loans of mercury, a reduction of the

quinto for a short while, and the assignment of Porco's

mitayos to reconstruction, however, the azogueros were
able to rebuild their mills.

73

Both the "civil war" and the flood disrupted silver

,

.
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production, but they did not end it.

The azogueros

'

response to those crises demonstrates
that silver mining
at Potosl was still a profitable
undertaking. The battle
between the Basques and the Vicunas for
control of
the

villa would not have been waged had there
been nothing
to fight for.
The mills would not have been rebuilt
after
the flood unless there were prospects for
future profits.
Had the silver industry really been on the verge
of

collapse, as the azogueros claimed, surely the
events of
the 1620s would have brought it down.

The emergence of mita service in silver provided the

azogueros with an element of flexibility in an increasingly
inflexible and hostile environment.

The mita was therefore

an unofficial capital subsidy as well as a forced labor
system.

The azogueros

'

misuse of service in silver

— not

to be confused with their mistreatment of mitayos who

served in person

— and

their involvement in contraband

allowed them to make a profit despite the crown's refusal
to grant them new concessions.

At the same time their

participation in those illegal activities was responsible
for their inability to secure further aid from the

government
The Government and the de facto Mita

The crown's position vis-a-vis the azogueros was eroded

further by the appearance of mita service in silver.

The

.
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new form of the mita was an
unauthorized arrangement
between the azo^ueros and' the
caciques to which it was not
a party.
Government officials in Lima and
Madrid, moreover,
were unable to determine whether
the money delivered

by the^

caci^

was used to further silver
production or for the
private aims of the azogueros. As
with earlier changes in
the de facto mita, however, the
crown could only condemn
service in silver as an abuse of the
Toledan system, and
await an opportunity to counter it on
a functional level.
The crown conceded its relative
weakness with regard to
the encomenderos and the azogueros in
1609, in its second
c|dula on Indian personal service. All of
the goals of
the 1601 edict were preserved, but Phillip
instructed

m

the Marqugs de Montesclaros to delay their
implementation

until the prospects for their realization were
more

promising 74
.

.

The azogueros

'

requests for new concessions presented

the crown with a dilemma.

Each of their proposed measures

would have lessened its share of silver production without
any firm guarantee that the azogueros would use the aid to

increase production.

The King did not want to grant the

concessions if they would only enhance the azogueros

'

position at his expense, but he also worried that their

warnings about Potosl's imminent collapse might be true.
He denied their requests to punish them for their misuse of
the mita

;

and because Potosi did not break down as they

.
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had threatened, the King was
convinced that his denial of
aid had been correct. But because
no new concessions were
forthcoming, the azogueros grew ever
more dependent upon
their misuse of service in silver
and other illegal
practices.

Viceregal efforts to counter the azogueros
ineffective for a number of reasons.
of the viceroys in Lima.

'

abuses were

One was the isolation

Luis de Velasco's successors did

not venture to Upper Peru, but relied
upon officials in La
Plata and Potosi to administer the mita. The
Conde de

Monterrey died before he was able to visit the
realm.

The

Marques de Montesclaros traveled only as far as
Huancavelica, arriving in 1608.

He found that mining

center plagued by similar problems as those at Potosl,
and

abandoned his plans to increase mercury production there.
He chose instead to confirm President Maldonado de Torres'

order that new deposits of mercury be discovered and

exploited for use at Potosi."^^

The Principe de Esquilache

and Marqugs de GuadalcSzar both followed precedent, and
did not go to Charcas
The removal of the viceroys from the everyday reality
of Potosi silver production caused them to depend upon

governing techniques much like those that were used by the
crown; and it resulted in greater opportunities for delay
and confusion.

An order issued by the king would be

modified in Lima to conform to the viceroy's view of its
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propriety and chances for success.

As noted with regard to

the 1601 cidula, the crown and
the Council of the Indies
expected that to happen. But once
the viceroys began to
direct the mita from Lima, their own
provisions, as well as
the adjusted orders of the crown,
were subjected to similar
modifications by government officials at
Potosl. Thus, not
only were the crown's orders vulnerable
to wider

interpretations of their intent and the extent
to which
they could be executed, the procedure also
took years to
complete.
The result was even greater isolation
of the

crown and the Council, and the complication of
Hapsburg

administration of the mita.
The assignment of responsibility for the mita to

officials in Charcas might not have been so significant
had authority accompanied responsibility.

But the

viceroys insisted that they remain in the position of

authority where the mita was concerned.

Luis de Velasco

held to Toledo's premise that only the viceroy, in the
name of the crown, could force the Indians to work in the
mines.

His personal involvement ranged from making broad

policy decisions to minor adjustments of his repartimiento
to reward or punish individual azogueros

"^^
.

The Conde de

Monterrey expressed his intention to continue at the head
of the mita in a direct order issued to the Audiencia de

Charcas not to meddle in mita matters.

77

Monterrey's successors reaffirmed his insistence on
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viceregal supremacy.

The Principe de Esquilache, for

example, ordered the Audiencia de
Charcas not to hear the
appeals of the azogueros he had denied
Indians in his

repartimiento .'^Q

But the viceroys, despite their expressed

intentions, were unable to exercise the
authority they so
ardently protected. Apart from the problems
caused by
distance and their reliance on local officials,
they were
'

distracted by their other responsibilities.

The Marques de

GuadalcSzar had to contend with civil strife at Potosl,
Dutch attacks on the port of Callao, Indian wars,
drought
and famine

— as

well as the Potosl mita.^^

A second cause of viceregal ineffectiveness was the
fact that ultimate authority really rested with the crown.

There were, therefore, two centers of authority:
Lima and the other in Madrid.

one in

The former was more

'

immediate while the latter was theoretically superior.
An official who disagreed with a viceroy could appeal to
the crown; one who disapproved of a royal order could argue
for its suspension by the viceroy.

No decision was ever

final, and there was little incentive to come to an

accomodation with other sectors of government.

Finally,

orders could come from either center of authority, or both,
and could therefore be inconsistent and contradictory.

A third reason for viceregal ineffectiveness was the
means used to administer the mita from a distance.

The

crown divided the responsibility for overseeing the mita
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among the various government officials
at PotosI and in
La Plata.
The Audiencia de Charcas was assigned

the task

of protecting the Indians from abuse,
but only by reporting
incidents of mistreatment to the viceroy.
The viceroys
held presidents of the Audiencia responsible
for directing
the shipment of refined silver from PotosI,
distributing

mercury from the royal warehouses, and drafting
their
repartimientos de la mita.

Corregidores de PotosI were

assigned to the daily administration of the mita and
the
supervision of the provinces' compliance with their mita
obligations.

The division of responsibility was deemed

necessary to ensure that the viceroys and the crown would
receive information from more than one source, and to

prevent the azogueros from subverting the officials who
were sent to govern PotosI.

Competition among officials was encouraged by the
design of Hapsburg bureaucracy, but in the case of the mita
the division of duties further compromised the government's

ability to administer the system.

As greater problems

developed at PotosI from 1600 to 1633, professional
jealousies and the protection of personal interests by

officials combined to foment conflicts that went beyond

healthy competition.

Feelings were particularly bitter

between the Audiencia de Charcas and government officials
in Lima.

Traditional rivalries between La Plata and Lima

had been heightened when Velasco selected the Corregidor de
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Potosl, an official who was subordinate
to the Audiencia
within the legal hierarchy, as his
personal representative
in mita matters; and Monterrey's order
to the court not to
meddle added insult to injury.
The Audiencia responded
that it would continue to protect the Indians,
for the

crown had instructed it to do so.^^

La Plata, it argued,

was much closer to PotosI than Lima, and the
court's

proximity to the cerro guaranteed the quick resolution
of
mining disputes and an ongoing concern for the mitayos.
Government officials in Lima, the Audiencia charged, cared
only about the amount of silver they sent to Spain.

When the Conde de Monterrey died after only a year in
Peru, the Audiencia de Lima claimed the right, in accordance

with a 1550 cgdula
of his successor.

,

to govern the realm until the arrival

The Audiencias of Charcas and Quito

replied to the Audiencia de Lima's pretension that they
were its equals and would administer their respective
territories.

Both courts were dismayed when the crown

backed the Audiencia de Lima in an order of November 20,
1606.
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That was not the end of the matter, however.

The silver deposits at Oruro were discovered in 1606
as well, and by the time the crown's order arrived in
Peru, Oruro and PotosI had become pawns in the struggle

between the Audiencias of Lima and Charcas.

The former

supported the new center's request for mercury and mita
labor; the latter argued that only Potosi should receive
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government assistance.

The Marques de Montesclaros
adopted

the Audiencia de Lima's stance
when he arrived in Peru, and
he ordered the Audiencia de Charcas
to obey his ban on the

delivery of mi tayos or mercury to Oruro.^^
The Viceroy fined the Audiencia de
Charcas 1,000 pesos
in gold per member when it continued
to oppose his orders.
Undaunted, the court argued for the sustenance
of Oruro in
its correspondence with the crown.
It claimed that the

new mining center was the heir apparent to

failing

a

PotosI, and should be assisted with mercury and
a mita of
its own.
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The Audiencia 's support for Oruro, it claimed,

was a courageous defense of the crown's interests—
royal

quintos and other tax revenue there had totaled 106,796
P^sos during the first six months of production; and the
sale of offices in the new villa of San Phelipe de Austria

would net its namesake another 109,800 pesos

.

Other government officials joined in the battle over
Oruro.

The Cabildo de PotosI, as one would expect, opposed

the new mining center, and its representatives

Caveza de Vaca

— were

— Molina

and

instrumental in winning Montesclaros'

rulings against concessions for Oruro.

The Corregidor de

PotosI was also pro- azoguero and anti-Oruro.

When he sent

judges to San Phelipe to retrieve the Indians who had gone
there from PotosI, however, the Audiencia de Charcas

suspended their powers.

with the Audiencia

's
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In retalitation for his alliance

lime no enemies, moreover, it withdrew
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the commissions of the judges the
Corregidor had sent to
increase the number of mitayos delivered
from the

provinces.

Corregidor

The Audiencia's right to suspend
the
's

commissions was hotly contested by officials

in Potosi, La Plata, Oruro, Lima and
Madrid, but the most

important effect of its actions was that
provincial

corregidores and economic interests found themselves
with
an important ally in their effort to keep their
Indians
from being taken off to serve at Potosl in the
mita.
The clearest indication of the viceroys' inability
to administer the mita from Lima was the constant
stream

of their reiterated, and disobeyed, orders.

In 1616,

for

example, the Principe de Esquilache reissued Velasco's
1603 provision for the delivery of mitayos

ignored.
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,

as it was being

The Marques de Guadalcazar was compelled to

repeat Velasco and Canete's orders that the mitayos were to
work only in those activities to which they had been
assigned. 92

All of the viceroys ordered the azogueros to

pay the Indians their travel allowances, but they were

never paid. 93
Indeed, it seemed as though the only impact a viceregal

order could have was the opposite of that which had been
intended.

The Principe de Esquilache found it necessary to

revoke Velasco's order empowering the royal officials at
Potosi to rent mills to pay the azogueros

'

debts.

He noted

that other creditors were always paid before the crown, and
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that some azogueros had indebted
themselves to the crown
simply to allow the rental of their
mills, and thus the
Indians assigned to them.^'*
The viceroys were very much aware of
the limitations
of their power over the Indians and the
azogueros

.

when

the crown pressed the Principe de Esquilache
to begin

establishing a resident work force at PotosI in
1619, he
responded that there was no way the required number
of

Indians could be settled, with the required lands,
near
the villa.

He said that a total of 38,241 laborers would

be needed, and allowing for four-person families the
total

Indian population would reach 191,205.

The Council of the

Indies argued that an exemption from tribute would attract
the Indians to PotosI, but the Viceroy pointed to the much

cleverer means they already used to keep from serving in
the mita or paying tribute.
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Another cedula of 1619

instructed the azogueros to pay the veedores and alcalde
n^ayor de minas

,

rather than deducting the half- peso per

week from the mitayos

'

wages.

Esquilache suspended that

order, noting that the azogueros would reject any attempt
to enforce it.
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The Marques de GuadalcSzar received a royal cgdula in
1621 that ordered him to abolish service in silver.

He

realized that execution of the order was impossible given
the extent of the abuse and the violence engulfing PotosI.
He tried, instead, to increase the percentage of the mita
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that was delivered in person,
and so empowered the
Corregidor de Potosl to suspend and
replace any corregidor
who failed to comply with his mita
obligations.^^

Royal and viceregal orders were
reissued to remind
their recipients of the goals toward
which they were
supposed to be striving. Viceregal
directives, like the

crown's cgdulas, were also designed to
increase the
ability of local officials to control those
who were living
under their jurisdiction. Thus, as with
the kings' orders,

the viceroys' edicts were at times exaggerated
so that

the goal of the order might survive its
modification by

officials at the local level.

One of the keystones to the

viceroys' directives on the mita was their insistence
that
the Toledan system was still viable, and that any
departure
for its tenets was an abuse of the mita.
In reality this "official" position was untenable, but
as an administrative tool it was employed with some success.

Each time a new repartimiento de la mita was published some

azogueros found themselves denied mitayos for their misuse
of service in silver and other abuses.

Both Velasco and

Esquilache spoke of having deprived guilty azogueros

.

The assignment of mitayos to the azogueros therefore

acquired a similarity to the granting of encomiendas

,

for

the grantees received the Indians in recognition of their

past performance.

The azogueros did not immediately protest

this shift away from the concept that the mita was part of
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their pact with Francisco de Toledo,
because they had
adopted the same tenor in their petitions
to the crown
for new concessions; and because those
who lost their
""^^^y^^ ^^^^ fe^' and were usually able
to secure Indians

in one way or another.

An example of the relationship between the
viceroys in
Lima and officials in Potosl is that of the
Marques de

Montesclaros and President Maldonado de Torres.

Maldonado

was not involved in the Audiencia de Charcas'
battle with
the Viceroy because, after 1604, he spent most
of his time
in Potosi, overseeing the despatch of silver and
the

distribution of mercury to the azogueros .^^

He supported

Potosi against the Audiencia on the question of aid for
Oruro, and he wrote his oidores that mercury and Indians

were indeed being diverted to the new mining center. "^^^
The President was greatly appreciated by the azogueros for
his flexibility and understanding; when he prepared to

leave the villa in 1607, for example, the Cabildo begged

him to

stay.'''^''"

Maldonado proposed a series of mining ordinances in
1608 that would have greatly assisted the azogueros

^^'^
.

The Viceroy was impressed with the thorough knowledge of

silver production that they demonstrated, but he was not

prepared to adopt the new guidelines.

When the crown's

second cedula on Indian personal service arrived in 1610,
however, Montesclaros empowered Maldonado to investigate

.
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the prospects for its implementation.

The President

brought a junta together in March to
consider the crown's
plan for the replacement of the mita
with a resident labor
force, but it could reach no firm
resolution.

The junta

disbanded with promises to provide Maldonado
with written
position papers on the matter.
Two of those papers have survived.

by the Jesuits of Potosl.

One was authored

it reviewed the evils of the

mita as the Fathers knew them in 1610, but argued
against
the introduction of any major novelties.

Although they

were attracted to the concept that voluntary labor might
someday replace the mita, the Jesuits believed that the

resident labor force plan was unrealistic.

They suggested

that the crown order the repopulation of the provinces

that were obligated to the mita instead, so that the

weight of the system would fall on the shoulders of more
Indians
A second paper is identifiable only by those who signed
it:

Juan Martinez de Mecolaeta, Juan Maria DSvalos de

Castillo, Juan Ndfiez de Ovando, Pedro de VerSstegui and

Fernando Joan de Ibarra.

These gentlemen were all members

of the Cabildo de PotosI, and as one might expect, they

also supported the continuation of the status quo."^^^

Maldonado 's investigation of the 1609 cgdula repeated
the process that Velasco had undertaken in 1603, in response
to the 1601 edict, and it arrived at the same conclusion:

^
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the mita was necessary and irreplaceable.

In keeping with

that decision, the President prepared
a new repartimiento
in June of 1610 that involved no major
changes of the
system; the mita ordinaria included 4,413
Indians '"^^
.

When the Principe de Esquilache published his
repartimiento
in 1618,

the only changes he had made were to limit
the

number of mitayos assigned to the soldados (to
200) and to
reserve

some

200

others for use in future adjustments

caused by complaints or unforeseen need.
totaled 4,29 4.^°^

His mita ordinaria

The Marqugs de GuadalcSzar followed the

lead of his predecessors in 1624, and assigned the

responsibility for his repartimiento to President Diego de
Portugal of the Audiencia de Charcas.
"^ita

On that occasion the

ordinaria was reduced to 4,175 Indians

azogueros and 283 for the soldados

— 3,982

for the

°

None of these repartimientos gave any indication that

mita service in silver existed, and the first two ignored
the fact that the provinces were having a difficult time

supporting the system.

Everyone knew that the number of

Indians an azoquero really had, or how he used them, bore
little resemblance to the number of Indians he received on
paper.

These repartimientos simply ensured that the status

quo would not be disturbed.

President Portugal's repartimiento

,

however, did show

some signs that the originario population of the provinces

was no longer able to support a 4,000-Indian mita ordinaria.
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The Indians who habitually failed
to come to Potosi were
now distributed among all of the
azogueros so they would
all share some of the burden of the
missing and
,

uncooperative ayllus

.

The meses, who had earlier been

assigned to support activities in and around
Potosi,
now found themselves included in the contingents

that were

sent to the mines and the mills. -"-^^
The government's efforts to reverse the effects
of

Indian migration had been as unsuccessful as its
attempts
to control the azogueros

.

Velasco had been encouraged by

the crown to return the forasteros to their villages,
and
the Marques de Montesclaros received very explicit orders
to do so in 1607.

The Marques ordered two oidores of the

Audiencia de Charcas to conduct the reducciones, but they
refused; the task, they argued, was impossible for two men
to perform.

^

The Principe de Esquilache ordered the

forasteros in La Plata and at Potosi either to return home
or serve in the mita, but most of them did neither.

Because no local official took an interest in the matter
the Viceroy's order had little

effect.''""'""'"

In 1623 the

Marquis de GuadalcSzar told President Portugal to have
each corregidor hold the forasteros who were living in
his district until their own corregidores or caciques

could come for them. 112

Like the earlier edicts, this

last directive was thoroughly unenforceable.

Guadalcazar was convinced, nevertheless, that the Indian
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population of the pueblos would not
support the mita at its
current levels for very long. He
wrote the crown that the
quotas demanded of the provinces
should be reduced to
one-seventh of their originario population,
no matter what
the effect on silver production at
Potosi might be.
He

received the King's permission to proceed,
but because he
feared that the azogueros might revolt if
the downward
revisions were implemented all at once, the
Marqugs waited
for the pueblos to request revisitas before
lowering
their

quotas.

Seven such revisitas were conducted during the

last years of his viceroyalty, and the mita
obligations of

Caquiavire, Macha and other villages were lowered.
"^i^^

The

ordinaria was reduced by a total of 147 Indians

^

The Marqugs de Guadalclzar was replaced in 1629 by the

Conde de Chinch6n (1629-1639)

.

Phillip iv sent the new

Viceroy a cedula on February 18, 1631 that ordered him to
determine whether mita obligation should be extended to
more provinces.

A 16 30 memorial had claimed that one-third

of the Indian population in the mita provinces had been

lost since Toledo's viceroyalty.

The crown was now

convinced that the reducciones that it had so often ordered
were impossible and that a resident labor force was also
unrealistic.

The Conde was instructed to sell the lands

that had been left by the long-absent

ChinchSn

Indians.''""'"'^

was reluctant to concede defeat on the reducciones

,

however,

and he responded that there already were not enough lands
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on which to settle the few Indians who were
returning to
their pueblos. He warned that the sale of
their lands
would permanently remove any possibility of
resettling the

Indians in their villages in the future, but the
crown

insisted that the Viceroy comply with its earlier
order
in another of 1634.^^^

The Conde de Chinchon was therefore

faced with the need to develop another means for reconciling

Potosl's insatiable demand for mitayos and the depleted

originario population in the provinces.
Summary
The seventeenth century opened with a royal order to

abolish the mita

,

included in the crown's 1601 cedula

banning Indian personal service.

The edict came in

response to the King's deteriorating position vis-a-vis
the colonists, both the encomenderos and the azogueros

,

and it was meant to strengthen Viceroy Velasco's ability
to combat those powerful Peruvian interest groups.

mita, in fact, was never really threatened.

The

Indeed, the

investigation conducted by Velasco in 1603 underscored
Peru's dependence upon Potosi silver production, and

Potosl's dependence on the mita

.

Mitayos constituted only a small percentage of the
total Indian labor force at Potosl, but they were the most

important workers there.
cerro as apiris

,

The mitayos toiled inside the

hauling silver ore out of the mines for

.
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refining in the amalgamation mills.

Mingas worked

voluntarily in the mills and in support
activities, but
they would rarely do the work that the
mitayos were forced
to perform; and when they did, they
demanded very high
wages
The mitayos' increased importance was not
reflected in
their working conditions.
Indeed, the work inside the

mines was harder than ever, and they were seriously

mistreated as well.

The mitayos

to meet their needs,

let alone to make service in the mita

attractive to them.

The perquisites that Toledo had

'

wages were insufficient

provided for that purpose, and his provisions for their
good treatment, were now things of the past.

In response

to their deteriorating situation, the Indians fled from

the mita.

Indian migration was also caused by their flight from
the provinces to escape the oppression they suffered at
the hands of their caciques

,

priests and corregidores

.

Viceregal immunity from taxation and mita obligation for
forasteros, the growing need for labor on chacaras and in

other enterprises, and the opening of new mining centers
also caused the Indians to leave their pueblos.

Many

migrated to completely outside the provinces obligated to
the Potosl mita.

The economic interests that competed

with the azogueros for Indian labor blamed the mita for

depopulating the provinces, but it was only one of many
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causes.

The magnitude of the demographic
decline in the
mita provinces is unclear, moreover,
because of the

deception practiced by the provincial
interests, the
failure to include forasteros in censi,
and the various
means used by the Indians to evade their
obligations.
The caciques were the key to the mita,
as they had

been in the sixteenth century.

The developments in the

provinces and at Potosi from 1600 to 1633 made
it even
more difficult for them to deliver mitayos to
the

azogueros than before.

The methods they had used

earlier— keeping Indians at Potosi longer than was
permitted, bringing old men and boys to serve in the mita,
etc.

— were

no longer adequate by the early 16 00s.

The

caciques were fined nine, and later seven and one-half,
P^sos for every Indian they could not deliver in person,

ostensibly so that a minga could be hired in his place.
The azogueros

'

efforts to maintain their profits in

the face of production crises

shortages, and lower-quality

caciques

'

'

and water
the

difficulties with the delivery of mitayos

marriage of the azogueros
caciques

— caused by mercury
ore — coincided with

'

.

A

need for capital and the

payment of fines led to a new form of the mita:

service in silver.

The azogueros used some of the money

they collected from the caciques to hire mingas

,

but they

also used some to defray production costs and other

expenses.

The mita, therefore, became something more than a
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draft labor system.

it was now an unofficial
capital

subsidy as well.

By 1630, the percentage of
the mita that
the azogueros received in silver
had grown to between
one-third and one-half of the total
entero.

Service in silver could not be stopped
by the Hapsburg
government. The crown's relative
powerlessness to affect

developments in Peru was admitted in its
second cedula on
personal service in 1609. Not only did
the King suffer
the effects of spatial isolation,
however, he
also found

himself atop an ever more complicated colonial
bureaucracy.
The viceroys in Lima were also ineffective,
in part because
they depended upon government officials in
Charcas to
administer the mita, and employed the same techniques
to
rule Potosi from afar that the crown used to govern
the

Indies:

exaggerated legal demands, and the division of

responsibilities among local officials.

A second tier of

bureaucratic flexibility was created, and authority was
divided between Lima and Madrid.

The viceroys' efforts

were also compromised by the vigorous infighting between
the Audiencia de Charcas and other government officials.

The government was also unable to conduct new

reducciones
Upper Peru.

,

or otherwise control the Indians who lived in

The crown's plan for the establishment of a

resident work force at Potosi to replace the mita was
deemed impossible to execute as well.

But some means were

needed to solve the problems created by the inability of
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the provinces to support the
system.

The Viceroys' direction of the
mita from Lima, and thus
their dependence on the officials
stationed at PotosI,

caused their orders to become
exaggerated, so they could
withstand modification at the local level.
One of the

official positions the viceroys' adopted
for that purpose
was that the Toledan mita was still
viable,
and that any

digression from its tenets represented an abuse.

On the

basis of that stance the viceroys removed
mitayos from
some of the azogueros for their indulgence in
"pocket
Indians" and other abuses.

The azogueros did not quickly

challenge the viceroys on the issue because their

directives were generally defused in practice by the
presidents of Charcas and corregidores de Potosi.

Those

officials were the buffer between viceregal orders and

potosino reality that allowed the de facto mita to
continue despite the viceroys' "official" position.
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Notes for Chapter III
^'

(Velasoof ^'rof

l"-153v, "Provisi6n del virrey

conforms a lo ordenldo aau?

^" reraitirlos

H»

Velas^!:d?^^o„pL^,--,-ria''^^^^^
de las minas del Cerro de Potosi
y su conservaci6n el
"^^^^^^^ as^^^an perSonalmente
ai'^rabai^^d^ ^? "'"^ ^
oro para el corregidor que no lo
McJese cumplir,
niciese
cu^pJr "''fnrp^^
Los Reyes, 14. III. 1601 (MC448;
MOM 420).
c^dula is discussed at length in
Zavala,
c^^r-Jnir.'^^^
Servicio personal li, 3-4.
,

Zavala, Servicio personal.
"Memorial
.. sobre la cldul a
del servicio personal de los indios.
1603," Pareceres
thFTTiHtlie was
1
3,

'^^'ai^o^^^^m'^^^^^^^^^^'
Alfonso Mesla Venegas,
5;

.

^^JtU'j,
4.

Zavala, Servicio personal

5.

Ibid

.

,

4-5.

6.

Ibid

.

,

5.

,

ll,

4.

Ibid.; K. V. Fox, "Pedro Muniz, Dean of Lima,
and
the Indian Labor Question (1603)," The Hispa nic
Amerilean
Historical Review XLII (Durham, 1962T,~64T
7.

,

Zavala, Servicio personal II, 5-6; Campo
de la
Rynaga, 23, says the orders to suspend were secret,y
and
Perez de Tudela, 367, agrees (on the basis of Solorzano
Pereira, I, 270~Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles edition:
"43.
Y aunque por la otra de 24. de Noviembre del
mismo ano, que llaman del Servicio personal cap
13. y cap
15. se quiso alterar esta forma, y se
mand6 sefialar t^rmino de dos ahos S los mineros,
para que dentro d§l se proveyesen de esclavos,
y
de gente de servicio para el beneficio de las minas
viendo que esto, aunque era facil de decir, havia de
ser dificil de executar, y parcticar, se le embi6
orden secreta para que la suspendiese: Si hallase
que de ello podian resultar inconvenientes 6 que
8.

,

,

.

.

,

,
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iSlavSr
esciavos
,

6 Indios voluntarios

.

—

suficientement,. con
nnrrmo i. TD^..i-

voluntad no era sue esta labor
c^iffiT F^ef^ se
ie^a
£e
xa labranza
^
it^afff
=
n^f^6 crianza.)
FOX, 65, says that the
"general sentiment" was against it.
9.
Campo y de la Rynaga, 26.
,

10.

^-^-^lOmifT

Ibid., 25, for the list of
contributors.

Zavala, Servicio persona l, ll, 17-22
for '
^
fei-Ugart^,
Pareieres
jurldicos
?u?£diIos''2?'T"?
21, includes some mention of Agia
,
in his
introduction to Mes£a Venegas' arguments.
^^""^ °? Agia's retraction is included at the
^nH^^;
end of rl^^
Campo y de la Rynaga.

Fox, 65-69, for his commentary; 86-88
for an
outline of Muniz' paper; and 75-86 for
a
13.

transcription of

Mes£a Venegas (see note 3), 94-123.
14.
for a discussion of the axiom that the

for the survival of Catholicism.

See Fox, 71
mita was necessary

orders included in notes 16, 19, and 20, ^cxuw,
below,
^n'^^'.r
'^^f
all
refer to the 1601 c€dula.
BNB, MSS 2, fs. 153-154v, "Provisi6n de don Luis
de yelasco, virrey del Perd:
El corregidor de Potos£ y los
de las demSs provincias de donde fueren indios
a las
hagan pagar a §stos lo que les corresponda tanto para minas
la
Ida como para la vuelta," Lima, 14. XI. 1603 (MC
475; MOM
438).
See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal II, 8-9.
16.

,

ANB, EC 1689-31, f s 423-424, "Provisi6n del
virrey:
Segdn la ordenanza del virrey Toledo, solamente el
hijo legitimo mayor del cacique principal sea reservado del
tributo y la mita; solamente los demSs hijos legitimes del
cacique principal sean reservados de la mita;
ningun otro
indio, aunque sea hijo de segunda persona o de y cacique de
huaranca, pisca pachaca y pachaca sea reservado del tributo
ni la mita," Lima, 3. XII. 1603 (MC 476a; MOM 440).
See,
also, Zavala, Servicio personal II, 9.
17.

.

,

BNB, MSS 2, f s
168-168v, "Provisi6n librada por
don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Peru, para que en cada
pueblo que hubiere de 200 indios para abajo esten
18.

.

.

.

.
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reservados de mita solamente un oficial
de sastre otrn
"
zapatero. otro tintorero de lana
otro
y
s!l?ero qie
tiendas ptlblicas, y en los pueblos de
200
Tn^^ni^""
mdios para arriba a dos de cada uno de los
oficios
mencionados/' Los Reyes, 5. XI. 1603 (MC
472; MOM 436)
See
also, Zavala, Servicio personal II,
9-io.
,

BNB, MSS 2, fs. 147-148v, "Provisi6n
de don Luis
de Velasco, virrey del PerQ:
en conformidad a
cSdula que es notoria, las personas a quienes la real
estSn
repartidos indios para las minas de Potosl no
puedan
traspasarlos, ni hacer donaci6n de ellos, ni
venderlos, ni
enajenarlos en ninguna forma, ni prestarlos,
y si hiciese
lo contrario los indios se dan por vacos desde
lueqo, y se
comete al corregidor de Potosl ejecutar en las
personas y
contraventores
las
penas
7^^^?^.?^.-^°^
senaladas," Lima,
14. XI. 1603 (MC 474a; MOM 437).
19

BNB, MSS 2, f s 158-158v, "Provisi6n del virrey:
no se carguen los indios en este reino," Lima, 14. XI.
1603
(MC 476; MOM 439)
20.

.

BNB, MSS 2, fs. 135-139v, "Provisi6n librada por
don Luis de Velasco, virrey del PerQ, para que la que se
expidi6 en 1596. XI. 1 estableciendo la orden que se habia
de tener con los indios de la provincia de Chucuito que
van a la mita de Potosl, que aqui se inserta, se guarde
y
cumpla con todos los indios de mita de Potosl," Los Reyes,
10. IV. 1603 (MC 468; MOM 433).
This order followed an
earlier exhortation for corregidores to follow the program
established for Chucuito: BNB, MSS 2, fs. 182-183v,
"Provisi6n del virrey: Los corregidores de cuyos partidos
van indios a las minas de Potosl tengan el mayor cuidado
en remitirlos conforme a lo ordenado aqui, de manera que
no haya fraudes, atrasos, ni f alias," Los Reyes, 30. VI.
1601 (MC 453; MOM 424)
21.

22.

,

II,

3.

Pgrez de Tudela, 368 (based on Sol6rzano Pereira,
262-271 Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles edition)
23.

I,

Zavala, Servicio personal

—

24.
"Descripci6n de la villa y minas de Potosi," 377378.
The 1601 cgdula had called for such a profile. The

figures included here correlate with the 1611 census at
Potosl:
160,000 inhabitants, including 76,000 Indians
(Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de 1793), 3738)
Padden, xx, interprets these figures differently; he
does not include the 19,000 among the 30,000 total, and
therefore derives an Indian population of 79,000. He also
.

.
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notes the 1611 figures from
Baquijano v Carrilln

on
°^ ^^^^

HersoJl,^!?? I'lZlual's an

140
80

280
2

100
200
80

200
200
500
13. 000

— mill owners
— mine owners
— employees of mills
— mayordomos per mill
~- miners
oversee Indians
— Spaniards
involved in
rescates
— involved in carting ore
— merchants
— officials (or artisans)
— foreign merchants
— indios de obligaci6n

mitayos
this list r '^st be considered incomoletf^ fn
minaas are not included. Baquijano
y CarrillS's letl
figures include 3,000 Spaniards;
35,000 Creoles- 40 000
Europeans; 6,000 mulatos, zambos, aAd negros
Pedro de
Lodena, Corregidor de Potosl, won a royal
order in 1602 to
castigate 4,000 "gente suelta
y valdia":
ANB, CRC 292,
Copia de una cedula real dirigida a la
Audiencia de
Plata:
Favorgzcase a don Pedro de Luduena, corregidorLa
de
Potosl, en el castigo de la gente suelta
que hay en la
villa, asl como lo demSs tocante a la
administraci6n de
justicia y buena marcha de las minas, en vez de
irle a la
mano como suele," Tordesillas, 22. II. 1602 (MC
456).
The
°^scripci6n de la villa y minas de Potosl" lists
6,000 Spaniards:
4,000 male and 2,000 female.
(

1793)

)

S^g^ij^no y Carrillo, no. 212

,

37-38

(13 de

enero de

For mitayo wages, see the "Descripci6n de la villa
y minas de Potosl," 384, among others.
Pgrez Bustamante
quotes extensively from the account of the Carmelite
Vazquez de Espinosa, who visited Peru between 1617 and
1619; see 302-303, for the passage on Potosl, including the
wages paid to mitayos and mingas
"Pareceres de los
Padres de la Companla de JesQs de Potosl.
1610,"
Pareceres jurldicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte)
120, says that
mingas earned nine pesos per week until Corregidor Ortiz
de Sotomayor reduced the sum to seven and one-half.
That
action, the Jesuits contended, had reduced the number who
were willing to serve in the mines from 1,200 to 600.
Another reason why service in the mines was unpopular was
that the tunnel owners charged passage for Indians to
enter the cerro through them. BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 353-354v,
"Tltulo de veedor del cerro de Potosl provisto por el
26.

.

,
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Zavala, Servicio personal

27.

ParecerlTj^Hdifer^

,

13-17- MesTa
Vargas Ugarte), 113.

II,

^^^^ ^°te 133, Chapter II), fs
^^^^s
of
abuse in the cerro from 1600 to
f^J^i^
^llr including
1628,
the two examples cited:

226^2^?^'

BNB, MSS 2, f. 138 (see note
21), for Velasco's
comments on priests who took all of the
Indians'
funerals and masses on their behalf.
Forthr??^^S
For
the 1615 decision that sick and dead
mitayos were not
"Ci^ItSl^ de acuerdo
del cabildo
cabSdrdf'poJ'n''^^^
de Potosi:
Que Juan Altamirano, escribano de
este cabildo vaya a La Plata
y suplique ante la audiencia
P'''' ^^^^ expedida a solicitud del protector
iL^^'^'V^''^''
de naturales
de esta villa para que se rebajen del
numero
de mitayos que sirven en las labores de minas
los muertos
y enfermos, pues ello acarrearia la total destruccion del
trabajo,
Potosi, 16. X. 1615 (MC 580; MOM 513). For
GuadalcSzar's approval, two sources: a) BNB, MSS
7, fs
56-66, "Provisi6n librada por el marques de GuadalcSzar
virrey del Perti, a petici6n de don Antonio Cer6n,
protector
de naturales de Potosi, para que el corregidor
de dicha
villa no consienta que habiendo enfermado o lastimSndose
algQn mitayo quedando imposibilitado el azoguero
reclame
otro mdio en lugar del primero ni que gste pague algo
para
mmgar otro indio, quedando la falta a cuenta del azoguero
hasta la venida de una nueva mita;
y que el mitayo que
hubiese lastimado en la mina el dueno de ^sta le dg dos
reales al dla hasta que se cure," Los Reyes, 9. II. 1626 (MC
624; MOM 539); and b) BNB, MSS 7, fs. 74-78v, "Provisi6n
librada por el marques de GuadalcSzar, virrey del Peru,
para que no obstante lo alegado por el procurador general
de Potosi a nombre de los azogueros de dicha villa, se cum
pla la provisi6n del dicho marques, de 1626 II 9, inserta ,~
sobre lo que se ha de hacer cuando un mitayo enferma o se
lastima en la mina, asi como la del virrey Toledo, de
Potosi, 2. II. 1574, asimismo inserta, para que ni aun con
indios de huelga se suplan las faltas de los enfermos y
lastimados, quedando los capitanes de la mita obligados a
suplirlos con los indios que les estSn repartidos," Los
Reyes, 13. XI. 1626 (MC 637; MOM 548).
See Zavala, Servicio
personal II, 34, for President Maldonado's proposed
ordinances to combat these problems, in 1608.
29.

•

,*

,

.

,

.

.
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rescates, see Zavala, Servicio

3/1

ner-^nn;.!

tt

-3l°Slo^r:j?^,o1 ^Se

a^^stai^L^Si^F^'L"

^^^-^^

Que'^'los'lAdio^'no" ° iL
rancherlas pan de triao rebazo"
(the Indians were said to be able
to li?e on chufio and
Creoles), Potosl, OT.?S?o
(Sc'557r)'^%or?^""^'
^'^''^^^^^'^^ llamas, BNB, CPLA
31v "rfif^-nTo^,
31v,
Capltulo de acuerdo del cabildo de PotosI: 16, f.
Que el
corregidor de esta villa confirme a Juan
VSzquez de Castro
cumplimiento de
l^ordenan^^ ?°''
prohibe
la
^""^
matanza
de Hamas que
=L? hacer
K
suelen
los indios que residen en esta villa,
dedonde
siguen grandes inconvenientes para los
trajines v
particularmente para el de los metales de esta villa,"
PotosI, 8. VI. 1618 (MC 596; MOM 520).
"^^^^.^^^
^endf enia
P^^^^
T^K
T 5-^

^

"RelaciSn del Senor Virrey Don Luis de Velasco
al
Conde de Monterrey sobre el estado del Peru,"
28
XI
VSn?^
1^04' lios virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez),
Peru il
(no. 281)
52 (from the manuscript in the Real Acidiiia de
la Historia, Colecci6n Munoz, XXII, fs.
54-71v)
c

-^"^'^

,

32.

Dobyns, 509.

BNB, CPLA 16, f. 147, "Capltulo de acuerdo del
cabildo de Potosi: Se nombre a los capitulares Luis
Hurtado de Mendoza, alcalde ordinario, y Pedro de
Ballesteros, veinticuatro, por diputados para que acudan
3unto con don Francisco Sarmiento de Sotomayor, corregidor
de esta villa, a la cura y regalo de los indios de mita
con motivo de la actual epidemia de sarampi6n," PotosI,
1. VIII. 1619 (MC 598; MOM 521); BNB, CPLA 18, f s
279v-280,
"Capltulo de acuerdo del cabildo de PotosI: N6mbranse
diputados para que distribuyan azdcar, carnero, pasas, pan,
chuno y papas a los indios enfermos de viruela que hay en
las parroquias de esta villa," PotosI, 4. IV. 1628 (MC 652;
33.

.

MOM 557)

.

34.
Castillo (AGI Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30,
Chapter II), 11, for comments on the 1617 order of the
Principe de Esquilache meant to counter Indian absence from
home pueblos; Zavala, Servicio personal II, 27-28, for
fugitives hidden on chScaras. Also, BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 241243v, "Acuerdo del cabildo de PotosI:
Habiendo el
,

,
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corregidor don Rafael Ortiz de
Sotomayor
resistencia que hacen los corregidores? proDuesto 1^
cac^aues v
entero'de la Lll^alTLLo de
esta villa, se resolvi6
lltTTAr
t^'^T-^.' pedir al virrey
y al presidente

t

ly. IX. 1609

(MC 544;

r^i,ui>j.,

MOM 490).

ANB, M 123, no. 2, "Carta de su
Ixcenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, presidente el
a^es?a Real'
tribunal
debe
favorecer
^
en todo a que la
mitf d^'pn.
mantenga
^®
sin
disininuci6n alguna,"
Si^ ?
said that revisitas were so fraught^^5)' 2 fs.^Ma?donado
sa^r^Aat
with fraud that it was
better not to permit them.
35.

^

"^^^^^
Lodena, corregidor
p^; f^^' ^
Audiencia:
Sehala los inconv4nienterqSe
^^^2
n^r-r^?^f'
K
traba^o
del cerro se siguen de la rebaja de mitayos
^nl^
como ?i
la de esta audiencia ha ordenado en los
indios de
Cochabamba," Potosi, 29. XI. 1606, If.
mr^4ir'MnM°I^;jf^^
(MC
496; MOM 454).
ANB M 123, no. 2 (see note 35) was
written in support of this letter.
,

37.

Cited in Campo y de la Rynaga, 57-61.

Basadre, "El Rggimen," 325, includes this quote
from the 1601 cgdula (my translation):
"That inasmuch as
the Indians are useful to everyone, and for everyone,
everyone must look after them and their conservation, for
everything will cease without them
."
38.

.

39.

Cobb,

.

.

"Potosi and Huancavelica

,

"

98.

BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 241-243v, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
40.
Ante la inminente ruina de estas labores de minas por la

falta de mitayos, por las razones que se enumeran,
envlense algunos regidores ante el presidente de la
audiencia de Charcas por el remedio y escrlbase sobre lo
mismo al virrey del PerG," Potosi, 19. IX. 1609 (MC 543;
MOM 489); BNB, CPLA 12, f. 251v, "Capitulo de acuerdo del
cabildo de Potosi: Que se escriba al presidente de la
audiencia de Charcas y al fiscal sobre la retenci6n de los
indios de mita de esta Villa en Oruro," Potosi, 21. X. 1609
(MC 546; MOM 492).
For Oruro s ability to repulse the
Cabildo 's own efforts, BNB, CPLA 12, f. 142, "Acuerdo del
cabildo de Potosi: Que se pida a la audiencia de Charcas
provisi6n para traer preso a esta Villa a Juan de la
Portilla Aguero, teniente de corregidor de Oruro, por la
resistencia opuesta a Pedro Gonzalez de Menera, juez de
comisi6n para sacar los indios de mita de esta Villa
'
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retenidos en ese asiento," Potosl,

3. X.

1608

(MC 535a;

MOM

in-depth look at the politics of PotosI
f"^;including
the azogueros' hold on the'^Cabiido,
see ^respo
c^ls^o
R.
La guerra entre Vicunas
Vascongados
y
•

,

.

BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 241-243v (see
note 40).

42.

Rynaga, 21, for the mines playing out
^
Viceroy Montesclaros was responsible for
denyina
mercury; see ANB, M 86, no!
"SrL^dr'%^^."^^^^^°"
Audiencia al rey en su real coAsejo de
^nd?L
las Indias:
El marques de Montesclaros, virrey
del Peru
ha resuelto avocar a si todos los asuntos
del Cerro de
PotosI como cosa de gobierno, con desmedro
de
:urisdicci6n de esta audiencia y dano de las la
partes por
las distancia; tambien ha prohibido
socorrer a las minas
de Oruro con azogue," La Plata, 17. III. 1608
(MC
Campo y de la Rynaga, 26, says that the Viceroy 523)
was ordered
by the crown, in 1607 and again in 1611, not
to permit the
employment of mitayos at Oruro. Zavala, Servicio
personal,
II, 50, says that Montesclaros banned
mitas for new mining
zones in 1612, including Oruro.

by 1612.

'

ANB, M131, no. 1, "Recur so ante la audiencia
La Plata.
Don Francisco Michaca, cacique de Puna,
provincia de Porco, sobre unos indios de dicho pueblo
quienes retiene injustamente en su chacra don Pedro
Andrada Sotomayor y pretende mingarlos para las minas
cerro de Potosi," 21 II -14 .XI 1608 13 fs. (MC 535i;
44.

.

476)

.

.

,

de
a

del

MOM

.
m

ANB, M 123, no. 11, "Don Gabriel Fernandez
Guarachi, indio, capitSn general para el entero de la mita
de Potosi en 1634, sobre los impedimentos que don Antonio
Mogoll6n de Ribera, corregidor de La Paz, le opuso por sus
particulares intereses al cumplimiento de dicha comisi6n
en la provincia de Pacajes," La Paz, La Plata, and
Caquiaviri, 2 VIII-24 .XII 1633 30 f s (MC 683; MOM 569).
45.

.

.

,

.

ANB, EC 1762-16, "Recurso a la audiencia de
Charcas:
El padre Fernando Doncel, de la Compania de
Jesus de la Plata, y a nombre de los colegios de Arequipa
y Juli, sobre que se les ampare en la pocesi6n de indios
yanaconas exentos de la mita de Potosi que gozan por
provisiones vicerreales, para sus haciendas del Collao,"
1589-1696, 101 fs. (MC 1136a).
46.

47.

ANB, M 123, no. 5,

"Don Pedro Uychu, cacique del

,
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±e compeia a dar mas de los
veintecinco Indios de mita n»r=.
'J"^
^ aicho pueblo el virJev
nr
31-VIII-24.IX.1610,'8 fs.
560a;
MOM t02°!'

«

Of ^?s

iS^ii^

^ih^^^;si.^^;^^?'p-%5t\r?6?ri^ir

ANB, C 1215, "Memorial de Luis de Vega,
cura
vicario del asiento de Tomahavi, provincia de
audiencia de Charcas: Contra la acusaci6n de Porco, a la
haber gl
quemado las casas de los indios acarapis
Tolapampa, para obligarlos a reducirse al y sibaruyus de
pueblo de
Tomahavi," Tomahavi, 13. XI. 1616, 8 fs. (MC
586a; MOM 517a).
In his zeal, Vega says of the PotosI mita
"Para la mita de Potosi los llevan 20 leguas.
pierdan su hazienda y libertad, q^ es inestimable,
se ahorcan por no yr alia, se depenan, toman
veneno, y se echan en los rios, malpazen las
prenados por estos caminos y otros mil danos.
y no es lejos ni caro. y para venir a missa 1.
legua o dos es lejos
"
49.

;

For the origin of mita service in silver, see
50.
Zavala, Servicio personal II, 69.
His information comes
from an anonymous and undated paper entitled "De la mita
de Potosi, y reducciones del Reino." The paper is
published in a Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations
edition, Livro Primeiro do Governo do Brasil, 1607 -1633
(Rio de Janeiro:
Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1958)
7-28.
A margin note on the document says it was obtained
from "Dom Rafael Ortis." Don Rafael Ortiz de Sotomayor was
Corregidor de PotosI from 1608 to 1617, and from the
context of the paper I believe it was produced during his
tenure (the Principe de Esquilache is said to be the most
recent viceroy)
Zavala discusses the paper on II, 67-70.
A 1620 cgdula against the entero en plata said it responded
to Contador Alonso Martinez de Pastrana's report; perhaps
he was the author of the paper.
The 1620 edict is noted
in note 54, below.
,

.

51.

ANB, M 123, no.

Servicio personal

,

II,

2

32,

(see note 35); and Zavala,

respectively.

Ramirez del Aguila, 118-120; Jesuits of Potosi,
"Pareceres de los Padres" (see note 26), 120. Both sources
note the cause of the reduction from nine pesos per week.
52.

.

164

™!

described in note 50.
personal

lb passage is fro.
quoted

Zavalari^^

,

i?? 68-69

^
251v-253, "Cidula real a la
andf^;^.^''^
audiencia de nt^
Charcas:
Informe al virrev sobre lo
oi
^^"^^^^^
Pastrana pLpone qie ^ara
^'I'^'^'r
""'"'"^ ^
'^^^^ le m??ayos,
respec^Lame^S""'"
socavones que atraviesen
el cerro de nar;.^
P^""^^' ^
mitayos y se
^^^^^^
enc^r^^?. ! ?los senores
de minas e ingenios que reciben
h2 ?o=
de
los indios siete pesos semanales
para no trabaiar en
las minas
/' Madrid, 15. VII. 1620
(MC
Another copy of the order is AGI, Charcas6^?; mSm 525)
"tanto de el CapO de Carta de Su Magd al 266? no 25B
Priniipe de
esquilache virey sobre Los indios de plata
de Potossi,"
Z fs., of the same date.
See, also, Zavala, Servicio
^^^^^"^
Escalona y Aguero— see note
\
??^^''rh
116, Chapter II).
Crespo, Guerra, 19, cites a letter
Sarmiento de Sotomayor to the crown, Potosi,
Q
S"'J^q''';J^^5°
9 V. 1619 (AGI, Charcas 52), that claims that
one-third of
the mitayos were missing.
'

™f

'

^

.

55.

.

.

Zavala, Servicio personal

,

II,

79-80.

56.
Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C— see note 30,
Chapter II), 8, says that the entire population of
Condes,
some 1,240 Indians, failed to come in the mita. They
were
joined, he says, by Moromoros, Chachacas and~Ancocabas
I have seen two instances were caciques
sought compensation
for their service as capitanes
a) ANB, ACh.LA 14, fs.
14V-15, "Parecer de la Audiencia de La Plata en la
informaci6n de servicios de don Antonio Peraza de Ayala
y Rojas de Gomera, gobernador de la provincia de Chucuito,"
La Plata, 23. XI. 1601 (MC 454; MOM 426); and b) AGNP,
Derecho Indiano, C. 79, "Testimonio de los autos seguidos
por D. Bias Ignacio Catacora, Cacique principal de Accra
en la provincia de Chucuito, a fin de que se le acordasen
las gracias y premios a que sus mayores se habian hecho
acreedores por sus servicios al Rey, y su continua
asistencia a la pesada mita de Potosi," (incomplete),
:

1625,

152 fs.

ANB, C 799, "Capltulo de carta de la Audiencia de
La Plata al virrey del PerQ:
Se espera un acrecentamiento
en la saca de metales de Potos£ en raz6n de un nuevo
beneficio de los metales negrillos en que han venido a dar
algunos mineros," La Plata, 26. XII. 1602, 1 f. (MC 464);
ANB, C 866, "Capitulo de carta de esta Audiencia al virrey
del Peru: Aunque los metales de Potosi no tienen la
riqueza que solian tener no hay disminuci6n en los quintos
reales, gracias a los nuevos procedimientos de beneficio
57.

"

'
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como el del cobre v la r^^i
=
"^ue se da toda ayuda,"
^
La Plata
?fi YTT iLt
?
Capltulo de acuerdo del cabildo
de Poto^T.
t
nombran al alcalde ordinario Salvador
de Campos v^l
veinticuatro Antonio de Rueda como
diputados para aL
mformen sobre el nuevo cedazo de cerner
meLles ofrLn^o
per Gonzalo Atanez," PotosI,
'

8.va62nMC eo^arM^M

^® Ugarte
J^'
.^^i^^
Aud^^^de^Charc^
A

IsSa)

.

to the crown, La Plata, 10 XI 1600
Correspondencia (ed. by ^Leviuler??

r^P°^s^ to the drought, BNB,
^7. ^9^.
CPl1^2 '/
^^?gr^»g
263V-264,
"Capltulo
de acuerdo del cabildo
Z
de Potosi:
'

'

Habigndose quejado los azogueros del rigor
con
que se les cobra lo que deben dar para
la obra de JIs
lagunas de Tabaconuno, se nombran diputados
PotosI, 20.XI.1609 (MC 549). The President que lo vean,"
of
Audiencia commented on the shortage of water in the
ANB, M 3,
presidente, el licenciado Alonso
5^^^
Maldonado de Torres, estante en PotosI, a esta
Audiencia: Los ingresos de real hacienda estSn Real
quebrantados
en PotosI por falta de agua
azogue
con
que hacer funcionar
y
los ingenios y beneficiar los metales," Potosi,
8.1.1609,
1 f. (MC 508).
The following day he reported that the water
was all gone: ANB, M 3, no. 16, "Carta de su
presidente,
ei licenciado Alonso Maldonado de Torres, asistente
en
Potosi, a esta Real Audiencia: La escasgz de agua para
mgenios es absolute," Potosi, 9.1.1609, 1 f. (MC 539) los
ArzSns, Historia, I, 262-265, says that the drought took
place in 1606.
These claims were made continually. They are
included in BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 139-140v, "Acta de cabildo
abierto celebrado en Potosi para ver lo que se ha de hacer
en vista de que de seis anos a esta parte los metales del
Cerro Rico son de ley tan pobre que no alcanza su valor
a cubrir los costos," Potosi, 30. IX. 1608 (MC 535); and
BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 144-145v, "Acuerdo del cabildo de
Potosi:
Sobre una peticion de los azogueros para que se
busque remedio a la ruina que amenaza a las labores mineras
por la diminucion de la riqueza del Cerro y otras causas,
Potosi, 14.x. 1608 (MC 535b).
Nearly a decade later the
problems had not changed: BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 346-348v,
"Acuerdo del cabildo: Escrlbase al virrey encareciendo
la necesidad y urgencia de proveer lo conveniente ante la
decadencia actual del servicio de mita que sefialen los
azogueros en memorial inserto, presentando ante este
cabildo y amenaza para en definitiva las labores mineras
de esta villa," Potosi, 29. VII. 1617 (MC 590; MOM 518).
60.
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•

5^ azogueros' problems with mercury, see
ANP rl
9^^-85. "Carta del sr President^ Don DiO
^'
^n^f
de Portugal,
escrita a nos Los Juezes/ officiales De
la
Hazienda de Su Magd desta Villa impl de
Potossi
en
Veinti
cinco de novi.e de mill seisciOs
"
y diez y siete aOe^' "
La Plata, 25. XI. 1617.

^

ANB, M 143, "RepresentaciSn dirigida a
61.
audiencia por ... los azogueros de PotosI, sobreesta real
que se
les guarde el privilegio de no poder estar
presos ni
rematarse sus bienes por deudas aunque hubiera
precedido
cualquier renunciaciSn de esos privilegios " PotosI
28.X.1602, 1 f. (MC 462); BNB, MSS 2, f s 119-128,
diciSn suscitada entre los mercaderes y los duenos "Contra
mmas e mgenios de Potosl sobre el cumplimiento de dela
provisi6n librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del
para que estos Qltimos no puedan ser presos por deudas PerU,
aunque en las obligaciones hayan renunciado al privilegio
que en esta raz6n les estaba concedido," Potosl, 7.IV-9
V
1603 (MC 468a); BNB, MSS 2, fs. 181-181v, "Testimonio
autorizado de un capltulo de carta escrita por don Luis
de Velasco, virrey del PerQ, a don Pedro de Lodena,
corregidor de PotosI: C6mo se comprenderS el privilegio
de que gozan los duenos de minas de PotosI para no ser
presos por deudas," Lima, 14. V. 1603 (MC 469a); BNB, MSS 2,
fs. 14 3-144, "Provisi6n de don Luis de Velasco, virrey
del Perta:
Los privilegios concedidos a los duenos de
minas e ingenios de PotosI para no ser presos por deudas
a pesar de cualesquiera renunciaciones en contrario, se
entiendan desde la fecha en que se pregonaran en dicha
villa," Lima, 16. VI. 1603 (MC 469b). For permission to
rent mills and mines, BNB, MSS 2, fs. 140-142v, "Provisi6n
librada por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del Perta, dando
licencia a don Luis DSvalos de Ayala para poder arrendar
el ingenio y minas que tiene en Potosl durante cuatro anos
y pagar la deuda que reconoce a dona Blanca de Montoya,
y para que a los arrendatarios se les acuda con los
mitayos que en el repartimiento general hecho por este
virrey se aplicaron a dichas haciendas," Los Reyes,
9. V. 1603 (MC 469; MOM 434).
,

.

*

62.

Mesia Venegas (see note 3), 96.

63.

BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 263v-264

64.

BNB, MSS 2, fs. 119-128

(see note 59).

(see note 61).

BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
Habiendo pedido el corregidor licenciado Juan de Ibarra se
nombre procurador de esta Villa ante el Virrey para cosas
65.
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tocantes a las minas, se eligi6 por
voto
Molina, tesorero de estas cajas reales " a Crist6bal de
PotosT
ii t i^no
(MC 518; MOM 466); BNB
CPLa'i2, Is 168-169

"6aMido
Para'conkrir^obre el

,

f

remedio
SmIdJo a la
la°fa?rT^?^
falta de la mita y de azogue para
las labores
ll.XIl!l60l (MC 535ffSSr
4/8)
BNB, CPLA lo'^V"
478rBNf
12, fs. ^^S^^^f'
189v-190, "Acuerdo del cabildoVista la necesidad de que vaya un
procurador a representar
al virrey el perjuicio de la falta
de azogue se determ?n6
convocar a cabildo abierto para elegir
ante el virrey a pedir remedio para la procurador general
ruina
mineras por la falta de la ley de los metales,de las labores
de la mi?a
y del azogue," Potosl, 25.1.1609 (MC 540b; MOM 480).
For
the azogueros' determination to get water,
in one way or
another: BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 94v, 98 and
102, "Capltulos
de acuerdos del cabildo de PotosI:
En vista de la sequla
falta
de
agua
en
las
y
lagunas para la molienda de
metales, t6mense las providencias necesarias para los
hacer
rogativas," Potosi, 21. II, 11. n, and 14. III.
?^nr^M?''??J
1608 (MC 521); and BNB, CPLA 12, f. 208, "Capltulo de
acuerdo del cabildo de Potosl: Que en vista de la escas^z
de agua en las lagunas para la molienda de los metales,
se
trate con el presidente de la audiencia de Charcas, los
oficiales reales, los azogueros y demSs interesados en la
molienda, la tralda del agua de las lagunas de Tabaconuno,"
PotosI, 6. III. 1609 (MC 541b).
See, also, the sources cited
in note 59.
,

BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 158-164, "Cabildo abierto reunido
para responder a la carta (inserta) recibida del marqu€s
de Montesclaros, virrey del Peru, de Lima, 1608. XI.
1, en
respuesta a la que este cabildo le escribio (asimismo
inserta) en 1608. IX. 1 sobre el empobrecimiento de los
minerales del Cerro," PotosI, 5. XII. 1608 (MC 535e; MOM
477)
The threat that the cerro might come into the hands
of the Protestants was inserted for shock value, and was
born of the azogueros long-held contention that Potosl
silver financed the Spanish crown's defense of Catholicism
against the heretics.
66.

.

'

67.

ANB, M 3, no. 17

68.

BNB, CPLA 15, f s

(see note 52, Chapter II).

211-211v, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
Se elige procurador general de esta villa ante el virrey
(Esquilache) a don Juan de Ayala Figueroa para cosas
tocantes a la labor minera y particular a la mita," Potosl,
11. V. 1616 (MC 583; MOM 515)
For mention of Ibarra, see
BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82 (see note 65); and Sandoval y
Guzman, 20-21.
.

.

69.

BNB, CPLA 15,

fs.

346-348v (see note 60).

"
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70.

See the sources cited in note 43.

the azogueros' involvement in contraband,
see
H^ll^; "n^
Helmer,
Comgrcio e contrabando" and Hanke, "The
Portuguese/' 27. The Audiencia de Charcas
could make 150 £esos for every Indian they said that they
rented in a
year: ANB, M 123, no. 3, "Carta de esta
audiencia al rey
en su consejo de Indias:
De los arriendos de minas e
mgenios en Potosi y de los envlos de jueces de comisi6n
a las provmcias de mita se siguen graves
danos para los
naturales que es menester remediar; en nueve meses
las
mmas de Oruro han producido doscientos mil pesos ensayados
a su Magestad," La Plata, 13. III. 1608 (MC
522; MOM
Juan de Ayala was prosecuted for renting Indians in 468)
for a reported 112 pesos apiece (seventy-five were 1621,
rented)
BNB MSS 3, fs. 59V-60, "C§dula real a don Diego de
Portugal,
presidente de la audiencia de La Plata: Que informe sobre
el estado de la causa seguida contra don Juan Ayala
por
amende de indios de mita contra lo dispuesto en esta
materia, y se cele estrictamente el cumplimiento de las
ordenanzas y disposiciones que prohiben tales arrendamien
~
tos," Madrid, 14. IX. 1621 (MC 606; MOM 527).
See, also,
the "Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache," Los virreyes
(ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez), PerG II (no. 281), 164 (from
Biblioteca Nacional, Ms. 3078; it is undated, but responds
to a cgdula of 1620)
SSnchez-Albornoz 71, notes the
transformation of the mita in general terms:
"Los titulares de las minas no siempre vieron
con malos ojos la sustituci6n de trabajadores manuales
por dinero, de las mitas personales por los indios de
plata o de faltriquera. Disfrutaban as£ de una renta
segura sin los inconvenientes de la mineraci6n, o por
lo menos les entraba numerario para reclutar indios de
minga mSs efectivos quienes se contrataban a cambio
de un salario.
La mita comenzaba, pues, a tornarse
un tribute pecuniario en favor de un grupo econ6mico
privilegiado o una contribuci6n de las comunidades
indlgenas al abaratamiento de los costos de producci6n
del cerro de Potosi.
De esa manera se cubria parte de
los salaries insumidos por la explotaci6n.
He refers, however, to the period of the 1660s, and the
transformation started much earlier than he suggests.
;

.

—

,

—

The best source on the "civil war" is Crespo,
Guerra entre Vicunas y Vascongados
Arzans, Historia
includes information on inter-national battles throughout
the work.
I have relied, for this brief summary, on
Padden, xxvii-xxviii An example of the continuing violence
took place in 1628, when a miner and his men caved in the
the mine of another; the Indian barretero sued them for the
72.

.

.

,

.
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"^^^'^ ""^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^
the cave-in (ANB
M
ri25''''no°''7;''''
125, no. 13— see note 133, Chapter
II— f. 232v)
.

^^-^2' "Provisian del marqugs de
del PerG:
El
reparta por via de dep6sito a los corregidor de Potosf
duenol de los iSgenios
inundacion de la ?Iguna de
Carica^i en
Caricari
en'l?
^"^S
de marzo
15 T^^"
de este ano todos los indios aue
hubieren vacado legitimamente
y vacaren de
comenzando por los ingenios mSs necesitados aquJ adeLnte
y que huMesen
hasta ponerlos en\l mismo
esTaTo au/t
estado
que tenlan antes de la reventaz6n " j im^
\t icoc
'''' fs:Totls, "Pr^k^^Ioi'del
C^ovio'pi Tsl''^''
socorro
de azogue por la innudacion de la
,1
r
Laguna
(by the Marques de GuadalcSzar)
Los Reyes, 30. V.
1626 (a copy); BNB, CPLA 18, fs. 19-19v,
"Capltulo de
acuerdo del cabildo de Potosi: vi6se la
petici6n de
Cristobal del Salto, procurador general, para
que se
suplique a la audiencia de La Plata suspenda la
ejecuci6n
de las sentencias pecuniarias y de prisi6n
pendientes
contra azogueros de esta villa en causas criminales
de
maltratamientos y muertes de indios en las minas de Potosi,
por hundimiento y sueltos que han caido de lo alto,
en
consideraciSn de los grandes trabajos
y pgrdidas que han
sobrevenido esta repQblica por la inundaci6n de la laguna
de Caricari," PotosI, 5. VI. 1626 (MC 629; MOM
541).
This
last request was not granted.
""^^

^'
GuJ^V/''^'
GuadalcSzar, virrey

T'

,

'

Zavala, Servicio personal ll, 36-40; Cobb,
"Potosl and Huancavelica " 96-97; and Pereyra, 19.
74.

,

,

BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 135v-136v, "Provisi6n del virrey:
Aprugbase el auto inserto, de Potosi, 1608. VI. 28, del
licenciado Maldonado de Torres, presidente de la audiencia
de Charcas, para que ante la declinaci6n de las minas de
azogue de Huancavelica y la falta de este ingrediente todos
los que sepan de minas de azogue las descubran," Lima,
9. VIII. 1608 (MC 534; MOM 473).
75.

BNB, MSS 2, fs. 65-69v (see note 180, Chapter II);
BNB, MSS 2, fs. 81-81V, "Provisi6n librada por don Luis de
Velasco, virrey del Peru, para que el corregidor de Potosi
d§ sin lugar a queja los 10 indios de mita que se han
senalado a Leandro de Valencia para el trabajo de las minas
que este tiene en la veta Rica," Lima, 12. V. 1602 (MC 457;
76.

MOM 428)
ANB, M 122, no. 10, "Carta del Virrey a la
Audiencia de Charcas: Los asuntos de la mita de Potosi
corresponden privativamente al virrey y esa a s61o resolverS
77.

.
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Cobb, "Potosi and Huancavelica " 101-102and i-h*=
"Razon del estado en que el Marques
de GuadalcSz^r Sena el
gobierno del Perta al Virrey Conde de
divide en cuatro materias que son las Chinch6n? la cual se
princip^les a que se
^^,^°-^-P°ndencia con el Consejo de las Indi^s?"^
iTxTl
(ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez),
lla
ttI (from Real Academia
£erQ
Perfli
II
249-273
de la Historia
Colecci6n Mata Linares, vol. XLIV, f s
56-74v)
79.

,

.

Examples Of the division of responsibilites
follow in the text and in the notes.

i^Jl'i:^
Its
effects,

,

and

^5 overview of the correspondence between Luis
^^^.Corregidor Pedro de Lodena, see BNB, MSS
2,
ft
ts.
i79-180v, Testimonio autorizado de capltulos
de cartas
misivas escritas en Lima a 1603. VI. 6, Lima a
1603. VII 1
Lima a 1603. VIII. 1, Lima a 1603. IX.
Lima
a 1604 V.'l'
1, y
por don Luis de Velasco, virrey del PerG,
a don Pedro de
Lodena, corregidor de Potosi encareciendo que las
de
mdios para el trabajo del Cerro anden cumplidas mitas
y que se
castigue rigurosamente a los corregidores que
omitieron
respecto,"
Lima, 16 .VI 1603-1 .v.
V?Sf^.
1604 (the testimonio is dated 18. VI. 1605) (MC 487; MOM
448)
See note 77 for Monterrey's letter to the Audiencia
de Charcas.
w"^;

.

.

ANB, M 122, no. 11, fs. 273-274, "Carta de la
audiencia de Charcas al virrey: A esta audiencia corres
ponde por reales cedulas el amparo y defensa de los indlos
de mita de Potosi y a ello acude cuando se ofrece," La
Plata, 1. VIII. 1605 '(MC 492; MOM 452).
82.

83.

Ibid

.

;

and ANB, M 123, no.

3

(see note 71).

Engel Sluiter, ed.
"Francisco L6pez de Caravantes'
Historical Sketch of Fiscal Administration in Colonial
Peru, 1533-1618," The Hispanic American Historical Review,
XXV (Durham, 1945), 243.
84.

85.

,

ANB, M 86, no. 10

(see note 43).

ANB, C 1083, "Tanto simple de capitulo de carta de
esta audiencia al rey:
justifica la fundacion de Oruro,
no habiendo raz6n para decir que la fundacion de Oruro ha
86.

.
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de esta villa y en cumplimiento de
disposiciones de su

asistente en PotosI: Dada la gran riqueza
de las minas de
Oruro, convendria asignarles una razonable
de
mdios,' La Plata, 19. IV. 1607, 1 f. (mc 517;cantidaS
MOM 459).
"^^^^^
rnnll'r.
S-^^^^' A pesar de la audiencia de La Plata al
Conseco ^""^
de rIndias:
enorme riqueza
minas nuevas de Oruro no se les ha asignado para de las
la labor
y menos se ha quitado un solo mitayo a PotosI,

siendo
que en contrario se hubiese
villa," La Plata, 6. XII. 1607, 3 fs. (MC
^^r^M^n.^L^f''^^
515; MOM 465).
The amount of revenue generated was up
to 200,000 pesos after nine months, according to
ANB, M
123, no. 3 (see note 71).
See, also, ANB, Minas
complemento, "Carta de esta Real Audiencia de La Plata al
Consejo de Indias: Se ha provisto auto para que los
mitayos de PotosI no puedan desviarse al trabajo de las
minas nuevamente descubiertas en Oruro," La Plata, 13 III
1607, 3 fs. (MC 501; MOM 458).

inexactas las

mf ormaciones

See note 40 for the pressures that eventuated in
the Corregidor sending judges to Oruro to retrieve Indians.
For the Audiencia 's suspension of one judge's commission,
BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 293-293v, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
Supllquese del auto de la Audiencia de Charcas para que don
Juan de ZGniga cese en su comisi6n de sacar de Oruro a los
mitayos de esta Villa, y escribase al Virrey sobre lo
mismo," PotosI, 23. IV. 1610 (MC 557g; MOM 497).
89.

BNB, CPLA 12, f s
54-54v, "Capltulo de acuerdo del
cabildo de PotosI: N6mbrase al contador Juan Martinez de
Mecolaeta para que contradiga en nombre de este cabildo
ante al audiencia de La Plata el auto provista por dicho
tribunal suspendiendo a los comisionados que el corregidor
de esta villa habia enviado contra los corregidores de
diferentes partidos para el despacho de los indios de mita
en vista de los muchos que faltan," PotosI, 31. VIII. 1607
(MC 507a)
90.

.

BNB, MSS 9, fs. 294-311V, "Provisi6n del virrey
al gobernador de la provincia de Chucuito y a los
corregidores de las demSs provincias mitarias: Vean y
cumplan las provisiones y cartas insertas so pena de
suspensiSn, para el puntual entero de la mita de PotosI,"
91.

.

.
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Lima, 20. III. 1616

(MC 589);

this is a copy from 9. X. 1790.

BNB, MSS 7, fs. 79-80, "Provisien
librada por el
marques de GuadalcSzar, virrey del Perta,
para que en vJsta
de los grandes inconvenientes que resultan
de arrendarse
1^ -^^^ y beneflcio
derL^.r^^^'°"
del
metal como para el menoscabo deP^^^
los reales quintos y
el mal uso de los indios de mita que
son vendidos por los
arrendarios a otras personas para trabajos
ajenos, no se
hagan mSs los arrendamientos sin expreso
este gobierno," Los Reyes, 30. IX. 1626 (MC consentimiento de
633; MOM 544)
This was
keeping with royal orders: BNB, MSS 3, fs
59-59V, "Real cgdula al presidente Portugal de
la audiincia
de Charcas:
Sabigndose que de Potosi se sacan muchos
indios de mita a otras partes despoblando minas
e ingenios
en el Cerro y la Ribera, cumplase la ordenanza
del virrey
Toledo tocante a este punto," Madrid, 28. V. 1621 (MC 60592

m

MOM 526)

*

'

.

For two examples:
the "Relaci6n del Principe de
Esquilache" (see note 71), 161; and ANB, RC 325, "Carta
del marques de GuadalcSzar, virrey del PerG a la Audiencia
de La Plata:
Con copia, inclusa, del real cidula de
Madrid, 1627.1.13, a dicho virrey, ordenSndole que haga
pagar, sin observaci6n a los mitayos de Potosl los leguajes
de ida y vuelta," Lima, 13. XI. 1627, 4 fs. (MC 655; MOM
The c§dula referred to in the second is BNB, MSS 5,
560)
fs. 230v-231v, "Copia de real c^dula al virrey del Perta
marques de GuadalcSzar: PSguese a los indios de mita de
Potosi sus jornales de ida y vuelta en cumplimiento de las
c§dulas reales de 1609. V. 26 y 1618. XII. 10, no obstante lo
arguido por el corregidor Sarmiento de Sotomayor y los
azogueros en carta de 1621 Ill 17 " Madrid, 13.1.1627
(MC 644; MOM 551)
93.

.

,

.

.

94.
"Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache" (see note 71),
166.
This order was later reinforced by the Marques de
GuadalcazSr (see note 92 for BNB, MSS 7, fs. 79-80), after

the crown had ordered Toledo's ordinance against mill
rentals followed (see note 92 for the cedula as well)
See
note 71 for what happened in the specific case of Juan de
.

Ayala
95.
"Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache" (see note 71),
160.
For comments on the Viceroy's statement, see Zavala,
Servicio personal II, 71; and Cobb, "Potosi and
Huancavelica, 98.
,

96.
161.

"Relaci6n del Principe de Esquilache"

(see note 71),
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^^"^^^ "Provision
^'
rnJZiV/
GuadalcSzar virrey del Peru, a don Felipe del marques de
corregidor de PotosI: En cumplimiento de Manrique,
la
ae ..
inserta, los corregidores remisos en elprovislsn
envlo de
la mita de PotosI sean suspendidos
se
envlen en su lugar
y
hagan," Los Reyes, 22. XII. 1622 (MC 609;
MnS 528); BNB, MSS
MOM
7, fs. 47-49, "Provisien del marquis
de GuadalcSzar, virrey del Peru:
Reitera la de 1622. XII.
22 sobre la exactitud en el envio de la mita a
PotosI por
encargados de ello," Los Reyes, 10.11.
^?o.''?M^^?t^°''^^
1624
(MC 614; MOM 532).
For an example of the process
see BNB, CPLA 18, f s 40v-52, "Diligencias
rela^Ivafa la
designaci6n del capitSn Juan Serrano de Amalgro como
corregidor de la provincia de los Carangas en sustituci6n
de don Pedro Diaz de Alvarado que ha resultado
culpado en
^® -"-^ ^^^^
dicha provincia," PotosI, 16. VIII
1626 (MC 639; MOM 550); and BNB, CPLA 18, fs. 37-37v,
Acuerdo del cabildo: Recibase por corregidor de la
provincia de los Carangas a Juan Serrano de Amalgro con
quien el factor Bartolome Astete de Ulloa, corregidor de
esta Villa, sustituy6 a don Pedro Diaz de Alvarado,
depuesto en virtud de las provisiones del virrey, por la
quiebra que hay en la mita de esa provincia," PotosI,
9. IX. 1626 (MC 632; MOM 543).
Guadalclzar also provided
Felipe with very explict orders about how he was to conduct
his duties as Corregidor de PotosI AGI, Lima 39, vol. 2
(transcript provided by Lewis Hanke)
Castillo (AGI,
Charcas 270, no. 33C— see note 30, Chapter II), 12-12v,
says that Guadalclzar also sent Juan de Sandoval and Suero
Vigil to assist in the delivery of mitayos from the
provinces of Quispicanchi Canas y Canches, Asangaro,
Cavana, Paucarcolla, Omasuyo, Pacajes, Caracollo,
Cochabamba, Paria and others. The suspension of provincial
corregidores for their failure to comply with their mita
was also ordered by the Principe de Esquilache, in an order
of 20. III. 1616 (see note 91).
'

'

.

—

.

,

For Velasco, BNB, MSS 2, fs. 147-148v (see note 19);
and for Esquilache, his "Relaci6n" (see note 71), 164.
98.

For letters by Maldonado on the shipment of the
carta cuenta, see ANB, C 896, "Tanto simple de una carta
dirigida a esta audiencia por su presidente, licenciado
Alonso Maldonado de Torres, asistente en PotosI: la carta
cuenta de la plata que se despacha a su magestad se ha
cerrado con un incremento sobre la del ano pasado, "PotosI,
6. IV. 1604, 1 f. (MC 483); ANB, C 898, "Carta escrita a esta
Audiencia por su presidente, licenciado Alonso Maldonado
de Torres, asistente en PotosI:
Al trajinero para Arica
se han entregado mas de 120 barras de plata con un valor de
99.
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Forosi, 12. IV. 1604,
100.

1

f.

ANB, M 123, no.

(mc 485).
2

(see note 35).

BNB, CPLA 12, f. 53, "Capltulo de
acuerdo del
suplique al licenciado Alonso
SSdinLn%''°^°"^^
Maldonado de Torres, presidente de la
audiencia de La
Plata que postergue su retorno a la ciudad
de La Plata
negocios de minas que estSn pendientes en
esta villa," Potosi, 21. VIII. 1607 (MC
506).

101

102.
103.

Zavala, Servicio personal

Ibid

.

,

,

II,

32-35.

45-50.

104
"Pareceres de los Padres de la Compania de Jesus
de Potosi.
1610" (see note 26), 116-131; Vargas Ugarte's
commentary on the paper is on page 22 of Pareceres
jurldicos.
See, also, Zavala, Servicio personal, II,
^
45-48.
'

Zavala, Servicio personal II, 49. Martinez de
Mecolaeta, for example, was second to Molina in the voting
for procurador in 1607 (BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 80v-82~see
note
and he was sent to La Plata in that year to argue
65)
against the Audiencia de Charcas suspensions of the
Corregidor de Potosi 's judges (BNB, CPLA 12, fs. 54-54v~
see note 90)
105.

,

;

'

.

Angulo (AGI Charcas 268, no. 36— see note 58,
Chapter II), 2, lists 4,413 with the repartimiento done on
16. VI. 1610.
His figure, and the same information in
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B see note 58,
Chapter II), 8, are both based, I believe, on the
Archbishop of Lima's letter to the crown of Lima, 30. XII.
1661 (AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16 see note 91, Chapter II).
Cafiete y Domlnguez, 102, is mistaken is saying that the
repartimiento was conducted in 1602. A copy of the 1610
repartimiento is apparently housed in the Bibliotheque
Nationale, Paris (Ms. Espagnols 175, fs. 257-301) —noted
in Hanke and Rodriguez, Los virreyes Peru II (no. 281)
89, note "(10)."
The University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
Library has ordered a copy of that document, on microfilm,
and at this date (April, 1981) it has not yet arrived.
106.

,

—

—

,

,

—

Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36 see note 58,
Chapter II), 2v; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B
see note 58, Chapter II), 8; and the Archbishop of Lima
(AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16
see note 91, Chapter II)
2,
107.

—

—

,
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all agree that the figure is 4 ?qa Tr.^-,--,
repartimiento done on
1618--thP f
two sources
based, I believe, on th^
ihJrd
ctr^ltl
102, says the sa^e.
The "Reiaci6n del Prfnn^^^'^T^''
Principe de
Esquilache" (see note 71)
Ifi? t??

repo^rt

Till

"Capitu?^

d1%!Sn?!f^^-

^? AC?:^^ha1c;s

2TCt:

22A,

°^
^^^^^ page is^"Da qta
ef Virrey
el
Virrev H^^A
J*^^^^"
de como a "^^^
hecho
el Repartimto genl de potossi
^ satisfacion."
I know
of^^h^
of
the^l618 repartimiento de la mita, of^o survi?Jng copy
but expect t^at there

AHP CR 201, last item, a partial copy
repartimiento de la mita conducted by President of the 1624
Diego de
Audiencia
de
Charcas, with pages missing
^""^
at ^hfL
the beginning and at the end.
The figures
tribution of the mitayos are complete, however,for the disand the
adjustments of the repartimiento that were
light of mathematical mistakes made by the required in
President are
also documented. Angulo (AGI, Charcas
268, no. 36— see
Valera
(AGI, Charcas 268,
1!°
^^f?^^''
Chapter
II), 8, both say ihat
^ <
r^f;
GuadalcSzar
did not conduct a repartimiento
108

™'

.

109.

AHP, CR 201, last item (see note 108).

Campo y de la Rynaga, 80-83.
Zavala, Servic
£ersonal, II, 27-28, says that the reducci6n effort io
began
Monterrey. Sandoval y Guzm5n, 20v, notes
?i
i^n? order to the
the 1607
Marques de Montesclaros
For his
orders to the oidores and their response, see ANB,
C 1160,
^^^^ audiencia al rey en respuesta a real cedula
^^^?c?n^^
ae 1610. IX. 7:
la raz6n para que los indios se huyan de sus
pueblos a esconderse en chacras, quebradas
y uaycos son
los malos tratamientos y trabajo intolerable
de las minas
de Potosi y otras partes y los que asimismo les hacen sus
caciques, corregidores y curas doctrineros " La Plata,
17.11.1611, 1 f. (MC 561; MOM 504); the information on
the Viceroy's order and their answer is on f. 5v.
See,
also, the "Billete que escribi6 el Principe de Esquilache
al Marques de Montesclaros pidigndole que por escrito le
diese relaci6n del estado en que dejaba el reino del PerG,
y lo que a el le respondio," 11. V. 1616, Los virreyes (ed.
by Hanke and Rodriguez)
Peru II (no. 281)
139-140 (from
110.

.

,

,

I

,

,

.
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the manuscript in the Universidad de Sevilla, Coleccion de
manuscritos del Risco, vol. XXII, fs. 114-121), for the
Marques' coiranents on the impossibility of compliance with
the crown's orders.
BNB, CPLA 15, fs. 249v-350v, "Acuerdo del cabildo:
Sobre el cumplimiento de la orden del virrey para que se
echen a minas y reduzcan a sus repartimientos los indios
forasteros, aquerenciados y avecinados en La Plata y en
Potosi," PotosI, 2. VIII. 1617 (MC 591; MOM 519).
111.

112.

Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C— see note 30,

Chapter II)

12.

,

113.
Ibid
12v, for the seven revisitas and the total
of 147 Indians so lost to the mita ordinaria
For the
specific mention of Caquiaviri, Macha and other pueblos,
BNB, CPLA 18, f. 203, "Acuerdo del cabildo: Vianse los
papeles de las rebajas de indios de mita de los pueblos
de Caquiaviri, Macha y otros, ordenadas por el virrey
marqugs de GuadalcSzar, y hSganse las reclamaciones que
convengan," PotosI, 9. IX. 1627 (MC 649; MOM 554).
.

,

.

Zavala, Servicio personal II, 95; Campo y de la
Rynaga, 84. Viceroys Velasco, Monterrey and Esquilache
actually hampered the reducciones
Velasco and Monterrey
both ordered that an Indian who was absent from his pueblo
for ten years could remain where he lived if he wished
(these orders are included in ANB, M 113, no. 1 see note
Esquilache prohibited judges from chasing forasteros
44)
who had gone outside the mita provinces, and so encouraged
flight to outlying chgcaras (BNB, CPLA 16, fs. 169-169v,
"Acuerdo del cabildo: Vi^ndose la proposici6n inserta,
presentada por los azogueros sobre los nuevos inconvenien
tes contra el entero de la mita, se resolvi6 remitir la
proposici6n al virrey para que provea remedio," Potosi,
the order is mentioned on f.
3. XI. 1619 (MC 600; MOM 523)
Charcas 270, no. 33C see note 30,
169; Castillo (AGI
Chapter II), 17-17v, says the order was dated 15 Ill 1617)
These viceregal directives were issued in a spirit of
fairness, both for the Indians and their new employers, but
like Toledo's earlier protection of forasteros they added
to Indian migration away from mita service.
114.

,

.

—

.

—

,

—

.

.

,

115.

personal

Campo y de la Rynaga, 85; and Zavala, Servicio
II,

119.

CHAPTER

IV

1633 TO 1648

The appearance of mita service in silver and the

creation of a viceregal bureaucratic mechanism to
administer the system from Lima were the major developments
of the first third of the seventeenth century.

During

the subsequent fifteen years the consequences of those two

developments were to be profound.
The Viceroy Conde de Chinch6n broke with tradition in
1633 to send an outsider to conduct his repartimiento de
la mita.

The flexibility theretofore afforded to the mita

by assigning that task to the presidents of Charcas, and

having the corregidores de PotosI administer the mita on a
daily basis, was eliminated.

The result was a collision

of the de facto mita with unmodified viceregal orders,
and a battle between the azogueros and the President of

Charcas on one side, and the Viceroy and his representative
on the other.

The crown and its Council of the Indies were too

isolated by distance, time and bureaucracy to play any
other role in the struggle than as referees.

The conflict

at PotosI produced hyperbolic charges and counter-charges

.

.
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however, and the crown was unable to determine what
was

really happening in Peru.

It had no choice, therefore,

but to leave rectification of the controversy to Chinch6n's
successor, the Marques de Mancera (1639-1648)
The same difficulties that prevented the crown from

determining the true situation at Potosi make quantitative
observations about the mita from 1633 to 1648 extremely
precarious.

For example, the azogueros claimed that the

effective mita ordinaria in 1636 was only 1,500 Indians.
Ten years later they set the figure at 2,600 and said that
things had gotten worse. 2

on

,

To understand what was going

therefore, one must keep a keen eye out for the

arguments behind the numbers, and the reasons behind the

arguments
The Azogueros

The status of the azogueros is especially difficult to

ascertain.

On

the

one hand the Cabildo de Potosi was able

to provide a procurador

,

Sebastian de Sandoval y GuzmSn,

with ample funds to publish his arguments on Potosl's
behalf before the Council of the Indies.

On the other

hand the azogueros claimed that they were near ruin and

needed further crown assistance if silver production were
to continue.

Sandoval y Guzman's Pretensiones de la Villa Imperial de
PotosI were published in Madrid in 1634.

3

The first section

of the work proposed means to improve
silver production at
Potosi; the remainder concerned viniculture
and other

matters.

The essay on mining was the azogueros

'

official

response to the viceroys' position that mitayos
should be

distributed on the basis of merit.

At the same time, they

continued to argue that their right to receive government

assistance was based on their history of service to the
crown.

That sentiment was expressed in Sandoval's opening

letter to the President of the Council of the Indies:
[Potosi,] which until recently has supported the
the full weight of the Monarchy with its great
riches, now places itself humbly at the feet of
Your Excellency, needing your protection and
asking for justice.
The Potosi silver industry deserved consideration because
of its past service, and it required justice if it were to

continue to serve.
azogueros

'

The shift in the basis for the

privileges, apparent in their arguments against

Oruro and their imprisonment for debts, was now formalized
by Sandoval y GuzmSn. 4
The procurador proposed four innovations for the

mining sector, which he argued would contribute to the
regeneration of Potosi, and therefore Peru:
reduction of the quinto to the diezmo;
of a reduccion general

;

cost and on credit; and
de azogueros.

5

b)

a)

the

the execution

c)

the distribution of mercury at

d)

the formation of a Consulado

Sandoval's arguments in support of these

proposals were both legal and pragmatic, and thoroughly
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explored the relationship between the crown
and its
vassals at Potosl.
The procurador predicated the reduction of
the quinto

on a combination of fairness and the azogueros
to pay the 20 per cent tax.^

'

inability

He noted that Phillip

m

had ordered that mining centers should remit one-fifteenth
of production during their initial ten years in existence,

one-tenth during the second ten years, and one-fifth
thereafter.

Potosi had not benefited by the King's

cgdula because it had been discovered in 1545, long before

Phillip III came to the throne; it was only fair, Sandoval
argued, that it should benefit now.

Q

Furthermore, the

recently discovered mines at Castro Virreyna and Nueva
Potosl were paying only the diezmo

,

and Potosi deserved to

be treated as well as those less-important centers.^

Sandoval said that the legal means for Potosi 's

payment of the diezmo already existed.

Phillip II had

ordered that no more than one-tenth or one-twelfth of

production be taken by the government if ore quality was
below twelve ounces per quintal

.

The cedula in question

had been issued for Spain, but it applied to Peru because
it was included in the Recopilaci6n de leyes that was sent

to the entire hispanic world.

"'"^

The current ore at Potosl,

he noted, was no richer than five or seven ounces per

quintal

.

Not only should the quinto be lowered, Sandoval argued.
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but production costs should be
subtracted before the crown'
share was determined. King John
I of Portugal had already
ruled that costs be deducted before
his percentage was
exacted, and Spanish monarchs were
always better
to their

subjects than other sovereigns.

it would not do the crown

well to be bettered in this instance.
Sandoval assured the Council that any
revenue lost by
lowering the guinto would quickly be made
up through

expanded silver production.

To begin with, the quintos

currently sent to Spain were not as significant
as they
appeared. Of one million pesos despatched from
Potosl,

only 670,000 were derived from exaction of the
quinto
real; the remainder came from the sale of mercury,
the

quintos from other mines, al cabalas and the sale of public
offices. 13

The change to the diezmo would permit the

refining of desmontes, and thus every stone that contained
silver would be milled, new exploration would take place,
the Indians would return to Potosi voluntarily, and the

boom of the 1570s would be repeated.

Increased production

would more than offset the 335,000 pesos lost by lowering
the quinto to the diezmo

.

The alternative, the procurador

warned, was the irrecoverable loss of Potosi.

Sandoval did not mention that Potosi had one advantage
that other mining centers did not:

mitayos

.

His inclusion

of increased mercury sales among the factors that would

supplant lost quintos is interesting in light of the fact

s

8
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that his third proposal was for
mercury to be sold at
cost.
Moreover, his argument that the Indians
would return

voluntarily was inconsistent with his second
proposal that
new reducciones be conducted to augment
the delivery of
initaxos.

Clearly, he was prepared for the possibility
that

the entire package might not be adopted.

Sandoval and the azoqueros requested that

a

reducci6n

be conducted in the entire realm, but said that
they would

accept one that was limited to the provinces that were

obligated to the PotosI mita.^^

The crown had pursued that

goal since the first years of the century, the procurador
noted, but the viceroys had stifled its execution because

they believed the task was impossible."*"^

They had feared

that officials of sufficient ability and disinterest were

not available in Peru, and that less-competent judges sent
to undertake the reducciones would prey upon the Indians

like those that the Corregidor de PotosI sent to ensure

that mita quotas were met. 17

If the resettlement program

were not completed correctly, and fewer Indians were

counted than actually existed, those quotas would have to
be lowered.

1

The viceroys had also argued that chacareros

would oppose the process, to protect the Indians who worked
on their chacaras

;

if they were unable to corrupt the

judges, they would resort to violence. 19

The viceroys had

also worried that food production would suffer if the
Indians were removed from those agricultural enterprises.

20

.
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The procurador said that other
viceregal reservations
had centered on the Indians themselves.
The pueblos had
no attraction for them, and without
their cooperation the

resettlement of the villages would be impossible.

The

Indians currently left their pueblos, he said,
because of
the mistreatment they received from their
caciques priests
and correqidores. Many owed considerable sums
in past
,

tribute

(

rezaqos

)

,

which would be demanded should they

return to their homes.

Finally, lands were not available

for the Indians who did return to settle on, as they
had

been sold to Spaniards
Sandoval admitted the validity of the arguments that
the viceroys had given for not undertaking the reducci6n

general

,

but he argued that its execution was nonetheless

imperative.

There was no alternative if Peru were to

return to its former prosperity.

The program could be

successfully completed through a combination of fairness
and diligence, he said, as fairness would justify its

execution and hard work would ensure its conclusion.

It

was unfair, for example, that chacareros who illegally

availed themselves of Indian labor should continue to
receive their services.

It was also unfair that those

Indians who were living in their original pueblos should
bear the weight of obligations that were intended for many
more.

Again, diligence in the conduct of the reducciones

would ensure their completion despite all the obstacles.

22

184

Sandoval did not include the PotosI mita
among the
factors that he blamed for the Indians'
flight from their
pueblos. Nor did he identify the agricultural
duties to
which they were assigned by the caciques and
corregidores
The Indians were accustomed to mining and
agricultural

.

service, he argued, because they had performed
both under
the Incas.

Indian migration was caused by their forced

participation in activities that were new to them, and
those that kept them from their wives, families and homes.

They liked to live on chScaras, he noted, because they
received a plot of land and stayed with their families.
Measures were therefore necessary to make life in the
pueblos more attractive than it was anywhere else.

The

Indians' debts needed to be pardoned; their tribute waived

while they were serving in the mita; and their lands, even
if they were legally held by Spaniards, would have to be

returned to them.

Once the pueblos were repopulated, the

procurador argued, the weight of the Indians' obligations

would no longer be excessive, for more of them would bear
that weight.

24

Sandoval said that the reducciones were prerequisite
to the- conservation of Peru.

Even if the mita had to be

constricted as a result, justice demanded that they be done
The azogueros had called for the reducciones because they

were confident that the large numbers of Indians that
were scattered throughout the provinces would be documented
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The caciques and corregidores had called
for them to prove
that the provinces were devoid of Indians.
This was the
crown's opportunity, Sandoval concluded, to
prove who was
right.

25^

The third proposal that Sandoval y GuzmSn put
before
the Council of the Indies was that mercury be provided
to
the azoqueros at cost and on credit.

Quicksilver had

originally been distributed on credit, he said, but debts
that the azoqueros incurred during the sixteenth century
had prompted the crown to order that it be sold only for
cash.

The procurador

'

s

arguments in support of this

proposal were almost wholly pragmatic.

President

[

sic

,

He noted that

Oidor] Diego Munoz de Cuellar had allowed

the distribution of mercury on credit in 1630, and silver

production had climbed to three and one-half million pesos
While it was true that the azogueros owed the crown one
and one-half million, they had paid back much more than
that, and had contributed sixty million pesos in quintos

since the introduction of amalgamation technology in the
1570s.

Their debt would never be collected, he added, if

they went bankrupt.

The azogueros

'

needs were also a

reason to grant the third request; Sandoval said they were
too poor to pay for the mercury when it arrived, and had
no one to borrow from.

by virtue

of

They were deserving, furthermore,

their hard work and sacrifice; for every

forty marks of silver they produced, they spent sixty on

,

materials and labor.
Sandoval manipulated silver production figures
to
arrive at the sixty million peso total for the
crown's
quintos.

He left out all mention of moneylenders, mita

service in silver, or "pocket Indians."

Bailey Diffie

has suggested that Sandoval's misuse of the production

figures might be excused as "lawyer's licence. "^^

more significant than that, however.
was playing two games concurrently.

It is

Sandoval y GuzmSn
On the pragmatic

level, the reduction of the quinto to the diezmo would

have increased the azogueros

'

profits; the reducci6n

general would have augmented the delivery of mitayos

— in

person and in silver; and the distribution of mercury on
credit would have allowed the azogueros to declare their
financial independence from the moneylenders and silver

merchants.

The proposals were therefore designed to

return control of silver production to the azogueros

— to

free them from their dependence upon other groups and

interests.

But to win those concessions from the crown

Sandoval had to convince the Council of the Indies that
the concessions would also benefit the royal cause, and

that the azogueros were deserving of more government

assistance.

The manipulation of the production figures

was part of that process, as was the omission of all

mention of the azogueros
The procurador

'

s

'

misuse of mita service in silver

fourth proposal was that a Consulado

.
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de azogueros be established.

That body would have made the

self-governing, and so have freed them
from the
bothersome meddling of the Audiencia de
Charcas in their
affairs.
Sandoval argued that the Consulado
would relieve
the tensions caused by the Audiencia
's interference
in

mining matters that it did not understand.

Once they were

freed from the court's unsympathetic and
erractic decisions
the azogueros would be able to concentrate
on production
Perhaps the phrase should have been "free to
concentrate on
their profits."

Each of Sandoval's proposals was supported with
legal
and pragmatic reasons why it should be granted.

The crown

was assured that it would not lose revenue by granting
the

new concessions, but would lose PotosI if it failed to do
so.

Other petitions submitted by the Gremio de azogueros

in the past had carried similar warnings that the failure
to act would bring the quick and irreversible ruin of

Potosi.

Yet despite their threats, the quintos flowed

from year to year

— albeit

in smaller amounts

— and

oft-promised demise of Potosi never materialized.

the

Why

would the crown believe the azogueros in 16 34 when it had
not before?
all?

Did it really risk anything by not acting at

What did it risk if it did provide the azogueros

more aid?

Sandoval y GuzmSn's proposals, like the petitions that

preceded them, served to counter the reports of azoguero
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abuses the crown received from their
enemies, and were
therefore necessary to prevent the King
from ordering
measures that might have hurt them. Despite
its isolation
and relative powerlessness the crown could—at
any moment
,

—order the abolition
supply of mercury.

of the mita or cut off the azogueros

Thus, more than the success of the new

proposals hinged on their ability to convince the crown
that they were loyal, industrious and valuable subjects.
Indeed, there was nothing in the procurador 's work to

suggest that the azogueros were involved in any abuses at
all.

If they were unable to persuade the crown totally of

their merit and need, the azogueros could at least keep it

off-balance.

Royal uncertainty in Madrid furthered the

preservation of the status quo.

Assuming that the

azogueros were not operating their mills at a loss, the
status quo was preferable to a government campaign against

"pocket Indians," and other modifications of the mita that

were now integral parts of the system.

Unfortunately for Sandoval and the azogueros

,

however,

the real threat to the de facto mita was not to come from

Madrid, but from Lima.

The Marques de Guadalcazar had

started to reduce mita obligations, based on revisitas,
and the viceroys had begun to deny mitayos to the azogueros
for their involvement in abuses.

But because the viceroys

had left the local administration of the mita to the

presidents of Charcas and the corregidores de Potosi, the

'
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impact of those developments had been
lessened in practice.
Most azogueros were able to use their personal
influence to
retain their mitayos whether they were involved
in misuse
29
or not.
That situation changed dramatically in
1633.

While the procurador was in Madrid singing their
praises,
the azoqueros were under attack at home by a direct

viceregal assault on the de facto mita.
Visitador Juan de Caravajal y Sandi
The Conde de Chinch6n decided not to leave his

repartimiento de la mita to the President of Charcas.
Instead, he assigned the responsibility for it to Visitador

Juan de Caravajal y Sandi.

Caravajal arrived in Peru in

16 33 to conduct visitas of the Audiencias of Lima and

Charcas, and he began with the more difficult
de Charcas.

— the

Audiencia

Upper Peru contained the richest provinces in

South America, but it was inhabited by colonists renown for
their irreverence and independence.

Like other visitadores

Caravajal faced the role of Daniel in the lions' den, for

visitadores were so unpopular that usually antagonistic
groups closed ranks against

them."^*^

The Marques de

Montesclaros had likened a visita to a gust of wind that
stirs up the rubbish in the streets but accomplishes little
else.

31

That would not be the case in this instance.

Chinchon was discouraged by the failure of his efforts
to complete a reduccion general

,

and the crown had ordered

,
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him to abandon the program and sell the
vacated lands.
The solution for falling mita deliveries
that the crown
had pursued since the viceroyalty of Luis de
Velasco

had

been put to rest by the viceroys' arguments that
the

reducciones were impossible to execute.

Chinch6n

therefore had to find a new means to reconcile the failing

originario population in the provinces and the labor needs
of Potosl.

He found the bases for a solution in the

concept that mitayos should be assigned on the basis of
merit, and the azogueros
in silver.

'

widespread misuse of mita service

The Viceroy instructed Juan de Caravajal to

employ misuse of the mita as his central criterion for

determining which azogueros would receive mitayos and which
would not.

Chinch6n believed that misuse was so pervasive

that once those azogueros who were guilty of abuse had

been stripped of their Indians, there would be plenty of

mitayos for the remainder. 32

Chinch6n's decision was a compromise born of viceregal
inability to control the Indians

— an

accomodation with the

reality that reducciones were impossible.

Had that

decision been implemented by the president of Charcas, its
effects might have been minimal.

Upon his arrival in

Potosi, however, Visitador Caravajal began to enforce the

Viceroy's instructions without any modifications at all.
Caravajal denied mitayos to the owners of twenty-nine
of the one-hundred mills at Potosl.

33

He did not lower the
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mita ordinaria by an significant amount,
however; his
weekly total came to 4,115 Indians. He
ordered that travel
allowances be paid, and he abolished the
subtraction of the

half-£eso from the mitayos
the alcalde mayor de minas

'

wages to pay the veedores and

.

The Gremio de azogueros was infuriated.

The changes

that Caravajal had made in the assignment of the
mitayos

,

on paper, were not very great; and in truth the mills
that

were denied Indians had not been in production for some
time.

It was the functional impact of the Visitador's

repartimiento that caused the azogueros

'

outcry.

The

mitayos were assigned in complete ayllus or pueblos, so
that their service in person would be more tolerable.

President Portugal had spread the Indians around, so that
every azoguero would share the burden of those ayllus that
did not come in the mita at all.

Caravajal 's order meant

that some of the azogueros would receive entire squadrons
of Indians who normally complied with their obligations,

while others would receive contingents that were composed
of those who had not appeared in Potosi for decades.

Three more important reasons for the azogueros

unhappiness with the new repartimiento were:

a)

'

their

acceptance of the distribution would mean their capitulation
on the issue of the removal of mitayos from azogueros for

misuse, and thus their confession that abuses existed;
b)

the assignment of mitayos in complete ayllus disrupted
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the arrangements between the azoqueros and
caciques for the

delivery of service in silver; and

the owners of the

c)

twenty-nine mills also owned active mills, and they
were
used to having twice as many mitayos in silver and

—

person

— as

they would now receive.

in

The Caravajal

repartimiento was unacceptable to the azogueros
could not condemn it for these reasons.

,

but they

They therefore

resorted to their traditional bargaining position.
The azogueros complained to Chinch6n that the new

repartimiento would seriously lower silver production, and
that it would impair their ability to keep the Potosl

silver industry in business.
their appeals.

The Viceroy was not moved by

He had expected their complaints, and the

outcry seemed to confirm that the medicine that he had

prescribed was having its intended effect.

Nevertheless,

he instructed the Visitador to soothe any legitimate

grievances by adjusting the repartimiento when Indians

became available because of future azoguero abuses, death,
or the sale of their mills.

36

ChinchSn ordered the Audiencia de Charcas not to
consider the azogueros

appeals.

'

He told the court that

the mita was not their concern, for the assignment of the

mitayos to the azogueros was a privilege granted by the
crown which could be revoked at any time for abuses on the
part of the grantees.

The azogueros

right to receive mitayos

,

,

he said, had no

and could therefore lose access

to them without recourse to the legal
system.

The

Viceroy's order repeated earlier such directives
sent by
his predecessors to the Audiencia de Charcas,
but the

precaution is nonetheless interesting in light of the
traditional animosity between the court and the azogueros .^'^
The Council of the Indies' role in the controversy

was limited to its service as a referee between the

azogueros and the Visitador.

The Council was too isolated

to participate in a more direct manner, but it still

represented an authority superior to the Viceroy.

It

could not force Chinchfin to act as it wished, but it could

discredit his actions.

Both sides of the battle understood

that, and they wrote to Madrid with explanations of their

positions.

Early in 1636, Carava jal told the crown and the

Council that Potosl's problems were not his doing, but the

result of maladministration at the local level.

He

charged that the President of Charcas and Corregidor de
PotosI were immersed in personal business ventures that

compromised their effectiveness as representatives of the
crown.

Their letters, he warned, were not to be trusted. 38

The Council was flooded with the azogueros

about Juan de Carava jal.

'

complaints

They arrived just as the body

was considering Sandoval y GuzmSn's proposals and another

azoguero memorial written by Gregorio de Obiendo Luz6n.
One azoguero who complained was Pedro de Andrade Sotomayor.
His

f if ty- mitayo

share of the Portugal repartimiento had

.

been pared down to forty.

Caravajal claimed that Andrade

had indulged in misuse, and that his mill had
been

unlicensed. 39
Garavito.

Another who protested was Ger6nimo

Caravajal countered his complaint with the

charge that he had neither a mill nor honor to lose
in
repartimiento, but was merely a bookkeeper who received

mitayos for his services as a procurador of the Gremio de
azogueros. 40
The Visitador's characterization of the azogueros as

greedy and disloyal did not correlate with their own

manifestations of sacrifice and faithful service to the
crown.

The Council was unable to clearly determine what

was happening at PotosI, so it ordered the Conde de

Chinch6n to investigate the situation there and then act
accordingly.

On April 6, 1631, Phillip IV signed a cgdula

instructing the Viceroy to resolve the difficulties that

had arisen because of Caravajal

's

repartimiento

,

and he

strongly suggested that another be conducted to replace
that distribution of the mitayos 41
.

In the meantime, the azogueros had found a champion in

President Juan de Lizarazu of the Audiencia de Charcas
Like many of his predecessors, Lizarazu participated in
the daily administration of silver production at Potosi,

and he supported the azogueros on mercury questions and in

their efforts to win new concessions from the crown.

The

President offered the crown and Council his own solution

for the problems created by Caravajal's
repartimiento

:

the

assignment of all aspects of PotosI
silver production to
the President of Charcas.
Lizarazu argued that
the

administration of the silver industry depended
upon four
elements:
a) the delivery of mitayos
b) the use to which
those Indians were put; c) the conservation
of the mills;
;

and

d)

the distribution of mercury.

Practical experience,

he said, was needed to understand and successfully
direct

each of those factors.

The crown and the Viceroy both

lacked the necessary experience, and decisions reached
in

Madrid and Lima took too long to implement.

Although his

bid for presidential control of Potosi production was not
successful, Lizarazu 's arguments would play a role in the

future of the mita.^^
The President's more immediate problem was that Juan
de Caravajal was still in Charcas.

The Visitador's

uncompromising demeanor and Lizarazu 's strong personality
did not go together very well.

The latter chafed under

the former's usurpation of his powers while in Charcas,

and he resented the charges that he and his Audiencia were

corrupt and incompetent.

The two officials clashed openly

in 1636, over Lizarazu' s plan for the distribution of

mercury on credit to the azogueros

.

At issue was the

President's abridgement of the crown's ban on such

arrangements

— his

Caravajal

demand that royal orders be followed to the

's

flexibility based on experience

— versus

letter.

Lizarazu had ordered that 1,500
guintales of mercury
be distributed from the royal
stores, with payment
deferred from April until June.
if payment was not made
at that time the azoguero
forfeited all access to
his

mita^

until his debt was covered; and
anyone who settled
his account received the use of
those Indians in the
interim. Andrgs de Sandoval had been
one of those who
was unable to pay for his mercury, and
his mitayos were
therefore transfered to Juan Manuel. At
that juncture the
Visitador intervened, removing thirty-four
Indians from
both Sandoval and Manuel. Apparently the
agreement had

provided for some sort of payment to the azoguero
Caravajal treated it as misuse of the mitayos

.

,

for

Without

his Indians, Sandoval was unable to raise the money
to

cancel his debt, and Juan Manuel lost the money he had

paid to settle the former's account.

The royal treasury

officials in PotosI had opposed the distribution plan, and
so sided with Caravajal against Lizarazu.

The Viceroy

ordered the President's program terminated, and he decreed
that mercury be provided to the azogueros only when they

could pay for it in

cash."^"^

Lizarazu lost the battle over Andres de Sandoval, and
his plan for presidential control of silver production was

turned down as well, but he did outlast Juan de Caravajal
y Sandi.

44

in 1638, Chinchon recalled the Visitador and

a
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ordered him to begin his inspection of
the Audiencia de
Lima.
Lizarazu would enjoy only a brief respite,

however,

for he would soon have to contend with
another visitador,

Juan de Palacios.^^

With Caravajal safely back in Lima, Lizarazu
resumed
his efforts on behalf of the azogueros

In 1638 he wrote

.

to the crown and the Council of the Indies to
suggest how

he believed the April

6,

1636 cgdula should be implemented.

The order provided for a six-month period during which
the

Viceroy was supposed to hear the azogueros

'

complaints.

Lizarazu said that they were unable to travel to Lima
distance equal to that from Madrid to Rome

— for

—

lack of

means, and they held no hope of recompense should they find
the means.

Chinch6n was responsible for their plight, he

noted, and they had no desire to ever see Caravajal again ."^^

The President preferred the alternative offered by the

cgdula

;

a

new repartimiento

.

He suggested that the new

distribution follow three guidelines:

a)

fixed quotas of

mitayos for the mills based on their number of stamping
mechanisms;
and

c)

b)

a total of 300

mitayos for the soldados

;

a provision that no azoguero could own more than

two mills.

These parameters, Lizarazu argued, would

ensure that the Indians were distributed fairly, to as many

recipients as possible.
The azogueros supported the President's plan in their
own correspondence with the crown; and they reiterated

.
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their reasons for not traveling to Lima.

Their support of

Lizarazu's proposal was born of their hope that
its
adoption by the Council would mean the restoration
of the
status quo ante—merit played no part in the
proposed
repartimiento.

Indeed, the azogueros asked the crown to

reinstate the 1624 repartimiento until the new one was
completed.

48

Lizarazu's arguments and his three-point program won

him the confidence of the Viceroy, who had grown disgusted

with Juan de Caravajal.

Chinch6n would later note that

while it was generally impossible to please everyone, the

Visitador had managed to alienate almost everybody
Lizarazu and Chinch6n corresponded throughout 1639 on

a

remedy for the problems that Caravajal had left in his
wake.

On March 29, the Viceroy empowered the President

to make adjustments in the 1633 repartimiento

.

Lizarazu

responded that adjustments would not be sufficient; that

more fundamental changes would be required.

argued that the azogueros

'

He openly

misuse of the mita had been a

necessary and natural result of declining ore quality and
rising production costs; that it was not an abuse, and
should not be the basis for deciding which azogueros
should receive mitayos

.

More specifically, Lizarazu said

that the rental of a mitayo by one azoguero from another
was not the rental of the Indian, but of his labor.

The

legal distinction, the President noted, was the very one
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upon which the mita had been
founded. ^0

This discussion

of the relationship between the
de facto and Toledan mitas
was not included in Lizarazu's
explanation to the crown
for his refusal to accept Chinch6n's
commission ^1
.

Perhaps

he understood that the Viceroy
was prepared to be told the
truth, but that such an argument
would probably hurt the

azoqueros

chances of winning new concessions from
Madrid.
The Conde de Chinch6n left the
responsibility for any
further efforts to comply with the April
6, 1636 cgdula
to his successor, the Marqu€s de Mancera.
He counseled
Mancera, however, that he should reinstate
'

the 1624

repartimiento if he did not devise one of his own.

The

greatest problem facing the Marques, he said, was the

discovery of some means with which to rectify the falling
originario population in the provinces and the labor demands
of the azogueros

.

Some had suggested that forasteros should

be included in the mita, but Chinchon disagreed.

He argued

that they would probably migrate further away, into

"infidel" lands, if any such effort were made.^^
By 1639 the Council of the Indies was thoroughly

confused, frustrated and worried.

Its efforts to gather

information on the Caravajal visita and its investigation
into the prospects for Sandoval's four proposals had been

thwarted by the vehemence of the charges that were made
in the azoguero - Visitador struggle.

From 16 36 forward

the Council tried to employ the Audiencia de Charcas as a
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relatively unbiased source of information.^^
As one would
expect, the Audiencia did not care
for Sandoval's proposal
that a Consulado de azogueros be
formed.
The oidores
delayed their response to the crown's
query on the subject
as long as possible, and submitted
its opinion only
after

the Gremio de azogueros demanded that it
do so.

Following

the lead of Fiscal SebastiSn de Alarc6n,
the Audiencia

argued that abuses would increase under
azoguero self-rule
and counseled the Council not to allow the
establishment
of the Consulado.
In 1639 the crown asked the Audiencia how the
azogueros

could call for the construction of more mills at PotosI

when Caravajal had closed twenty-nine of them; and whether
the Indians should be transfered in mill rentals, despite
the many laws prohibiting that practice.

The azogueros

had claimed that the inclusion of mitayos was necessary

given current production realities.
The crown and the Council were vainly searching for
some common ground in the correspondence they received from
Peru.

They had earlier deferred judgement to Chinch6n,

but he had not resolved the problems created by Caravajal.
Three and a half years later they had no other option but
to reissue the April 6,

1636 cedula to the MarquSs de

Mancera; the order was dated December

7,

16 39.^^

The Council's support for a new repartimiento was

made more explicit in the 1639 directive, however.

Mancera

.
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was urged to conduct the new
repartimiento in accordance
with President Lizarazu's three
guidelines, and to include
at least 5,000 Indians in the mita
ordinaria .^^
The

crown was concerned that the azogueros

'

warnings that

Potosi would soon collapse if assistance
were not provided
might be true. it chose to offer that aid
in the form of
more mitayos, rather than selling mercury at
cost
or

lowering the guinto to the diezmo, both of which
would have
cut into royal revenue.
The Marqugs de Mancera

Despite the vehemence of the Council's 1639 order and

Chinch6n's suggestion that a new repartimiento be completed,
the Marques de Mancera did not move quickly to resolve the

problems surrounding the mita.

Instead, he studied the

situation at length, balancing his instructions and the
counsel of his predecessor against his
of the status quo at Potosl.

ov/n

investigation

Like his predecessors, the

Viceroy did not go to Charcas himself, but depended upon
written reports from the officials who were stationed
there

Mancera did act quickly on minor measures for PotosI
that simply required his implementation of standing orders
or whose effects were temporary.

In October of 1640,

for

example, he reiterated the Conde de Chinchon's order that

Chucuito be represented by one capit^n enterador for each
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pueblo.

Early in 1641 he permitted the short-term

exaction of the diezmo at PotosI to boost
silver production
for the upcoming carta cuenta of March 15.^^
That measure
showed a degree of willingness to innovate
to solve
the

problems of falling silver production, but it
was also
motivated by the Viceroy's desire to show an
improvement in
silver output under his administration. The
azogueros were
encouraged, but their hopes that Mancera would soon
issue a

new repartimiento de la mita were not to be fulfilled.
By 1642, the azogueros were frustrated with Mancera
's
inaction, besieged by a new shortage of mercury and plagued

by Visitador Juan de Palacios.

The Gremio and the new

President of Charcas, Dionisio Perez Manrique, both

complained to the Viceroy that Palacios was overzealous in
his efforts to collect past mercury debts.

The current

year's supply of quicksilver had not arrived until

February
in March.

5,

and the carta cuenta was scheduled to depart

Faced with the Visitador 's unrealistic demands,

the azogueros reported, many of their comrades had followed
the Indians' example and fled from the villa

.

The one bright spot for the azogueros was the assistance

they received from President PSrez Manrique.

He gave them

the same support, where the distribution of mercury and

their petitions were concerned, as Lizarazu had.

P^rez

Manrique warned Mancera that only three or four of the
azogueros could afford to pay cash for mercury when it
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arrived; and that Palacios' collection of
debts would ruin

the silver industry if he were allowed to persist.

Gremio informed the Marqu§s on October

8,

The

1642, that it

was confident that Pgrez Manrique would rectify all of
the
azogueros

'

problems if he were provided the opportunity.^^

The Viceroy responded that the President would indeed be

empowered to adjust the 1633 repartimiento de la mita to
their satisfaction.

Mancera signed the requisite order and sent it to
PSrez Manrique on December

1,

1642.

By that time the

situation at PotosI had altered dramatically.

The alliance

between the azogueros and the presidency of Charcas had

broken down when the President assigned the enforcement of
orders to punish three azogueros for their misuse of the

mita to his brother Pedro. 64

Perez Manrique had apparently

not adopted Lizarazu's position that misuse was a natural

result of fluctuating mining fortunes.

His brother had

taken seventy mitayos from the three azogueros and assigned
half of them to a soldado
the

twenty-four

^

Francisco Mexia, in addition to

he already received.

The Gremio de azogueros responded to Pedro Perez

Manrique 's actions on the night of October 26.

It met in

an open forum, with Corregidor Juan VSzquez de Acuha

presiding.

The azogueros complained that the ore they

mined and refined was no longer rich; that production costs
had increased; that there was not enough labor

— only

2,600
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Of 4,116 mita^^os included in the
last repartimiento really
served; that the crown continued to
demand the quinto that
they had no assets left; and that
their enemies had
prevented them from obtaining new aid from
the crown with
their endless, insidious, reports. There
was no hope for
;

•

government assistance and no appreciation of
their past
service to the crown. Their years of sacrifice had
been
rewarded, the azoqueros cried, with the removal
of their
mi t ay OS because they had not been used correctly.
The azoqueros drafted a statement encompassing
all of

their complaints and problems.

That document reflected

the arguments that Sandoval y GuzmSn had presented before
the Council of the Indies, but the procurador

'

logic

s

failed them where the removal of mitayos for abuse was
concerned.

They had to fall back, therefore, on their most

effective bargaining tactic.

The azogueros presented the

Corregidor with the rights to their mitayos

,

and challenged

him to distribute them to those who could better employ them
in service to the crown.

Why, they asked, should they

prolong the now inevitable demise of PotosI?

Acuna refused to accept the azogueros

meeting disbanded without

'

VSzquez de

dejaci6n

a final resolution.

fi

,

and the

7

The de jaci6n and the Corregidor 's refusal to permit it

were a ploy to pressure the Viceroy to act on the azogueros
behalf.

If future attacks for misuse were to be prevented,

then a new repartimiento

,

based on Lizarazu's non-merit

'

guidelines, was absolutely crucial.

The process was

cpmplicated, however, when the soldados
and miners, led
by Pedro Pgrez Manrique, offered to
assume responsibility
for Potosi silver production in the
place of the

azogueros

.

The azogueros then warned that any
attempt to

assign their "available" mitayos to the
soldados would
mean serious trouble. Indeed, even without
such

a move,

the soldados and azogueros met in an armed
confrontation
in the center of PotosI on November
30, 1642.

Azoguero

Juan Antonio Munoz de Cu^llar was killed, and two
soldados and a miner were wounded.

President Pgrez Manrique and the Audiencia de Charcas
reacted to the dejaci6n in La Plata on November 29.

They

ordered the azogueros to meet and decide upon a more
appropriate means to represent their displeasure than the

abandonment of their mitayos

.

On December 2, the Gremio

met again, to draw up its reply to the Audiencia.

The

azogueros asked what a soldado was going to do with more
than sixty mitayos

.

They argued that they had invested

some 30,000 to 40,000 pesos each in their mills, and

would not have done so had it not been for Toledo's pledge
that mitayo labor would be provided.

Thus, the azogueros

established their claim that the receipt of mitayos was
their right, not a privilege.

The Gremio voted to send

seven deputies to La Plata, to carry its response to the

Audiencia 's order, and then to Lima to argue its case befor
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the Viceroy himself.

Meanwhile, Pedro P€rez Manrique had
journeyed to La
Plata to confer with his brother.
The Audiencia met on
December 2, 1642 to consider the situation
at PotosI, and
the President explained to the oidores
that his brother's
actions had been taken on his orders. The
directives of

October 26 were issued to castigate individual
azogueros
for misuse, specifically "pocket Indians."

The legal basis

for Pedro Pgrez Manrique 's actions and the exact
nature of

the soldados' offer had been unclear to the azogueros

,

the

President argued, and rumors had given rise to the violence.
The Audiencia voted to send the question of the dejaci6n
to the Marques de Mancera for resolution, and to despatch

President Pgrez Manrique to PotosI to settle matters down
there.

71

He left for the villa the following day.

On the road to Potosi, Dionisio Pgrez Manrique met the

Gremio de azogueros' seven deputies.

When he learned of

their mission, and especially their intention to argue

before the Viceroy, he dashed off a quick letter to his
oidores.

The President asked them not to be persuaded by

the deputies' portrayal of the events in Potosi, and not
to allow them to go on to Lima.

His concern was caused by

his fear that he had made a grave mistake by leaving the

execution of his orders to his brother.

In the letter,

PSrez Manrique confessed that he had erred in assigning the

mitayos to Mexia.

He said that he had thought that the
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soldado was an azoguero

.

Mexla's discoveries of silver

deposits at Potosi were legendary,
however, and the
additional Indians would no doubt be used
to uncover new
veins of rich ore. The President promised,
finally,

to be

more careful in the future.

From Potosi, on December

6,

Perez Manrique reported

that the azogueros who were leading the dejaciSn
were those
he had denied mitayos in October.
Most of the azogueros
,

he claimed, were not involved in the maneuver.

He also

ordered the oidores to send the Gremio's deputies back
to
Potosi; one could stay as their representative, but
the

other six had to work in their mills to pay their debts to
the crown.

^"^

The President wrote to the Audiencia again the next
day.

He denied all wrongdoing on his part or that of his

brother.

For the first time the source of the problems

came to light.

The azogueros charged that Pedro had

collected two pesos from each of the soldados for his
services on their behalf.

azogueros

'

Perez Manrique said that the

initial reports of a military confrontation

between themselves and the soldados had been overblown.
They had claimed that the soldados marched on the central

plaza in columns of three, with the intention of razing
the villa

,

but the President said that was not so.

He

instructed the oidores to leave the resolution of the
de jaci5n to the viceroy, and he was joined by the azogueros
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in that regard. 74

President Perez Manrique gathered the
azogueros
together on December 9 to promise that
he would do nothing
about the dejaci6n until he received word
from Mancera or
the crown. With these assurances—and
the knowledge that
the Viceroy would have to respond to their
complaints— the

azogueros agreed to recall their deputies from
La Plata as
75
he requested.
Once the issue of the dejaci6n had been eliminated—

by the end of March, 1643— Pgrez Manrique and the
azogueros

were again working together.

Nothing more was ever said

about the events of November and December of the previous
year.

Under the President's direction the azogueros drew

up another petition for the Viceroy.

The document included

material from 1642 and 1643, and generally repeated the
requests made by Sandoval y Guzman in his Pretensiones

:

the quinto needed to be reduced to the diezmo; mercury

sold at cost; and a Consulado de azogueros formed.

The

azogueros also asked for an increase in the mita ordinaria
to 6,000 Indians.

This last point may seem out of step

with reality, but it effectively pressed the issue of the

repartimiento without mentioning Caravajal or reducciones

Mancera was known to consider the latter impossible.
Perez Manrique supported the azogueros

'
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petition with

letters to the crown, and later, by gathering supporting

testimony from the religious orders of PotosI that the

;
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villa's silver industry was indeed near
ruin as the
azoqueros claimed. "^^ The President argued
that mercury
should be distributed at cost, that the diezmo
should
replace the guinto and that the azogueros should
be

,

allowed ten years during which to pay their debts to
the
crown for mercury they had received on credit. Those
debts, he added, would have to be adjusted in light
of the

azogueros

'

overpayment for quicksilver from 1609 to 1631;

they now claimed that they had paid ten pesos per quintal
too much because the crown's 1609 order to distribute

mercury at cost had not been obeyed. "^^
Other government officials joined Perez Manrique in

supporting the azogueros

'

requests.

The Corregidor de

Potosi, Bias Robles de Salzedo, wrote to Mancera on May 30,
1643.

He said that the best way to improve upon mita

deliveries was to include the forasteros
current places of residence.

,

from their

The effective mita ordinaria

had fallen to 2,9 34 Indians, the Corregidor noted, with
2,693 of those going to the azogueros and 241 to the

soldados.

The 1,088 that were missing, he argued, could

be regained with the inclusion of the forasteros 79
.

Despite the support of Perez Manrique, Bias Robles de
Salzedo and the religious orders, however, the Marques de

Mancera was not moved by the azogueros

'

petitions.

He had

begun to distrust them and their motives, and he accused
them of greatly exaggerating their plight.

80

Part of the

210

reason for the Viceroy's demeanor
was the ongoing
denunciation of one azoguero by another
for his misuse
of mitayos
Azoguero unity had been fractured by
.

an

intra-Gremio struggle between the few
azogueros who had
benefited by the 1633 repartimiento and
the others, who
had been hurt.^^ The charges of abuse
raised questions
about the azogueros' credibility and
merit at the very
moment that Mancera was weighing his response
to their
requests.
The Viceroy sent ex-Corregidor Juan
VSzquez
de Acuna back to PotosI to conduct a visita,
and
he

ordered the Gremio de azogueros to send a representative
to Lima.

In September, 1643, the azogueros answered Mancera

's

criticism and his order to despatch a representative.

They

said their economic difficulties had made the collection
of

seven pesos apiece, to pay the soldado who carried their

petition to Lima, very difficult; they could not afford to
support an emissary.

The azogueros also heightened the

stakes on the mercury issue.
the crown

4

00,000 pesos

,

They claimed that they owed

and that their overpayment for

quicksilver had amounted to two million.

They told the

Viceroy that they would not demand immediate payment of
the 1, 600, 000 -peso balance if mercury were provided to

them at cost!

83

On December

1,

164 3, the azogueros wrote to Mancera

again, to complain that their requests had not been

.
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answered.

They said that they were pleased with
Bias

Robles de Salzedo and glad that VSzquez
de Acuna was taking
only public testimony in his visita. Robles
had improved
the mita ordinaria, they reported, by 163
Indians.
They
were still having problems with mercury, however,
and the
next carta cuenta would suffer as a result.
The azoqueros

'

prediction was to come true, for in

January of 1644 both Robles and Perez Manrique reported
that the carta cuenta would indeed be lower than the last,

because of the problems with mercury and the azoqueros
debts.

'

The officials explained that in order to pay

their debts, the azoqueros had to sell the mercury that was

allotted to them, less 16 per cent interest on the loans
they contracted to buy it when it arrived.

They then had

very little quicksilver to use in their mills.

Mancera

had already chided Perez Manrique once for defeatism; his

earlier predictions that the carta cuenta would be low were

met with a viceregal lecture that a government official's
duty was to perform the impossible
The Marques answered the azoqueros

January

1,

1644.

'

September letter on

He told them to name someone already in

Lima to represent them if they would not afford to send a
deputy.

He was preparing the new repartimiento de la mita,

considering their requests and ruling on matters left from
Chinchon's viceroyalty, he said, and it would do them well
to be represented.

87

The azogueros understood the Viceroy's

message, and they sent deputy Phelipe
de Bollbar to
Lima at once.^^

Mancera took two more years to develop the
new
repartimiento. The delay was caused by the need

to

conduct a census in the obligated provinces,
for the
Viceroy doubted that there were enough Indians
to meet
Potosl's requirements. Should the enumeration
demonstrate
that there were too few, then new provinces would
have to
be added or the mita ordinaria reduced.

The census showed,

however, that there were sufficient Indians in the sixteen

provinces and the Marques proceeded.

He maintained the

quotas included in the 1633 repartimiento
4,116

— but

—a

total of

added to that figure the 380 mitayos previously

assigned to the mines at Porco and one-tenth of the
yanaconas living in the obligated provinces (about 700 per
week)

.

The mita ordinaria was thereby increased to 5,196

Indians, with the azogueros receiving 4,636 mitayos and
the soldados 44 0.
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Unsure about the feasibility of his distribution, the

Viceroy sent a draft of it to Potosi for comments.
instructed the Corregidor to obtain the azogueros
in an open forum. 90

'

He

response

This gesture of renewed cooperation

between the azogueros and the Viceroy was to be undermined
by the variety of responses that he received in return.

The requested meeting took place on July 29, 1646,

with most of the azogueros responding to the repartimiento

s
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favorably.

The 5,196 Indians would be sufficient,
they

said, if all of them served; but that was
a problem.

Only

2,600 mitayos were currently working at PotosI, and
only
80 of the 380 who were assigned to Porco.

The azogueros

were particularly unsure about the dependability of
the
yanaconas.

They expressed their continued concern that

whatever the number of mitayos

,

they should be distributed

fairly, on the basis of each mill's production capabilities
(that is, not on the basis of merit)

.

Each azoguero

'

contingent, they added, should be formed with the various

ayllus

'

records of compliance in

mind.^""-

Azoguero Pedro de Vallesteros wrote separately that
the types of Indians assigned to each azoguero were as

important as their total number.

It was better, he said,

to assign the ayllus as units, however, than split them up
as Diego de Portugal had done in 1624.^^

The royal treasury officials counseled that a visita
of the cerro and the mills was needed to determine who

should receive the mitayos

.

They noted one case in

particular, the Barriales mill, where no silver had been

produced for many years.

The mitayos that were assigned

to it were rented, and the proceeds were used to support

the azoguero

—a

nun.
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The royal officials were holding,

therefore, to the importance of ensuring that azogueros

who were guilty of misuse were not provided with mitayos

Corregidor Juan de Velarde confessed that he was

.
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worried about the proposed distribution.

Some of the

azocfueros who were highly favored were known
to be involved

in misuse, he said, and others who were
conscientious and

received fewer Indians would surely object.

Velarde

suggested that the royal officials draw up a list of
those
who had complied with their duties and obligations;
unless
the meritorious received the mitayos

,

he warned, the villa

would be overcome by recriminations.^"*

From the azogueros

comments it is clear that the Corregidor did not show them
the details of the proposed repartimiento

.

His insistence

that the distribution of mitayos be based on merit, echoed

by the royal officials, worked to nullify the azogueros

'

demand that they be assigned according to each mill's

production capability.
This motley response to the repartimiento by the

azogueros and government officials in PotosI raised new

questions in the Viceroy's mind.

Mancera sent back a list

of four queries, which he asked the azogueros to answer:
a)

which mills were totally destroyed, and how long had

they been out of production?

b)

which ayllus were good,

which were bad, and which were mediocre?

c)

what problems

could be expected if the forasteros in the provinces were

obliged to make up the difference between 2,600 and 4,116
mitayos

,

and how could they be overcome? and

more than eighty mitayos appear at Porco?

d)

why did no

95

These questions were asked without the benefit of the

'
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Corregidor's visita of the cerro
and the mills, conducted
with Carlos de Oviedo in August
of 1646.
Velarde included
the results of that inspection
with a letter to the Marqugs
of August 31 concerning the
failure of provincial

corregidores to improve upon their
deliveries of mi tayos
The contingent from Chucuito, he
noted, had not arrived at
all, Paria's group was doubtful,
and rezagos for both were
inevitable.
.

The azogueros wrote to Mancera the same
day that he
wrote to them, September 1, 1646. They
asked him not to
be persuaded by the opinions of five or
six azogueros who
had benefited by the Caravajal repartimiento
and hoped to

prevent the new one by spreading lies about their
colleagues
in the Gremio.

They noted that the Council of the Indies

had not confirmed the 1633 distribution of mi tayos

,

and

they argued that the sooner it was replaced the better.
On October

3,

^"^

1646, the azogueros answered the four

questions the Viceroy had put to them in his letter of

September

1.

They replied that the Velarde-Oviedo visita

should be the basis for distributing the mitayos

.

The

determination of which ayllus were good, bad or mediocre
was difficult, for the Indians were delivered according
to their pueblos; the azogueros sent a list based on each

pueblo's history of compliance.

The inclusion of forasteros

would be beneficial, they said, because the census had shown
that there were plenty of them in the provinces.

The Gremio
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suggested that the forasteros be obliged
to serve in the
mita from their places of residence,
under the direction
of local government officials.^^

The azogueros argued, however, that strict
penalties

would be required to keep priests and corregidores
from
protecting the forasteros for use in their own schemes.
They believed, furthermore, that the 5,000 mitayos

included in the Viceroy's repartimiento would probably
result in an effective mita ordinaria of 4,000 Indians,
but that that number would be sufficient.

The 300 mitayos

who failed to arrive at Porco were irrecoverable, because
Porco drew upon the same geographic area as Potosl.

If

the 2,600 current mitayos were joined by 700 yanaconas

and 1,700 forasteros, the azogueros thought, then the mita

could be successful once again.
The Marques de Mancera was looking for a consensus

where there was none, and perfection where it was not
possible.

Administration of the mita from Lima was

proving to be as difficult as trying to govern Peru from
Madrid.

The more information the Viceroy received, the

less consistent it became.

The royal treasury officials

did not help his indecisiveness when they alleged that the

crown's quintos were low because the azogueros were heavily

involved with "pocket Indians."

They charged, moreover,

that the azogueros mistreated the Indians so that they would

leave Potosi, and then demanded service in silver from the

.
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caciques.

Their inspection of the cerro and
the mills,
the officials said, had shown that
most of the azogueros
were refining desmontes, if anything
at all, simply to
present the appearance of production. '"^^
The treasury officials' report did not
correlate with

Corregidor Velarde's contention that the
azogueros were
trying to hire mingas with the money they
received from
the caciques, but that they could not find
enough

Indians

who were willing to work in the mines.

These comments

were included in Velarde's letter to the Viceroy of

October 31, 1646, which served as the cover for the
azogueros

'

answers to his four questions

By the end of 1646, Mancera was thoroughly frustrated
and vindictive.

The crown's quintos

reported, were down by

4

,

the royal officials

3,000 pesos despite the Marques'

suspension of the collection of mercury debts until the
crown could rule on the azogueros
from 1609 to 1631. 102

overpayment for mercury

'

The Viceroy was particularly upset

with the reports he received that the azogueros were using
"^ita

service in silver for their own purposes, and the

Corregidor 's statement that mita quotas were impossible to
meet.
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The crown was at war and needed money, Mancera

argued, and thus anyone who did not labor to raise that

money was

a traitor;

the azogueros

'

use of "pocket Indians"

was not just an abuse, it was treason.

down the law:

The Marques laid

Those who merit assistance will receive
who do not, will not. And for now, the it; those
who qualifies and who does not will be proof of
based on two
factors:
the first is the punctual payment for
mercury; the second is the improvement of
the royal
quintos— not only must they not go any lower,
they
must return to earlier levels. Any of you
who
fails me in this regard, I assure you, will
feel my
response personally, and in his pocketbook 104
.

The Gremio de azogueros asked Mancera to implement
his

repartimiento on November

1,

1646, and he promised, on

November 30, that they would not have to wait long—he

would finish it once the end-of-the-month correspondence
had been despatched; he did

The Viceroy's

not."'"^^

warning to the azogueros suggests the probable cause of
his inaction on the matter.

He had rejected their argument

that the receipt of mitayos was their right, by virtue of

their pact with Francisco de Toledo.

He was now an ardent

believer in the use of merit as the basis of the
repartimiento

;

and he did not believe that the azogueros

were deserving of his assistance.

The royal officials

reported, in April of 1647, that "pocket Indians" had

again caused a very low carta cuenta to be sent from
Potosl.
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The report may well have been the final nail

in the repartimiento

'

s

coffin.

In his relacion for the Viceroy Conde de Salvatierra

(1648-1655)

azogueros

.

,

Mancera related his experiences with the
He said that he had tried to help them, but

without success.

They habitually exaggerated their

problems; each year they said they were near ruin, but the
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^^^"^Q^ ""^^ nonetheless.

His efforts toward a new

repartimiento had stalled, he said, because
the information
he had received from PotosI was untrustworthy,
and fairness

in the distribution was absolutely
fundamental.

He had

decided, therefore, that it would be better to
leave the
azocjueros with the hope that a new repartimiento
would be

completed than to risk doing it wrong. "'^'^
Thus, the az ogueros did not get their new repartimiento

and their attempt to impose their view of the mita on
the

Marques de Mancera had failed as well.
the conceptual basis of the mita

right or a privilege

— had

The struggle over

— whether

it was their

important temporal consequences,

for not only did the azogueros fail to obtain new

concessions, they were unable to reverse the damage that

had been done by Juan de Caravajal in 1633.
The de facto Mita
The fifteen years from 1633 to 1648 were dominated by
the political machinations concerning the repartimiento

.

Viceregal administration did little to improve the
faltering delivery of mitayos

,

but it did evidence some

movement away from the belief that the corregidores could
be held accountable for the failure of the Indians to

arrive in Potosl.
In 16 34, for example, the Conde de Chinchon ordered

that each pueblo in Chucuito was to be represented by its

,
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own capitgn enterador.

The Viceroy hoped that the

dispersion of the capit^n 's duties would increase
the
province's compliance with its mita obligation,

but it

did not. 108
.

.

Juan de Caravajal reported, in 1636, that

only 600 of the 1,800 mitayos required from
Chucuito were
actually present in Potosl. The quotas from the
other
provinces, he added, were unfilled as well.

held the corregidores

,

The Visitador

priests and caciques responsible.

He said that they drove the originarios from their pueblos
to make room for the forasteros they used in their own
109
enterprises.

That same year, Lizarazu claimed that there were more
Indians in the provinces than ever.

He said they were

only spread wider than before, and that they had learned
to evade the mita.

The President called for the inclusion

of yanaconas and forasteros in the mita, and for grave

penalities to be applied to corregidores and priests who

harbored runaway Indians.

The priests, he said, should

not be granted continuance after three years unless their

cooperation with the mita was documented by the Corregidor
de Potosl.

at least

Corregidores should serve perpetually

— rather

—a

decade

than the present two or three year term.

Lizarazu argued that the economic activities they used to
recover the initial cost of their offices would be run with

moderation if their tenure were longer

"^''"^
.

After Caravajal departed PotosI in 1638, Corregidor

Josg Slez de Elorduy and President
Lizarazu agreed to send
Diego NQnez de Ovando to oversee the
delivery of mitayos
from Canas y Canches, Carabaya, Chucuito,
La Recaja,
Omasuyo, Pacajes, Paria and Paucarcolla.
Their decision
was in accordance with an order from ChinchSn
that the

Corregidor do whatever he deemed was necessary
to increase
provincial compliance with mita quotas.

A more persuasive indication that the caciques were

unable— or perhaps unwilling— to deliver their full
contingents of mitayos was included in the azogueros
reply to Mancera's second set of questions.

'

After they

had expressed their concerns about the inclusion of the

forasteros and yanaconas in the mita, they argued that

every mitayo should serve in person.

The azogueros said

that the caciques no longer delivered the silver that they

collected from the Indians for the purpose of meeting
their mita quotas, but kept it for themselves

^

The

azogueros no doubt expected that they would be able to
retain some access to service in silver extralegally

,

but

their confession that the de facto mita was no longer

meeting their needs was important.

Velarde's reference

to the inevitability of rezagos de mita for Paria and

Chucuito in 1646 was another sign that the caciques were
no longer satisfying the demands of the azogueros 113
.

In addition to the traditional difficulties that the

caciques faced in delivering the mitayos to Potosl,
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they were now hindered,
as Lizarazu suggested,
by the
Indians' growing ability to
evade mita service. An
example is the case of the
Carrillo brothers.

From 1638 to 1640 Antonio and
Agustin Carrillo held
the canity enterador from
Potobamba at bay with the claim
that they were mestizos, and
therefore exempted from mita
service.
The two lived in Potobamba and
their father was
an Indian, but their mother
was a mestiza. The case was
ultimately brought before the Audiencia
de Charcas, where
the Fiscal counseled that a ruling
in favor of
the

Carrillos would destroy the mita, for
the judicial system
would soon be clogged by the petitions
of Indians claiming
some degree of Spanish ancestry. He
noted
that the two

looked, dressed and lived as Indians.

The Audiencia

rejected this ethnological definition of

"

Indian-ness"

and voted to prevent the caciques of
Potobamba from

including the Carrillos in future mita deliveries

.

"^^^

A

century of miscegenation since the conquest of Peru
had
created a new problem for the mita
just who was an
:

Indian?
In another case, the gobernador and capitgn enterador

of Santiago de Yanaoca, Fernando Surco, accused Pedro Alata

Arusi of changing his name to Pedro Gualpa and his place
of origin to Oruro to evade mita service.

Surco chased

Pedro down after he had fled from Potosi after only

a few

days working in the cerro, and had him jailed pending

a
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decision by the Audiencia de Charcas.

Pedro said that he

had been born in Oruro and later
moved to the estancia of
Gonzalez Pic6n at the age of seven,
after his parents had
died.
Evidence on both sides of the dispute
showed that
he had then been entrusted to Domingo
Arusi and raised along
with his three sons. Arusi was originally
from Santiago de
Yanaoca, and served in the mita from the
estancia when his
sons came of age they too traveled to
Potosl from there.
;

Pedro fled from Potosl after his first
taste of mita
service, and when he was captured by Surco
he challenged
the legal basis for his obligation.
Despite serious

questions concerning his true origin— he changed his

birthplace to Areguipa during the course of the litigation

—the Audiencia ruled

that his adoption by Domingo Arusi

'

did not oblige him to serve in the mita .'*""'-^
As in the first third of the seventeenth century, the

caciques who managed to deliver their full quotas in spite
of the obstacles were rewarded.

In 1640,

for example,

Fernando Ayra de Arriutu's family won a coat-of-arms and
the right to carry a sword in recognition of three

generations of faithful service as caciques and capitanes

enteradores de la mita

^
.

More common were the capitanes who could not comply

with their responsibilities.

In 1646 the Corregidores of

Colquemarca, Desaguadero, Chayanta and Paria all reported
that the mita contingents from their provinces could not

be delivered because the
canitanes had followed the
Indians
in flight from their
obligations
Corregidor Juan de
Velarde wrote Mancera, also in
1647, that the only
provinces that were sending any
mitayos in person were
Canas y Canches, Collao, Asangaro
y Asillo, Paucarcolla,
Chucuito, Omasuyo, Pacajes and
Chayanta-eight
.

in

The azogueros

'

alL^^^

struggle with the government over
the

mita was focused on service in
silver, not their treatment
of the mitayos who served in person.
Therefore, while a
great deal of attention had been paid
to the mitayos
working conditions during the first fifty
years of the
'

system's existence, reports about the life
of mitayos at
PotosI from 1633 to 1648 are virtually
non-existent. One

in-depth description was produced in 16 39 by
Father Pedro
Ramirez del Aguila. He reported that the
Spanish section
of Potosi was ringed by the Indians' parroguias

each of the provinces subject to the mita.
was governed by a capitan

,

,

one for

Each parroguia

gobernador and other caciques

.

The caciques and Indians change each year, each
change being called a mita. This change-over is
the source of the problems, pressures and extortions
that afflict these poor Indians. The Spaniards
pressure them to come; the Indians resist. A
thousand injustices are perpetrated involving supposed
deliveries in person and others in silver, which end
up in the pockets of the miners, paid or taken at
times with force from the Indians who do not owe it.
All of these tricks and illegalities give vent to
legal confrontations. Most every Monday some of the
caciques are punished in the plazas, the women and
children of the fugitives are imprisoned, and the
mitayos are all in an eternal state of chaos and
confusion, pain and work ... at the top of Guayna

—

'
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each Monday the Indians that have
to work that
week come together with the Corregidor,
veedores
miners and owners, and the capitaLs
obl igated t ^
the Indians
The group is a small
arn,v ir^^
thousand persons. The entire
dfv^ic ^-^i^^ ^^u^^""
distribution.
Indians sit
tt^Ll
about on the ground, on millstones
or wheels, in
their respective fields, that are corrals,
divided
by province. Once the distribution
is finished
and the Indians have been assigned,
the barreteros
and apiris climb the cerro most of
them
from the day's drinking and perplexed by drunk
the effects
of the chicha.
They work all week, day and night,
three or four hundred meters below the
ground, more
or less.
Once at work they do it with apparent
pleasure, smiling as though they were at a
fiesta
The risks that these mines hold for one's
life are
great, from falls or cave-ins, which many times
have
buried two or three hundred. Because of the many
miracles granted by Our Lady these have escaped,
but there usually are some broken limbs, deaths
and
wounds despite the considerable effort to maintain
safe working conditions by the miners, veedores
and the alcalde mayor de minas.
It is impossible
to prevent all such accidents because the cerro has
been mined infinitely with tunnels, shafts, wells
... it is like a sieve. Four or five thousand
work inside the mines all week, and then return down
the sides of the cerro on Saturday.
They carry
candles in what appears to be a long procession. On
Sunday morning they are gathered by the priests for
religious instruction and mass, but most of them are
drunk and tired and the effort is not very successful.
After mass the Indians are paid their wages mitayos
receive two and one-half pesos mingas are paid
seven and one-half and immediately spent it all on
alcohol. 119
.

,

—

;

From other, fragmentary, evidence it is apparent that
the mitayos continued to face problems with disease, short

food supplies and the high cost of necessities.

In the

mid-1630s the mitayos complained loudly when the price of
candles doubled, for they were now obliged to buy their
own

121
.

It is difficult

,

however

,

to say whether Ramirez

description of PotosI was based on his personal experiences

I

.

or borrowed from other accounts.

His passage concerning

work inside the cerro, for instance,
is very similar to
Father Acosta's sixteenth century
account;

and his 4,000

to 5,000 total for the Indians
working in the mines is

higher than a mita ordinaria of
2,600 would have permitted.
For want of another view of life at
PotosI
for this period,

therefore, Ramirez' report is as undependable
as it is
invaluable

Summary
In 1634 SebastiSn de Sandoval
y GuzmSn, procurador

^^^^ral of the Cabildo de PotosI, published

Pretensiones in Madrid, including:
the quinto to the diezmo

general;
cost; and

c)

d)

;

b)

a)

a

series of

the lowering of

the execution of a reducci6n

the distribution of mercury on credit and at
the formation of a Consulado de azogueros.

Sandoval's arguments in support of these. four proposals
did not mention the azogueros

'

misuse of service in silver

or other unauthorized aspects of the de facto mita, because
to win the new concessions from the crown they had to

appear both needy and righteous.

The requests were, in

part, an azoguero attempt to regain control of the silver

industry at PotosI.

They were also meant to keep the

crown from believing the azogueros

'

enemies.

As Sandoval

y GuzmSn was arguing their case before the Council of the

Indies, however, the azogueros were under attack at home
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for their misuse of the mita

.

The Viceroy Conde de Chinch6n
decided not to leave his
repartimiento de la mita to the President
of Charcas, but
assigned it to Visitador Juan de Caravajal
y Sandi.
The
Viceroy had decided upon a new means for
aligning the mita
with the falling originario population in
the provinces;
he told Caravajal to use misuse of the
mita as his central

criterion for granting or denying mitayos to the
azogueros
Chinch6n believed that misuse was so extensive
at Potosl
that the number of azogueros who received Indians,

.

and so

the number of mitayos required, could be greatly
reduced
in this fashion.

Caravajal did not lower the total number of mitayos

,

but he did implement basic changes that seriously

threatened the de facto mita.

Indians were assigned to

the az ogueros in complete ayllus or pueblos, and twenty-nine

mills were denied all access to mitayo labor.

Those

alterations disrupted service in silver arrangements and
reduced the total number of mitayos that some of the
azogueros received by virtue of their ownership of more
than one mill.

More fundamentally, the azogueros

'

acceptance of the repartimiento would have meant their

capitulation to the viceroys' position that the mita was
a privilege.

They argued that their receipt of mita labor

was their right, under the terms of their pact with Toledo.

Those were the real reasons for the azogueros

'

.
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opposition to the 1633 repartimiento
argue against it on those bases.

but they could not

.

Instead, they had to

employ their traditional argument
that silver production
would be hurt, and so royal income,
and that PotosI might
collapse because of the meddling of
an ignorant government
official
The azogueros' complaints received
short shrift in
Lima, so they were sent to the Council
of the Indies,
which tried to serve as a referee in
the battle between
Caravajal and the azogueros. Because the
combatants argued
on two completely different levels-the
Visitador accusing
the azogueros of abuse and they warning that
PotosI silver

production would be lost forever—there was no common
ground upon which the Council could base a decision.

it

therefore left the resolution of the conflict to the
Viceroy, but suggested that he conduct a new repartimiento

Despite some cooperation between Chinch6n and President

Lizarazu

— the

azogueros

'

advocate

— the

two officials were

at odds over the implementation of the Council's order.

The President wanted to conduct a new repartimiento

,

with

no provision for the distribution of mitayos according to

merit, while the Viceroy merely wanted Lizarazu to adjust
the 16 33 repartimiento

.

Their disagreement ended in a

stalemate.
The Council of the Indies then ordered the Marques de

Mancera to conduct a new repartimiento

,

according to

.

Lizarazu's guidelines.

Mancera moved slowly, weighing his

instructions and the counsel of his
predecessor against
his own investigation of the situation
at Potosl.

m

the

meantime, the azogueros had to withstand
an attempt by
the new President of Charcas, Dionisio
Pgrez Manrique, to
remove some mitayos from three azogueros for
misuse.
Pgrez
Manrique, unlike Lizarazu, did not believe that
misuse of
the mita was a natural result of fluctuating
mining
fortunes.

The azogueros countered the President's move

with a deiaci6n of their mitayos
down the silver industry.

,

essentially shutting

The dejaci6n was also meant to

force the Viceroy to conduct a new repartimiento

.

It

apparently succeeded in bringing Perez Manrique back into
line, but Mancera continued to move very slowly toward

completion of the new repartimiento

.

The project was

delayed for two years because he had doubts that there
were enough Indians in the provinces to support the mita.
His investigation discovered, however, that there were

sufficient numbers, and he drew up a 5,196 Indian mita

ordinaria

:

the 4,116 previously included by Caravajal;

380 mitayos theretofore assigned to Porco; and 700

yanaconas

.

That might have been the end of the repartimiento
problem, but the Viceroy then sent his proposed distribution
to Potosi for prior comment.

The azogueros responded only

to the total numbers of Indians involved, and raised some

questions about the assignment of
mitayos in complete
a^llus and the prospects for the
inclusion of yanaconas
Corregidor Velarde was concerned about
the implementation
.

of the repartimiento, because some
azogueros who were

heavily involved in misuse of the mita
were favored in
the distribution.
He argued that the mitayos

should be

assigned on the basis of merit— a sentiment
that was
repeated by the royal treasury of f icials— and
so countered
the azogueros

'

arguments to the contrary.

The uneven response to the suggested repartimiento

caused Mancera to delay its execution, at first with
more

questions—including the possibility of incorporating the
forasteros.

Then charges of abuse leveled by some of the

azogueros against others, general confusion in the

correspondence between Potosi and Lima, and falling carta
cuenta shipments combined to frustrate the Marques.

He

decided that only the meritorious should receive mitayos

,

and because he could not determine who they were, he left
the problem of the repartimiento to his successor.

Meanwhile, the caciques were proving less able to

deliver their quotas of mitayos

,

in person or in silver.

The azogueros claimed, in their correspondence with the

Viceroy, that the caciques no longer delivered the money
they collected from the Indians.

In fact, they were unable

to raise enough money, and because rezagos de mita were

now demanded, each year's failures were added to the next

231

year's obligation to compound
their difficulties. The
caciques were prevented from meeting
their quotas by the
falling originario population in
the provinces, the
increased demand for Indian labor in
them, and the growing
ability of the Indians to evade mita
service.
In the battle between Lima and
Potosi over the

conceptual basis of the mita the Indians
who served in
person were virtually forgotten. The struggle
was not
over how the azogueros treated the mitayos
who worked for
them, but how they used those mitayos

— especially

who arrived in Potosi in the form of silver.

the ones
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own "Relacien del estado del gobierno del
pl?a qie haSe el
Marques de Mancera al Virrey Conde de Salvatierra,"
8.X
1648, Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez),
Peru III
(no. 282), 148 (from the printed version
in the British
Museum)
cr.

!?*

,

ANB,
RC 335, "Copia simple de real cedula dirigida
a la audiencia de La Plata:
Informe con su parecer sobre
SI convendria que los azogueros de Potosi paguen
solamente
el diezmo de los metales que sacan, o el quinto
deducidas
costas, o el quinto de los metales ricos de minas nuevas
y
el diezmo o duodecimo de los metales pobres de minas
antiguas, segQn pide a nombre del gremio el doctor don
SebastiSn de Sandoval y Guzman," Madrid, 4. XII. 16 35 (MC
703)
The crown would later ask the age-old question about
Black slaves again, ANB, RC 392, "Tanto simple de real
c€dula dirigida a esta real audiencia: ordenasele informe
sobre si conviene traer a estas provincias esclavos negros
para el beneficio de las minas y la labor de los campos,"
Zaragoza, 12. X. 1645 (MC 764; MOM 615). Arzans, Historia
II, 57, mentions two cedulas by Phillip IV benefiting the
azogueros which came in response to Sandoval y Guzman's
efforts on their behalf: a) a 9. X. 1635 order that azogueros
could not be jailed for debts owed to the Real Hazienda;
and b) a 15. X. 16 35 order that debts would not prevent the
azogueros from obtaining government positions.
53.

.

,

ANB, RC 356, "Expediente relative a las diligencias
practicadas en la real audiencia de La Plata con motive de
54.

.
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la peticiSn hecha por
don L6pe
procurador general de la villa de Andrar^^ q^^^
''^^^
°
de
pStoS?\
^^P^
Potos£
a
nombre
y
gremio de azoqueros de
del

L

ii£-£,rt£^

".-'.K^-s.'-

-^o--'-V.1639,

2 fs.
MC 731; MOM 594)- ANB Rr ^rq
simple de real cedula dirigida a
esU ^diencia
1^ petici6n que Ger6n?mo
Gafav?^n''°''
^r^^^^
de\zoguerSs de
Potoli ha^r''''^^^^
cualquiera pueda fabricar ingenios
en dicha
dfcha villa
v^Tir""^
por la utilidad que se sigue a la
real
^"^^"""^
liclnciado
don Juan de
Carvaifl'v^^^H^^^'^
esta audiencia, hizo
despoblar'^a^anni;
aespoblar
algunos mgenios con pretexto de no ser
nec4
"
sarios/' Madrid, 16. IV. 1639, 1 f. (mc
727).

MO
Copia
.

'

'

includes two copies of the order:
no ^IfiR t^^Ao^^^'^'^r i^^' '^^^^
Sol6rzano Pereira in 1654)
^nH
and no. 3 9B which appears to be the
original; both are 2
ts.
length.
The order was also included in AGI, Charcas
no. 20B, "Cedula del repartim. to
266
with
President Nestares Marin to ?he crown, 30. V. a letter from
other extracts supporting the distribution of1652? and
mitayos on
the basis of stamping mechanisms mazos
4 fs. total- this
may be a draft of AGI, Charcas 26871^ 70C,
"TestimO sobre
el repartim^o General de Indies de las Minas,"
4.II.1679,
7 fs., which includes an order to Corregidor de
Potosi
Sarmiento de Mendoza of 8. XI. 1653 to implement the
terms of
the 7 XII. 1639 cidula; AGI, Charcas 266, no.
20B could also
be a draft of that 1653 order (which will be
discussed in

m

^

(

)

,

'

Chapter

V)

In addition to the sources in note 56:
57.
Castillo
(AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30, Chapter
II), 15v,
gives the 5,000 Indian figure; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268,
nos. 69A & 69B— see note 58, Chapter II), 10, relates
the
7.

XII. 1639 order and Lizarazu's three guidelines.
58.

ANB, M 125, no.

3,

"Provisi6n del virrey:

La

,
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aijuuT:

now Dad things are at Potosl.

Perez Manrique to the Marqugs de
Mancera, Potosl, 6. X. 1642
The azoc^ueros 1642-1643 informaci6n
2 fs
(AGN S^la ix,'
Chapter II) includes lengthy
testimony 'bi ^hr^
azo2ueros, from March and April of 1642
^hf^
that !^?^T,^
the President had personally
underwritten some azoaue.oneylendlrt™
^^^^^^
iIIv:r°m:L^hant:^'^
'

'

^^^^

r™-;

t°

e^X 1642?

i^f'^''^''^^

1' the Deputies of the
Marqugs de Mancera, Potosl,

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 4, the Marques de
63.
Mancera
to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1. XII.
1642, 1 f. (draft).
ANB, M 125, no. 5, "Acta en testimonio, de
un
cabildo celebrado por el gremio de los azogueros
de PotosI
con presencia del general don Juan VSzquez de
Acuna,
corregidor de dicha villa: En consideraci6n a la pobreza
actual de los metales, a los gastos excesivos de azogue,
mineros, capatazes, herramientas y otros inconvenientes
el gremio resuelve suspender las labores
y hacer dejaci6n
de los indios mitayos," Potosl, 26. X. 1642, 8 fs. (MC
746;
MOM 601)
Gunnar Mendoza relates the events surrounding
the dejaci6n in a note in ArzSns, Historia II, 90; he
refers to " Minas catllogo 418, 420-425" in that note—it
would seem that the numeration of the ANB/BNB catalogues
has changed since the Arz5ns Historia was published.
64

.

,

ANB, M 125, no. 6, "Carta del gremio de azogueros
de PotosI a esta Real Audiencia:
Informa que los azogueros
65.

.
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<1^3^<=i«n de los Indies de
mita
mitroor^el^L?"^"""
por el mal repartimiento
J'
que de Sstos pretendia hac^sr
don Pedro Manrique, hermano de don
Dionlcio^ManriqGe,
Real_Audiencia," PotosI, 2...AV,2.
.

rii:'wc%^l.."^S
66.

ANB, M 125, no.

67.

Ibid.

5

(see note 64).

^c^e^do de la audiencia de
^'
c' vi6 una
Se
proposiciCn del doctor don Dionisio
P§rez Manrique, gobernador-presidente de esta
en orden a la dejaci6n que los azogueros han audiencia
ofrecido hacer
de los indios mitayos agraviSndose del castigo
que dicho
gobernador habia impuesto en algunos de ese gremio
por el
mal uso de los indios llamados de f altriquera "
La Plata
2. XII. 1642, 4 fs. (MC 750; MOM 604).

^x*^

rhJnlc
cnarcas:

,

69.

ANB, M 125, no.

70.

Ibid.

71.

ANB, ACh.LA 7, no. 42

6

(see note 65).

(see note 68).

ANB, M 125, no. 7, "Carta de su presidente, don
Dionisio Manrique, a esta Real Audiencia, desde el camino
a PotosI:
El tribunal no debe dejarse sorprender por los
diputados del gremio de azogueros de dicha villa que
vienen a representar supuestos excesos del mencionado don
Dionisio en el repartimiento de los indios de mita," El
Terrado, 3. XII. 1642, 2 fs. (MC 750a; MOM 606).
72.

ANB, M 125, no. 8, "Carta de su presidentegobernador, don Dionisio Pgrez Manrique, asistente en
PotosI, a esta real Audiencia:
Da noticias sobre el
estado en que se encuentra esa villa despues de los alter
~
cados que promovieron los azogueros en el asunto de los
indios de mita.
Incluye un auto para que se los notifique
a los siete diputados del gremio de azogueros que vinieron
a esta ciudad de La Plata a presentar sus quejas a la
Audiencia, para que comparezcan en PotosI, como deudores
de la real hacienda por azogues, a seguir en sus labores
de minas para afianzar sus deudas," PotosI, 6. XII. 1642,
3 fs.
(MC 751; MOM 607)
73.

ANB, M 125, no. 9, "Carta de su presidente, don
Dionisio P§rez Manrique, estante en PotosI, a esta Real
Audiencia: Desmiente la especie de que el prop6sito de
los mineros y soldados el dia de su encuentro con los
74.

,

.
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contra su heLano
d:n'pldrola^??°L?"%o?osr°rxiri642

ANB, M 125, no. 10

75.

(see note 74).

Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 2, is an undated
petition
iTon^
along the same lines as the 1642-1643
informaci6n it ?s
2 fs. long and entitled "Petission del
de los
azogueros de esta Villa, Para que su ex gremio
la probea lo que
fuere servido en aquello que solo pende
de^su Voluntad
que en quanto a los demas, en que puede
obrar Don Dionisio
haziendo Las diligencias con tSdo
;

ciydad^

^^^^
"Informacian" before
p.ol^;
i^^'President
Dionisio Perez Manrique, including testimony by
the religious orders of PotosI supporting
the Gremio
azogueros' request for assistance, PotosI, 25. VIII. de
1643
For P^rez Manrique 's correspondence, AGN, Sala
14 fs.
IX,
6-2-5, no. 10 (see note 74); and AGN, Sala
IX, 6-2-5, no.
4b, for what appears to be a letter from
Perez Manrique to
the Marques de Mancera (so noted by the Viceroy's
secretary
on the letter), Potosi, 8. IX. 1643, 4 fs. (unsigned).
AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 45 (see note 77); AGI
Charcas 266, no. 14, "Consulta del consejo de 16 de Abril
de 650 sobre la pretension de los Acogueros de
Potossi,"
Madrid, 16. IV. 1650, 9 fs.
78.

79.

Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C— see note 30,

Chapter II) ,15.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 48, the Marques de Mancera
to the Gremio de azogueros, Lima, 1. XI. 1643, 2 fs. (draft;
in the Viceroy's hand?)
80.

81.
One such denunciation, undated however, is AGN,
Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 44, Christ6val de Castaneda to the
Marques de Mancera, 1 f. His position is supported by
AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 42, the Gremio de azogueros to the

Marqugs de Mancera, Potosi,

1. XII. 1643,

1

f.

The Viceroy

242

comments on the situation in
AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no
note o. l.XIX.l64%^!.o^nf^i-XX^:'%^^!^-L

r.r.ll'^

38

!l"!f^^e^:;oie

f rrival of the Visitador was one of manv item^
a letter describing the

•

o?!
plaguing
the azogueros

gamut of ux^ricuxties
difficulties

.

^^^^

^-2-5. no. 47, the Deputies of the
^^^^^^^
ManceL, PotosI
?X ^64.
IX.
1643 T.h'^r^^"^"
(the day is not provided), 2 fs.

r^J^'

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 37

84.

(see note 82).

Corregidor Bias Robles
ll^
Salzedo
to the Marqugs de Mancera, PotosI,
31.1.1644
''''
^^'2
President Don Dloni^io
P^r^;'M''''''PSrez Manrique to the Marqugs de Mancera,
PotosI,
ri.
de

1644,

2

86.

(draftf^
87.

31 I

fs.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 16, the Marqugs de
Mancera
Dionisio Pgrez Manrique, Lima, 1.1.1644, 4 fs.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 38

(see note 81).

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39, the Marques de Mancera
to the Gremio de azogueros and Corregidor de
PotosI, Lima,
30. VI. 1646, 10 fs.
The twenty pages include drafts of the
Viceroy's letters and a copy of the tentative repartimiento
de la mita
Bollbar is mentioned in the letter to the
Gremio; he also figures in Mancera 's "Relaci6n" (see note
88.

.

52)

,149.

89.
Castillo (AGI Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30,
Chapter II), 15v, mentions a letter of 30. VI. 1646 which
stated that the census had been ordered, including the
yanaconas and forasteros. The results are to be found in
AGN, Sala IX, 17-1-4.
The letter noted by Castillo is,
most likely, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39 (see note 88).
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B~see note 58,
Chapter II)
11, says that Mancera ordered reports from
provincial corregidores on the number and condition of the
Indians in their jurisdictions.
Zavala, Servicio personal
II, 109, says that Phelipe de Bollbar presented the
Marques de Mancera with a document entitled "Padrones de
,

,

,

'
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^

^^N, Padrones, 1623-1646,
tu^ \
of
padrones for 1623-1646 in Sala
^5^,i^2iao
TY ]l
K
NicolSs S5nchez-Albornoz no^es
In a fn^^""^^
"Migraciones internas en el
°?
Alto PerQ
^^^"^^ acumulado
en 1646" (provided
^tlu
author)f
Zavala provides the province-bylprovince bv the
SSnchez-Albornoz analyzes\he da?a further
T^r^^r?'
originarios; 15,446 forasterSs;*
and 10 alt T""^
Mancera, in his "Relaci 6n" (see n ^te
52? 149 s ltTtT.t" ;^
^^^""^ ''^^^ enough Indians to support
^
ItL'^
^^^^^ exception^and
says
savs ggat
'""^i^'
that th^?^"
the figures
show an insufficient Indian base for
The census was presented to the Viceroy
^^^ /^P^^^i"'^^"^^
with
prefatory remarks that many corregidores had
represented the Indians within their jurisdictions underand that
others had not complied with their orders to
send an
accounting (Zavala, II, 109); perhaps Mancera's
that there were enough Indians was based on his decision
belief
that the official figures were a minimal estimate
of the
true Indian population in the provinces.
SSnchez-Albornoz
forthcoming article will have more to say about the
census, and its ramifications. For the terms of the 1640s
repartimiento, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 39 (see note 88).

21-]!^

'

r.

Si'Lif
^

.

\

^

^
''

-

90.
Mancera notes his order in his "Relaci6n" (see note
52), 159.
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos 69A & 69B— see
note 58, Chapter II), 11, also says that the meeting was
ordered by the Viceroy. AGN, Sala IX, no. 39 (see note 88)
.

includes the notes sent to the Corregidor and the Gremio,
as well as the tentative repartimiento
.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 17 (see note 35).
It
would seem, judging by the azogueros response, that they
were privy only to the totals involved in the tentative
91.

'

repartimiento

.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 18 (see note 35).
For
the Viceroy's acknowledgement, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no.
19, the Marques de Mancera to Pedro de Vallesteros, Lima,
31. VIII. 1646 (draft), 1 f.
92.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 40, the Oficiales reales
to the MarquSs de Mancera, Potosl, 31. VII. 1646, 2 fs.
93.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 29, Corregidor Juan de
Velarde to the Marques de Mancera, Potosi, 31. VII. 1646,
94.

2

fs.
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||£aHeros. reply, PoLsr3.xa646'ah;'or
iiSL^'tho
latter beginning where the
former
leaves
off?'
s i
t . ,
A draft of the Viceroys letter
6-2-5°'''L'AGN?
no. 13, Lima, 1. IX. 1646,

Sa"'ix!

2

fs.

o

^:

b.

96
2

fs.

Velarde says that he is including
a oo^v of'hf^

£

n

L-L'^e^i?^

'

r?

•i^^''^^
the Corregidor
were despatched.

his instructions for

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 23, the Gremio
de
azogueros to the Marqugs de Mancera, Potosi,
1. IX. 1646,
97.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22 (see note
98.
95).
The
list of good, bad and mediocre pueblos is
AGN, Sala IX
Provincias Y Pueblos qe estan,
^' "^^"^
'^^
Z.'.^°'
obligados a emuiar, Yndios Para la mita del
cerro de
Potossi con distincion de quales Son buenos
medianos Y
malos," 2 fs.
AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22

99.

(see note 95).

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 20, the Oficiales reales
to the Marques de Mancera, Potosl, 31. X. 1646, 3 fs.
100.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 21, Corregidor Juan de
Velarde to the Marques de Mancera, PotosI, 31. X. 1646, 2 fs.
101.

Baquijano y Carrillo, no. 212 (13 de enero de
The 43,000 pesos figure is included in the
39.
Royal Officials' letter of 31. X. 1646 (AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5,
no. 20
see note 100)
Mancera discusses the overpayment
issue, and his actions on it, in his "Relacion" (see note
52), 148; he says the amount of the overpayment was really
5 pesos
6 tomines
per quintal
The Viceroy's letter,
which includes the 43,000 pesos figure (actually 43,900) is
AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 26, the Marqugs de Mancera to the
Gremio de azogueros, Surco, 31. X. 1646, 3 fs. (draft).
102.
1793),

—
,

.

,

.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 33, the Marques de Mancera
to Corregidor Juan de Velarde, Lima, 30. XI. 1646, 2 fs., for
the Viceroy's unhappiness with Velarde.
103.

.
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104.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 26

(see note 102)

^zo2ueros' request, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5,
no 24 ^hf
/^°^:;^-°^to the Marques
Mance^a,
Poios^' I xi itTe''
Viceroy's
response is AGN,
'
Sala ly k l'\
Marques
de
Mancera to the
rrp^
Gremio
de azogueros, Lima, 20. XI.
1646, If.

f

J

'

106.
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 1, the
Oficiales reales to
the crown, Potosi, 10. IV. 1647, 3
fs.; I assume a simll^?
similar
report was sent to the Viceroy.

^^^^^^^

"RelaciSn" (see note 52), 140, 148-150
°"
2lita.
Valera'(AGI charcas'
268
no; fi^A^f^Si"'
268, nos.
69A & 69B— see note 58, Chapter II), 11 sav<.
that Mancera believed it would b4 bet?er
to
incoming viceroy implement a repartimiento h^ve an
than an
one.
Bartolomg de Salazar, who would later serve outgoing
as
President of Charcas and Superintendent of the
mita, was
Asesor under Mancera, and told the crown in
1662
repartimiento had been ready to be put "en limpio"that the
when
Salvatierra's imminent arrival reached Mancera
"jA^i""^^?
(AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24, Bartolome de
Salazar to the
crown, PotosI, 1. IV. 1662, 15 fs.).

^aa^h^

'

^

^

From Mancera s confirmation of that order, ANB,
M 125, no. 3 (see note 58).
10 8.

109.

'

AGI, Charcas 266, no.

8

(see note 38).

110.
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 6, "Consulta en que Se
Proponen Los Remedies mas eficaces que ay para el entero
de la mita del Zerro de Potossi" (President Juan de
Lizarazu to the crown), 1. III. 1636 2 fs.
,

AHP, CR 264, f. 178v, "Capltulo de Carta del s.^^
ViRey conde de chinchon Sobre La mita al contt.r CorregO^^
Joseph Saez de Elorduy," Lima, 4. IV. 1638; ANB, M 125, no.
1, "Tltulo conferido por Josg Saez de Elorduy, corregidor
de PotosI, al maestre de campo Diego Nunez de Ovando para
el entero de la mita en los corregimientos de Canes
y
Canches, Carabaya, Chucuito, Larecaja, Omasuyo, Pacajes,
Paria y Paucarcolla, " Potos£, 5.1.1640, 3 fs. (MC 733;
111.

MOM 596)
112.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 22

(see note 95).

113.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 28

(see note 96).

114.

ANB, M 125, no. 2, Antonio Carrillo y sus
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hermanos, naturales del pueblo
ijucijj.u de
ae Pn^oK;,mK=
ForoDaitUDa. provincia dp
p-,___
,

Svrco, gobernador
^cx pueoxo ae bantiago de Yanaoca,
dei'piebTde^Santiaao'd^'v
provincia de Canac;
^^'^
Po^osl'^SnL^
Pedrfliata"irusi^\^^^
originario
de
dicho
pueblo, que
nrP^L^o ^
cambiSndose
el
nombre ke^
Pedro Hua^^n^^'H-^^
Huallpa y diciendo ^'^^
ser natural de la
"
•

La Plata, 27 III-21 IV. 1643
.

116.

.

,

16 fs.

villa de Oruro
MOM

(MC 757;

612^'

Ramirez del Aguila, 82-84.

ANB, C 1463, "Cedula real expedida en
favor de don
Fernando Ayra de Arriutu, cacique principal
y gobernador
del pueblo de Copoata [sic-G.M.]
parcialidad de Hur?nsaya,
^""^^^^^
provincia de Chayanta: En atenci6n a los servicios
prestados por §1 y sus antecesores a la corona
espanola en
la mita de PotosI y otras cosas, se otrogara
a Ayra y sus
el escudo de armas que ha pedido," Madrid,
4%^.''?2?n^''c^S
4. V. 1640, 5 fs. (MC 735a; MOM 596a).
117.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 29, Corregidor Juan de
Velarde to the Marquis de Mancera, Potosi, 31. VII. 1646, 2
fs., for a discussion of Chayanta.
For Colquemarca, AGN,
Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 32, Don Antonio de Toledo Pimentel
to
the Corregidor de Potosi, Colquemarca, 22. VI. 1646, 1 f
For Paria, AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 15, testimonio by
Diego Pacheco de Chaves, Escrivano of actions taken to
shore up the mita deliveries from the province of Paria,
Potosi, 31. VIII. 1646, 1 f. For Desaguadero, AGN, Sala IX,
6-2-5, no. 31, Don Augustin de Sobranis to Corregidor Juan
de Velarde, Desaguadero, 20. VII. 1646, 2 fs.
118

,

119.

AGN, Sala IX, 6-2-5, no. 21, Corregidor Juan de
Velarde to the Marques de Mancera, Potosi, 31. X. 1646, 2 fs.

BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 8-8v, "Capitulo de acuerdo del
cabildo de Potosi: El juez nombrado para ello haga cumplir
la ordenanza en lo pedido por Crist6bal del Salto, Juan
DSvila, Juan Ruiz Caballero, Caspar Garrido, Francisco
Garcia Barroso y Bias de Espinosa, duefios de ganado de
llamas que hacen la baja de metales del Cerro, para remediar
los robos que padecen," Potosi, 4. IV. 1634 (MC 684a); the
Indians were stealing llamas for food. For more on disease,
BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 332 and 334v, "Capltulos de acuerdos del
cabildo de Potosi: Que se vea lo conveniente en la solici
tud de don Pedro Calder6n y Contreras, protector de los
120.

.
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^ ^^^^1°

indios de las
^^^^^ ^^^^ algunas semanas estSn apestados
H« S
K^f?^
de
bubillas,
sarampi6n, tabardillo y dolor de cosCdo "

^f^H

r^^""^

""^"^^

"^""^

an Indian from Chucuito, claimed he
had served in the mita

Capltulo de acuerdo del cabildo de
(inserta) de Lorenzo Layme,
5^nd?n^
Chucuito, para que en consideraci6n
a t^^.dL f
servicios
^.^""^
y de su familia en la mita de
Lf^ ?
exceptGe de la ordenanza para el cierre de las
l?,^
t
chicherias
de esta Villa/' PotosI, 1635 (MC 695f;
MOM 580).

Pn^J

'

n
Deniggase la solicitud

BNB, CPLA 20, fs. 285v-286, 327v, "Capltulo
de
acuerdo del cabildo de Potosi: Sobre la denuncia
hecha por
don Juan Quispe y don Felipe Sapana, indios de
Jatuncolla,
candeleros, contra algunos mercaderes por estanco
encarecimiento del cebo y la grasa en perjuicio de y la
repQblica y de las labores del Cerro," PotosI, 9. IX 1635
(MC 699; MOM 583); BNB
CPLA 20, fs. 422v-423, "Capltulo
de acuerdo del cabildo de Potosi:
Sobre que con motive de
la escasez de cebo para hacer candelas en esta Villa,
los
indios candeleros estSn atravesando ese material
fabricando velas de mala calidad," PotosI, 7. III. y1636 (MC
710; MOM 591)
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CHAPTER

V

1648 TO 1666
In the wake of Mancera's
decision not to issue a new
repartimiento de la mita, the Council
of the Indies tried
again to break the impasse between
the Gremio de azogueros

and the viceregal administration in
Lima.

Beginning in

the early 1650s, the Council issued
a comprehensive

program, including both reforms and a new
repartimiento
which it hoped would meet the legitimate
needs of the

.

azogueros without condoning their involvement
in abuses.
The fate of the Council's program in Peru
is further
testimony to the frustrations of administering
the mita
from afar.
Because a series of viceroys in Lima found
the Council's program counter to their conception
of what

should be done at PotosI, or feared the repercussions
of
it,

they postponed its implementation.

Meanwhile, in

Potosi, corregidores de Potosi and presidents of Charcas,

moved by varying mixtures of personal and professional
jealousies, worked at cross-purposes.

While the government proved incapable of answering
the crisis over the mita, the caciques who bore the brunt of
the system's disintegration responded to the increasingly
248

violent means used by the azogueros
against them with
complaints to the government and
flight from the provinces.
The Council of the Indies

'

Program

The Council of the Indies, in its
capacity as referee,
responded to Mancera's decision not to
issue a new
repartimiento during the early 1650s. it
developed a

two-part program which it hoped would
appease the azogueros
protect the crown's economic interests, and
ensure that
the Indians were not mistreated. The Council
was trying
to find a middle road that would break
the stalemate that

had resulted from the Marques' efforts.

The first step was taken on April 28, 1650, when
the

crown despatched a cedula ordering a new repartimiento

,

to be based on a census and reducciones in the sixteen

obligated provinces.

The Council considered the April 28

order to be a concession to the azogueros

,

with Sandoval y Guzman's second proposal."""

for it complied

The directive

was complemented by a simultaneous edict suspending the

collection of mercury debts incurred from 1609 to 1631
while the matter of azoguero overpayment was debated by
the Council.
a

May

6,

2

The second part of the program began with

1651 order banning "pocket Indians."

The

concessions that were granted in 1650, the Council argued,
had removed any need on the part of the azogueros to engage

m

misuse of the mita.

3

,

.

:

250

The council of the Indies had
constructed its program
after carefully analyzing Sandoval
y Guzman's four
proposals, other azoguero petitions
and government

correspondence on the mita/

Those materials had emphasized

both the importance of the system
for the production of
royal revenue and the extent of the
abuses that permeated
the mita.
The two-part program was a balanced
effort to
minimize the abuses while maximizing silver
production at
Potosi
The two orders also showed a renewed concern
about the
justness of the mita. The question had been raised
anew

by Juan de SolSrzano Pereira in his 1648 opus,
Politica
Indiana.

Sol6rzano had extensive experience in America,

including service at Huancavelica under the Viceroy
Conde
de Chinch6n, and he had served on the Council of
the Indies

from 1629 to 1644.

His was one of the great legal minds of

the day, but Sol6rzano was unable to determine definitively

whether the mita was just.

Instead, he fell back on the

traditional method of presenting affirmative and negative
arguments
Affirmative
The parity of mine work and agricultural work; if
the Indians could be rightfully assigned to the
fields then they could be assigned to the mines.
The need of the public good, which in Peru depended
upon gold and silver production. The Indians were
the best-suited for mine work (compared to the
Spanish, Blacks and mixed-bloods)
.

.
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Princes could rightfully
require

to

^rkloi'^hr^'^''''

that

th^^ir-

"^^^'^^^ ^'^^^

—

Service in dangerous occupations
where death was not certain, as was permissible
during tTmes of
"""^

theL^f^r^r^""
tneir rirst discovery.

"

'^'^^

Americas, from

Negative
The incompatibility of Indian liberty
good treatment with their service in and their
the
Such work was normally left to criminals. mines.

Indian service was not justifiable when the
work
was strange to them, or when it was
intolerable.
Indians were subjected to great dangers and
suffering in the mines.

There was no difference between the Indians'
service and that of slaves during Roman days.
Indeed, the condition of the Indians was worse,
for they had committed no offense for which to
atone

Personal service for encomenderos had been
banned because of abuses; so it should be for
the azogueros
.

The Indians were prohibited from pearl diving
because of the dangers involved. In addition,
the republic was not supported by mita labor,
but was being destroyed by it.

For all of the orders allowing such labor there
were many others that banned it.
The questions that Sol6rzano raised about the mita in 1648

had been asked at its inception, and they were debated by
the Velasco junta in 1603.

During the intervening

I

half-century they had not received a great
deal of
attention, until the azogueros -vicerovs
struggle

over the

conceptual basis of the mita brought them to
the fore once
again.
The legal foundation for the system was
well
established, as Sol6rzano's lists attest.

The question of

its justification, however, was more difficult.

Sol6rzano

leaned toward the negative, but he offered no clear

statement one way or the other.

He was torn between the

crown's continuing need for silver and the abuses that

pervaded the mita.

He suggested, simply, that the mines

be worked, wherever possible, by slaves, criminals and

volunteers.

The Council of the Indies' dual-fold program

reflected that same dialectic.^
If he was unable to determine whether the mita was

just, Sol6rzano did create the device for measuring the

"justness" factor:

as long as the benefits of mining

outweighed the evils wrought by the mita, the system would
be justifiable.

The balance between evils and benefits,

however, was subject to differing interpretations based

on varying conceptions of the mita

— one

PotosI, and still another in Madrid.

in Lima, one at

From 1648 to 1666,

the azogueros' de facto mita and the viceroys'

"official"

mita were still battling for supremacy.
The Council

'

s

Program in Peru

The balanced program devised by the Council of the

indies would have to survive both
the bureaucratic process
and the Potosl-Lima confrontation
if it were going to be
effective. The program's first stop
in Peru was at Lima,
where it was received by the Viceroy
Conde de Salvatierra.
The Conde was aware of the problems
that the Marques de
Mancera had faced with regard to the
azogueros and so he
declined to carry out the April 28, 1650
cedula. He
offered two reasons for not implementing
the Council's
order for a new repartimiento
first, he doubted that the
azogueros deserved assistance, for their abuse
of the mita
was epidemic—of only 2,600 mitayos delivered
each week,
,

:

over 1,600 were "pocket Indians"~and unstoppable;
and
second, he doubted that reducciones, now
prerequisite to

any new repartimiento

,

could be completed successfully.

The experiences of his predecessors, Salvatierra noted,

had demonstrated the futility of such efforts.^

A third,

though unarticulated, cause for the Conde 's refusal was his
fear that Potosi silver production might collapse if any

significant novelties were attempted.

As the chief royal

official in the realm, Salvatierra, not the Council, would
be held responsible for the cedula 's consequences.

He was

aware that a viceroy's performance in office was measured,
to a very large extent, by the amount of royal revenue that

was produced during his tenure.

Potosi was still the source of a large part of the
silver Peru despatched to Spain each year, though it was no

^

longer the producer that it
had once been. During 1651
the
Villa suffered through a
four-month drought that lowered
silver output from the already
deficient levels of the late
1640s.
Salvatierra was afraid that PotosI
was doomed,
and he resolved to allow it to
die a slow death rather than
risk bringing on its complete demise
during
his

viceroyalty

.

The Viceroy took limited actions,
however, to keep
PotosI going for as long as he would be
held accountable
for it.
On October 29, 1652, he empowered the
Corregidor
de PotosI, Francisco Sarmiento de Mendoza,
to suspend and
replace any corregidor who failed to assist
in the despatch
of mitayos to PotosI.^ The following August,
he exhorted
the provincial co rregidores to return the
Indians who were

hiding in the valleys or elsewhere to their pueblos,
and
to include them in the mita.^°

These were the traditional,

time-worn, measures that his predecessors had used.

One of the effects of Salvatierra

•

s

decision not to

execute the 1650 cgdula was that local government officials
at PotosI took it upon themselves to solve the silver

industry's problems.

Unfortunately, Corregidor Sarmiento

de Mendoza and President Francisco Nestares Marin of the

Audiencia de Charcas did not agree on

a

course of action.

Nestares did not play a supportive role where the azogueros
were concerned because he was also a visitador

,

with orders

to collect outstanding mercury debts and to implement the

1651 royal order to ban "pocket
Indians. "^l

His duties

as Visitador placed him in marked
opposition to the Gremio.
Sarmiento de Mendoza, on the other
hand, championed the
azoc^ueros
cause, in much the same way that
President
'

Lizarazu had done.
The Council of the Indies was worried
about the future
of Potosi silver production. When the
Viceroy refused to
implement the 1650 cgdula, it decided to
bypass Lima
entirely and assign the matter to Sarmiento de
Mendoza.
in
a cgdula of November 8,

1653, the crown ordered the

Corregidor to conduct the new repartimiento according
to
Lizarazu 's three guidelines. Nestares Marin was instructed
to guard against abuses and the Viceroy was told
only to

assist each official in his duties. -"-^

The Council was

aware that there would be some antipathy between Sarmiento
and Nestares.

In traditional fashion, it relied upon

their antagonism to ensure that each would execute his

orders to the best of his abilities

"''^
.

Sarmiento approached his duties with a conception of
the mita much like Lizarazu' s.

He believed that abuses

had been caused by rising prices for mercury and other

production costs.

He opposed the closing of a mill because

its owner had engaged in misuse; he felt that it was better
to punish the azoguero in some other way and to keep the

mill in production.
followed Lizarazu'

s

Sarmiento 's repartimiento plan
guidelines closely:

a)

no owner would

s

6

be allowed to have more than two
mills;

b)

five mitayos

would be assigned for each stamping
mechanism; and c) those
mills that were owned by widows or
children would be rented
to worthy individuals for two years
at a
time.^"*

To increase the now-depleted pool of
mitayos

,

the

Corregidor suggested that a census be conducted
by a group
of specially-empowered judges.
Once all the Indians had
been counted, then everyone— originarios forasteros
and
,

yanaconas— would serve in the mita.

They would, however,

have the option of serving in person or remitting four
and

one-half pesos per week in silver.

The inclusion of the

previously-exempted Indians, and the legitimization of
service in silver, he said, would make a 4,000-Indian
J^ita

ordinaria possible without overly burdening anyone.

The need for reducciones

,

moreover, would be eliminated.''"^

Sarmiento borrowed upon extant theory to design his

repartimiento
of his own.

,

but he also included some original ideas

His most ambitious suggestion was that the

Corregidor de PotosI administer the mita without any
interference from the Viceroy or the Audiencia de Charcas.

Sarmiento claimed that the Conde de Salvatierra

•

reluctance to implement the Council's program was caused
by his economic interests, which competed with PotosI for

Indian labor.
the mita.

1

The Audiencia was a long-standing enemy of
The Corregidor proposed another new idea to

the Gremio de azogueros:

that provincial corregidores be

forced to pay the rezacfos de mita
that were incurred
during their terms in office. He
shelved the plan when the
^^""^^^^os doubted that the corregidores
had the resources
required to pay the sums that were
involved.

President Nes tares Marin was unhappy
with the crown's
decision to assign the repartimiento to
Sarmiento de
Mendoza. He accused the Corregidor of
wrecking the mita
during the preceding three years, through
mismanagement
and his tolerance of abuses. Nestares asked
the Council
to name Ger6nimo Luis de Cabrera in Sarmiento
's

place.

The President's letter had little immediate impact,
however, since it was lost in a shipwreck with most
of
the government's correspondence for 1654, and a copy
had
to be sent to Spain in 1658.

"''^

Nestares did not have to worry about Sarmiento 's plans
for a repartimiento

,

for the Viceroy had already intervened

to prevent its completion.

In May, 1654, Salvatierra

ordered the Corregidor to suspend all action on the 1653
cgdula until the arrival of his successor.

The Viceroy's

suspension of the 1653 order, which had been meant to

circumvent his opposition to the Council's program, points
to the role of the bureaucratic hierarchy in frustrating

the Council's efforts to resolve the outstanding problems

with the Potosi mita ."*"^
Salvatierra not only bequeathed the political liability
of the proposed repartimiento to his successor, he also
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confused the issue of who was responsible
for the two-part
program with a last-minute directive to
Nestares Marin that
he take control of the mita.^O

This brought vehement

complaints from Sarmiento to Lima and Madrid,
and fueled
his 1655 broadside against the President-Visitador
The
Corregidor accused Nestares of engaging in misuse
.

of the

mita to pay the costs of his visita and to collect
the
azogueros' mercury debts.

Sarmiento charged that he had

held back travel allowances to pay Chucuito's back
taxes,

rented mills and mitayos, and assigned the veedores and
the al calde de minas four "pocket Indians" each in lieu

of wages; he had also blocked the Corregidor

'

s

attempts

to hold provincial corregidores accountable for mita
deliveries. 21 Whatever the degree of truth in Sarmiento 's

claims, the conflict between the two officials had clearly

gone beyond productive competition.

Caspar Conzalez Pav6n, a government official with many
years of experience at PotosI and in TucumSn, wrote to
Lima on May 26, 1655 that the personal and professional

squabbling between Sarmiento and Nestares had rendered them

ineffective as representatives of the crown.

He asked the

Viceroy Conde de Alba (1655-1661) to send someone else to
supervise the mita

—a

superintendent that would be superior

to both Sarmiento and Nestares Mar£n.

22

The Corregidor

asked the new Viceroy to assume that role himself.

23
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The Conde de Alba and Francisco de la
Cruz
The arrival of the Conde de Alba in Peru
did not speed
progress toward the new repartimiento
Like Salvatierra,
.

the new Viceroy ordered Sarmiento to act
swiftly against

uncooperative corregidores

.

but he held off on resolution

of the proposed re partimiento until he could study
what

Mancera had done during the 1640s.
The Corregidor wrote to Alba often during 1655 and
1656, with his suggestions on how best to realize the

aims of the 1653 cgdula .^^

In addition to repeating his

earlier sentiments about the repartimiento

,

he noted the

difficulties that were presented by the Principe de

Esquilache's order, of 1617, that Indians who had been
absent from their pueblos for more than ten years could
not be returned home against their wishes.

That directive

had fallen into disuse, but it had been revived by the

Conde de Salvatierra after the caciques of Pacajes

descended upon Altos de Arica to gather up the Indians
that had left their province.

2 ft

Sarmiento also expanded upon his earlier comments that
service in silver was a necessary part of the mita

.

He

again suggested that the remittance be reduced to four and

one-half pesos per week, with the azogueros contributing
the balance of the seven peso minga wage.

and the capitgn mayor de la mita

,

he added,

The veedores

should oversee

.

s

.
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the hiring of the mingas. and
none of the money should go
to the azogueros themselves

Despite the Corregidor's insistence
that the new
repartimiento was long overdue, the Conde
de Alba made no
movement toward its execution. Sarmiento
was not the only
one who was impatient.
The Council of the Indies sent yet
another cgdula to the Viceroy on April
18, 1657, ordering
him to conduct the repartimiento and to abolish
"pocket
Indians." The Council said that it had been
moved to

repeat its earlier orders by reports from Nestares
Marin
and the royal officials at Potosl that no action
had been
taken on its previous directives
The Conde de Alba had been persuaded by Salvatierra

'

"dying patient" analogy, and he was disinclined to

introduce any novelties at Potosl.

He responded to the

1657 order with a delaying tactic meant to force the

Council to assume responsibility for the implementation of
its program with a direct order.

The Viceroy was uncertain,

he said, who was supposed to do the repartimiento

.

The

1653 cedula had named Sarmiento de Mendoza, but an April 18,
1656 order said that Nestares Marin should be responsible.

Alba said that he thought it would be best to name someone
other than the Corregidor or the President to draft the

repartimiento

,

which Sarmiento would then implement and

Nestares monitor.

While Alba waited for the Council to respond to his

query, he began preliminary
preparations based on his
belief that a third party should
conduct the repartimiento
He brought the Audiencia de
Lima together in an Acuerdo
consultivo on August 26, 1658 to
determine the best course
of action. After reviewing the
arguments of Sarmiento de
Mendoza and Nes tares Marin, and
hearing the views of

Protector Diego de Le6n Pinelo and
the Fiscal, the Acuerdo
voted to send an emissary to investigate
the situation at
Potosi and then to conduct the
repartimiento
The Viceroy
chose Francisco de la Cruz, Bishop-elect
of Santa
.

Marta,

for that assignment.

The Conde provided Cruz with extraordinary
powers as

Superintendent of the mita which ostensibly placed
him
well above President Nestares Marin and the new
Corregidor
de Potosi, Gomez Davila.^^

His apparent authority was

curtailed, however, by secret instructions.

Publicly

Cruz was free to act as he deemed necessary; privately
he

was ordered only to gather information.

Any action was

to await viceregal consent, and no azoguero was to be

punished for misuse of the mita until the repartimiento
was finished.

33

The Viceroy wanted Cruz to be spared any

interference from local officials at Potosi, but he did
not want him to implement the anti-abuse section of the

Council's program until the azogueros
in abuse were removed.

'

reasons for engaging

Alba also wanted to delay action

until the Council's reply to his query was received.

.

Cruz set forth for Potosi immediately,
and he arrived
in the villa on May 20, 1659.
On the twenty-ninth he
called the azogueros and the local
officials together to
explain his mission. His message was
unmistakable: the
new repartimiento would have no place for
service
in

silver, and all of the abuses that had
stemmed from it,

including the mistreatment of mitayos and their
caciques

.

Sarmiento's arguments in favor of service in silver
had

apparently not impressed the Conde de Alba.
The Superintendent then began to collect the

information that was required for the new repartimiento

.

The kinds of material he gathered also suggested that

Lizarazu's three guidelines had been replaced by the
viceregal position that mitayos should be distributed on
the basis of merit.

Cruz ordered the silver merchants to

report on the number of silver bars produced by each
azoquero during the preceding ten years, and he told the
veedores to conduct a visita of the mills and the cerro.^^
The Bishop-elect then broke with his secret orders to
send three judges of his own to conduct a census in the

sixteen obligated and fourteen exempted provinces of Upper
Peru.

This step was taken, he explained to the crown,

because he had encountered very few Indians in the mita

provinces while he was en route to Potosi.

If the mita

were to be revived, then more provinces would have to be
added.

His letter to Madrid was sent by way of Buenos

Aires, as a quick reply would be needed
if his suggestions
were to be incorporated into the new
repartimiento
.

Although Cruz had changed the criteria
for both the
distribution of the mitayos and where they
were to come
from, he had maintained a balance between
assistance for

the azogueros and the elimination of misuse.

The extension

of mita obligation to more provinces would
benefit the

azogueros; the abolition of service in silver would
benefit
the Indians and their caciques

;

and both measures would

contribute to an increase in silver production

.

Thus,

while the means had been changed, the object of the Council
of the Indies' program had been preserved.

Cruz would soon abandon his balanced approach, however.

A new element in the relationship between the benefits and
the evils resulting from the mita would cause him to launch
an attack on misuse while the new repartimiento was still
in the preparatory stage.

Cruz was moved by the desolation

of the pueblos he had passed through on his way to Potosl,

but he was particularly horrified by what he had discovered

once he arrived.

His initial enquiries revealed that the

sums collected by the azogueros for service in silver came
to 587,000 pesos per year, while the crown's quintos had

fallen to 300,000.

38

More importantly, he found that to

extract some 11,000 pesos per week from the capitanes

enteradores

,

the azogueros were employing torture, including

the hanging of the caciques by their hair, beatings and
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whippings.

TO save themselves from such
treatment, the

caciques were selling their property,
and their wives and
children into slavery
cruz also learned of one caci que
who had hung himself upon hearing that
he was to serve as
a capitan enter ador, and of the
practice of maiming male
children to keep them from serving the mita/^
He

determined that all but a dozen of the azogueros
were
involved in these abuses— both fraud and the
mistreatment
of the caciques/^

The torture of the caciques was a new

factor which joined the depopulation of the
provinces and
the misuse of the mita by the azogueros on the
negative

side of Sol6rzano Pereira's justness equation.
The crimes that were committed by the azogueros

reported, did not end with torture and fraud.

,

Cruz

They were

also involved in Indian slavery—selling Indians in Lipez
for 250 pesos each

— and

they were carrying on a thriving

contraband trade with the Hollanders via Buenos Aires.

Not

only were the azogueros merciless sadists, he cried, they

were defrauding their King to aid his enemies l"*"^
Thus, in Sol6rzano Pereira's terms, Cruz had decided

that the evils that were wrought by the mita far outweighed
the benefits produced by the silver industry at Potosli

Indeed, he believed that the relationship was now so far

out of balance that he felt compelled to abandon the

Council's balanced approach and immediately relieve the
Indians of the oppression they suffered under the system. 44

on June A, 1659, Cruz ordered all
service in silver
halted. He instructed the capitanes
enteradores that they
were to deliver mitayos in person only.
The Superintendent
had to qualify that order, however, in the
face of adamant
complaints by the azogueros that silver that
had been sent
to hire mingas would now end up in the
pockets of the

caciques.

In a clarification issued on July 1, Cruz

ordered the capitanes to hire substitutes for those
Indians
who had chosen not to serve in person, and had sent
money
to Potosi for that purpose.

The Conde de Alva was

persuaded by Cruz' arguments for the June

4

order, and he

issued his own directive that service in silver be stopped.
Thus, in November of 1659 the ban was again enforced; not

only were the capitanes not to deliver mitayos in silver,
they were not to be held responsible for any more Indians
than they received from their corregidores in their home

provinces. 46

Rezagos de mita were outlawed as well, in

accordance with two sixteenth century provisions by Canete
and Velasco.

47

Thenceforward, the mitayos who arrived in

Potosi would be distributed to the azogueros on a pro-rated
basis. 48

In December, Cruz underscored the government's

insistence that c orregidores

,

and not the caciques

,

were

to be held accountable for the failure to send Indians in

the mita.

If the azoguero s had a complaint, he told them,

then the Corregidor de Potosi could, at their expense, send
a judge to investigate the regional corregidor who was at

.

fault

More orders were forthcoming in February
of 1660.

On

the third, Cruz prohibited the use of
corporal punishment

against the caciques.

On the eighteenth, he reinforced

the ban on mita service in silver, this
time adding that
the cagitanes did not have to replace mitayos
who were

injured while working or those who were driven away
by the
azogueros ^'^
.

Although Cruz had abandoned his plans to conduct the
repartimiento, the Viceroy had not.

Alba probably felt he

would have to compensate for the damage done to the
azogueros

'

campaign.

production capabilities by Cruz' anti-abuse
The Conde ordered the Superintendent to return

to Lima; Alba would then draft the repartimiento himself,

based on reports he would receive from parish priests in
all thirty of the provinces.
the Viceroy's plan.

Cruz did not approve of

He said that most of the priests were

idiots^ and that they were engaged in economic pursuits of

their own which would compromise the reliability of their

reports 53
4.

The azogueros

'

first response to Cruz' actions was

their request that he reconsider his orders.

They warned

him that his actions would have dire consequences.
did qualify his June

4,

54

He

1659 order, as noted above, but

once the Viceroy had reinforced his stance on service in
silver, Cruz refused to listen to the azogueros

'

protests.

They also complained to the Conde de
Alba, through the
Corregidor, that the Superintendent was
trampling on

G6me2 DSvila's jurisdiction and jeopardizing
the villa 's
very existence with his ignorant demands.
The Viceroy
stood behind Cruz, however, and answered the
Corregidor's

complaint by naming the Superintendent Judge of
Appeals
in all matters concerning the mita.^^

Rebuffed by the Viceroy and Cruz, the azogueros chose
the only course of action that was still open to them.

On

the night of April 23, 1660, they slipped poison into his

chocolate; he went to bed in perfect health and died in
his sleep.

President Nestares Marin died the same evening,

quite possibly murdered by the same means.
Cruz' anti-abuse campaign had threatened the azogueros

on both the conceptual and functional levels, because he

was in PotosI to enforce his directives.

They had responded

by exercising their ultimate power advantage

— violence.

The

Superintendent's death only halted the government's attack
on misuse temporarily, however, for another official soon

replaced both Nestares and Cruz, and sought to implement
the Council of the Indies' program.

Before we consider his

fate, a brief look at the de facto mita is in order.

The de facto Mita

Francisco de la Cruz painted a very grim portrait of
the mita in his correspondence with Alba and the crown.

268

His description of the system was
largely an extrapolation
from his limited personal experiences.
His assertion that
the provinces were depopulated, for
example, was based on
what he had seen while traveling from Lima
to Potosi.
He

attempted to prevent the torture of the caciques
after he
had personally witnessed various instances.
From
these

particular observations he had concluded that:
provinces were depopulated;

b)

a)

the

the caciques bore an

impossible burden as capitanes enteradores

;

c)

the mita

had degenerated to the point where the crown lost more
from the system than it gained; and

d)

the azogueros did

not deserve royal assistance.

Despite the limited bases for Cruz' conclusions they

were essentially correct.

The question of depopulation

in the provinces, and the mita

's

relationship to that

phenomenon, were also discussed by the Alcalde de Lima,

Juan de Padilla, in his 1657 memorial on Indian labor in
Peru. 57

The Council of the Indies asked viceregal officials

in Lima and in Charcas to comment on Padilla 's memorial in
a series of orders of October 7,

The respondents,

1660.

who included the Archbishop of Lima, Sarmiento de Mendoza
(now an oidor of the Audiencia de Lima)

,

Fiscal Nicolas de

Polanco and others, all agreed that the provinces were
depopulated.

They believed that the Indian exodus to the

cities and outlying areas had been the principal cause,
and that Indian flight had resulted from the forced labor
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demands made by the correqldores

.

caciques and priests in

the provinces, as well as the rigors of
mita service and
the mistreatment of mitayos by the azogueros
The sale of
lands under the Conde de Chinch6n, which had
continued in
.

the viceroyalty of the Marqugs de Mancera, had
caused

irreparable harm, they said, because the Indians had
not
only been left without lands for their crops, their
pueblos

were now inhabited by Spaniards and mixed-bloods.

The

respondents also blamed legal loopholes— the exemption from
tribute that Toledo had afforded the forasteros and the

ten-year exemption from resettlement ordered by the
Principe de Esquilache; the protection provided to the
Indians by the chacareros
by local priests.

;

and the harboring of fugitives

The death of mitayos in the mines at

PotosI was not a major factor in the depopulation of the

obligated provinces; the mita was only one of many reasons
the Indians had migrated away from their pueblos.

The Conde de Alba was instructed by the October

7,

1660

orders to develop a program to counter the problems that
the respondents identified.

But by the time the Viceroy

called the group together on May 20, 1661, he had already
learned that he would soon be replaced by the Conde de

Santisteban (1661-1666)
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.

He passed the responsibility

for compliance with the Council's directive on to the new

Viceroy, as well as the burden of the still undone

repartimiento de la mita.

The officials who replied to
the Padilla memorial may
not have blamed the mita for
depopulating the provinces,
but it is clear that the system
had had an effect on the
pueblos that were obligated to it,
and that the situation
in the provinces had also had an
impact on the mita.
The caciques had started to deliver
incomplete quotas of
mita^ during the 1600-1633 period, and they had
faced
increasing difficulties thereafter. Even
the repartimiento
drafted by Caravajal y Sandi in 1633 demanded
only a few
Indians less than Francisco de Toledo had
included
in his

last distribution in 1578.

Then, with the introduction

of rezagos de mita by the 1640s, the burden
of delivering

mitayos— in person and in silver—was compounded by each
year's failures.
The caciques of Pacajes complained to the crown about

their plight in 1657.

They charged that the azogueros

were using torture, humiliation and extortion to squeeze
silver from them.

Under that kind of pressure, many of

their comrades had fled from their provinces or committed
suicide.

They asked that the position of capitln general

for their province be abolished, as had been done for

Chucuito, and that capitanes be named for each of the
pueblos, so that the economic burden of mita service in

silver would be distributed among them.
The capitanes of all sixteen obligated provinces

combined forces on January 23, 1660 to ask the crown for

relief from the abuses that they
suffered at the hands of
the azogueros
The caciques charged that the azogueros
.

were not content just to torture them,
but also jailed
their wives and children, and mistreated
them while they
were being held. Four years later the
Protector general
sent the crown a pair of petitions that offered
specific
examples of the mistreatment of the caciques
by the azogueros:

'

families

the cacique principal and gobernador

of Calcha, Domingo Yelma, claimed that he had
been whipped,

and his wife and children jailed, because he was unable
to

meet his mita quota in silver; and Ignacio Bias said that
he had sold everything he owned to raise 1,100 pesos of a

2,000 peso debt for rezagos de mita

,

but that because he

could not deliver the remaining 900 pesos his wife and

children had been jailed for three years.
Other reports of the mistreatment of capitanes by
the azogueros reached the Condes de Salvatierra and Alva.^^

One cacique who was able to meet his obligations was

Gabriel FernSndez Guarache

— the

same cacique who had so

much trouble with the Corregidor de La Paz in 1633.
FernSndez Guarache was named to be capitgn general for
Pacajes ten times between 1628 and 1660, and often he was

chosen after another cacique had fled from the province.
He alone had the personal wealth and property necessary to
be capitSn --his wealth permitted him to meet the service in

silver obligation of the province and his property kept him

from fleeing with the others.
The sum of silver required from
Pacajes was enormous.
The quota for two villages alone came
to 16,408 pesos per
year, and the total for the province
was just under 50,000
pesos.
The province of Porco contributed between
65,000
and 70,000 pesos per year.^^ Francisco de
la Cruz reported
that 50,000 pesos for a province was quite
common, and

given the figures for Pacajes and Porco, his
total of
600,000 pesos per year in mita service in silver is
quite

plausible.
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Not all of the silver delivered in the mita came out
of the caciques

'

pockets, however.

Padilla said that

many of the miners in recently discovered zones were

willing to pay the Indians' service in silver obligation
in return for their services.

FernSndez Guarache's

province had a similar means of raising the money:

maharaques

.

indios

When the mitayos from Pacajes came together

at Topoco each year for despatch to Potosi, they were

offered for hire to anyone who needed Indian labor.
caciques

,

The

or often the Indians themselves, would contract

out their services for a payment of 150 pesos and the

cancellation of their tribute requirements.

The indios

maharaques also received two reales per day in wages, and
the tenure of the contract was one year. 69
In 1662, the chaplain of Caquiavire estimated that

there were 500 indios maharaques working at Merenguela

(a

mining center) alone.

For most of them the decision
to

work for someone in Pacajes,
rather than go to PotosI in
the mita, was their choice of
the lesser
of two evils.

The 150 £esos covered their
service in silver obligation
for twenty weeks (a mitayo was
supposed to work a total
of four months) and they were
spared the trip.^^ Similar
arrangements were probably common
elsewhere as well. The
treatment of the caciques at Potosi
would suggest, however,
that even these means, and the caciques
personal
'

resources, were insufficient to meet the
demands of the
azoqueros
.

The extent to which the mita was delivered
in silver
is also suggested by a comparison of
various officials'
and individuals' accounts from the period
1650-1655, as

shown on Table 2.

it appears that total mita service

averaged about 2,000 Indians per week, with roughly half
of that amount being "Indians in silver."

Moreover, the

total number of mitayos serving at PotosI seems to have

fallen gradually over the fifteen year period, with a

sharper fall in 1659 and 1660 caused by Cruz' actions with

regard to service in silver.
One cannot base too many conclusions on the data in

Table

2

because the true relationship between mita service

in silver and "pocket Indians" remains cloudy.

Many

officials began to use the terms interchangeably.

Cruz

and Gonzalez Pav6n both argued that very few m ingas were
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TABLE

2

ESTIMATED MITA SERVICE,

YEAR

SOURCE

1651

Council of the Indies

1651

Salvatierra

TOTAL
MITAYOS

1,300

Sarmiento de Mendoza

2,600

1654°

Sarmiento de Mendoza

2,778

Salvatierra

1658^

Gonzalez Pav6n

1659

Francisco de la Cruz

MITAYOS
IN SILVER

1,600

558

Sarmiento (unofficial)

1655^

1659-^

MITAYOS
IN PERSON

2,800

1651

1654®

1651-1665'^-'-

1,100

2,000
1,500

2,000
1,600

Bartolomg de Salazar

2,580

1660^

Salazar and the
Archbishop of Lima

2,447

1660

Acarete du Biscay

2,300

1660"'"

Conde de Alva

1660"^

Bartolome de Salazar

>

1661

n

1,294

400

1,603

Salazar and the
Archbishop of Lima

1,252

882

957

1662°

Bartolomg de Salazar

1662^

Bartolomi de Salazar

2,306

1663^

VSzquez de Velasco

1,449

1664^

Vazquez de Velasco

1,670

166 4

the azogueros

1,800

1665^

Guerrero de Luna

2,000

2,000

(plus 286 for
the mills)

(plus 310 for the mills)

hired with the money that was
remitted for service in
silver, but later sources suggest
just the opposite. "^^
More specific statements are impossible
because the real
uses to which the silver was put was
a secret that was
carefully guarded by the azoqueros
.

Another indication that the caciques were no
longer
capable of meeting the azoqueros demands
is
the

'

appearance of Indian collectors (sacadores)

.

The azoguero

hired these collectors to gather money from the
caciques
and paid them a percentage of the silver that
they were
able to produce. "^^ The methods the collectors used,

,

and

their abuse of their contracts with the azogueros

only be surmised.

,

can

But it is clear that the caciques were

no longer a dependable vehicle for the delivery of mitayos
as far as the azoqueros were concerned.

The Corregidor de

Potosi did his part to pressure the caciques by sending
judges against them, at their expense, to collect rezagos
de mita 74
.

Life for the mitayos who served in person had changed

very little from what it had been at the beginning of the
century.

They were still paid less, for example, if they

failed to meet a quota

— now

twelve bags of ore per day.^^

Padilla noted that the mitayos were also forced to work
both day and night, and that they were often used to drain

water from flooded mines.
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Other than his memorial

,

however, the sources for this period are silent on the

'

subject of mitayos in person, for
the most part.
Table 2 includes figures for the
1660s as well as for
the 1650s.
It indicates that the decline in
the total
number of mitayos at PotosI was not
reversed after Cruz
death.
This discussion of the de facto mita
has suggested
that the abuses that he attacked outlived
him also.
Cruz'

successors had little more success than he
when they were
confronted with the realities of the mita. Yet
each new

superintendent believed that he would succeed where
others
had failed; each learned from experience that
the mita
was virtually uncontrollable.

Administration of the Mita after Cruz
Francisco de la Cruz' demise had a profound effect on
the mita.

For one thing, his murder convinced the Conde

de Alba that all of

been true. 77

his

reports about the azogueros had

in a letter to the crown of July 3, 1660,

the Viceroy adopted Cruz' argument that the mita now

wrought more harm than good.

He noted, for comparison,

that the mines at San Antonio Esquilache (in Chucuito) had

produced 400,000 pesos in guintos that year without any
mitayos

;

Potosi had yielded some 100,000 pesos less, despite

the hellish mistreatment of the Indians and caciques there

by the azogueros

78
.

The Viceroy acted quickly to preserve what Cruz had

accomplished, and to keep the azogueros from returning to

business as usual.

He ordered Bartolomg de Salazar to

leave his post at Huancavelica and assume the
offices of

President of Charcas and Superintendent of the mita."^^
Alba's antipathy toward the azogueros manifested
itself
in Salazar 's commission.

First, he explicity restricted

the census, upon which the new repartimiento would be

based, to the sixteen provinces that were already subject
to the mita.

Second, he ordered Salazar to collect all

service in silver and hire the mingas with the money
himself.

The Conde now placed the measures to relieve the

Indians' suffering far above providing assistance to the

azogueros

.

His repartimiento

,

he said, would affect

one-seventh of the originario population in the sixteen
provinces, no matter how small that number might be.

He

had concluded that the azogueros deserved no more.

Bartolomg de Salazar drew different lessons from the
Cruz visita than Alba.

His experience

.at

Huancavelica

had accustomed him to the realities of mining, and once
he arrived in Potosi

— on

November

1660

7,

see the need for a new repartimiento

.

— he

was able to

He agreed that

abuses would have to be curtailed, but he believed that
his efforts in that regard would have to wait until the
r epartimiento had

revitalized the mita.

Cruz, he said,

had destroyed one house before building another; his

anti-abuse campaign had reduced the total delivery of
mitayos to 1,603, and so had worsened the production crisis
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rather than alleviating it.

Salazar pointed to many ways

that he believed Cruz might have
been more effective, if
less spectacular.
He expected that he would be
more
successful.
It is interesting that the azoqueros
shared the new

Superintendent's assessment.

They agreed that Cruz had

not been malicious; he had simply
represented ignorance
run rampant. Salazar, they noted, seemed
to be more
realistic, and they held great hopes that
PotosI would
slowly recover under his guidance.
The Conde de Alba and President-Superintendent
Salazar

were therefore at odds about what they expected to
happen
at Potosl.

The Viceroy was looking to punish the azoqueros

for their crimes, while the President was trying to

revitalize silver production in the villa

.

The immediate

object of their disagreement was the pre- repartimiento
census; Cruz had already launched the attack on misuse of
the mita

.

The officials' argument over the census was an

obstacle in the path to the repartimiento itself.

The Conde

wanted the census to be conducted by two judges, within the
sixteen obligated provinces.

Salazar, holding to his

contention that the repartimiento should contribute to the
recovery of Potosi, counseled the Viceroy that more
provinces would be needed if the mita ordinaria were to
include a sufficient number of Indians.
of assigning the census to two judges.
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Nor did he approve
The President

.

based his opinion on the fate
of the three judges that
Cruz had sent out for that
purpose. They had been
overwhelmed by bribery, deception and
their own
incompetence. The payment of the
judges was another
problem, Salazar argued, for the
total cost of the census
would come to 66,600 £esos, and neither
the azogueros

nor

the government could afford to pay
that sum.

He asked

Alba to reconsider his orders in
conference with Sarmiento
de Mendoza and Alarc6n, both of whom
were now stationed in
Lima, and he strongly suggested that
the provincial

correqidores conduct the census in all thirty of
the
provinces 84
The struggle between Salazar and Alba was fought
with

bureaucratic maneuvers.

The President's letter to the

Viceroy was dated December

1,

1660.

The Conde responded,

after an Acuerdo consultivo of February

3,

1661, that all

thirty provinces would now be included, but that the census

would be conducted by local priests.

Salazar replied that

the new plan would be disastrous, because the priests could

not be trusted.

Alba called another Acuerdo for April 29,

and then sent the President an ambiguous instruction that

could be interpreted to mean that Salazar could do as he
wished, or do nothing at all.

He was therefore compelled

to ask for a clarification, which he did on June 1.

By

that time he had learned that the Viceroy's successor,
the Conde de Santisteban, was on his way to Peru, so he

also wrote to Santisteban with
his analysis on the matter
as it then stood.
On July 1, Alba decided to allow
the
President to do as he wished, and he
sent Salazar the
requisite orders on July 3, 1661.
The Conde de Alba
acceded to Salazar 's requests only after
he had delayed the
execution of the census for almost a year,
and only after
it was clear that the President's plan
would be conducted
under his successor.

Salazar quickly prepared the orders for the
provincial

corregidores to undertake the census, and despatched
them
to all thirty provinces.

No sooner had they been sent

than he received new instructions, from the Conde de

Santisteban, to suspend action on the July

3

directive.

The new Viceroy wanted the census to be conducted by two

oidores from the Audiencia de Charcas, during the course
of a visita general of the sixteen obligated provinces;

the fourteen others were not to be included.

The President suspended Santisteban

•

s

order and wrote

to the Viceroy that there were a host of reasons why the

oidores were incapable of performing the duties that he
had assigned to them.

with the Conde

's

He also expressed his displeasure

decision to limit the census to only

sixteen provinces.

Santisteban replied to Salazar 's

critique on September 30, 1661.

He said that the matter

would be studied further, and that
forthcoming.

a

decision would be

When Salazar pressed him for

a

decision in
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November he was scolded for his haste.

The Viceroy told

him that a decision on the census
had been postponed until
the arrival of Pedro Vazquez de
Velasco, the next
President-Superintendent.

When VSzquez arrived in PotosI,

Santisteban promised, then Salazar could
return to Lima
and participate in the final deliberations

on the census.

^"^

The Conde de Alba had successfully
postponed action

on the new repartimiento until the arrival
of the Conde
de Santisteban by frustrating Salazar 's
efforts to conduct
a census.

He had been convinced by Cruz' accounts, and

especially by his murder, that the azogueros did not
deserve the new repartimiento

.

Santisteban was no more

enthusiastic about coming to the Gremio's aid than his
predecessor, and he was using another bureaucratic ploy
to delay his consideration of the census, and ultimately

the repartimiento

.

The Viceroy's decision to wait for VSzquez de Velasco

effectively postponed

a

resolution of the questions about

the census for two years.

The President-elect was detained

in Quito, where he was President of the Audiencia, by

charges lodged against him by the Bishop.
arrive

in

He would not

Potosi until August of 1663.^^

The delay also had a serious impact on Salazar 's

enthusiasm for the repartimiento

.

His change of heart

resulted from his realization that he could not comply
with his orders or improve the situation at Potosi.

A

.

°
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drought had stopped the mills
from December 18, 1660 to
February 6, 1661.^9 corregidor
G6mez Davila steadfastly
refused to cooperate with him.
His efforts to oversee
the hiring of mingas with the
money collected for mita
service in silver, moreover, were

disastrous-ruined by

confusion at Guayna and his inability
to communicate
directly with the capitanes enteradores ^
.

The President was dishearted, as well,
by the

difficulties he faced in determining the
true situation
at Potosl.
Despite his presence in the villa he could
not discover how many Indians were actually
working in
,

the cerro.

Trying to count them, he said, was like

counting bees in a hive, and nobody would testify
against
those azogueros who were involved in "pocket Indians"
and other forms of misuse.

The veedores and the alcalde

de minas were afraid to act against wrongdoers because

they would be open to revenge.

Everyone in Potosl knew

what happened to someone who pressed to hard against
abuses; the means that had been used to dispose of Cruz

and Nestares Marin were public knowledge

Meanwhile, in Lima, Fiscal NicolSs de Polanco raised

grave questions about the propriety of a census.

He said

that the costs and risks of such a venture were very high
in comparison to the potential gains.

Should the sixteen

provinces not hold enough Indians, then the mita would have
to be halved or obligation would have to be extended to
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more provinces.

The addition of new areas
would be
hampered, he warned, by the novelty
of the action, the
exemption from resettlement after
ten years and the
logistics of a thirty-province mita.
A new repartimient_g
would also drag the Indians away
from more profitable
mining centers in their own provinces
and from agricultural

activities which were as important to
the economic health
of Peru as PotosI silver production.
Polanco supported
the execution of a repartimiento
that was limited to the
sixteen traditional provinces, and he
suggested that the
Conde de Santisteban find a means to
implement the new
distribution of mitayos without conducting a
census.

The Viceroy was impressed by Polanco

's

discourse on

the difficulties involved with the census, and
the Fiscal

arguments were now echoed by President Salazar.^^

's

The

Conde began to explore alternatives to a census-based

repartimiento de la mita

.

Where Alva had decided to tailor

the mita to the originario population in the sixteen

provinces, Santisteban sought to adapt the de facto mita
to the needs of the crown.

On August 20, 1663, he wrote to

the Council of the Indies with a rationalization of service
in silver

— comparing

Spain during wartime.

it to the recruiting of soldiers in

He sent along three papers, without

identifying their authors, that weighed the pros and cons
of mita service in silver, and the possibility of a total

delivery of mitayos in money.
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Another who responded to Santisteban

•

s

questions

about service in silver was Pedro VSzquez
de Velasco.
The President had finally escaped from the
grasp of the

Bishop of Quito, and he was in Lima by November
of 1662.^^
There he conferred with the Viceroy on the
problems

surrounding the execution of a census, and thus
the
repartimiento. 96

He had recently completed a census in

Quito, where he had included forasteros and yanaconas
in

various mitas, and he felt that he would also be able to

overcome the difficulties that NicolSs de Polanco had
described.

The Viceroy decided to let him try, and

VSzquez de Velasco left Callao for PotosI on February 11,
1663.^^

When the new Superintendent finally arrived in the
villa in August, he found the mining industry in a shambles.
The total number of mitayos

,

he reported, was down to a

mere l,449~plus 286 for the mills—and only 500 Indians
were actually working in the cerro.

VSzquez charged that

Salazar had understated the extent of Potosl's degeneration,
and that he had included fifteen months of silver production
in the last carta cuenta. 98

Salazar had apparently indulged

in a favorite pastime of Hapsburg administrators:

the

protection of one's reputation by adjustment of official
production figures during his term of office.
Despite his initial outrage, VSzquez de Velasco was

determined to save Potosl.

He looked to accomplish that

.
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feat with a fresh approach to
government there. He
informed the azogueros that their
past involvement with
misuse of the mita, and all past
difficulties in general,
would be forgotten. Furthermore, he
would not act against
those who were currently engaged in
misuse until he had
completed the new repartimiento and he
would then be
lenient toward the first offense.
Thenceforward, however,
they were to keep careful records of the
Indians that they
received, both in person and in silver, and
the use to
.

which they were put.^^

VSzquez had seen a glimmer of hope

for the new repartimiento when the Corregidor
de Chayanta

delivered 1,100 Indians, after conducting an extensive
reducci6n in his province.

At the same time, he wrote

to the Viceroy to confess that Potosi's recovery
would

take longer than he had originally predicted

During the latter half of 1663, Vazquez de Velasco

corresponded with Santisteban about how best to conduct
the census.

The President suggested that priests be used

in all thirty provinces, under the general direction of

the Archbishops of Lima and Charcas

"""^^

On January 31,

.

1644, he again urged that a prompt decision on the matter

be reached, for while he had been able to raise the number
of mitayos to 1,670 per week, his success at PotosI would

ultimately depend upon the repartimiento 103
.

The azogueros

warned the Viceroy that Potosi would collapse within two
years if the new repartimiento were not completed soon. 104

.
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The President sent a comprehensive
repartimiento
plan to the Viceroy on February
2, 1664.
He now wanted
to include only the Indians in
the sixteen provinces,
and those in the fourteen others
who had migrated out of
them.
The provincial corregidores were to
conduct the
census, and the new mita would not
distinguish among the
forasteros, yanaconas and originarios
The new plan was
.

predicated upon the Viceroy's ability to order
its
execution on his own authority; VSzquez said that

the

census could no longer wait for another crown
directive
On March

3,

he again warned that silver production at

PotosI would soon collapse if action were not taken
immediately. -"-^^
The azogueros reinforced Vazquez de Velasco's

exhortations with petitions that underscored Potosl's
economic and military importance to Peru.
sensitive to the villa

's

They were

diminishing role as a silver

producer, and so they promoted its importance as a

consumer of goods produced in Charcas and its strategic
location half-way between Lima and Buenos Aires. "^^"^

Bartolome de Salazar, who had earlier joined Nicolas
de Polanco in raising doubts about the feasibility of a

census, now pressed for an immediate enumeration and

repartimiento

.

He said that the questions that had been

raised about the dependability of the corregidores mattered
little when compared to the urgency of the situation. 108
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The Viceroy refused to proceed,
however, for he said that
he had only been ordered to
conduct a repartimiento and
did not have the authorization to
undertake a census. He
wrote to the Council of the Indies
to request permission to
follow VSzquez de Velasco's suggestions,
and he added that
he would act anyway if he did not
receive a prompt reply
While Santisteban waited for word from
Madrid, VSzquez
de Velasco—like Bartolomg de Salazar
before him—grew
.

disheartened and frustrated.

He was painfully annoyed by

the new Corregidor, Guerrero de Luna.

Despite Vazquez'

insistence that he put the crown's interests before
his
own, Guerrero had set up gambling in his home for
the

azogueros.

The President was not upset that the azogueros

were gambling, but that they paid for their losses with

mercury and "pocket Indians."

The Corregidor was therefore

encouraging the abuses that VSzquez was trying to end.

The

President asked that his and the Corregidor 's positions be
merged, to eliminate such problems in the future, and that
the joint position be awarded to someone

else."'""''^

Guerrero countered Vazquez' charges with manifestations
of his innocence and the claim that his efforts to augment

provincial compliance with mita obligations had been

compromised by the President's meddling.

He claimed that

he could have doubled the effective mita ordinaria had he

been free to act on his own.
Meanwhile, Viceroy Santisteban was again looking for an
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to a census-based repartimiento

m

.

1665 he

aez de Velasco a plan that
called for 1,000 mitayo s

from the sixteen obligated
provinces, and another
^ the fourteen theretofore exempted
provinces who
the option of serving in person
or remitting two

^

£esos per week for a year.

^ilf

Oriqinarios

.

iand forasteros were all included on an
equal
l^ose

who served in person would work more
often

fceek in three,

reft open.

but the actual ratio of work to

All service in silver from the fourteen

P would be matched by the azogueros
w<ired for five pesos per week.

wlta^os or mingas
araz ogueros
ti

.

,

,

and mingas

All workers,

would be distributed equally

Should the new mita not revitalize

silver industry, then the guinto would be

Icrhe Viceroy suspended all discussion of the
ceil this

new plan could be considered by Vazquez

an.

ssident did not hold out much hope for the plan.

Hereferred a program consisting of a census and a
£^ito
IILLl

,

but his ultimate conclusion was that the

be abolished altogether.

He argued that the

po^ains from a new repartimiento

— however

rsoere simply not worth the costs.
niiJe

it was

Misuse of the

only way the azogueros could make

a

profit at

Po^said^ and it was therefore impossible to prevent.

.
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The evils wrought by the mita would
not be solved by the
completion of the new plan, or the
implementation of a

census-based repartimiento

Only the abolition of the mita,

.

VSzquez counseled, could accomplish that
goal.

The crown

would lose little, he added, for the guintos
it received
from PotosI were no longer significant '"'•^
.

Fiscal Juan Baptista Moreto de Espinosa was
another

who responded to Santisteban

'

s

1665 plan.

problems with it as Vizquez de Velasco.

He found as many

By the time he had

devised a step-by-step plan for its implementation,
furthermore, it was so unwieldy that it presented even

greater difficulties than the census it was meant to
replace
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The Conde de Santisteban died on March 16, 1666, before
he could receive the opinions of Vazquez and Baptista.

His

death effectively ended all discussion of the new plan.
The Audiencia de Lima, following established practice,

assumed direction of the realm until the arrival of his
successor, the Conde de Lemos

(1667-1672)

.

''"'^

It was the

Audiencia that received Vazquez' call for the abolition of
the mita.

It also received an order from the Council of

the Indies and Queen Mariana

September 17, 1665

way he wished. "^"^^

— Phillip

— permitting

IV had died on

the Viceroy to act in any

The Audiencia could therefore have

legally pursued the matter of the repartimiento

,

but it was

no more inclined to assume the responsibility for it than

—
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Viceroys Salvatierra, Alba and Santisteban.

The Audiencia

chose to leave the entire affair to the
Conde de Lemos-^^'^
Summary

From 1648 to 1666, Hapsburg officials spent
a great
deal of time and effort on the mita.

They accomplished

very little because the Council of the Indies,
the
viceroys and the local officials in PotosI were
often

working at cross-purposes.

The Council of the Indies tried

to implement a two part program involving both a new

repartimiento and the abolition of misuse.

The program

contained assistance for the azogueros and the Indians, and
it required a balanced execution of its tenets for it to

succeed.

— and the
government — did not

Viceroys Salvatierra, Alba and Santisteban

Audiencia de Lima as interim head of

implement the Council's program for three reasons:

first,

they doubted that the azogueros deserved further government
assistance, given the extent of their misuse of the mita

;

second, they doubted that the prerequisites for a new

repartimiento

— first

reducciones and then only

a

census

could be conducted successfully; and third, they would have

been held responsible for any negative consequences of
their execution of the Council's orders.
For fear of making things worse at PotosI, therefore,

each viceroy did his utmost to pass the responsibility for

compliance with the Council's directives
on to his
successor. Meanwhile, he presented
the appearance of
action by collecting information and
making short-term
decisions of little consequence.

President Nestares Marin and Corregidor
Sarmiento de
Mendoza pressured the Conde de Salvatierra
to comply with
separate sections of the Council's program,
and they were
later assigned the responsibility for implementing
that

program when the Council of the Indies grew tired
of the
Viceroy's obstinacy. Their effectiveness was diminished
by the division of responsibility for the program
between
them, and their personal antipathy toward one another.

The two halves of the Council's program were then reunited,

by the Conde de Alva, and assigned to Superintendent

Francisco de la Cruz; but Alva refused to allow Cruz

a

free hand, despite his apparent authority to do as he

deemed necessary.
Cruz was shocked by what he encountered in the mita

provinces and outraged by what he discovered at Potosi.
The provinces, he reported, were so thoroughly depopulated

that the caciques were unable to meet their mita quotas in

persons or in silver.

The azogueros

,

supported by the

Corregidor de PotosI, demanded mita deliveries according
to the 1633 repartimiento

,

and they used collectors,

torture, extortion and other abuses to squeeze as much

silver from the caciques as they could possibly produce.

The mistreatment of the cacicrues
by the azogueros the
extent to which they were involved
in misuse of the mita,
and their illegal trade with the
crown's Dutch enemies
caused the Superintendent to abandon
the Council's balanced
program and launch an attack on the
de facto mita.
Cruz struck against the azogueros
misuse of service
in silver and their mistreatment
of the caciques by
demanding that they conform to the tenets
of the Toledan
mita.
He abolished service in silver and
rezagos de mita,
and he ordered that the caciques were
not to be held
.

'

responsible for their provinces' inability to
meet
unrealistic mita quotas.

The azogueros complained that

Cruz' direct enforcement of the viceregal
position that

the Toledan mita was still viable was itself
unrealistic,

and that he would destroy the PotosI silver industry
if
he were allowed to continue.

When their protests were

ignored, they killed Cruz and President Nestares Marin.
Cruz' reports to the Conde de Alba, and especially

his murder, further disuaded the Viceroy from assisting
the azogueros

.

In Sol6rzano Pereira's terms, the

Superintendent and the Viceroy concluded that the mita
was no longer justifiable

— that

the abuses it generated

far outweighed the benefits of Potosi silver production.

Alba did not act to abolish the mita

,

but he did prevent

Bartolome de Salazar from making any progress toward

repartimiento

.

a

new

The Conde de Santisteban looked
for some means to
tailor the mita to current realities:
the extension of
obligation to more provinces; the
legitimization of

service in silver; the inclusion of
forasteros and
yanaconas or a combination of all three.
He hoped to
restructure the de facto mita so that it might
continue
to meet the legitimate needs of the
azogueros without
;

generating the abuses that Francisco de la Cruz
had
documented. The implementation of alternatives

to the

standard mita, however, presented as many problems
as
the execution of the Council of the Indies' program.

Santisteban was also kept from developing an
alternative by an overzealous and overconfident President
Vazquez de Velasco.

He had conducted a census and had

reformed mitas in Quito, and he believed that he would be
able to do the same in Charcas.

VSzquez learned very

quickly, however, that the problems at Potosi were unlike

any he had encountered elsewhere.

By 1666 the President

had resolved that the abuses that were plaguing the

Potosi mita could not be eliminated without abolishing
the system, and he began a concerted drive toward that
goal.

He too had concluded that the mita now caused more

harm than good

— that

it was unjust.
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Notes for Chapter V
1.

AGI, Charcas 266. no

2^.?v??i5^?

m: ^'-^

1

Qr

"r-^i/iiii,

- ------

e

?os^L^?-?^°

azogueros de la
^^^1^^ el exceso que por
^!
^iio^ h
° ^^"^'-^^
^--^^
ibuy
16^9 hasta
hast^?6??^f
1631 o que se impuse a cuenta de ese
exceso lo
retrasados/' Aranjuez, IstwtiesJ

vil?nrPo.'%^5^^^^"'^^

(MC

806K

^^^^^^s 266, no. 15, the President of
^^^l'
Francisco
de Nestares Marin, to the crown, Potosi, Charcas
3o!v!
1652, 2 fs.
This letter discusses the Council's order
at
length, including the motivation for it.
Nestares was
responsible for its execution in Potosi.
r',.,

'

Charcas 266, no. 14, "Consulta del consejo de
Tc
16 de Abril sobre la pretension de los Acogueros
de
Potossi," Madrid, 16. IV. 1650, 9 fs.
See note 27, Chapter I, for the first citation of
Solorzano Pereira's Polltica Indiana
The summary included
here is drawn primarily from Castaneda Delgado, 345-349
Arguments in the affirmative, in SolSrzano's discussion 'of
the good and bad of the mita are found, in the Biblioteca
de Autores Espanoles edition, on I, 261-271; arguments
in
the negative are on pages 272-288.
Sol6rzano's observations on the question are on I, 289-314.
5.

.

,

Salvatierra's response is included in AGI, Charcas
266, no. 30D, "Copia de la carta que el Virrey Conde de
salbatierra escrivio a S Mg.^ en 2 de 7re de 1651
Respondiendo a la cedula de 28 de Abril de 650~en que se le
m^o cuydase del entero de los Yndios de la mita de
Potossi
y q® se hiciesen reduciones de ellos," Los Reyes, 2. IX.
1651, 3 fs.
For his "Relaci6n" and his later comments on
the cidula, see note 34, Chapter IV; the comments on the
1650 edict are on page 41.
An overview for everything in
this chapter is the "Relaci6n que hizo la real audiencia
y
la cancillerla de los reyes de su gobierno vacante por la
muerte del Virrey Conde de Santisteban al Conde de Lemos,
su sucesor," 15. XI. 1667, Los virreye s (ed. by Hanke and
Rodriguez), Perta IV (no. 283), 205-209 (from Biblioteca
6.
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"Reiao?^;

MS

3122); this is chapter 38 of the

^^^a de Potossi," ffs
^
^°
Zavala^ L^f,^^^
^^1^^^^
-o-tlAt
or
Chapter 38 and on page 148
orcha^tif^ll^nf^^
V.o sums his
discussion with:
^."^""^
incapacidad
de accifin hah?^??.'''^''?^
llegado la administraci6n Indiana de
la ctti^J^t t
^""^^^^^
^^^^ ^P^^^' si i^ien se trataba
nn
?
gobierno
interino en
P^f^°^°
sentir el ascendiente de los letrados. el que se hacia
eI notable el
ntimero de consultas
papeles
de las Audiencias de
y
Los Reyes y La Plata mientras el
grave problema
ocasionado por la disminuciSn de los indios
que acudlan
a la mita de Potosi seguia pendiente.
No s61o la
altamagistratura Indiana ocasionaba esta tardanza
sino
tambign la de Espana, que finalmente, ante
la variedad
Sin nueva resoluci6n a
las autoridades del PerG.
Se esperaba del nuevo gober
nante que llegaba que tomaria las decisiones
que tantS
se hablan demorado."
See, also, Valera (AGI Charcas 268, nos.
69A & 69B— see
"^^^""^
Audiencia's
^^^^^
"Relaci<5n^"^^^^''
,

™'

BNB, CPLA 24, fs. 480-482, "Acuerdo del cabildo
de
PotosI:
Sobre lo propuesto por don Luis de Sotomayor
Pimentel, caballero de la orden de Santiago, corregidor
de esta villa, para remedio de la falta de lluvias
que
tiene parada la ribera de ingenios desde agosto pasado
y
promueve, entre otros danos, la deserci6n de indios
mitayos," Potosi, 13. XII. 1651 (MC 832; MOM 630). As the
summary suggests, one of the problems caused by the drought
was that azogueros were unable to pay their mitayos and
the Indians left the villa in search of employment.
7.

,

8.

Salvatierra, "Relacion"

(see note 34, Chapter IV),

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19B, "Provission de govierno
para suspender a los Corregidores el de Potossi," 29. X.
1652, 4 fs.
Sarmiento de Mendoza's compliance with that
order is discussed in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 24A, an undated
and untitled addendum to no. 24, Corregidor Sarmiento de
Mendoza to the crown, PotosI, 30. IX. 1654, 5 f s
See, also,
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 28, "testimO de las diligS qe se an
hecho en el buen entero de la mitta desde qs es Corr^r el
dO^ dn frco Sarmto/- sin fecha, 7 fs.
9.

.

,

.
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10.

AGl, Charcas 266, no. 30A

"rr,r,f=

>i„

i

salvatierra vxrey destos rreynos,"
31.VII??l653?

also'dlscussef

f ^llulfif

f i^ffwh^^^

irn^onvenientlTfnrhrSI?'
12.

''^^

^'

2

fs.

'•

"

considered

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39D, "Al CorrexOr
^«

se^Ssponf L'f

„

cedulf ar?"f inserta^niie

observar en el repartimi^
ento ae
Into
II Los
los In.os
~
?n §^1""^^%^
<ae mita de aquel Cerro
la
v
auardp
v
cumpla executandola en la confSrmd
q.e se^e alvierte^"
Charcas 268, no. 70C (see
^'
r^^^l'ia
note
Chapter IV). For Sarmiento de Mendo^a's
56, nu
response
no. 20C, "Discursso breve que hace
fif
Docttor Don franco sarmiento de mendoca
oydo? de liL
corregidor de la ciudad de la platta
villa ynperJa? de
pottossi tenientte de capp.an General y de
la
de
sobre el reparttim.to General de los
yndios de
n,??^r^^
la mitta
y zerro de pottossi que su mag.d fug servido de
cometterle Cuya Zedula recivio en esta\ltima
ocSon de
Armada en dha Villa de pottossi a Ultimo de
Abrill de mill
cinquenta y quattro y por horden de el
^
I ^ma^''^-'^^^^^
Ex.mo
senor conde de salbattierra esta suspendido El
haga El dho reparttimientto asta la llegada del s.r que
conde
de alba que Viene por Nuevo Virrey," 1654, 12
fs.
Nestares
s orders are AGI, Charcas 266, no.
26B, "Copia de una
?
cedula
de su Mg.d de 8 de novire de 1653 en q.e se
avico
al Press te de la Audia de los charcas lo qS
se ordenava, en
quanto al repartimto de los Indies de mita del zerro
de
Pottosi, concediendole Juridicion pa la Aberiguacion
de los
excesos qe cometiesen en ellos," 8. XI. 1653, 4 fs.
'

p™c?a

Caspar Gonzalez Pav6n refers to the system of
playing the Corregidor against the President in AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 3A, "Copia de carta escrita al Virrey
Conde de Alba de aliste" (by Caspar GonzSlez Pav6n)
Potosi, 26. IV. 1655, 1 f.
13.

14.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20C (see note 12).

15.

Ibid.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19, Corregidor Sarmiento de
Mendoza to the crown, PotosI, 31. VII. 1654, 3 fs. This
letter was written the same day that Sarmiento informed the
16.
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crisis

-7-

™-

^^:.^?i^t!-r

Charcas 266, no. 30E, "Propon qe el
Corrr de
u^^' al
Potossi hico
Gremio de Azogueros sobL diferentes
cossas
del remedio de la mitta," PotosI,
23. X. 1654, 17 fs
0^4-'^^*

Fienaoza s various proposals.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 22, "el
charcas sobre El Repartimiento de los presidentte de los
?ndios de mitta dll
cerro Rico de Pottossi" (Francisco
Nestares Marin to the
crown)
PotosI, 30 .VIII 1654 , 2 fs.
The letter was sen?
""^ perdieron en el naufragio de la cappno
^^^n
d^?
sur"; a copy was sent with another letter
S^f^^ff^^^l
of
0.11.1658.
Sarmiento de Mendoza answers the charges made
by Nestares Marin in AGI, Charcas 266, no.
CoLegidor
sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosi, 25,
30. IX 1654
6
fs.; he notes that Don Ger6nimo Luiz de
Cabrera is eighty
years old and his jurisdiction of Chucuito is
one of the
worst when it comes to sending mitayos
18.

.

.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20A, "Capi de carta q.e le
escrivo el virei pa qe no hiciese el repartimto asta qS
llegase alba" (an escrivano 's report to Sarmiento de
Mendoza on the contents of two viceregal letters to him
of 31. V. 1654) , 2 fs.
Sarmiento de Mendoza's response, as
observed in note 12, is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 20.
19.

20.
Sarmiento de Mendoza's response, as observed in
note 16, is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 24. The Conde de Alba
discussed the order in a discourse on the mita written in
Lima on 13. XII. 1661 (AGI, Charcas 267, no.^lA, 14 fs.).

The broadside is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 26, Corre
gidor Sarmiento de Mendoza to the crown, Potosi, 31. V. 1655,
For charges that Nestares permitted a relative to
2 fs.
engage in abuse, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32F, "Tantto de
la carta que El Correg.or de potossi Don franco sarmientto
de mendoca escrivio al conde de alva Virrey del peru sobre
El mal Usso de los yndios de mita que a Yntroducido El
presidente de los charcas," Potosi, 31. VII. 1655, 3 fs. For
Sarmiento 's charge that Nestares was in league with the
moneylenders, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32H, "Tantto de la
2. Cartta que se remittio al Virrey conde de alva por El
21.
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Docttor Don fran.co sarmiento de
mendoza Correqidor de
Pottossi/' Potosi, 31.VII.1665, 3 f
s
AGI ChCcas
anonymous indictment of the President 266
en;it?;d'"n^''
^^^os cavos qe ha causado la visita
que
K
^^^°f
°' Don francisco de Nestares'L^^n
P^esidente de
Fresidente
dr^or'."'
los charcas assi en la
R.l como
en lo universal del Reyno en general hacienda
y particular de el
°
^^^^^^^^ dermLmo
te°?r^°i^f
Press te
Press.
ha valido la visita y cobrancas que
ha hecho de
las caxasR.es hasta ultimo de Jullio
de 1654 anos qSe es
Superintendent^the mi?a
'
??ancftnT%-';'"
Francisco
de la Cruz, on 14. IV. 1660, said that
Nestares
Mann had withheld travel allowances to pay Chucuito's
r|Z|20s(AGI Charcas 266, no. 57, "Plata que entra
en la
caja R.l devida a Los yndios de chucuyto por
Venida y
buelta a esta Villa qe parecese les deve
Restituir y la
razon de ello," Potos£, 14. IV. 1660, If.).
.

,

'

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 3A (see note 13); and AGI,
Charcas 266, no. 59, second item, "Copia de carta
escrita
al Conde de Alba de aleste Virrey del peru" (by
Caspar
GonzSlez Pav6n)
Potosi, 31. VII. 1655, If.
22.

,

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32K, "Tanto de la Carta que
el correg.r de Pottossi don franco sarmto de mendoca
escrivio al conde de alva Virrey del peru sobre que
combiene que su ex. a benga a potossi. con la cedula de
Su magci que asi lo mando a su antecesor El Conde de
salvattierra," PotosI, 31 .VIII 1655 4 fs. The 1650 order
said that the Conde de Salvatierra could go to PotosI if
he believed it would help matters there.
23.

.

,

For orders to act against corregidores
AHP, CR
120, "Carta del Senor Virrey escrita a los off is
RS de esta Vi^ sobre la ex°^ en recevir las fi^s de los
Correg.es que se nombran en lugar de los suspendidos por
el mal entero de la mita," Lima, 30. IX. 1655 (a copy).
For
Alba's delay of the repartimiento AGI, Charcas 267, no.
17A, "Tanto de la carta que escrivio el
Virrey Conde de
Alva al
D.°^ franco Sarmiento de Mendoca Sobre el
Repartimiento de los Yndios de Potossi que su Mag^ le avia
cometido," Lima, 31. V. 1655, 1 f. For Sarmiento's later
retrospective, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 19, Oidor Sarmiento
de Mendoza to the crown, Lima, 10.1.1662, 14 fs.
24.
339, f.

:

,

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 32E, "Tantto de la carta que
franco
Don
sarmiento de mendoza Corregidor de pottossi
escrivio al Virrey Conde alva Sobre que ponga remedio en
lo que combiene por que no se pierda Pottossi," PotosI,
31. XII. 1655, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas 266, no. 36C, Corregidor
25.

.
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problems caused by the ten-year
the same effect, though It was orders. taS?h" orler to
not mentioned in tSe
correspondence between Sanniento de
AGN ColecciSn Biblioteca Nacional, Mendoza and Alba is
legajo 181 "Retl
Cedula para que los indios que
estSn-^iiifrsos; pasados
connaturali.arse en ^1 pa^^jHondl
naoitan,
h!MtL'"°rir?^??
4. II. 1655 (two copies), 5 fs.
(see note 21); and AGI,
^^^^
NO. 36C mentions a
25).
'
t capitgn
roll for
fnr- a
role
mayor de la mita, and he plays a part
the deliberations in AGl
266
no! 3 2D. ?his
mention of such an official, and I do not
know
''u
tu

ChJ-h.

otl' ^^^""S??

m

^-Qh^s

,

^Si^

^^"^ed.
The Conde de
ar^ r^'"''^^
Tn
in AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 31A (see note 20) later said Alba,
that
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz had requested
such a
position be established, but that there were
problems with
funding.
The position of capitgn mayor de la mita, I
can
only suggest, may have been created by thi
Potosi to relieve himself of the day-to-day C^rliildor de
administration
of the mita.

The cgdula is AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39C, "Al Virrey
del Pera, encargandole el cumplimiento de las
cedulas
arriva insertas que tratan de la Justif icacion conque
se
deve hacer el repartimto de los Indios de mita de
Potossi
y el rem.o de los excesses q.e se cometen con el abusso de
los que llaman de f altriquera " 18. IV. 1657, 2 fs.
The
Corregidor's effectiveness may have been hampered by hiIS
involvement in a jurisdictional dispute with Alcalde ma
mayor
de minas Pedro de Montalvo during 1656 (see note 133
Chapter II)
28.

,

The Council of the Indies' deliberations, in
anticipation of the 16 57 cgdula noted that the Viceroy
was dragging his feet on the matter of the repartimiento
(AGI, Charcas 266, no. 35, 1 f.).
29.

,

For Alba's response, see AGI, Charcas 266, no. 39,
the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 22 .VIII 1658 2 fs.
See, also, his "Relacion que el Conde de Alba hace del
30.

.

,

,
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33C-see note 30, Chapter
18v-lf
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'
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'

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 64A, "Testim.o
de las
clausulas contenidas en el Acuerdo
consultibo que tuvo el
yirrey Conde de Alva en 26 de Agosto de
16 58 en orden a
los preparatories del repartimiento
geneHlTque come?io
al Reverendo pe Mro fr. Francisco
de la Cruz Obpo elec?o
"
^^^^^
^°te 3^ a^so
refer^o
^""^
Angulo (AGI,
'^f ^fjib^^^tions
Chfrcas 268^ n^^^f
36-see note
58, Chapter II), 2v, notes
Alhl tnr^
rl'
Alba
and Cruz
passing.
31.

.

m

BNB, CPLA 26, fs. 143-149, "Provisi6n del
32.
virrey
conde de Alba, de acuerdo con los antecedentes
que
insertan, se haga nuevo repartimiento de los indios se
de mita
de Potosi segQn el orden al efecto aprobada,
designandose
por juez comisario para que vaya a Potosi
y haga dicho
repartimiento a don fray Francisco de la Cruz,"
Lima 8 X
1658 (MC 866; MOM 640).
'

33.
All the orders are included in AGI, Charcas 267,
no. 9B, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima, 3. VII.
1660,
The secret orders of 25. IV. 1659 are AGI, Charcas
4 fs.
267, no. 9E, 1 f.
See, also, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A,
Testimonio de las Ynstrucciones Publicas y secretas qe
dio el Conde de Alva a D fray franco
la cruz y Don
Bar.nie
Salazar sobre el Repartimiento general de la
Mita de Potossi y lo resuelto por el Conde de Santisteban
con consulta del Acuerdo de la Audiencia de Lima para la
suspencion de esta comission hasta que llegue D.n Pedro
Vazquez de Velasco Presste de la de los charcas," 52 fs.
The Viceroy's decision not to punish anyone until after the
repartimiento was completed is mentioned in his retrospective, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 31A (see note 20).
34.
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41, Superintendent Francisco
de la Cruz to the crown "Sobre lo obrado en El desagrabio
de los Inos de la mita de Potosi," Potosi, 3. VI. 1659, 6 fs.

35.

Ibid.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 8A, Superintendent Francisco
de la Cruz to the crown, Potosi, 11. VI. 1659, 4 fs.
That
this action was against orders, AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 31A
36.

—

.

'
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(see note 20)
"^^^"^'^
Al conde
de Alva
ae
llva sobAe^'iSr^^
sobre Las esperas qe
"^S*
pretende El Gremio de
Acogueros de la va imperial de Potosi
En Lo que deven de
Acogues a su Magd" (by Francisco de
la Cruz) ? Po^os?? 23
^^""""^
"^^^ Infirme^Al
conde de'Alvfsibr^'i
conae
de Alva Sobre las esperas qe
Pretende el Gremio de
Azogueros De La Villa Imperial de Potosi"
(by rrancisco
Francesco de
la Cruz), Potosi, 1.X.1659, 3 fs.
'

Charcas 266, no. 41 (see note 34). Crespo,
-tJ^'^.^^^^u
^^^^ 308,547 in quintos and 700,000
indios de faltriquera. John Lynch, Spain
under
Hapsburqs, Vol. Il: Spain and America, 1598-1700the
(New York:
Oxford University P^iii7~l969Tr2207-says that
the relationship was 400,000 to 700,000;
his
ultimately, from Alba's "Relaci6n" (see note figures come
30r 120
Francisco used "indios de faltriquera" and "entero
en'plata"
interchangeably, so the reader should beware the
terms
involved.
11,000 pesos per week figure, AGI, Charcas
49, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the
crown, Potosi, 1. IV. 1660, 2 fs.
For the use of torture,
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 52, Superintendent Francisco
de la
Cruz to the crown, Potosi, 15. IV. 1660, 1 f. (the same
source
used by Crespo, "La 'Mita,'" 179-180).

ncJ^'no.
266,

40.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 49

(see note 39).

For hangings, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 43B, "Certifi
cacion de un Cazique qS se aorco" (Father Garcia de
Vargas to "V^a mma"), Toledo, 4. II. 1660, 2 fs. Cruz
mark is on the certification. For maiming male children,
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 42, "Los caciques
y principales de
las Prov,as que mitan a Pottosi" to the crown, Potosi,
15. IV. 1660, 3 fs.
41.

42.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41

(see note 34).

For the sale of Indians, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 55,
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosi,
14. IV. 1660, 1 f., describing "Excesos graves que se cometen
en la Provincia de lipez Comparando Y Vendiendo los Indios
publicamente y Remedio que pide." Sarmiento de Mendoza
noted this problem in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 28 (see note
9).
For contraband, AGI, Charcas 266, no. 56, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz to the crown, Potosi, 14. IV. 1660,
1 f., describing "Extravios de quintos y Plata Por Buenos
43.

302

ayres. y como no a tenido reparo
Govyno y nececita de los de V.M. con los ordenes del
por la distancia qrande
que ay de lima al Puerto." President
Nestares Marin was
ordered by Alba to combat contraband on
4.I.!660rASB
virrey al presidente Nestares Marin:
/^""^^
Ar.tl la
1
Ante
frecuencia de noticias sobre el contrabando
Plata por Buenos Aires, ad6ptense las providencias de
del
caso,
Lima, 4.1.1660, 2 fs. (MC 874); the notices
may
nave come from Francisco de la Cruz.

For a Cruz retrospective, see AGI Charcas
44.
266,
no. 46, Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz
to the crown,
Potosi, 17.11.1660, 3 fs.; "Da qta por menor de lo
que
obro pra remedio de los excesos que se cometian
en el
entero de los Inos de mita de Pottosi,
y repartimto ge de
ellos se hace, y de las molestias y bexaciones
qe los dhos
Indies recivian de las Justicias y de los mineros,
remite Testimo de los autos que s^e gllo hico." AGIy
Charcas 266, no. 49 (see note 39) is another look back by
Cruz.
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268 nos. 69A & 69B~see note
58, Chapter II), 13-14, is perceptive when he says that
,

,

Cruz began where he should have finished.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 8C, "Testim.o del auto de
su senoria" (Francisco de la Cruz), Potosl, 1. VII. 1659,
2 fs.; the June 4 order is related in this clarification.
Zavala, Servicio personal II, 139, says:
"El virrey Conde de Alba de Liste envi6 a
Potosi como juez de comisiSn a fray Francisco de
la Cruz, O.P., que en 1652 habia sido presentado
para el Obispado de Santa Marta. El comisionado
promulg6 auto para que el entero de la mita se
hiciese en persona. Los mineros se opusieron y
fray Francisco revoc6 el auto.
Informo al virrey,
por carta escrita en Potosi el 2 de agosto de
1659, que los indios de faltriquera montaban al
afio 600,000 pesos y los quintos reales apenas
alcanzaban a 400,000. De la provincia de Porco se
enviaban 60,000 pesos al afio a Potosi. El virrey,
en 2 de marzo de 1660, inform6 al rey que habia
mandado empadronar y reducir los indios de las
provincias que mitaban a Potosi y los que estaban
en la comarca.
Pretendla reforzar aquella mita."
(based on Rub^n Vargas Ugarte, Historia General del Pert!
(10 vols.; Lima, 1966-1971), III, 289-292).
45.

,

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 53B, "Autto para que no
obliguen los curacas y capittanes a enterar mas yndios que
los que les hubieren entregado en sus provinzias" (by
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Potosi, 3. XI. 1659,
46.

,

.
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Francisco de'la Cruzr?'lo?o^i:Tx???65^'^'?r'^'^"'^^'
Superintendent Francisco
de tI*crn^^;o^!?K''''^^
^°
Potosi,
14. IV.
"Li^^f^'f
Representase a V.M. como se a Reformado1660, 2 fs
el abuso de apre
miar a los capitanes enteradores
"
por lo qe no deSian
execucion.""^ See, ^IsS? A§I''charcas
267^ 'nn
no
267,
31A (see note 20), for Alba's basing
of the order
on precedents set by Canete and
Velasco.
•

^?f r

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 51A, "Autto
para que los
Yndios no paguen Ressagos" (by
Superintendent Francisco de
3. XI. 1659, 6 fs.; AGI, Charcas
^66 no
^n'i'-T°f Francisco de la Cruz to
51
51, Superintendent
the crown
1 '-rQue los Indies no'de™;gar
rezagos.
Y lo que en esto se a hecho~Con
testimonio")
48.

'

r™;

.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 45D, "Testimonio
del Auto
para que los diputados pidan se despachen
jueces" (bv
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), PotosI, 8.
XII 1659
Also, Cruz' exhortation of the Corregidor,
6 fs.
Charcas 266, no. 45E, "Testimonio del exssotatorio AGI,
Repuesta del Corregidor," Potosl, 12 and 14.1.1660, CoA la
5 fs
total.
49.

'

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 451, "Auto para que se
oyga
a los Indies en justicia y no se execute
desta forma en
ellos pena corporal" (by Superintendent Francisco de
la
Cruz), Tarapaya, 3. II. 1660, 1 f.; AGI, Charcas
266, no.
52A,
Auto. Paraque contra los caciques se proceda
conforme a de^ sin llegar a pena corporal" (by
Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz), Tarapaya, 3. II. 1660,
50.

2

fs

51. AGI, Charcas 266, no.

SOB, "Auto para que los indios
no enteren en platta sino en perssona y La dilixencia que
con ellos se hico" (Superintendent Francisco de la Cruz)
Potosi, 18.11.1660, 8 fs. Penalties are included in AGI,
Charcas 266, no. 50A, "Auto en que se rrefieren las penas
contra los que reciven en plata Los indios de mita con su
publicaci6n y dilixencias que se hicieron," Potosl, l.Ill.
1660, 6 fs.

AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 9A, the Conde de Alba to the
crown, Lima, 2. III. 1660, 4 fs.; "Da qta de las dilig^s que
se han comenzado a hacer sobre el repartimto genl de los
In°s de Potosi, la forma conque se precede y la quexa de
los Interesados por haver quitado los In^s que llaman de
52.

304

census.
DeUberaSons on thrif^°\^°-^^^^ priests do the
to include represei?ativL
f k^^^^^"^^^"^° ^^^^ ^1^° going
azogueros and Inquisitor
Juan de Ybarra!

^^f^^hat priests were idiots, AGI,
Charc;s
Lnarcas 266
no. 43, Superintendent
266, ^nn
Francisco
"^^---^o^u de xa
la uruz
Cru^
to the crown. Poto«:;T
^A tt iccn
o ^
tied from the mita provinces—
AGI

.

Charcac;

r,^

ao

cJiz'^o^^thl c^^;n?°Po
^4^1^ J^^rfZ^^^r^^
o??^^^^^^^^'^

incombenient^s
^
adquieren Domicilio fuera

*

de'io*iaze; mita {
de su naturaTeza.i

Charcas 267, no. 8B, "Testimonio de la
de azogueros" (to Francisco de la
Cruz),
Potosr^'l1. SiT^^fi^Q^
Potosi,
VII. 1659, 2 fs.; AGI, Charcas 266,
no. 45C,
^^^in del
^
sa!arine°lo^
salario
de los jueces" (to and by Francisco
de la Cruz
respectively), Potosi, 17. XII. 1659, 4 fs.
total

Po^?^

^^5^.'

^^^'-.^^^'"''^^
decree of the Conde de
AiK^^'rLima 1. XII.
Alba,
1659, 2 fs.
His letter to Cruz is AG?,
Charcas 267, no. 9D, "Copia de carta que
escrivio El Conde
de Alva mi s^ Virrey del Peru al M.R.P. Mro.
fray franco
Obispo de santa marta en l.o de Diciembre de
7?..Q n''f''l
ib^/
If. But Cruz' public orders were again curtailed
by secret orders, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9F,
"Segunda
Ynstrucion secreta que el M R P M fr. fran.co de la Cruz
de la orden de Predicadores ha de observar para
el usso de
sus comissiones, y espezialmente la que se le
remite en
este chasque, que sale de esta Ciudad oy dos de Diziembre
de mil seiscientos y cinquenta
See, too,
y nueve," 2 fs.
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note 33).
Cruz was to act
only with Alba's consent.

56.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 93

(see note 33); and AGI,
Charcas 26 7, no. 3, Caspar Gonzalez Pavon to the crown,
Potosi, 30. IV. and 10. V. 1660, 4 fs. Arzans, Historia II,
128-133 discusses an earlier attempt, in 1651, to kill
Nestares Marin with poison; on II, 187-194 he notes the
deaths of the two officials. The author of the Dominican
contribution to the Conde de Lemos' proposal that the mita
be abolished (in 1670) said he was in Potosi at the time
Cruz was there. He noted that the azogueros first tried
to burn Cruz' house down, and later killed him.
On the
Tuesday following the murder indios de f altriquera were
again demanded by the azogueros and caciques who refused
,

,
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to comply were jailed

lu^
that

(AGI, Charcas 268, no.

15E

sin

crown, CSdiz, 2. IV. 1676, 9 fs
^°
lu
savs
the I"
"voz pGblica" was that Cruz had
be4n poisoned,
poisoned

the venom slipped into his chocolate.

Padilla's discourse is AGI, Charcas
266, no. 37A
apuntamientos que remite el Alcalde, Don
Juan
^« ? i-??
657'sobre los
^^1^°
Travatoi^e''^^"^
^^f^^
Trayajos qe padecen
los Inos = asi en lo eiEIritual como
en lo temporal," 20 fs. His letter is
AGI "^Charcas 266?
Padilla to the crown, Lima, 20.VII.1657
? ;
'i-'^^
discourse is published in Ruben Vargas Ugarte,
^^"-^
Lz:
His^ori^
General de^
(10 vols., Lima, 1966-1971)
lii,
57.

'

^

,

the Council's orders to Alba, AGI, Charcas
266,
°^''''^^°
'^^^
^ista
de la carta de D Jun
1^;/
?
de o
Padilla de 20 de julio de 657," Madrid, 3. IX.
More action was taken in the Council on 22. IX. 1660, 1 f
1660; AGI
Charcas 267, no. 6, "En El consejo a 22 de sep.re de 1660Decreto del g.o sobre los despachos qe se an de dar
cerca
del repartimto General de los inOs de Mita su fha
de 22
de Septtre de 1660
If. The c§dula sent to the AudiiHcia
de Charcas is ANB, RC 438, "Copia de real cedula
dirigida
a esta Audiencia de La Plata:
Envigse relaci6n de los
abuses que en perjuicio de los indios de mita cometen los
corregidores y demSs encargados de ella, en perjuicio de
ese servicio," Madrid, 7. X. 1660, 3 fs. (MC 879; MOM 643).
The Archbishop's response is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 16 (see
note 91, Chapter II)
Sarmiento de Mendoza wrote the
response for the Audiencia de Lima (AGI, Charcas 267, no.
19, Lima, 10.1.1662, 14 fs.) but the other oidores would
not sign it when it was finished; Sarmiento explained what
had happened in AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 17, Oidor Sarmiento
de Mendoza to the crown, Lima, 31. XII. 1661, 1 f.
Bartolom^ de Salazar answered as President of Charcas in
AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 25, Bartolom^ de Salazar to the
crown, 8. IV. 1662, 12 fs.; the Audiencia 's official answer
is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28, Bartolomg de Salazar to the
crown, PotosI, 29. IV. 1662, 7 fs.
Oidor de Lima SebastiSn
de Alarc6n wrote the crown about the mita in AGI, Charcas
267, no. 21, Lima, 20.11.1662, 3 fs.
The Fiscal de Lima,
NicolSs Polanco de Santillana, wrote the crown on the
problems with a prerequisite census in AGI, Charcas 26 7,
no. 22, Lima, 20.11.1662, 9 fs.
These last two letters may
well have been in response to the cedula given the fact
that Alarc6n and Polanco refused to sign Sarmiento de
Mendoza 's missive. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 10, is a brief
note by Juan de Subica, Madrid, 22. IV. 1661, that he is
nr.

^l^u

,

.

,
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See Alba's "Relaci6n"

59.

^cLTclTlti

see^AGI

(see note 30), 118-119.

°' th^,^°£££2idores' abuse of Indians,

ToL^^^pa?^^^^^
agravios que reciven los In.os de
sul'correa
comparar lo que no an menester
y prenSeSdoies
n a^o^°^^^
^^^^^^
""^^^^^^
retirarse
a
despoblado Se?ando
v^rnn?^.'' ?^
^^""^^^
^"^^^
destru
vran si no i^^^""^" I
"^"^
^GI Charcas 267,"
no 3?N "Jnt Gov.
cT^rlT'
res y caciq.s de aq.l
Pueblo y del de
tolapampa"u^?^
to the crown, Tomahave, 20. V.
1664, 2 fs
que
reciven
de los Correg.res los
J^llt^^^^
comprar
por
fuerca
y a precios muy suvidos
?::
los generos que comercian y si ocurren
a la Aud.a les
prenden y molestan y les venden las hazdas
para conseguir
sus grangerias como sucedio con D. P.o
oe Cartaxna gravo
Correg.r
En la feria de unas mulas; de que
^^'^
?r q.e
resulta
prosigan en nra sta fee retirandose a la
ydolatria y no hava quien sque metales
quint. s y supp can se provea de Rem.o" y perdiendoselos
For a
treatment of the mita 's impact on a province, comprehensive
in
with internal factors, see Canedo-Arguelles studyconcert
of
Pacajes. Her thesis is based on documents in the
AGI,
Escribania 868a. Hanke, in notes on pages 253-254 of
ArzSns, Historia, II, says that Escribania 868 includes
a 911-folio complaint by Gabriel Fernandez
Guarache from
'

,

'

•

16 6 3.

Canedo-Arguelles, 71-74. An earlier request was
made
1648, but the azogueros were able to block the move
to abolish the capit^n general position.
61.

m

For the caciques 1660 petition, AGI, Charcas 266,
(see note 41).
For the 1664 petitions, Zavala,
Servicio personal II, 146-146.
62.
no. 42

'

,

See their relaciones (described in notes
respectively), pages 40 and 120, respectively.
63.

6

and 30,

64.

Canedo-Arguelles, 57-59.

65.

Ibid

66.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43, President of Charcas

.

,

60-64.

.

.

..

.

,
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Pedro VSzquez de Velasco to the Conde de
Santisteban
the quote f rom
zlTll' Servicio personal II, 139, included
Zavala,
in note 45.
'

f

,

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 53 (see note 53).
example of a cacique who was spared such problems,For an
legally
If not really, ANB, M 125, no. 17, "Don
Felipe
Choquetijlla, indio principal del pueblo de Oropeza
de
los Quillacas, provincia de Paria, sobre
que le guarden
los privilegios por los cuales esta reservado
del oficio
de capitSn enterador de la mita de Potosi
y de otros
29.x. 1652-31. XII. 1666, 26 fs. (MC 934;
SnM^'^^i^f'"
MOM
649a)
67.

68.
Padilla (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A— see note 57),
7v (Vargas Ugarte transcription, page 401)
.

Cafiedo-Arguelles, 93-96; Fernandez Guarache was
also engaged in wine and coca transport to raise money for
the delivery of the mita (page 67)
69.

Ibid

70.

.

,

97.

Sources for Table 2; "Estimated Mita Service":
a.
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19C (see note 1)
b.
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 30D (see note 6).
c.
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 19D, "Resumen de la
Vissita de minas y ingenios hecha por d. fran.^°
Sarmiento Oydor de la Ciudad de los Reyes Y Correg
de Potosi," 4. VII. 1654, 2 fs.
d.
AGI, Charcas —266,
— —
no.
—
19A, "Testimonio de los
Yndios que enteraban siendo Cor
Correg.i^ d. fran.co
O^^.
„
.rr.
sarmiento que eran 2660," 1651, .
e
Ibid
f.
Salvatierra, "Relaci6n" (see note 34, Chapter
71.

,

.

II)

,

--

-

,

40.
ANB, M 125, no. 14 (see note 72).
g.
h.
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 41 (see note 34).
i.
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60B (see note 81).
AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 16 and 25 (see note 91,
j.
Chapter II; and 58, respectively).
k.
Acarete du Biscay, "An Account of a Voyage up
the River de la Plata and thence over Land to Peru (c.
1660) ," Colonial Travelers in Latin America, ed. by
Irving A. Leonard (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972)
,

137-138.
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33).
m,
AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60B (see note 81)
n.
AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 16 and 25 (see note 91,
Chapter II; and 58, respectively)
1.

.

.

.
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^^^''''^^

pi
?*

s.
t.

29

Ibid

S?^^^^^

267, no.

(see note 93).

37E

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 36
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 46

(see note 100).

(see note 107).
(see note 111).

For GonzSlez Pav6n, ANB, M 125, no.
14, "CoDia dP
^"^^^^
escribiS, de PotosI a Espana, a don
escr!Mr'de^Po."\''"r"'"^°
G6mez DSvila,
corregidor provisto para dicha villa:
mente al rggimen de la mita," Potosi, Refi^rele orincin;,!"
25?! lels
(MC^864;^MOM 639). For Cruz, AGI, cAarc^s 266^ iS ?s^
'no! 46* (see
72.

"

'^^'>
^^^^
^
Charcas 266,
'
(see note 12); and Salvatierra s "Relaci6n"
(see
^^^P^^^ ^V)' 36-37. Sarmiento (AGI, Charcas 266,
24A— see note 9) and GonzSlez Pav6n (ANB, M 125, no

nn ^?nr
no.
20C

'

'

no.

i4--see note 72) both say that Tuesday was the day
of
reckoning for "pocket Indians."
74.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 46

(see note 44).

Canedo-Arguelles, 47. For wages being withheld,
Tv^-r^^A,AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 43 (see note 66). For what happened
when a cave-in occurred, see ANB, M 125, no. 13 (see note
133, Chapter II)
Padilla (AGI, Charcas 266, no. 37A~see note 57),
(Vargas Ugarte transcription, 401)
76.

8

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B (see note 33).
For Alba's
indictment of G6inez D^vila, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9G,
"Copia de Un Capitulo de carta de el Conde de Alva de
Aliste de 28 de Mayo de 1660 que es del N.o 17 tocante a
los procedimientos de Don Gomez Davila CorregO^ de Potosi,"
77.

1

f

•

78.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 9B

(see note 33)

79.
For Salazar's discussion of the letter sent to him
on 24. V. 1660, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24, President Bartolome
de Salazar to the crown, PotosI, 1. IV. 1662, 15 fs.
For his
comments on his commission and its contents, AGI, Charcas
266, no. 60A, "Copia de la Carta que el D.or Don Bartolome
de Salazar Oidor de la r1 Audiencia de Lima y Press. te de
la de los charcas escrivio al Conde de Alba Virrey del Peru

,

.

309

en 1^ de Diciembre de 1660 aOs
Potosl 1 xtt ifi^n n ^
see also, AGI, CharcaF^T no.
ISA
Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36-see (s^e ;oJe*33
Chapter II)
ii)
2v-2, discusses Salazar's experiences. note si, ^napter
'

,

^^^^
Charcas 267'
L.narcas
267, nn^''?^.^^^'
no. 28 (see note 58).

AGI,

^5)'

el D. r Don Bartolome de Salazar Oidor
de la r1 AudienJia
de Lima Press. te de la de los charcas
escrivio al S cSnde
de Alva Virrey del Peru en 30 de Novy.re
de 1660 a^s "
^^^^^^1
'
-ell,
ITlfi'
in AGI, ll'^'^'^'lln
Charcas 267, no. 12, President Bartolomg de
salazar to the crown, PotosI, 1. VI. 1661, 4 fs.

-

-

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41B, the Deputies of
the
Gremio de azogueros to the crown, PotosI, 17. XII
1660
The Protector de los naturales agreed; AGI,
Charcas
266, no. 61, Christ6val Laredo Trevino to the crown,
Potosi, 14. XII. 1660, 2 fs. (that Salazar was better
than
Cruz had been)
82.

Alba's plan was contained in Salazar 's commission,
which is described in AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A (see note
79) and the same questions were put to the crown in AGI,
Charcas 266, no. 60, President Salazar to the crown,
Potosi, 13. XII. 1660, 3 fs.; a comprehensive report on his
activities in Potosl.
83.

84.

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 60A (see note 79).

This entire course of events is included in AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 24 (see note 79). Valera (AGI, Charcas
268, nos. 69A & 69B
see note 58, Chapter II), 17, is an
overview as well. Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~
see note 30, Chapter II), 19v-20, says the O.K. for
twenty-nine provinces came on 3. II. 1661. In AGI, Charcas
267, no. 11, President Salazar to the crown, Potosi, 3. VI.
1661, 5 f s
the President says he received the go-ahead
on 3. III. 1661, but that it came with other orders to
suspend all action and that the 26. V. 1661 letter stuck
with the idea of using priests though permitting him to
name some corregidores if he wished. For the Conde de
Alba's side of the story, see his retrospective, AGI,
Charcas 26 7, no. 18, the Conde de Alba to the crown, Lima,
2.1.1662, 3 fs.
85.

—

.

,

—

86.
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 24 (see note 79); AGI, .Charcas
267, no. 15A (see note 33); and Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270,
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no

33C— see note

30, Chapter II),

20-20v.

President Bartolomg de

S^^ll'.r
Salazar ^"^^
to lu^^^''''^^
the crown, Potosl,

9 V 16 6 3
P f=
c^T
relates the contents of the 1662
iorre^pondeAie as'ell
AG^^lAarcaf
no "^24
no.
(sernotr?9f
24 (see
note 79) he °?
cleans his hands of the entire
"^^tter would have
had i
he 'k^^
been able to proceed with his plan. been settled
See? also
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 15A (see note
33).
.

,

'

°f

the delay, AGI, Charcas 267, no.
32 ^p;«JS'' l^t S^^^^
t° the crown, ^Lim^,
2l'xi
21.
XI. ?662
ff^V^'S^^^
1662, 22 fs.
For his arrival in Potosl, AGI, Charcas
267 no. 37D, President VSzquez de Velasco to

Santisteban, Potosl, 31.VIII .1663,

9

fs.

the Conde de
copy).

(a

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 63, Christ6val Laredo
89.
Trevino to the crown, Potosl, 31. V. 1661, 2 fs.;
AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 12, President Bartolomg de
Salazar to the
crown, Potosl, 1. VI. 1661, 4 fs.
90.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 28

91.

Ibid.

92.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 22

(see note 58).

(see note 58).

93.
Salazar 's remarks are included in AGI, Charcas
267, no. 28 (see note 58).
For Santisteban s comments on
the situation, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 23, the Conde de
Santisteban to the crown, Lima, 23. III. 1662, 2 fs. For
more from President Salazar, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 29,
President Bartolomg de Salazar to the crown, Potosl, 23. V.
1662, 3 fs.
•

AGI, Charcas 26 7, no. 35, the Conde de Santisteban
to the crown, Lima, 20. VII. 1663, 1 f.
The three discourses
are included as AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35A, "Discursos que
han dado algunos celosos del servicio de su Mag.d sobre el
entero de la Mita de Potosl," 11 fs. As I pointed out in
note 23, Chapter I, the second of the three discourses is
that written by P. Rabelo (Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid,
Ms. 19699/30)
and discussed by Zavala, Servicio personal
II, 41-43.
The third discourse is also in Zavala, on page
110, and discussed in an examination of material from the
1640s; it too comes from the Biblioteca Nacional Madrid,
Ms. 19699
it is the second item in that document.
I have
been unable to determine the author, but two possibilities
are Sarmiento de Mendoza and Gabriel Fernandez Guarache.
94.

,

—

,
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j

7

'

^°P^^

los Ynformes que en Virtnd

r^<=

cnarcas 26 7, no. 20, the Conde de
Santisteban to thi
10.1.1662,
^'^^
1 f., and margin no?es on no
20A
tSr^;
the respondents were:
Oidores Sebastian de Alarc6n
Francisco Sarmiento de Mendoza, Bernardo
de Yturric^rra
Juan'de Re^ueria;
t^cald^ de'"nT'/^°"r Padilla; Inquisitor
Albaro de
Ibarra and
Ybarra,
ind Protector
tL^
general Diego de Le6n Pinelo— all
responding to a proposal offered by a
"
Another copy of the first discourse is "sugeto mui ce?osso
AG?, Charcas 268
Ibarra's response
is
is*AGI
''^'''fc^^
AGI cLr;J^?.«
Charcas 268, no.
15B; both items were sent to the
crown in 1670 with the Conde de Lemos July
4 discourse
arguing for the abolition of the mita (see
note 76, Chapter
^^th
the
^^'^^
three
diiH^rses
will be necessary
ill^^^^ ^° identify the authors of the first and
n.t'^
third.
The question of a possible institutionalization
of
mita service in silver is one that deserves more
attention
the future.
See note 97, below, for more on this issue.
'

r

m

.95.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 32

(see note 88).

AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 37 J and 37K (37K is the
last page of the document)
"Tanto de un parecer que dio
el D"^ Don Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Presidente de
los
Charcas al conde de santistevan Virrey del Peru estando
dho Presste en Lima sobre la numeracion de los Yndios de
mita de Potosl," Lima, 31.1.1663, 3 fs.
96.

,

97.
For VSzquez de Velasco 's departure, AGI,
267, no. 34 (see note 87); Salazar's notation of
that he was en route.
For his comments while in
Charcas 267, no. 37B, "Copia de carta escrita al

Charcas
the fact
Lima, AGI,
Virrey del

Peru por el Doctor Don Pedro Vazquez de Velasco Presidente
de los charcas sobre la numeracion de los Yndios=es Parecer
que dio en Lima=," si^ fecha, 4 fs. (see note 23, Chapter I
for the fact that this piece is published in Zavala,
Servicio personal II, 43-44; it is a copy of Ms. 19699/30
third item, from the Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid; it is a
companion, therefore, of the second and third discourses in
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 35A (see note 94).
,

98.

AGI, Charcas 267, no.

37D (see note 88)

,

..
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99.

Ibid., and AGI, Charcas 267,
no. 37F

Presidpnf

J1.X.1663, 2 fs. (a copy).
SSnchez-Albornoz 70 notes
correspondence between Vazquez de Velasco
and Fi^caf
the question of the cen^usNfroxn
AGN "salf
a(jiN,
baia xi?f
XIII, is"?^
23.10.2) during 1663.
,

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37E, President
VSzguez de
velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, La
Plata
3o!?x.
IbbJ, 2 fs. (a copy)
100.

101.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37F (see note
99).

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37H, President
Vazquez de
Santisteban,
La Plata, 30. XI.
^°
yf^?^""?
xb63 , 2 f s
(a copy)
102.

.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 371, President VSzquez
Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosl, 31.1.1664de
'
If. (a copy) .
103.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41A, "Copia de la Carta
que escribieron los Acogueros al Virrey" (Santisteban)
PotosI, 31.1.1664, 3 fs.; AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41C,
"Informe en que los Diputados del Gremio de los Acogueros
de Potossi representan al Ex, mo sehor conde de Santisteban
Virrey de estos Reynos quattro puntos que miran a la
conservacion y augmento de esta ymperial villa," Potosi,
104.

25.11.1664,

4

fs.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37C, President Vazquez de
Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, "sobre la forma que
da para hacer la numeracion de la mita del cerro y 'Rivera
de la Villa de Potosi," PotosI, 2. II. 1664, 5 fs. (a copy).
105.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37L, President VSzquez de
Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, Potosi, 3. III. 1664
(a copy)
2 fs.
This letter was soon followed by AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 37M, a copy of a list of the provinces
responsible to the Potosi mita, the numbers of mitayos
required from each, and those that actually arrived,
Potosi, 31. III. 1664, 3 fs. AGI, Charcas 267, no. 37,
President VSzquez de Velasco to the crown, Potosi, 20. IV.
1664, 5 fs., is a comprehensive report based on many of
the letters cited in notes 88 to 105 (those with "AGI,
Charcas 26 7, 37" and a letter) which were sent with it as
106.

,

.

,

supporting documentation.
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 41C (see note 104); AGI,
Charcas 267, no. 41, the Deputies of the Gremio de azogueros
107.
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21. XII. 1664
4 fs.; AGI, Charcas
2?7 nn ?r'/°^°^^'
general de PotosI Francisco de
llrLcol'a y Diaguez to the crown,
Arracola
PotosI, 18. IV. 1664,
,

3

SaiaLr to
baiazar
to^;h^^^''''^^
the crown, Lima,

fs.

Bartolomg de

'

1. XI. 1664,

2

fs.

109.
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 39, the Conde
de Santisteban
to the crown, Lima, 11. XI.
1664, 2 f s
In his discussion
of the conde de Lemos 4. VII. 1670
proposal that ?hemi?a
.

'

'sL^o

Chapter'llf,
Zavala',
personal
personar"^??
ll, 'itt
149, says that Santisteban timidly proposed
the same to the crown in a letter of
16 .XI 1664 (from AG^
Lima 66
This would confirm that the Viceroy s
request
for a direct order was a delaying
tactic.
,

.

.

•

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 40, President VSzquez
de
Velasco to the crown, PotosI, 11. XII. 1664, 4
fsT
110.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 45, Corregidor Gabriel
Guerrero de Luna to the crown, PotosI, 11. II.
1665 1 f
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 46, Corregidor Gabriel
Guerrero de
Luna to the crown, PotosI, 6. V. 1665, 3 fs.
111.

•

112.
The plan is included on the first 2 fs. of AGI
Charcas 267, no. 48A, "Papel que remitio el Virrey al
fiscal de lo Civil para que dijese lo que se le ofrecia "
with the reply dated Lima, 15 .VIII 1665
The total number
of fs. IS 21, with Fiscal Juan Baptista Moreto de
Espinosa
responding on the remaining 19. AGI, Charcas 267, no.
50A,
IS a hodge-podge of material by VSzquez de Velasco--most
of It directed to the Conde de Santisteban—which
includes
his response to the plan in a copy of a letter of 3. IX.
'

.

1665,

5

.

fs.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 43, President VSzquez de
Velasco to the Conde de Santisteban, PotosI, PotosI, 20.1.
1665, 17 fs.; "Respuesta qS da el Presidente al Conde de
Santesteban acerca de que deiga su parecer en Vnos puntos
y medios que se proponen acerca del cerro de potosi su
mita y evitas los dahos q^ se causan por los azogueros con
Cuia ocasion responiendo refiere lo que padecen los indios
y como por la mita de Potosi esta destruido este Reyno y
sino se avide al remedio luego luego no ay que hacer caso
del
For more, AGI, Charcas 267, no. 42, President
VSzquez de Velasco to the crown, PotosI, 30.1.1665, 1 f.
113.

114.

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 48A (see note 112).

115.

See note

6

for reference to the Audiencia de Lima's

"

,
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"RelaciSn" for the Conde de Lemos.

Council of the Indies' deliberations AGT
267, no. 49, "Cons.o a 12 de Novie 1665
Secre^^
Acordado del Conss.o a la Mita de Potossi,"
1 f.*
Ill
^^nt ?o'
Pres?dL?'v^
i'""Velasco,
f.
each.
1
The cgdula that
was senf
sent to JS^v-^^
the Viceroy is AGI Charcas 267, n o.
56B
Copia de Z.la de 12 de X.re de 1665 en
que se respoAdio
al Virrey del Peru lo que havia de
executar cerca del
Potossi y avisandole se ordenava
}^ ""^^^
af^p^^o^te
al Press.
de los charcas asistiese en aq.Ha villa
el
tpo de su oblig. n," 12.XII.1665, 3 fs.;
this order summarizes a number of positions held by government
officials in
Peru.
nu^'^^'
Charcas

,

,

f

•

117.
AGI, Charcas 267, no. 52, the Audiencia de Lima
to
the crown, Lima, 21. X. 1666, 2 fs.; "Responde a
la c.la de
IZ de Diz^ de 665 tocantes al repartimiento
Gen^ de la Villa
de Potosi Ydize Yra disponiendo lo combeniente
llegara El Virey qe se esperava." See, also, mientras
the Audiencia
de Lima's "RelaciSn' (see note 6), 205-208.
Zavala,
Servicio personal II, 148, treats the Audiencia 's handling
of the 12. XII. 1665 cgdula this way:
"Al recibir esta cgdula, la Audiencia (de los
Reyes) la comunicS a la de La Plata, para que
informase especialmente en los _14 puntos pendientes
En carta de iQ de septiembre de este aho (de 1666)
recibida el dla 27, lleg6 la respuesta y tabla de
los indios que en el Qltimo repartimiento se
sefialaron y los que hoy se enteran.
La Audiencia
de La Plata opinaba que se hiciera la numeraci6n de
los indios ajustandose la mita a la septima parte
de los que hubiere; que entonces se podria decir a
qug ingenios se darlan y el nilmero a repartir a
cada cual.
La Audiencia de Lima estim6 que esto no
respondia a la pregunta sobre cual era el arreglo
posible sin hacer la numeraci6n
This is based on the Audiencia de Lima's "Relaci6n" (see
note 6), chapter 38.
It also mentions that Vazquez' reply
of 31.1.1666 was not an answer to the question posed,
whether the non-census-based repartimiento was a good idea.
,

.

.

CHAPTER

VI

1667 TO 1680

The viceroyalty of the Conde de Lemos holds a
special

place in the history of the PotosI mita, because he marked
the centenary of the system's foundation with a vigorous

viceregal attack on the mita 's very existence.

Lemos'

attempt to abolish the mita had caused him to be regarded
as an anomaly; as the one Spanish viceroy who placed the

good of the Indians before silver production.

The Conde

de Lemos was no anomaly, however, and his approach to the

PotosI mita was quite traditional.

His decision that the

system should be abolished, his reasons for it, and the
fate of his proposal once it had been made clearly show

that Lemos' were the logical result of patterns that were

already present upon his arrival in Peru.

.

Perhaps as interesting as the question of abolition is
the fate of the mita's key element:

the caciques

.

From

1667 to 16 80 they struggled to free themselves from the

pressures put upon them by the azogueros
Potosi, and a new tormentor

— the

,

corregidores de

CapitSn mayor de la mita.

The caciques also found new ways to disperse the obligation
of service in silver among the residents of their provinces.
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indeed, a wealth of documentation on
the caciques for this
period adds greatly to our understanding
of the de facto
mita, and their place in it.
The Conde de Lemos

The Viceroy Conde de Lemos took office on
November 21,
1667.

His official instructions included nothing
unusual,

and there was little reason to believe that he
would break

with the tradition of postponing action on the mita until
the arrival of his successor.

This Viceroy would prove

different, however, for he would come to advocate openly
the abolition of the PotosI mita

.

Lemos did not set out to extinguish the mita.

Like

many of his predecessors he first sought to reform the
system.

After four months as Viceroy the enormity of that

task was already apparent to him.

The Audiencia de Lima's

relaci6n was highly pessimistic about the possibility of
a new repartimiento , and the Viceroy's preliminary

enquiries found nothing to dispute its assessment

.

But

Lemos believed that he would succeed where other viceroys
had failed, much as Salazar and Vazquez de Velasco had

thought that they would be able to overcome the problems
that had stymied their predecessors.
The Conde wrote to the crown on March

4,

1668 to report

that the solution of the problems surrounding the mita

would require three steps:
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workings, and this can be completed
by the President
'''"^"^
The seconf
Is
IS th^^d'^r^K^^^
the distribution of the Indians
to the miners
according to the mines, mills and workings
that thev
^ 'r^'' ^° without leaving Lima!
The third
is the determination of the Indians
in the £3°''^^'^^^
subject to the PotosI mita. This can only provinces
accomplished by the Archbishop of Charcas,
the miners, the Indians and the government because
all lack
the means to pay for a census.
If Your Majesty
accepting this assessment of the situation,
name to that post an individual of sufficientshould
and intelligence, then I could adjust the mita age
to
everyone's satisfaction within six months. "2
The Viceroy's outline was drawn primarily from
the

advice of Juan de Ibarra, Visitador to the Audiencia
de
Lima.

Ibarra warned Lemos that any attempt to return the

Indians to their pueblos would be disastrous, and he argued
that the inclusion of more provinces than the current

sixteen would simply add to the abuses caused by service
in silver.

A census could be conducted in the sixteen

provinces, he said, if ecclesiastical channels were used;
and the government would save the 200,000 pesos in salaries

that an enumeration would otherwise cost.

The number of

Indians included in the census would be sufficient, Ibarra
believed, if those who lived at PotosI were included.

One-seventh of the Indians would serve in the mita at any
one time, and the mitayos would be assigned to the

azogueros on a pro-rated basis.

Should the number of

Indians found by the ecclesastical census not be sufficient,
then the Visitador felt that the yanaconas in La Paz and
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La Plata should be included as well."^

The Conde de Lemos presented Ibarra's
plan to Madrid,
in its entirety, in a letter of January
26, 1669.
He argued
that no alternative existed if a repartimiento
were to be

realized.

4

Because the means were novel and not provided

for by any previous royal order, Lemos said
that he would

not proceed with the ecclesiastical census until
the Queen

gave her consent.

While the Viceroy and Ibarra concerned themselves
with
the prerequisite census, the need for a new repartimiento

was underscored by Luis Antonio de Oviedo, the new

Corregidor de Potosl.

Oviedo had found 2,124-1/2 mitayos

,

of which 1,424 were serving in person and another 700-1/2

were delivered in silver.

He counseled Lemos and the crown

that silver production would be greatly improved if the

number of Indians assigned to Potosl were increased.

He

defended the mita against those who claimed that it had

depopulated the provinces, and he argued that service in
silver was a necessary part of the system

— if

only until

the new repartimiento was implemented.
If Oviedo and Lemos were in agreement that a new

repartimiento de la mita was needed, they disagreed on the

day-to-day administration of the mita.

The Corregidor was

confronted with the practical limitations of government at
Potosl and he was mindful of the fate of Francisco de la
Cruz.

The Viceroy's approach was based on legal

considerations and his experiences in the
mining center at
Puno.
Lemos had gone to Puno in 1668 after it
was wracked
by Indian revolts, and he was dismayed by
the treatment of
the Indians working there. ^

The Conde was motivated by

what he believed should be done at PotosI; the
Corregidor
was limited by what he thought could be done.
Thus, when
Lemos tried to institute three basic reforms of the
mita
late in 1669, he and Oviedo came into sharp conflict
over
the wisdom of their implementation.^

On November 4, 1669, Lemos decreed that the capitanes

enteradores were not to be held responsible for more

mitayos than those with which they had left their home
provinces.

8

On December

3,

he ordered that day-and-night

work in the cerro be stopped and that quotas be eliminated;
and that the Corregidor not despatch judges against the

caciques for rezaqos

9
.

Each of the practices described by

these three orders was patently illegal but historically
common.

Lemos told Oviedo that they could not be defended

on the pretext that they were required to boost silver
production.

The conservation of the Indians, not Potosl

silver, was the most important factor for the realm's
.

,

survival.

10

The Viceroy was further outraged by the fact that the

azogueros treated the mitayos as though they were their

personal property, and that they put their own interests

before the crown's.

But he had not yet given up on the
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mita.

Lemos explained to Oviedo that the
mita would be
just only as long as the mitayos
work did not lead to
their destruction. The Viceroy's
three reforms were
therefore meant to ensure, in Sol6rzano
Pereira's terms,
that the good produced by the mita
outweighed the evils
that were caused by it.
Only then would its continuation
be justified.
'

The Conde de Lemos was mindful that his
performance as

Viceroy would be judged, in part, by the level
of silver
production during his viceroyalty. Because he was
aware
that production at PotosI would probably decline with

the

execution of his reform directives, he defended his actions
in a letter to the crown of December 16, 1669.

Lemos told

the Queen that the Indians were more oppressed than any

people on the face of the earth; that it was not silver
that Peru shipped to Spain, but the sweat and the blood of
the Indians.

Less government revenue justly earned, he

contended, would be better than more silver unjustly
gained.
The Conde had overcome one of the reasons that his

predecessors had not conducted a repartimiento

.

He

explained, however, in follow-up arguments of January, 1670,
that his reforms represented an alternative to the

census-based repartimiento

.

Lemos said that he had

concluded that a government census would be impossible to
complete.

He again suggested that Ibarra's plan for an

ecclesiastical census be adopted, and he asked
the crown
to at least confirm his three reform
directives with

royal

cgdulas.

He identified the caciques as the key to the

mita and blamed the undue pressures on them for the
downfall
of the system.
His three orders, the Viceroy argued, were

designed to lessen the burden on the caciques
relieve the mitayos as

,

and to

well."*"^

The reason that Lemos went to such pains to explain

his actions lay with secret instructions that had been

provided to him by the Conde de Penaranda, President of
the Council of the Indies, and Queen Mariana in 1667.

Penaranda had ordered the Viceroy to carry out the
decisions that had been reached in the Council with regard
to Potosi.

Simply put, he was to abolish "pocket Indians,"

to include more provinces under mita obligation, and to

reverse the pattern of deficit spending that had been set
by his predecessors. 14

Queen Mariana had entrusted her

conscience to the Conde de Lemos.

She had ordered him to

ensure the conservation of the Indians by freeing them from
the oppression they suffered at the hands of the colonists.

The Viceroy was therefore responsible for improving silver

production at Potosl, through extension of mita obligation
to more provinces and the elimination of misuse, while at

the same time ending the mistreatment of the mitayos

.

By early 1670, Lemos had decided to put the alleviation
of Indian suffering, in accordance with his orders from the

Queen, before the execution
of his orders from Penaranda.
Like Francisco de la Cruz, the
Viceroy had decided that
the treatment of the Indians by
the azogueros was more
important than Potosl silver.
Lemos- three orders were Cruz'
directives reincarnate,
but the Viceroy was not in Potosi
to answer for their
execution.
Corregidor Oviedo was there, and fearing
the

worst consequences, he refused to implement
the Viceroy's
reforms. He told Lemos that the orders
would bring silver
production to an instant halt, and he reminded
the crown
that Cruz had been killed for trying to do
the same.
in

defense of his inaction, Oviedo argued that
Potosl supported
the entire realm; if it were to survive, a census
and
a

repartimiento were needed.

The Corregidor complained that

the Viceroy was too heavily influenced by legalisms,
and

that he lacked the experience and understanding of mining

that was required to govern Potosl.

He suspended the

Conde de Lemos' three orders, he said, because it was in
the crown's interest that he do

so."""^

•

Oviedo had repeated every tenet of the potosino

position on the mita.

The Viceroy was incensed by his

disobedience and ordered him either to execute the 166 9
directives or resign as Corregidor.

He chided Oviedo for

supporting practices which were clearly illegal.
n^ita

The

contract, Lemos argued, provided only that an Indian

should work and that he receive a daily wage; if he did
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not work then he was not to be paid.

Rezagos de mita and

"pocket Indians" were not part of the
bargain.

The

Viceroy ordered President VSzquez de Velasco
to travel to
Potosl, and once there to implement the
three reforms.
Should the Corregidor try to block their
execution, Lemos
added, then VSzquez was to arrest, suspend
and ship him
to Lima for trial. '^

The Conde de Lemos' direct orders to Oviedo and
to

VSzquez de Velasco suggest an unwavering determination
on
his part.

But the Viceroy was clearly worried about the

repercussions of his actions.

February

7,

He wrote to the crown on

1670 about the contents of an azoguero memorial

that claimed that Potosi would be destroyed by his

directives.

He asked the crown to decide whether his

reforms complied with his secret instructions to guard
the Queen's conscience:
In the secret instructions, and in other despatches
that I have received from Her Majesty, I am told
to unburden the royal conscience by following my
own, and to aid this unfortunate people.
In that
regard, I am proceeding to remedy the many offenses
that they suffer.
If these reforms which I
propose are not appropriate, please tell me what I
must do, so that the tyranny suffered by these
Indians does not weigh upon my conscience. Otherwise
one must justly suppose that the rocks will soon
burst open, with the blood of the Indians flowing
from them. 19

Lemos was still groping for an answer in April of 1670.
He had returned to the possibility of conducting a census

via ecclesiastical channels.

The nominee for the position

of Archbishop of Charcas had
died, and Lemos suggested
that the crown appoint Juan de
Ibarra in his stead. That
would place the Visitador at the head
of the church
hierarchy, and thus in a position to
oversee the census.
The priests would not be told why
they were reporting on
their Indian charges, Lemos said, and
he and Ibarra would
be the only ones who would know what
they were up to. The
costs of a government census would be avoided,
and the

entire process could be completed quickly.

The Viceroy

asked that Ibarra also be named President of
Charcas, and
that he be empowered to appoint Corregidores
de PotosI for
as long as the regeneration of the PotosI
mita required.

The only danger, the Conde added, was that the azogueros

might try to murder Ibarra, as they had Cruz.^°
The Viceroy was attempting to comply with all of his

secret orders

— searching

for some means to end the abuses

pervading the PotosI mita without ending silver production
there.

His letter of April, 1670, threw the matter back

to the Queen and the Council of the Indies.

then,

sent them a number of proposals

alternatives

— from

—a

He had, by

series of

which he hoped they would choose an

appropriate course of action for him to follow.
Meanwhile, what little Lemos had accomplished on his
own was being frustrated by the Corregidor de Potosi.

In

March, 1670, Oviedo finally published the orders that the

Indians were not to work day and night, and that judges

were not to be sent to collect rezagos
from the caciques.
VSzquez de Velasco's insistence that
Lemos' orders be
implemented had forced Oviedo's hand, but
he was still not
beaten. The Corregidor ordered that all
work in the cerro
be halted at sundown, and he informed
the Viceroy that
he

would send no more judges to the provinces
at all, for the
correcjidores had no power to send the Indians
in the mita.
He then complained to the crown that Lemos'
directives

would bring on the demise of Potosl.

His letter to Madrid

was complemented by similar warnings from the
Gremio de

azogueros and the Cabildo de Potosl.^-'"
Lemos accused Oviedo of intentionally misrepresenting
his orders.

He had ordered that no Indian should work both

day and night, not that all work should cease at sundown.
The Viceroy insisted that the Corregidor send judges

against those corregidores who failed to cooperate with
the delivery of mitayos

.

After months of debate, Oviedo

and Lemos agreed that an Indian could work five hours

during the day and another five at night.

By then the

Conde de Lemos had realized that any significant reforms

were impossible as long as Oviedo was Corregidor.
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Abolition?
The problems surrounding a census, the frustrations

that Lemos suffered in his efforts to reform the behavior
of the azogueros and Oviedo's refusal to cooperate with

him led the Viceroy to conclude
that the abolition of the
mita was the only means of ending
the abuses that pervaded
the system.
He had followed the same route to
that
conclusion as President VSzquez de Velasco
had traversed
four years earlier: he had first
tried to reform the
mita; then, realizing that he could
not control the system,
he called for its abolition.
Lemos proposed the abolition of the mita in
a letter
to the crown of July 4, 1670.
His arguments in support
of the measure formed a twenty-one folio
discourse,

including a history of the mita since its formation
by

Francisco de Toledo.

The paper focused on the problems

that had overwhelmed Toledo's original design.

The Conde

said that the provinces were no longer able to support

"

the system, because they had been deserted by the Indians;
a process that had been accelerated by the Marqugs de

Mancera's sales of the Indians' lands during the 1640s.
The decline in the population of the provinces had led to

abuses such as constant service, "pocket Indians" and
rezaqos de mita.
of the caciques

'

Lemos also provided graphic descriptions

mistreatment of the mitayos

,

including

their transport to Potos£ in iron collars, dangling from
the tails of horses.

All previous efforts to reform the

system had failed, he said, because viceregal orders were
ignored by the azogueros and undermined by the corregidores
de Potosi.
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The Viceroy did not question the
legality of the mita
as it had been designed to perform;
he said that it was
unjust in its current form. The system
was also expendable,
he argued, because those azoqueros who
had viable mining
operations at PotosI would survive the abolition
of the
mita, and only those who depended on misuse
would be hurt.
The royal guintos had fallen to fewer than
400,000 pesos

per year, he noted, and thus they no longer
represented the
significant sum that they had once been. Lemos assured
the

Queen, nevertheless, that her decision to abolish the
mita

would be divinely rewarded with discoveries of greater
mineral wealth elsewhere in the Empire.

Indeed, the

Indians who were freed from mita service at PotosI would
then be available to work at San Antonio de Esquilache,
Carangas, Cailloma, Puno and other mining centers that

were just coming into their prime.

Production at those

centers would increase, and royal revenue would rise as
a result.

PotosI

silver industry, meanwhile, would

's

continue to function
it had with mitayos

— albeit

producing less silver than

.

Lemos could only suggest that the crown should abolish
the mita because he did not have the authority to disband
It himself.

25

He probably would not have taken such an

important step on his own in any case, for he went to
great lengths to demonstrate that his proposal had

widespread support in Peru.

The Viceroy included, with his
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letter and discourse of July

4,

1670, the minutes of a

junta that was held on the third, in
which the abolition
of the mita had received the unanimous
endorsement of
government officials and clergy alike.

The Conde also sent the crown the position
papers that
he had asked the religious communities of
Lima to prepare
in anticipation of the July

3

junta.

An example is the

contribution of the Bishop-elect of Concepci6n.

He claimed

that the Indians who were forced to serve in the mita
were

stripped of their liberty, that their assignment to the
mines at PotosI was tantamount to their enslavement, and
that their treatment was abominable.

Mita service in

silver, moreover, was equivalent to the payments that

slaves made to their masters in lieu of personal service.
In sum, the Bishop-elect argued that the Indians were

subjected to a bondage worse than the Hebrews had endured
in Egypt

— the

implication being that they would soon be

delivered from their unjust condition by God if not by the
Queen.
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Juan de Padilla wrote to the crown on July

7,

1670

with additional thoughts on the abolition of the mita.
He noted that the system's negative consequences were

spiritual as well as temporal:

the Indians who served in

the mita were killed or oppressed, but those who escaped

via suicide or flight into "infidel" territory lost their
souls.

Padilla said that the Bishop of Arequipa had
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certified that some 600,000 Indians had
gone to live
outside the area of Spanish colonization,
and he reminded
the Queen that the conquest of Peru
had been justified by
the christianization of the Indians.

From PotosI on July

7

and August

1670, President

9,

VSzquez de Velasco added his name to the list
of those who
were calling for abolition. He reiterated his
arguments
of four years earlier, which Lemos had echoed in
the July

discourse.

4

He asked the crown to accept the advice of its

Viceroy and extinguish the mita.

VSzquez also requested

that he be permitted to leave Potosi.

His position in

favor of abolition was secret, and if it became public

knowledge he would never get out of the villa alive.

While the Conde de Lemos waited for the Queen's
response to his proposal, he vented his anger and his

frustration on Corregidor Oviedo.

Following Ibarra's

counsel that Oviedo was responsible fox everything that

was wrong at Potosl, from low quintos to the failure to

implement his orders, the Viceroy replaced Oviedo with
Diego de Ulloa.

January

29,

1671.

The new Corregidor arrived in PotosI on

Lemos explained to the crown that the

change had been necessary to clear up the misconceptions
that Oviedo had fomented.

Ulloa, he reported, had explained

the true nature of the three reform directives to the

azogueros

,

and now everyone was content.

The Viceroy had

also sent explanatory orders to the provincial corregidores

in the field.

Lemos- three reforms of 1669
received the Council of
the Indies' stamp of approval on
December 31, 1671— two
years after they had been issued. The
Viceroy would never

receive a reply to his call for the
abolition of the mita,
however.
The time lag that was caused by
Trans-Atlantic

correspondence and bureaucratic delays had played
important roles in preventing the realization
of a new

repartimiento de la mita since the 16 30s.

Now they

contributed to saving the mita from abolition.
months after Lemos had sent his July

4

Three

proposal, the

Council was only just responding to his early-1669 letters
on the problems that were preventing the execution of a
census.

It would not debate the question of abolition

until May of 1673.
In October, 1670, the Council considered Juan de

Ibarra's plan for a secret census conducted by priests in
the sixteen mita provinces, and Oviedo's concurrent call
for a thirty-province enumeration done by the correqidores

and the priests.

The Councilors favored the Ibarra plan,

but they left the ultimate decision to Lemos.

He had the

matter at hand, they argued, and he could decide better
than they.

Thus, a cedula of November 7, 1670 instructed

the Viceroy to do as he deemed fit, in conference with the

Audiencia de Lima.
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By the time that the Conde de Lemos answered the

.
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November

7

edict, it was September 18, 1671.

He had sent

his discourse on abolition more than year
earlier.

Viceroy noted that the problems surrounding

The

a census

were

still how many provinces to include, whom to name
to

conduct it, and how to pay them.

He stood by his call

for the abolition of the mita, but should the Council

choose not to follow his suggestion, then Ibarra's plan
was his second choice.

Lemos sent the matter back to

Madrid, and he was still waiting for a reply when he died
on December 6, 1672.
The Council of the Indies began its deliberations on
Lemos' proposal that the mita be abolished in April, 1673.

On the twelfth it decided to hold a consulta on the

question, and on the nineteenth it ordered Relator Andrgs
de Angulo to prepare a relaci6n of the Viceroy's discourse

and all previous correspondence on the mita.

After it had

considered that material in May, the Council voted that
abolition was
decide.

a

matter that only the Queen herself could

In other words, the Council did not want to take

the responsibility for ordering the abolition of the mita

any more than the Conde de Lemos 34
The dilemma of the royal conscience versus the crown's

revenue had been passed from the Queen and Penaranda to
Lemos, then from the Viceroy to the Council, and finally,

from the Council to the Queen.

The Councilors suggested

that a junta be formed, with members of the Council to be

joined by prominent theologians, so that all
sides of the
question would be debated. It noted that the
mita appeared
to have outlived its justification, and
that it was now
more harmful than beneficial
On October
9,

.

1673,

however, the Council abruptly halted the junta's
enquiry.
It then ordered the Conde de Castellar to investigate
the

situation in Peru in his capacity as Lemos' successor.

Castellar was provided with the Angulo relaci6n for his
information, and he was instructed to determine, once in
Peru, what course of action would be best, and then to

report back to the Council.

"^^

The reason for the Council's decision was not included
in its order to Castellar.

The suspension of the enquiry

may have come in response to the news of Lemos' death, but
it probably resulted from the Council's fear of the

possible ramifications of abolition of the mita, and its
inability to determine what was really happening in Peru,
and thus to judge the rationale for abolition.

VSzquez de

Velasco and Lemos had both prefaced their calls for the

abolition of the mita with the impossibility of reform,
and the relatively low levels of crown revenue generated

by the once-rich mines at Potosl.

The validity of their

arguments had been put in doubt by counter proposals and
their own government reports.

Nicolas Matias del Campo y de la Rynaga issued a

work in 1672 entitled Memorial apologetico

,

hist6rico.

:

juridico y politico

'

.

He said that he was responding
to an

anti-mita memorial written by a friar.

The structure of

Campo's Memorial and the issues it
considered, however,
suggest that it was written to counter
the Conde de Lemos
July 4, 1670 discourse. The unidentified
friar may well
have been an invention to protect Campo
from viceregal
retribution, for the work was published in
Lima.^"^

Campo's Memorial was heavily indebted to
Sandoval y
Guzman's Pretensiones of 1634, and it may best
be

characterized as a revision of that earlier work.

Campo

likened Peru to a sick patient, whom the doctors
had
failed to cure because they had applied mere half-measures.
Some physicians (also unidentified) had recently decided,
he said, that the disease

(the abuses caused by the mita)

was incurable and that the infected organ (the PotosI mita)

would have to be removed.

From a list of fifteen offenses

that they blamed on the mita, they had come to these four

conclusions
That the distribution and assignment of
the Indians to work at PotosI was unjust, and
that it was counter to their natural liberty.
I.

That the crown had aggrieved its royal
conscience with the assignment of the Indians to
the mines at PotosI.
II.

That the mita, or repartimiento of the
Indians for the cerro of Potosi, and the offenses
of the azogueros had destroyed and depopulated
the provinces.
III.

,

That it was convenient, and the crown in
defense of its conscience must, abolish and revoke
IV.

the repartimiento of the Indians
to PotosI- and
^^^^ proposal were rejected)
tSat It T^^""^""
that
should assign them to other mining
centers
.

Campo's arguments against each of
these conclusions
sought to ally the interests of the
crown with those of
the azogueros, against those of the
advocates of the mita's
extermination. His first Article maintained
that the crown
had an unquestionable right to order its
vassals to work
for it, and it defended the justness of
the mita

.

The

offenses that were currently plaguing the system,
Campo
argued, were not the fault of the crown or inherent

in the

mita; rather, they were the product of individual
azogueros

malice.

To doubt that the crown had a right to order mita

service, or to question the justness of the system, he
said, was disloyal and an affront to the royal family.

The

individual azogueros who were guilty of wrongdoing should
be punished, but abolition would unjustly penalize the

crown and the meritorious azogueros

O

Q

.

Article II of the Memorial defended the mita against
the charge that it had depopulated the provinces.

Campo

claimed that the priests, the corregidores and the caciques
who advanced that notion were trying to blame the system
for the damage that they had caused.

He admitted that the

mistreatment of mitayos by the azogueros had contributed
to Indian migration, but as he had in Article I, Campo

argued that the system could be reformed; that the abuses

'
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that contributed to Indian flight
could be purged from
the mita without destroying it
altogether
In Article III, Campo called for
the continuation of

the mita in recognition of Potosl's
record of service to
the crown, the azogueros current needs,
and the
'

ill-effects that would come from shifting the
Indians to
other mines. He reiterated, therefore, all
the tenets
of the azogueros' long-standing position in
defense of the

mita save one:

Viceroy Toledo.

that the system was part of their pact with

Perhaps Campo realized that the usefulness

of that argument had been eroded by time and by the
extent
to which the azogueros misused mita service in silver.

He

employed the remainder of their position to the fullest:
the transport of the Indians to other mining centers, he
said, would add to the problems that were caused by Indian

migration; and Potosl would collapse without mita labor.

When Potosi fell, he warned, then Peru would fall; and when
Peru fell, then Spain would fall; and when Spain fell, then

Catholicism would fall; and then the world would be left at
the mercy of the Protestants

1

Finally, in Article IV, Campo took on all fifteen of
the abuses that the mita

their four conclusions.

'

s

enemies had used to construct

He made no effort to deny that

the azogueros had engaged in the mistreatment of the

Indians or in the misuse of the mita, but he argued once

more that any abuses could be eliminated without abolishing

the system.

'^^

Thus, the most important message included
in the Campo

Memorial was that reform was possible.

The second most

important point that it had to make was that PotosI
would
collapse without mita labor. Those arguments were
supported, quite naturally, by the azogueros in their
own

complaints to the crown about Lemos' abolitionism."^^

But

the strongest evidence supporting Campo 's assertions
came

from Lemos himself, and his replacement Corregidor, Diego
de Ulloa.

Their efforts to demonstrate that they were

complying with their orders to end abuse and raise silver

production at Potosi were the cause of this ironic
circumstance.

In 1669,

for example, Oviedo reported to

Lemos that his diligence had raised the number of Indians

working at Potosi to 3,424

— both

mitayos and mingas

.

Lemos

relayed the Corregidor 's report to the Council of the
Indies, with one "minor" alteration:

number of mitayos had reached 3,424

he claimed that the

— an

apparent improvement

of nearly 100 per cent. 44

After Lemos had replaced Oviedo with Ulloa, the new
Corregidor reported, in February of 1672, that he had
raised the production of royal quintos significantly, and
that he had abolished "pocket Indians."

He attributed his

success to his implementation of Lemos' three reform

directives of 1669.

45

Pleased with Ulloa 's progress, the

Viceroy sent the good news on to the crown on April 26,

.
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1672.

46

The Conde de Lemos

•

reports of his actions countered

what he had argued in his July

4

proposal:

a)

that reform

of the mita was impossible and that
abolition was necessary
to end abuses; and b) that production
at PotosI could not
be improved and that the mining center was
on its way out.

The crown clearly appreciated the news
of higher quintos

,

for the Queen sent Oviedo orders on June
10, 1673 to

maintain the high level of silver production that
Diego de
Ulloa had reported.
Oviedo had been returned to office
by virtue of a royal cgdula, which he had been able to

obtain via personal connections in the Council of the
Indies.

48

The Queen's directive to the Corregidor was sent

just two days after the Council had presented her with the

case for the abolition of the mita.

The two issues were

therefore considered by her concurrently
It is even more ironic that Oviedo would later refute

Lemos' claims.

Upon his return to Potosi in April, 1673,

he charged that Ulloa had manipulated production data,

and that silver output had not been as high as he had

reported.

Oviedo said that the apparent rise in quintos

had been derived by Ulloa 's use of 1670 as the base year
for his comparison.

Production had been hindered that year

by a severe drought and an eleven-month production period.
Ore that had been stockpiled during 1670 was later milled
in 1671 and 1672, the two years for which Ulloa claimed

.
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credit.

The carta cuenta for 1671 had included,
moreover,

thirteen months' worth of silver production;
and that for
1672 had contained fifteen months' worth.
The total work
force had actually fallen, Oviedo added, to

2,664 Indians:

1,427 mitayos and 1,217 mingas .^^

The Condessa de Lemos

and Diego de Ulloa defended the integrity of
the late

Viceroy's reports in May, 1673, but by the time their
arguments had arrived in Madrid, the issue of abolition
had already been placed in the hands of the Conde de
Castellar.^"'"

Despite his refutation of Lemos' claims, Oviedo may

have contributed to the Council of the Indies' decision
to postpone any action on the abolition of the mita.

His

reports to the Conde de Lemos and to the Council about the
labor force at Potosi had indicated that the shortage of

Indians was not as bad as the system's detractors had
claimed, and that the mita was functioning better than

they had charged.

His reports differed from those of his

predecessors because he included mingas as well as mitayos

,

and he divided the latter into those who served in person
and those who served in silver (see Table
The figures presented on Table

3

3)

come from one source,

and therefore only tentative conclusions should be drawn

from them.

Oviedo

'

s

combination of the totals for mitayos

and mingas to determine the total work force is especially

questionable, for the money that was sent as mita service in

TABLE

3

MITA SERVICE ACCORDING TO
CORREGIDOR OVIEDO, 1668-1673^^
MITAYOS
IN PERSON

MITAYOS
IN SILVER

TOTAL
MITAYOS

MINGAS

1,424

700-1/2

2,

124-1/2

1,777-1/4

374-3/4

2,

142

1, 282

2, 033

1, 595

1/ 830

1/ 061

1, 427

1, 217

1, 634

1, 404

899

•
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silver was used, at least in part,
to hire mingas.
A
combination of his totals for mingas
and mitayos in person
would probably be a more accurate
indication of the actual
work force, and this would come to a
bit more than his
total for mitayos in 1668 and 1669.
His figures for mingas
were larger than the numbers for mitayos
in silver for

those two years, and this would suggest—to
the historian
and perhaps to the Council of the Indies as
well— that some
mining operations at PotosI were profitable enough
to hire
minaas, and that the azogueros were not as heavily
involved
in "pocket Indians" as their enemies charged.

These suggestions must remain very speculative until

more work can be completed with the quantitative source
materials.

They are offered here because the Council's

decision to halt its consideration of the Conde de Lemos
proposal in 1673 may have been based, in part, on a similar

interpretation of Corregidor Oviedo's reports.
The Campo Memorial, the reports of reform and higher

silver production at PotosI and the azogueros

'

arguments

combined to derail the abolition movement headed by the
Conde de Lemos.

They did not end discussion of the matter

completely, but the element of doubt and confusion that
they created in Madrid caused sufficient hesitation on the

part of the Council of the Indies that it postponed a

decision on the question of abolition until the Conde de

Castellar could report from Peru.
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Viceroys Castellar (1624-1678)
Lin^n ^ Cisneros

(

1678 - 1681

)

The Conde de Castellar assumed office
on August 15,
1674.
The Audiencia de Lima, which had ruled
Peru since
Lemos' death sixteen months earlier, reported
to the new

Viceroy that the mita was as it had been when his
predecessor arrived in 1667.

Lemos' three reform orders

of 1669, it said, had been completely neutralized
by

Corregidor Oviedo. 54
Castellar complied with his orders from the Council of
the Indies and reported on the mita on February 2, 1675.

He said that he had hoped to act quickly and decisively,

but that he had been forced to suspend his efforts when he

was unable to find anyone who would advocate the abolition
of the mita.

The officials who had served on the July

3,

1670 junta now claimed that they had been coerced by the

Conde de Lemos.

Given the circumstances, the Viceroy had

decided that he had better not risk anything novel, and
that he should keep the PotosI silver industry going with

traditional, if imperfect, means

— the

mita

.

The Viceroy was perplexed by the unanimity of opinion
in favor of the mita.

The current regimen of government

officials at PotosI showed uniform support for the system.

Corregidor Oviedo recounted his earlier sentiments for the
crown on November

1,

1674.^^

The new President of Charcas,
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Bartolomg GonzSlez de Poveda, wrote to
Madrid in February,
1677, that he had found the mita, and the
silver industry
in general, to be in a terrible state,
but
that the

azogueros were doing their best to keep the
center in
production. He claimed that they hired as
many mingas as
there were mitayos
.

The Archbishop of Charcas, Melchor LifiSn
y Cisneros,
sent the crown a proposal six days later that called

for

the mita to be returned to the status quo ante.

Lemos'

orders, he said, had cut silver production at PotosI
in
half, but the Indians had not benefited at all

caciques

.

— only

the

The Archbishop suggested, moreover, that the

28,000 Indians who lived in the villa should be included
in the mita, perhaps to work at night while the other

mitayos were resting.

They had no occupation at all at

present, he said, and spent most of their time committing
all manner of sins.

If they did not like the work,

then

they would return to their pueblos, and the provinces

would be repopulated.

58

It seemed to Castellar and to the Council that the

sentiment for the abolition of the mita had simply
evaporated.

Responding to the Viceroy's report of

February, 1675, the crown issued two cgdulas

,

on July

8

November 16, 16 76, ordering that the mita be maintained.
The first order empowered the Viceroy to extend mita

obligation to more provinces, after consultations with

and

1
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President GonzSlez de Poveda.

The second order instructed

Castellar to abolish "pocket Indians,"
in league with the
new Corregidor de PotosI, Pedro Luis
Enrlquez.^^ The
Council of the Indies had dusted off its
dual-fold program
of the 1650s.
Castellar 's dislike for novelties extended
beyond the
question of abolition, however, and like Alba,
Salvatierra,

Santisteban and others, he approached the two-part
program
with great caution. In response to a May 18, 1676
cgdula
which asked his opinion on a proposed pan-Peruvian
,

census

and an alcalde mayor de minas

report that the number of

'

mitayos had fallen to 1,300, Castellar confessed that he
did not like the idea of introducing anything new at
Potosi, no matter what might be happening there.

February 22, 1678, he replied to the July
16,

1676 orders.

8

On

and November

The Viceroy said that all of the

provinces were experiencing a shortage of Indian labor, and
that the Indians who were taken from the fourteen exempted

provinces to work at Potosi would be sorely missed by their
current employers.

He suspended the implementation of the

two cgdulas until he could collect the opinions of Gonzalez
de Poveda, Oviedo and Enriquez about their contents.

6

Oviedo and Enriquez answered Castellar 's request for their
comments on May

1

and June

2,

1678, respectively.

President replied in an inf orme of April 28.

62

The

But by the

time their letters were received in Lima the Conde had been

.
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replaced by

LiMn

y Cisneros, now Archbishop of Lima and

Viceroy of Peru.
The Archbishop brought a unique
background to his
duties as Viceroy. For example, he was
the first

seventeenth century viceroy of Peru to have
personally
visited Potosi. His long experience in Charcas

and his

pro-mita discourses while the Archbishop there,
gave every
indication that he would be more decisive and more
realistic than his predecessors in tackling the
problems

surrounding the system.

On August 24, 1678, LinSn reported

to the crown that he would soon complete his study
of the

various responses to the 1676 cgdulas, and that he would
then proceed as he deemed best.

Attached to his letter

was a long note by the Fiscal supporting the mita and

arguing that it was both legal and just, as long as only

one-seventh of the Indians served at any one time.

The

note referred directly to Nicolas Matlas del Campo's 1672

Memorial
Oviedo and Gonzalez de Poveda both argued for the

extension of mita obligation to more provinces.

Enrlquez

had only recently assumed the office of Corregidor de
Potosi, and he deferred to their years of experience.

Their

arguments were reiterated for the Archbishop-Viceroy by his

Asesor general, Francisco de Valera.

He reduced the matter

to six points, most of which revolved around the now

familiar problems with the execution of

a

census:

who to
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name to conduct it; and how to pay
them.

Following the

lead of Gonzalez de Poveda, Valera
argued that the census
should be conducted in all thirty of
the provinces by
their corregidores and local priests,
to save the cost of
judges' salaries and to complete the
process as quickly as
possible. He also noted that the ten year
exemption from
resettlement would have to be eliminated, and
he advocated
the abolition of mita service in silver.
The number of

mitayos to be included in a new repartimiento would
be

determined by the Corregidor de Potosi and the President
of
Charcas in an in-depth visita of the mills and the cerro.
The required number of Indians would then be drawn from

one-seventh of the Indian population in the sixteen
traditionally obligated provinces and any of the fourteen
that were needed.

In the event that more provinces were

needed, then the villa of Potosi and the provinces of

Yamparaez, Pilaya, Tomina and Chuquiauo would be the first
to be included. 64

Given the Viceroy's philosophical inclination in favor
of the mita, the unanimity of support for the system in

Charcas, and the Council's orders of 1676, it appeared

that the long-promised repartimiento de la mita might

finally come to fruition; but it did not.
time was the Council of the Indies.

The cause this

In response to LinSn's

earlier comments on the mita, the Council sent him

a

series

of position papers on the system on September 13, 1678,
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including the Conde de Lemos' discourse
on abolition.
The
Archbishop was instructed to study them
all, and to obtain
the written opinions of the Audiencia
de Charcas, GonzSlez
de Poveda, Oviedo and Enriquez.^^ The
Council was having
second thoughts about its 1676 orders, and
because the
1678 cgdula superseded those instructions,

LiMn

had to

suspend the implementation of a new repartimiento
until
he could comply with the order.

The azoqueros and the government officials at PotosI

were anxious that LinSn proceed in accordance with the
1676 orders.

President GonzSlez de Poveda complained to

the Council of the Indies on April 11, 1679 that nothing

had been done since he submitted his informe a year
earlier. 6 7

The azogueros reported that the number of

mitayos working at Potosi had fallen to 1,600, and they
said that all the doubts about the feasibility of a

census were ludicrous.

Francisco de Toledo, they noted,

had accomplished the original repartimientos de la mita
all by himself.
In August of 1679 the Archbishop-Viceroy and the Real

Acuerdo decided that Lemos* 1669 reform orders should be
observed until

a

new repartimiento was completed.

LifiSn

also ruled that corregidores should send one-seventh of
the

Indian

f orasteros

population in their provinces, including the
and the yanaconas if the number of originarios

was not sufficient.

The capitanes enteradores were not to
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deliver service in silver, he ordered,
and they were not
to be held responsible for any
more Indians than those
that they received from their
corregidores
LinSn did
not distribute these orders right away,
however, but
submitted them to the Fiscal, the Protector
de naturales,
and Gonzalez de Poveda for their comments.
He then
suspended their execution when he learned,
in April of
.

1680, that he would soon be replaced as Viceroy
by the

Duque de la Palata (1681-1689) .^^
The instruments of bureaucratic delay are by
now

painfully familiar.

The Council of the Indies' wavering

between the abolition of the mita and the reformation of
the system was only the latest manifestation of the
many

pitfalls of administering PotosI from afar.
On April 21, 1679, the crown sent forth a cedula

ordering Bishops and Archbishops to oversee reports on
their jurisdictions by priests in the field.

The cgdula

was not connected in any way with secular government.
Was it the culmination of Juan de Ibarra and the Conde de
Lemos* suggestion that priests conduct a secret census of
the realm in preparation for a new repartimiento ?

As the

Archbishop of Lima, even after Palata arrived in Peru,
LifiSn

would participate in that process.

The possibility

is certainly intriguing, but for lack of further evidence

it must remain just that:

a

possibility.

70

Such was the state of Hapsburg administration of the
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mita when the Viceroy Duque de la Palata
arrived in Peru
in 1681.
While the various echelons of the government
had debated the merits of the mita,
considered its possible
abolition and discussed the form of a new
repartimiento
.

the caciques who made the system work had begun
to fight

back against the mita.
The Caciques
In his letters to the crown of January, April and

July, 1670, the Conde de Lemos identified the caciques as

the key element in the mita , both in its design and its

deterioration.

He noted that he had received many

complaints from them about how they were treated by the
azoqueros

,

and he described the violent methods that they

employed to deliver Indians to Potosi.^"'"
In earlier years, the caciques had responded to the

pressure upon them through flight, suicide and legal
complaints, the last with limited gain.

From 1667 to 1680

they employed the legal machinery of Hapsburg government

with remarkable success.

The caciques

'

petitions and

court challenges not only had an impact on viceregal policy

toward the mita, they also affected the de facto system.
The materials that were included with their legal arguments

also provide further insights into the actual functioning
of the Potosi mita.

Gabriel Fernlndez Guarache

'

s

efforts to ease the burden
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of the mita on himself and other caciques
in Pacajes

influenced the Conde de Lemos and contributed
to the
Viceroy's decision to propose that the mita be
abolished.
In the mid-1660s, Fernandez Guarache petitioned
the

government in Lima to resolve five points.

First, he

again requested that the position of capitgn general
for
Pacajes be eliminated.

Second, he asked that only

one-seventh of the current Indian population in the
sixteen obligated provinces be required to serve each
year.

As the capitSn enterador for Pacajes he had been

unable to deliver more

than 176 Indians in person, and

had been forced to pay for 1,000 fugitives in silver.
Third, Fernandez Guarache argued that the Indians should

receive two weeks of rest for every one that they worked,
and that they should not be forced to work both day and
night.

He said that the mistreatment of mitayos at

Potosi had contributed to the labor shortage there.

It

had disabled many workers, and the stories that returning

mitayos told to the uninitiated caused many of the latter
to flee from their pueblos.

Fourth, the Indians who were

required to serve as meses were now assigned to the mines
and the mills, rather than to the support activities that

they had originally been used in.

Fernandez Guarache said

that they should no longer be required to serve at all.
Finally, he asked that the fines that were levied against
the Indians for missing a day not exceed one day's wages.

I

I

s
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A day's absence was currently met with

a one peso fine,

and thus an Indian who was absent for two days
received

nothing for the week at all.

The mitayos were also fined,

he said, when they failed to meet illegal quotas, and

that too had to be stopped.
The practices that Fernandez Guarache described in

his petition were those that the Conde de Lemos tried to

prohibit with his 1669 reforms, and ultimately with his
call for the abolition of the mita in 1670.

The cacique

'

petition had been sent to the Council of the Indies by
the Audiencia de Lima, and it was discussed by the Council

on June 19, 1668.

A royal order was then sent to the

Viceroy and to the President of Charcas to act against
the illegal practices that Fernandez Guarache had

described.

That edict contributed to the Conde 's "decision

to issue the 1669 reform directives.

The Viceroy borrowed the cacique

prefaced the three reform orders.

73

'

s

logic when he

He said that the mita

had been a solution for the problems of Toledo's day,

but that it had given vent to new difficulties.

The

azogueros had so modified the Toledan system that the de
facto mita no longer bore any resemblance to its original
design.

The Indians had fled from the oppression they

suffered as mitayos

,

and they had left the caciques to bear

the full weight of the mita

week in silver.

— at

seven pesos per Indian per

The Conde de Lemos' July

4

discourse also
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followed this line of thought.

Fernandez Guarache's arguments continued
to influence
the government's approach to the mita
even after Lemos
died.

In August of 1680, for example, the
Council of the

Indies considered his comments on the prospects
for a

general census and for reducciones

.

He maintained that

the execution of reducciones would be an exercise
in

futility, because the provinces that were subjected to

mita service were already completely destroyed.

He noted,

moreover, that the Indians did not have to be compelled to

work in profitable silver mines.

The reason that they

were unwilling to serve at PotosI, Fernandez Guarache
argued, was that the center had ceased being profitable
long ago.

He claimed that only eight of the sixty-eight

mills there were viable operations, and that most of the

azogueros merely collected mita service in silver.

The

majority of the silver refined at Potosl, he added, came
from surrounding mining zones.

75

Gabriel Fernandez Guarache's general portrayal of the
mita is substantiated by the events in Paucarcolla from
1669 to 1673.

The Corregidor of the province, Josef

Ord6nez de Aguila, was a creature of the Conde de Lemos,
and as such he gave unusual attention to his mita duties.

Ordonez was obligated to despatch a contingent of mitayos
at the end of 1669 to serve at Potosi for two years

— the

province's distance from the villa had led to biennial

.
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periods of service for the Indians of
Paucarcolla.

in

October, 0rd6ne2 ordered the caciques
of the province to
prepare lists of those who would serve from
1669

to 1671,

and to make ready for their departure.

The gobernadores

of Puno and Ycho responded that they could
not deliver the

number of Indians that was required of them in
person, and
that their personal resources were no longer adequate
to

meet their obligations in silver.

They asked that they be

allowed to resign their positions.

investigated the gobernadores

'

The Corregidor

claims, found them to be

true, and accepted their resignations."^^

Four years later, Ordonez began his preparations
earlier.

In April, 1673, he reported to the Audiencia de

Charcas that he had jailed the cacique gobernador of

Macari for a number of offenses, including the failure to
carry out his mita responsibilities.

Ger6nimo Cajiamarca,

the Corregidor charged, had run a series of illegal

enterprises and conducted unlawful collections of silver
from the residents of his pueblo, ostensibly to meet their

tribute and mita obligations; the gobernador had then kept
the money for himself.

Ord6nez said that he had imprisoned

Cajiamarca, but that he had posted 200 pesos bail and then

disappeared 77
The despatch of the mitayos took place from Puno in

November, 167 3.

troop to Potosi.

Ord6hez named a Spaniard to accompany the
The gobernador of the pueblo of

—

353

Paucarcolla provided him with five Indians;
a sixth was to
be picked up in Oruro en route to Potosl.
The caciques of
Puno and Ycho could not deliver anyone in
person, but they
entrusted him with 450 and 400 pesos respectively.
They
said that they had collected the money through
the rental
,

of land to forasteros and yanaconas

own property and livestock.

,

and the sale of their

The gobernador of San

Francisco de Tiquillaca provided two Indians in person and
300 pesos in lieu of the usual third from his pueblo.

He

too had raised the money through collections among the

forasteros
person.

.

The cacique of Capachica sent ten Indians in

78

From this limited base of evidence it is apparent that
the exempted Indians

forasteros and yanaconas

entirely free of mita obligation.

— were

not

The rent that they paid

for their lands, and the collections that were demanded of

them, went toward satisfying the mita quota from their

pueblo of residence.

They were, therefore, contributing

to mita service in silver.

The pressure on the caciques to deliver mitayos, in

person and in silver, is nowhere more evident than in
their legal battle with Joseph FernSndez Valencia, the

CapitSn mayor de la mita in Potosl.
a combination of financial,

FernSndez employed

corporal and psychological

pressures to force the caciques to deliver as many mitayos
as they possibly could.

79
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In 1677, the caciques launched
a legal assault on the
CapitSn mayor, en masse. They charged
that when they

arrived in Potosi with their mitayos
they had to pay him
an illegal delivery tax, and that
they were then imprisoned
until other caciques bonded them. The
caciques also
claimed that they were forced to bring
Fernandez Valencia
presents, in kind, from their provinces; that
they had to
lend him their mules whenever he wanted
them;
and that

they had to contribute building materials for
his mining

operation, decorations for his parties and Indians
to

work in his mine.^°

With the able assistance of the Protector de naturales
of Potosi, the caciques argued their case before Corregidor

Luis Antonio de Oviedo.

Fernandez Valencia defended the

bonding of the caciques and his rigorious treatment of them
as being necessary to ensure that they would comply with

their obligations.

He denied that he had required them

to contribute to his personal enterprises.

Oviedo was

sympathetic toward the Capitan mayor's situation, and he

ordered only a minor penalty that would have returned him
to office after a short suspension.

O

1

The caciques and the Protector then launched a second

offensive, through appeals to the Audiencia de Charcas and
the Viceroy.

They added new charges to those that they

had included in their first complaint:

that Fernandez

forcibly sold wine and chicha to the Indians at Guayna each

.

Monday; that he forced the caciques to
come to his home
and bid him good day; that he used physical
and verbal

abuse against them that was not appropriate
for nobles;
that he forced them to work silver ore by hand
while he

held them in his jail; and that he prevented
them from

hearing mass while they were imprisoned.

In the end, the

evidence that the caciques accumulated against Fernandez

Valencia overwhelmed him and the Corregidor.

The Capitin

mayor was heavily fined and permanently stripped of his
office.

Gabriel Fernandez Guarache had influenced the

Viceroy of Peru and the Council of the Indies; the caciques
as a group took on and defeated the immediate object of

their difficulties at Potosl, the Capitan mayor de la
82

mita

As the key pressure point in the mita, the caciques

also had their problems with the Indians.

They were by

no means benevolent toward their charges, and they used

many of the same methods against the Indians that the

Corregidor de Potosl, the Capitan mayor de la mita, and
the azogueros used in dealing with them.

The Indians'

response to oppression, as we have noted many times, was
largely passive:
16 80,

flight from their home provinces.

By

however, some of them had also resorted to violence,

and another apparently sought his revenge through the legal

machinery of the Hapsburg administration.
In 1679, Bartolome Gonzalez, the capitan enterador for
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Toropalca, Yura, Potobamba and Chaqui-all
in the province
of Porco-asked the Audiencia de
Charcas to permit him to
carry a sword and a dagger while he was
performing his
duties as capitSn. GonzSlez provided the
court with

testimony of the problems that he had faced in
1668 with
four Indians who had refused to serve in the
mita.
They
had answered his efforts to include them in a
contingent
of mitayos for Potosi by beating him up on one
occasion

and pelting him with sticks and stones on another.

It is

interesting that the number of witnesses that GonzSlez

brought forward to substantiate his case far outnumbered
his attackers; they did not explain why they had failed to
go to his rescue.

The Audiencia nevertheless acceded to

his request and granted him a license to carry arms to

protect himself.

83

The most compelling case involving the mita during

this period is that of Francisco Sonco Cari versus the

Corregidor de Asangaro, Francisco de Castro.

Sonco Cari

appeared before the Audiencia de Charcas in 1673, claimed
that he was the cacique principal of Asillo, and charged
that Castro was engaged in a number of abuses, including
the misuse of mita labor.

Sonco claimed that Castro had

forced him to buy wine, mules and clothing at inflated
prices; that he had forced other caciques to do the same;
and that he was using mitayos in his pack trains and his

other personal enterprises.

Sonco brought a series of

—
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witnesses before the Audiencia to corroborate
his charges.
The court was sufficiently impressed with
the case against
Castro that it sent a judge to Asangaro to
investigate.^^
The testimony that the judge gathered in the province

was completely at odds with that which supported Sonco
Carl's claims.

Indeed, the caciques and the Indians of

the pueblos of Asangaro and Asillo said that Sonco was
not
a cacique and that he never had been one.

They claimed

that he was a common Indian who had been sent to PotosI in
the mita three or four years earlier.

The other witnesses

who had been involved in the preliminary hearings were

unknown to the residents of the two pueblos.

The judge

ruled, therefore, that the charges against Corregidor

Castro had been fabricated, and the Audiencia stood by his
decision. 85
,

.

.

The Sonco Cari versus Castro case has two possible

explanations:

a)

that the charges were true but that the

Corregidor managed to cover up the affair with pressure
on the Indians and/or bribery of the judge; or
the charges were brought by a vengeful mitayo
is more probable,

.

b)

that

The second

for while the charges may well have been

based on some degree of fact

— such

practices were common

the Corregidor 's ability to control the caciques and the

Indians would have had to have been extraordinary to keep

them quiet.

86

The documentation in the Audiencia

's

files

held nothing to suggest that the judge had been corrupted

.
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by the Corregidor.

if Sonco Cari was a disgruntled

mita^, then the judicial process had been
manipulated,
if not entirely with success, by a
conunon Indian against
a provincial corregidor
.

Summary
Since 1633, the limitations of Hapsburg
administration

had prevented the completion of a new repartimiento
de la
mita.

The time delays that were caused by trans-oceanic

correspondence, the short viceregal terms in office, the
viceroys' reluctance to innovate, the problems confronting
a prerequisite census and the contradictory information

that the government officials at PotosI produced had

combined to postpone the execution of a repartimiento for
decades

While the government had wavered on how best to act,
the gap between the Toledan mita and the de facto system

had grown wider.

Service in silver had become a major

part of mita deliveries, the mistreatment of the caciques
had grown more violent and the provinces had proven

increasingly unable to support the mita.

Finally, in

the mid-1660s. President Vazquez de Velasco had concluded

that the abuses that pervaded the system could not be

prevented, and he had begun to call for the abolition of
the mita.

From 1667 to 1680, the same governmental limitations
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that had prevented the execution of
a new repartimiento
combined to frustrate first the reform
efforts of the
Conde de Lemos and then his call for the
abolition of the
mita.
Indeed, his support for the system's
extermination
was a direct outgrowth of his frustrations
vis-a-vis
reform, and his realization that he could not
otherwise

alter the status quo at Potosi and alleviate the
suffering
of the Indians who were serving in the mita.

Lemos' proposal for the abolition of the mita, like

Toledo's decision to establish the system a century
before, drew upon existing opinions and responded to the

condition of Peru as he found it.

The Conde

's

reform

package was drafted by Juan de Ibarra, and his July

4,

1670 discourse borrowed heavily from the arguments of

VSzquez de Velasco and Fernandez Guarache.

A generation

of anti- mi ta sentiments came to a climax during his

viceroyalty.

Lemos may have been unusually receptive

to those sentiments because of Queen Mariana's concern

for her conscience, but he was the vehicle of the abolition

movement, not the source of it.

Juan de Ibarra played an important role throughout the
period, from his proposal for the use of ecclesiastical

channels to conduct a census to his support for the three
reforms that Lemos ordered in 1669.

He and the Viceroy

looked upon the mita as a legal and a moral problem, quite

apart from the realities of silver production.

The reforms
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that they championed were those that
Francisco de la Cruz
had died for ten years earlier. Corregidor
Luis Antonio
de Oviedo was faced with the realities
of the mita full
square, and he was mindful of what had
happened the last
time that reforms were attempted at Potosi.
He was

therefore reluctant to comply with the Viceroy's
directives.

The struggle that ensued between Oviedo and

Lemos over the 1669 reforms was between what could and

what should be done; between potosino realities and limeno
plans; and between the de facto mita and the viceregal

position that the Toledan system was still viable.
The proposal to abolish the mita was an act of last

resort

—a

response to the impossibility of implementing

reforms at PotosI, and to the falling levels of silver

production there.

Like his predecessors, the Conde de

Lemos was disinclined to take action of major proportions

without first, obtaining the consent of the crown and the
Council of the Indies.

He proposed that the mita be

abolished; he did not disband it himself.

The Council

sought to evade the responsibility for such a crucial

decision by leaving it to the Queen alone.

Its reluctance

stemmed from Spain's need for revenue, which complicated
the question of the mita

'

s

justness.

The downfall of the abolition proposal lay with the

arguments upon which it was based:

that reform of the

system was impossible and that Potosi was no longer an
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important producer of silver.

Those points were countered

by NicolSs Matlas del Campo in his
Memorial and by the
azogueros in their correspondence with
Madrid.
Lemos own
reports that guintos were higher and that
abuses were
being eliminated by Diego de Ulloa confirmed
what the
'

enemies of abolition argued:

that reform was possible

and that production could be increased at
Potosi.

The

Viceroy's desire to prove that he was a good
administrator

compromised his call for the alleviation of the Indians'
suffering via the abolition of the mita.
Once the abolition proposal had been put to one side,
the Council of the Indies issued a series of resolutions.

First, it repeated its earlier call for both a new

repartimiento and the abolition of "pocket Indians."

Then,

after Archbishop-Viceroy Linan had begun to implement those
those orders, the Council asked him to reconsider his

earlier position in support of the mita, and the Conde de
Lemos' proposal for the abolition of the system.

It is

also possible that the Council then undertook to complete
a census through ecclesiastical channels, as Juan de

Ibarra had suggested.

The vacillation at the Council's

level clearly prohibited Lihan from pushing forward with
a new census and repartimiento

,

when viceregal resistance

to that process had been eliminated for the first time

since the 1640s.

Almost lost in the question of the abolition of the
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mita is the role of the caciques

,

both in the formation

of government policy and in the
de facto system.
Long
the key element in the mita-caught
between the system as
it had been designed and as it
actually worked— the

caciques now fought back against their
deteriorating

condition with petitions to the government
and with court
challenges. Gabriel Fernandez Guarache s arguments
•

of the

mid-1660s played an important part in the development
of
Lemos' reform directives, and in his subsequent
call for

the abolition of the mita.

The capitanes enteradores, as

a group, defeated the CapitSn mayor de la mita,
Joseph

Fernandez Valencia.
Lest we come to pity them too much, because their

access to the legal machinery was greater than that of

common Indians, we must bear in mind that the caciques

'

treatment of the Indians was a mirror reflection of their
treatment by the azogueros and the government officials at
Potosi.

Rather than absorbing all of the increased

pressure on them, the caciques diffused that pressure
downward onto the Indians.

They developed, for example,

a number of methods for collecting money from yanaconas

forasteros

,

,

widows and others, through land rentals and

forced donations.

Those Indians, who were legally exempted

from mita service, nevertheless contributed to the service
in silver deliveries from the pueblos where they lived.
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Notes for Chapter VI
For the Audiencia de Lima's "Relaci6n,"
and
chapter 38 in particular, see note 6, Chapter
V.
For
the Conde de Lemos' response to the Audiencia
's
Relaci6n," see note 2, below.
1.

El Conde de Lemos da cuenta a S.M. del estado
2.
que hall6 el reino del Peru cuando entr6 a gobernarle en
y
el remedio que ha comenzado a poner en las
materias mSs
prmcipales de su gobierno," 4. III. 1668, Los virrey es (ed
by Hanke and Rodriguez), Pert! IV (no. 283), 271-273
(from*
the manuscripts in the Archive de la Casa de Alba,
Madrid,
Caja 263-9; and AGI Lima 67); the quote is on page 272.
Lemos' response to chapter 38 of the Audiencia 's "Relaci6n"
Uee note 6, Chapter V) is AGI, Charcas 267, no. 54B,
"Copia del Cap.o 38 de las adbertencias que hico el Virrey
Conde de Lemos a la R.on del estado de las Prov.as del
Peru que le entrego la Au.a de lima del Tpo. que las avia
governado por falta de Virrey=," sin fecha, 2 fs. The
complete response is also included in Los virreyes Peru
IV, 251-271; it is entitled "Advertencias que hace el
Conde de Lemos a la relacion del estado del reino que le
entreg6 la real Audiencia de Lima
"
(from AGI, Lima
466), and dated "c. 1668."
,

,

,

"3.

In addition to AGI, Charcas 267, no. 54B (see note
2), see Zavala, Servicio personal
II, 148-149, for a
discussion of Ibarra's "Informe." For more on the problems
surrounding a census, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 8, the Conde
de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 13.1.1670, 3 fs.; "Refiere
las dificultades que se ofrecieron en tpo del conde de
Alva de Aliste cerca de la numeracion y repartimiento gen.-'de los yndios de mita de Potosi y la que de nuevo se
ofrece Ynsistiendo en lo mismo que Represento a VMg.'^ en
el numerS 38 de las advertencias que hico a la Relacion del
estado del Reino q.e le entrego la R^ Audiencia." See note
2 for Lemos' "Advertencias."
,

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 56, the Conde de Lemos to
the crown, Lima, 26.1.1669, 1 f.; "Da quenta de la forma
y modo, con que se puede ajustar la mita de Potosi,
remitiendose al Num.o 38 de las advertencias de la
Relaz,on del estado del Reino." See note 2 for Lemos'
4.

"Advertencias."
AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 56C and 56D (56D is the
envelope)
Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo to the crown.
5.

,

"
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"^^P^^^^nta que el descaecimto ^e
aauel^Cer;n-i'^'' '
ricos ni In. OS ni de qe los
Acogueros tengan mas de un
ingenio porqe de otro modo cesa?ian
en la^lavo? de toSos
ni tampoco es la causa los In.os
^ue llam;,n
el'dinlro
P-^-"
Zt/'^.
quedandose con el los enteradores. Y qie ?mportfn
las JusticLs v Curas
Travajando iL'q!"
s?rven%r^rS??/"""
sin ningun Intermedio de tpo para
su
descanc^n
n ? g^e no abia reducido
descanso p.r
la mayor p. te de los aue
" ^^^^'^^ ^
^^^^^^^ que se
rep^???m tS ^'!'"
convendra qe dejando reducidos los In.os
Yanaconas qe no mitan y son los de Potosi
mas de 17 S)
^^""^
apliguen
a la Mita y-despues
IZ
^f"^^^
se haga dho repartim^to
entre todas las treynta Prov.ls
^^"^
puntos de tanta conss.on a
^iputados de los Acogueros a comunicarlos con
tf^v^tL
el
Virrey y le a escrito s.e ello para qe provea
lo conv.te
de quien lo espera por su buen zelo."
AGI, Charcas 267,
^^""^^ orders which accompanied the
^Uo''^letter.
tJ^^ Their
B.X.1668
cover reads:
"Por estos autos
consta de los Indies de cedulaz
y mingas que havia
Ingenios del Zerro, Los que alquilaban o, mingaban en los
los
azogueros, y Como los metales salen y se sacan de muy
baxa
ley que es todo lo que toca el Correxidor en su
carta de
arriba.
'

•

hLf

For information on the altercations at Puno, AGI,
Charcas 26 7, no. 55, President VSzquez de Velasco to the
crown, 29. XII. 1668, 2 f s
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4, the
Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 6. XII. 166 9, 5 fs.,
"Da quenta de lo que, a, proveydo y resuelto en orden al
alivio de los Indies, y pondera la tirania
y opresion con
que usan dellos los Mineros de Potosi intentando
por este
medio acavarlos de alquiler en conveniencia suya, y no de
la R haz,da y i^s oras que, S, senalado para tratar de
su conservacion, y desagravio por ser materia en que se
deve poner la mayor atencion.
In his letter, VSzquez de
Velasco suggests that Lemos come to Potosi and personally
conduct a visita that suggestion was not followed. For
more from the Viceroy, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 16, the
Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 4. VII. 16 70, 3 fs.;
"Representa las extorssiones de los Yndios en las mitas
forcadas de minas especialm.te en la de Potossi y quan
aresgada esta La conciencia r1 si no se executa el nuebo
medio que propone y que lo a Comunicado con los prelados
y personas mas doctas de la Ciudad que son del mismo
sentir como consta de los recuados que acompanan esta."
6.

.

;

;

7,

Oviedo's opposition is noted in Zavala, Servicio

.

.
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^t\^r.i''^^\'^''^

^ escripto Luis Ant.o de

ob^ko cirrLor

-----

^sL":^i:"-'T^"'^'---^
''^^^^

t° ^he crown,
1670 S""?^'•n''^ quenta de
^
la resoluzion que,
'
^ t^n.:^'
t
a
tornado sobre
que a los Indies que enteran la mita
de
Capitanes Gene?ales no les obUgue el
or a, ''T^
Corrla'cH
Correg
enterar por muertos y ausentes,
y remite
copia del auto que sobre esto mando
publicar, y de la
carta q.e escrivio al correg. or de
Potosi"; this letter
IS discussed by Ronald Escobedo
Mansilla, El tribute
indigena en el Peru siglos XVI-XVII)
(PamiToHTl
Ediciones Universidad de Navarra"rT979)
88-89 (from AGI,
a
copy).
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 10,
l:^'^^J^--^PP^^^^tlY
the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima,
3. II. 1670, 2 fs.,
is a follow-up letter explaining that he
had also ordered
that caciques were not to be punished under any
circumstances, unless the azoqueros could prove that
they had
hurt by the caciques actions. See, also, Zavala, been
Servi^ personal, II, 149; Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos.
""^^^
Chapter II), 22; and Ezquerra
^t\<
^o?":.^^
Abadia, 489-490, note 9bis.
In AGI, Charcas 268, no. 4
(see note 6) , Lemos says that he reached his
decision in
conference with Ibarra; he repeats that fact in AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 5 (see above)

L?m;

?2

I

(

,

'

AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 6A, the Conde de Lemos to
Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo, Lima, 3. XII. 1669, 2
fs.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 7A, the Conde de Lemos to
Corregidor Luis Antonio de Oviedo, 3. XII. 1669, If.,
respectively (both are copies). See, also, AGI, Charcas
26 8, no. 6, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 12.1.
1670, 1 f., "Que combendra se sirva Vmg.^ de despachar
cedula para que los mineros de Potosi no puedan obligar a
los yndios a que trabajen continuamente de dia y de noche
y remite copia de la carta que en esta Racon escrivio el
correg. or de aquella Villa"; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 7,
the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 12.1.1670, 1 f.,
"Que combendra despache Vmg.d cedula para que los corre
~
gidores de Potosi y Governadores de Guancavelica no
embien Jueces para enterar las mitas de anos atrasados
sino para el entero de cada mita pues tiene facultad para
ellos." Ezquerra Abadia, 489-490, note 9bis, says that
Lemos first ordered that Indians were not to work day and
night on 26 .VIII 1668
According to AGI, Charcas 268, no.
9.

.

.
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10.

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 6A (see
note 9).

11.

Ibid.; and AGI

,

Charcas 268, no.

(see note 6).

4

^ (^^^
An order
6)of ll'xTT^h^?'^''''^^/tt'
banned
the
payment
of
tribute
for dead or
;
absent JIndians;
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 9A, copy of
an o?der
20 XII. 1669, 1 f/ Zagala^ ServiciS
^?4^""°^'
persona?°^?T
Egisonal,
li, 148, says that the 20.
that the entero de la mita was to be XII. 1669 order decreed
determined according
revisita, but my notes refer to taxes
alone
r°
Crespo, uf^
"La 'Mita,'" 181, notes all of this in
passing!'

^

/^"^ comments on the census, and that Oviedo had
a government census in a letter of
4 X. 1669,
Ar?
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 8 (see note
3).
AGI Charcas 268
"^^^^^
8 and 9) all requested that
^^S^'i
t' sent ^ ^^^^
be
to
confirm
his orders of November and
g^^^^f^
December,
n-r^o"!"^:

.

,

'

1669.

"Instrucciones secretas del Conde de Penaranda,
Presidente del Consejo de Indias, al Conde de Lemos,"
sin fecha (c. 1667)
Los virreyes (ed. by Hanke and
Rodriguez)
PerQ IV (no. 283), 246 (from the manuscript
the Archive de la Casa de Alba, Madrid, Lemos
C. 263-1).
14

,

m

The Conde de Lemos refers to the Queen's
instructions in his 4. VII. 1670 discourse on abolition of
the mita (see note 76, Chapter II); and in AGI,
Charcas
268, no. 11, the Conde de Lemos to the crown, Lima, 7. II.
1670, 2 fs., "Da quenta de vn memorial que presento el
Procurador del Gremio de Azogueros de Potosi diciendo se
perdia aquella Villa si se ponia en execucion lo ordenado
en alivio de los Yn.os de mita, Y supp.ca a VMg.d se
sirva de embiar la resolucion de lo que en este punto
hubiere de executar, y que en el ynterian hara se cumpla
lo resuelto en los puntos que expresa."
15.

16.
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7) includes a
letter from Oviedo to Lemos of 6.1.1670 which warns the
Viceroy that his orders will destroy Potosi; for Oviedo 's
correspondence with the crown, AGI, Charcas 267, nos. 58
and 58A (58A is the envelope)
Luis Antonio de Oviedo y
Herrera to the crown, Potosi, 12. III. 1670, 3 fs. Because
the Corregidor was aware that his opposition to Lemos
might get him into trouble with the Council of the Indies
he asked a friend a secretary of the Council to make
,

—

—
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certain that his arguments received
their due- apt
267, no. 59, Corregidor Oviedo
y Herr;ra
^^S^^^f
Gabrxel de Quires, Potosi, 12 Ill
1670
I
TdeLrmined
what position Quiros held by referring
to Ernst SchSfeJ
Conseco Real y Supremo de las indiL:
orqanizaci6n y labor adminlitFiti^^j-h^i-. Su histor^a
li terminac i6n
.^^^tria (2 vols.; SevilllT- llc uela
de
itMi§?fil^
Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1935-1947)
I
37n
n,Ho^„
included, with his letter
Quiros, aA inallof ?he
^° "^"^^t" his Lse (A§I,
?h??^L
Charcas f«7^^
267, no. 59A, If.).
.

.

,

^

n

'

Charcas 268, no. lOA, "Copia de Carta qe
e1
rnnHl*^/?^'
Conde de lemos Virrey del Peru escrivio
a D Luis Anto de
obiedo Corregr de Potossi," 33. II. 1670, 3
fs.

^^^^^^^ 268, no. lOB, the Conde de Lemos to
Pr-^lh.r.t%k
President
VSzquez de Velasco, 3. II. 1670, 2 fs. (a copy)
Both this order and AGI Charcas 268, no. lOA
(see note
17)
were products of deliberations which included
Ibarra
as a participant.
,

,

19.

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 11 (see note 15).

AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 14, the Conde de Lemos to the
crown, Lima, 7. IV. 1670, 4 fs.; "Refiere el Vnico medio qe
se ofrece para conseguir el apuntamto general de la
mita de
Potossi con ocassn de la muerte de D Berndo de Ycaguirre
obpo de Cuzco." President VSzquez de Velasco was to be
kicked upstairs to the Council of the Indies; Lemos did not
worry about what would happen to the Corregidor.
20.

Corregidor Oviedo's report that he had implemented
the orders was dated 10. III. 16 70 and included in AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7).
Zavala, Servicio
personal II, 149, says the orders were promulgated on
9. III. 1670.
Supporting letters are: AGI, Charcas 268,
no. 13, the Gremio de azogueros to the crown, Potosi,
19. III. 1670, 3 fs.; and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 12, the
Villa de Potosi to the crown, Potosi, 15. III. 1670, 1 f.
21.

,

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21A (see note 7).
The
Corregidor 's proposal came in a letter of 6. VI. 1670, and
the Viceroy's consent reluctant consent came on 8. VII.
1670.
Lemos may well have surrendered the battle because
he had already proposed, in his 4. VII. 1670 discourse (AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 15 see note 76, Chapter II), that the
mita be abolished.
22.

—

—

—

23.

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15

(see note 76, Chapter II)

.
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24.

See the sources cited in note
23.

President Vazquez de Velasco in AGI,
Charc^s Ten^'^'ln^ 9^
crown, 9. VIII. 16 70, 2 fs.; "Pondera
que padecen los Inos de la mita de las qrandes Veiazes
Potoli y lo que conv e
se quite sm envargo de haverse
discurrido en el m.S'^Se*
Cellos (pues no tiene nunca efe^to?
ion,r?r
como lo propone el Virrey c&e de lemos
lo escrivio a su
antecesor el c.de de santistevan en la y
carta de qe'remi?e
^harcas 268, no. 15 (see
nn^o^;^
^t""^^ II)
^f^^is °^
note 76, '^nt
Chapter
an "Indice de los
q.e la
aconpanan el Informe y relacion q.e hace elRecaudos
Exmo sr conde
de Lemos Virrey del Peru a su Mag.d en el
r1 Conss.o de
las Indias
and the items listed are included as AGI,
Charcas 26 8, nos 15A to 15 J:
ISA.
"Papel del s^ Conde de santistevan escrito
Visittor d. Alvaro de Ybarra y Su
and
respuesta sobre si se devia mandar q.e los
15B.
Indies de la mita de Potosi se enterasen en
platta y no en persona por escusar la
diminucion de las Prov.s y la vejacion
molestia q® padecen en sus personas," 1 y and
4 fs., respectively (see note 56, Chapter V).
15C.
"Parecer de la Junta de desagravios en que
concurrio el s^ ArzobpO d. po de Villagomez
en conform. a de cedula de su Magd," i f.
15D.
"Parecer del sehor obpo. electo de la concept,"
'

;

.

2

15E.

fs

"Parecer de la religion de
Domingo," 2
(see note 56, Chapter V).
"Parecer de la religion de sn fran<^°," 2 fs.
"Parecer de la religion de sn Agustin," 2 fs.
"Parecer de la religion de la mrd," 2 fs.
"Parecer de la Religion de la comp^," 2 fs.
"Parecer del cavildo eclesiastico de Lima,"
fs.

.

15F.
15G.
15H.
151.
15 J.

•

2

fs.

Pareceres jurldicos (ed. by Vargas Ugarte)
154, is a
transcription of the Jesuit contribution (no. 151)
For
more on the 3. VII. 1670 junta, Zavala, Servicio personal
II, 149-150.
Angulo (AGI, Charcas 268, no. 36 see note
58, Chapter II), 7-8, discusses these supporting papers.
,

.

—

,

.

*

•
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27.

AGl, Charcas 268, no. 15D (see
note 26)

28.
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 18, Juan
crown, Lima, 7.VII.1670, 1 f.; "Afiade de Padilla to the
algunas conss?es^
conformarse con la proposs.n que haze
el vL?ev a7n r""^ ^'''^^
Mita de Potossi quando
?•
^Ll
concurrio en la Junta qe cerca desto tuvo
Padilla was Alcalde del Crimen. Kubler, el Virrey"
the yuncjas were habitable for the Indians 347-350, says
because of the
introduction of European crops and livestock.
Crespo,
Reclutamiento," 4 74, discusses desertion of the
obligated provinces by Indians fleeing from the sixteen
mita and
other obligations.

^

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 17, President VSzquez
de
Velasco to the crown, 7. VII. 1670, 2 fs.; "En que
da q.ta
de lo obrado En el despacho de armda de este
ano de 670.
Y que se haga la numeracion de yndios para la
mita De
Potosi." Actually, the 7. VII. 1670 letter proposes
either
abolition or the completion of a new repartimiento based
on a census.
In AGI, Charcas 268, no. 20 (see note 25),
written two days later, VSzquez de Velasco drops the
alternative and supports abolition fully. Ezquerra
Abadia, 489-490, note 9bis, says VSzquez de Velasco went
to Potosi on the orders of Lemos, and supported abolition
on the basis of what he witnesses there.
In his 7. VII.
1670 letter, the President says that the azogueros were so
upset with the reform directives of the Conde de Lemos
that they threatened to stop payment for mercury and halt
production. His personal intervention, he claimed, had
kept the silver center from collapsing; he did not explain
how he had accomplished that feat.
29.

—

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 21, the Conde de Lemos to the
crown, Los Reyes, 14 .VIII 1670 2 fs.; "Remite a V Mg.<^
relaci6n de las cartas que a escripto el Correg.^ de Potosi
tocantes a la Mita y de las ordenes que se le an dado en
alivio de los Indies con el parecer y motives que an
ocasionado a hacerle comparecer en esta Ciudad." The
"relaciSn," as noted in note 7, is AGI, Charcas 268, no.
21A.
Ibarra's suggestion that Lemos replace Oviedo is AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 21B, 1 f.; in the margin is a note that
reads:
"Hagase como parece al s^ Visitador D Alvaro de
Ybarra para cuio efecto se despachen los ordenes necesa
rios.
Lima 15 de Agosto de 16 70 " ; it carries the rubric
of the Conde de Lemos.
30.

.

,

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 23, the Council of the
Indies to the Conde de Lemos, Madrid, 7. XI. 16 70, 2 fs.;
"Respuesta al Virrey del Peru
lo tocante al repartimto
31.
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2lB'and%Rr

""^^^

Potossi."

AGI

,

Charcas 268, nos

.

25A

pertenecientes a la mita de el Potosi, para
que saaue en
resumen vna Relacion de todas las razones
y parece?es qS
^
se han dado para que se cese la
mita de el Potosi
resoluciones qe ha avido sre ello, para
que con dAa
relacion se pase a hacer la Consta acordada
en 12 de este
268,
^^^^^^^
"Hos! 33A
and 33B
33^3
B ""^h'^^"
(33B
is the envelope), 3 fs., "Decreto de
la
Conss.ta que se a de hazer tocante a la
mita de Potossi
El mismo dia se puso otro pa qe p Andres
de Ang.lo haga
r.on de todos los pap.s pa formar
esta consta que esta de
ntro.
The relaci6n by Andrgs de Angulo is AGI,
Charcas
zbH, no. 36 (see note 58, Chapter II).
'

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 23 (see note 31); and
AGI,
Charcas 268, nos. 25A, 25B and 25C (see note 31).
32.

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 24, the Conde de Lemos to
the crown, Lima, 18. IX. 1671, 2 fs., "Responde a la
cedula
de V Mg.d de 7 de Novyre de 670 sobre lo tocante al
repartimto General de la mita de Potossi, haviendo lo
comunicado con el Acuerdo de la Aud.a" agi, Charcas 268,
no. 25, is a 1 f. list of papers sent with the 18. IX.
1671
letter.
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 26, is a draft of the
letter that the Council of the Indies sent to Queen
Mariana relating the contents of the 7. XI. 1670 cedula and
Lemos' response of 18 IX 1671~it is incompleted AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 35, is another draft of the Council's
letter; and the final draft is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 37,
the Council of the Indies to the Queen, Madrid, 8. VI. 1673,
21 fs., "Da q.ta a V Mg,d de lo qe ha escrito El Virrey
del Peru y pareceres qe a remitido de difertes minos
y
comunidades de aquel ReyO, proponiendo se quiten las mitas
forcadas de Inos y en partr la de Potosi, reduziendolas a
se travagen las minas con Voluntos para evitar los
q
agravios q^ se les hazen
El conss° es de parezer qe para poder tomar resson en mat^
tan grave, se sirva V Mgd de mandar formar Vna junta de
los Mnos del, y de los Theologos qe el Presste nombrare y
con lo qe se discurriere en Ella sobre este negO en ambas
facultades se conss^e a V Mg.d lo qe se offreziere."
Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B see note 58,
Chapter II), 24, is mistaken in saying that Lemos died on
6. XII. 1671.
33.

.

.

—

"
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AGI, Charcas 268, nos 3^
'^^a
and
31);
AGI, Charcas 268, n:;/26,'3t; and 37^
34.

'

35.

AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 26, 35, and
37

/

(i^ nS?e^

(see note 33).

^^^^^^s 268, no. 41, is the Council of the
Tn^?^*.
°' 9.x. 1673, 1 f.; "Escribase al sr vLrey
JSndrl
Conde de r"^"^"??
Castellar enviandole reion hecha por
Reior n
Andres de Angulo de lo qe en diferentes tiemposel
se ha
escrito sre quitar la mita forzada de el
Potosi, diciendole
que tmiendolo presente infe lo qe en
esta mata se ?e
offreciere qe puede ser de el mayOr servO de S. Mgd
y bien
de aquellos naturales Y por ahora se
suspenda a la Consta
qe estaba acordada cerca
desto" (rubricado)
AGI, Charcas
two
drafts
(no. 43 is the final)
^^.f?^
ott lu^'^'f.'
the Council's
orders for Castellar, Madrid, 9. X. 1673
If. each. The Council's end-of -century summary (AGI, '
Charcas 273, no. 21— see note 91, Chapter II) said
the
order was dated 9. XII. 1673. It was once thought
that the
Conde de Lemos had obtained a temporary suspension
of the
Potosi mita:
"Viceroy Luis de Velasco complained in 1597
that the greatest difficulty in the mines was the
lack of Indian laborers on account of the constant
opposition of ecclesiastics and lawyers. At one
time in the second half of the seventeenth century
Viceroy Conde de Lemos, a great friend of the Indians
who carried on the Las Casas tradition, actually was
able to obtain a temporary prohibition of the mita
(Lewis Hanke, The Imperial City of Potosi, 25-26) ',Tut
the mita was not suspended.
'

.

.

See note 29, Chapter II, for the first citation of
Campo y de la Rynaga s Memorial.
It was addressed to Dr.
Diego Hernandez de Cardona y C6rdova, Marques de SantillSn
(Schafer, I, 36 3, says the Marques de SantillSn was a
member of the Council of the Indies between 17. XI. 1671 and
1695)
and therefore sent directly to the Council of the
Indies for consideration.
Zavala, Servicio personal II,
150, notes the existence of Campo 's work, but did not use
37.

'

,

,

it.
38.

Campo y de la Rynaga, 4-5.

39.

Ibid

.

,

9-52.

Ibid
53-92.
Actually, each Article is paginated
individually; the running pagination used in these notes
is that in pencil on the copy in Sucre.
40.

.

,
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41.

Ibid

42.

Ibid ., 161-221.

.

,

93-160.

Charcas 268, no. 19, the Deputies
of the
rr-J?;
Gremio de azogueros to the crown,
PotosI, 8. VII?. 1670,
44

Oviedo's breakdown of the Potosi work
force
'''' -s. 56C and 560^ s^I note
IT'^-tl jSnL^^de^^^^^f mis-representation is
AGI,. Charcas
267
^b/, no.
nS 57,
5? thf
the rnT^I
Conde de Lemos to the crown, 18. III. 1669
If.; a testimonio was included (AGI, Charcas
257, no. 57A,
^^^^ °f Indians in 1669
1?^^^.''°'"?^''^^
tha? in 1668.
to that
Zavala, Servicio personal. li, 149
follows Guillermo Lohmann Villena's lead and
states that
3,424 (Guillermo Lohmann Villena,
p?%n;^;S^5
T
El
Conde de Lemos
virrey del PerQ (Madrid, 1946))
Ezquerra Abadia, 489-490, H^e^bls, discusses
the'role of
production in a government official's reputation.

m

,

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 28, Corregidor Diego de
Ulloa Pereyra to the crown, Potosi, 4. II. 1672, 2
fs.
AGI,
Charcas 268, no. 28A is his testimonio showing an
qumtos of 12,374 pesos from 1670 to 1671, 1 f. increase
AGI,
Charcas 26 8, no. 29, is a cover sheet for both pieces.
AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 31 and 32 (32 is the envelope),
Corregidor Diego de Ulloa Pereyra to the crown, Potosi,
20. V. 1673, 4 fs. repeated his earlier claims two
years
later.
An interesting sideline to Ulloa 's activities in
Potosi is the effort of Escrivano Juan de Torres Domlnguez
to get paid for the extra duties he was assigned under the
new magistrate: BNB, CPLA 30, fs. 69V-72v, "Testimonio
de las diligencias seguidas ante el virrey de Lima y este
cabildo de Potosi por Juan de Torres Domlnguez, escribano
de gl, para que se le reconozcan, de penas de camara
y
gastos de justicia, 400 pesos por su asistencia de todos
los lunes en la manana al sitio de Guayna al entero de los
indios de mita," Potosi, 1677 (MC 1012; MOM 663); Torres'
efforts were apparently insufficient, for he was still
looking for recompense in 1686, ANB, M 146, "Diligencias
hechas ante la audiencia de Charcas por Juan de Torres
Domlnguez, escribano del cabildo de Potosi, para que
conforme a provisi6n vicerreal se le asigne un salario por
su asistencia de los lunes en el sitio de Huayna al entero
de la mita del Cerro," 1686, 28 fs. (the fifth through the
sixteenth repeat the information in BNB, CPLA 30, fs. 69v72v) (MC 1071a; MOM 679).
45.

m

46.

AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 30, the Conde de Lemos to

.
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the crown Lima 26 TV if^io
i
^
certificacion
del aumto'que hkn tellko II'
PotlkL
lTlt
aiio de 1671 mediante
el c^pl?™?^'
dalo'a
ordenes
° ^ ?o,'n
del Govierno D Diecrn H*:^ mi^I
"^uien
nombro
^
por
Correg.or
de aauella viii*. "^mu
certification is AGI, Charcas 268,
no. sSf ? f
ll i.^^!
^^^^^^^^1 to AGI Charcas 268, no.
2Bk (see iot;'45f.
,

,

f

•

,

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 45A, a
c^dula of 10 VI 167-^
sent to Corregidor Luis Antonio dL
Oviid^ Herrerl by the
Of a favorable letter Lortll^oLT"
ae Lemos , "dLdo!''
dandole noticia ... del aumento que
tuvieron
^^^^1 offizTo
mi""'
^^^^^
?en^a en ll'Tuyl ^Tl'.^''^'''^ ^"^'^
47.

dHe^or
D^eaHf

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38, the Audiencia
de Lima to
17.VI.1673, 1 f.; "Remite la carta que
tuhn del
H°r'correg.or ^e Potossi D. Luis
tubo
Antonio de Obiedo en
que dio quenta del estado de aquellas
minas, con testim.o
de la Vissita g.l q.e hico del cerro e
ingenios." The
copy of the letter is AGI, Charcas 268,
no. 38A, "Copia
de Carta de D luis Ant.o de obiedo
y Herrera Correg.or ^e
Potosi," 26.V.1673, 3 fs.; the statistical results
of his
visita are AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38B, 22. IV.
1673, 2 fs.
Oviedo s return to office is noted, as well, in
the
Audiencia de Lima's "Relaci6n de la audiencia de Lima
a su
sucesor el Conde de Castellar," 1. VIII. 1674, Los
virreyes
(ed. by Hanke and Rodriguez)
Peru V (no. 284y7~19-20
(from Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid, Ms. 3122, fs.
62-86v)
See note 16 for Oviedo 's personal contacts in the
Council
of the Indies, which probably helped him to regain his
position as Corregidor de Potosi.
48.

—

,

49.

See note 33 for the Council's letter to the Queen,

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 35.

AGI, Charcas 268, nos
38, 38A, and 38B (see note
48); and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 40, Corregidor Luis Antonio
de Oviedo y Herrera to the crown, Potosi, 6. IX. 16 73, 2
fs.; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44, Corregidor Oviedo y Herrera
to the crown, Potosi, 22. XI. 1673, 2 fs., "Remite testimO
por donde consta el benefi.o que hallo en la visita Gen.l
que hico de Ingenios y labores, Y dice a sido tanto el
aumento en 7 meses al estado en que hallo el mineral que
havia vuelto a ygualar al que tenia quando el Conde de
lemos le despojo de aquel offiO." The testimonio mentioned
in AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44, is no. 44A (2 fs.).
50.

51.

.

AGI, Charcas 268, nos. 31 and 32

(see note 45).

A
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lengthier discussion of Ulio;?'.?
is AGI, Charcas 26 8? no.
^5 Corregidor
32A a serilfif
of
^^^^^^
orders
from his
tenure in office anH 2°:^.
'

.

Condesa de Lemos to the crown,
Lima

luin^or-f 16'?r^^^\^t^^^^^^^^^'^
'""^ '"^^
irrespectively:"
CorregidorSvildo-:

"^^'^

2

V 167^*

^-'^'^^^

i

?

^'^^

thai'*

-

^^^1'

'^^^^^ According

to

267, nos. 56C & 56D (see note 5).
apt' Charcas 268, no. 58B,
AGI,
2 fs ; a
testimonio of Oviedo's activities as
Corr4gidor that
he sent to the crown with AGI,
charcas
Corregidor Obiedo to the crown, 25. III. 268? no! 58
1678
2 fs
S!?^^^as 267, nos. 58 & 58A (see note 16).
^nl'
d.
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 2lA (see note
7)
e.
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 38A (see note
48).
f.
AGI, Charcas 268, no. 44 (see note 50).
b'
b.

.

For evidence that mingas were hired with
service
in silver, AGI, Charcas 268, no.
50, Francisco Antonio
Manzolo to the Conde de Medellln, Madrid,
22. IV. 1676
2
fs.
Manzolo says that Oviedo had told him, while
he'was
visiting PotosI, that the azogueros used the
money they
received in the mita to hire substitutes, at
least part
Of the time.
He said that the number of Indians working
in the mines and mills was larger than the
number in the
repartimiento, and that some azogueros hired extra help
if
the ore they refined was of sufficient quality.
The Conde
de Medellin was President of the Council of the
Indies
from 1671 to 1679 (SchSfer, I, 352).
53.

_

Audiencia de Lima, "Relaci6n" (1674) (see note
48), 19-20.
Zavala, Servicio personal II, 151, discusses
this section of the Audiencia 's account as well.
54.

,

The crown's response to Castellar's report includes
his observations: AGI, Charcas 268, no. 51, "Copia de
despacho de 16 de Novre de 1676 al Virrey del Peru en
respta de lo que escrivio s.^ el estado en que se hallava
el cerro de Potosi y repartimto cen^ de los In.°s de mita
del," 1 f.
See, also, the Council's end-of -the-century
summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21~see note 91, Chapter
f
55.

II)

'

.

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 47, Corregidor Oviedo y
56.
Herrera to the crown, Potosi, 1. XI. 1674, 2 fs. A financial
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lllrlTs^'letnt^tli: ^fT.'^ ""'^

quenta de el estado en ae se

^"^^

h^Ut

letter ,AG1,

'

'

^"

s^s"^ to corroborate the
f?
p^ooTJ
President's
statement about the azogueros
'

.

Charcas 268, no. 53, Melchor Arcobispo
de La
Platf 'tn^f^I
Plata
to the crown, 28. II. 1667, 3 fs.
Part
of LinSn'S
letter IS reproduced as AGI Charcas
26 8? no? 54
"Sooia
de Capitulo de carta que el D.or
d. Melcho? de Linan
escriv^f a^ T.r^CoTae de
^
MeleUif ef 28"d
Alferazgos
^
de ?os
ae
los ?nd?nl^
Indies, y mita de Potosi," 3 fs.
,

f^o^^—

"^""^^ ^ order, AGI, Charcas
268, no. 55,
n
^-i
President
GonzSlez de Poveda to the crown, 30. i.
1678, 1 f '
''^^^'^
"^^^<^^ aumentar'La
mtif ^^^P°tossi
P
a mas pueblos."
A copy of his reply to
t
^^^^"^^^
P^esiden? GonzSlez
de^Pov^df
de
Poveda to the crown. La Plata, 28. IV. 1678, 17
fs.,
"^"^^
prebenir
para
P""^^^
La ampliazion
1
""m^.^*!
Potosi." For the November 16 directive, see
^rr Charcas 268, no.
AGI,
51 (see note 56).
For Castellar's
treatment of both, AGI, Charcas 26 8, no. 57, the Conde
de
Castellar to the crown, Lima, 22. II. 1678, 3 fs.,
"Responde
a tres Z-Las gobre la mita de Potosi dize
lo que a obrado y
estado de la materia y que en otra ocasion dara quenta
de
lo que se ejecutare con conferencia del r1 Acuerdo "
The
third order was that of 12. IX. 1676—1 do not know what
it

L

concerned— and all three directives came to him via Buenos
Aires. Valera (AGI, Charcas 268, nos 69A & 69B~see note
.

Chapter II), 24-25, discusses the two cgdulas of 8. VII
and 16. XI. 16 76; as does Holmes, 53 and 55; and the Council
of the Indies' end-of-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas
273, no. 21— see note 91, Chapter II).
Castillo (AGI,
Charcas 270, no. 33C— see note 30, Chapter II), 23-24v,
provides a transcription of the July 8 order.
58,

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 56, the Conde de Castellar
to the crown, Lima, 1. II. 1678, 2 f s
The report cited was
that of Alcalde mayor ThomSs Martin de Ubidla, in a letter
to the crown of 1. XI. 1674; AGI, Charcas 268, no. 46, 2 fs.
60.

.

61.

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 57

(see note 59)
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tha^he

,He note.

-^^n

to lie c^oln.'c^^^^^^^^^^^

Po?oIL'"'

'^^^ ^^'^^ ^

^

lo'^icant^'a II

TtTll

Charcas 268, nos. 69A & 69B) is
58, Chapter II.
Corregidor Enrlquezresponse is AGI, Charcas 268, no. 68A,
"?nforme del
Corregidor de Potosi, hecho al Virrey del
repartimiento de los Yndios a las labores Peru? sobre el
de ninas" ^Pedro
Luis Enrlquez to the Viceroy, 2. VI.
1678),
Oviedo y Herrera's remarks, AGI, Charcas 12 fs? For
268, no. 58
Luis
Antonio de Oviedo to the crown, 25.III.1678,
2
He
receipt of the c^dulas in AGI, Charcas
268,
no. ?0A
58A, Luis Antonio de Oviedo
Herrera
to Francisco
y
FernSndez de Madrigal, Potosi, 25. III.
1678, If
dissenting opinion was that of Contador Sebastian a
de
Collado, AGI, Charcas 268, no. 59, 1.V.1678,
1 f.; he
argued that crown revenue would suffer if the
mita was
extended to more provinces, and suggested that
^^acon
and forasteros in the sixteen provinces—plus 20,000 as
Indians living in Potosl—be included instead, with
one-seventh of the total to serve in the mita each year.
Collado s arguments are those which the CoHdi de
Castellar
relayed to the crown on 22.11.1678 (see note 59) so I
would assume that the Viceroy was heavily influenced by
the Contador 's counsel.

H.J^K
I^^^""^
described
m note

AGI, Charcas 266, no. 14A, the crown to ArchbishopViceroy Linan y Cisneros, 13. IX. 1678, 2 fs., "Al Virrey
del Peru remitiendole copia de los ynformes
y pareceres
que ultimam.te se an dado cerca de Potosi para que pida
los ynformes q.e se le ordena y con vista de todos informe
de suerte que se pueda tomar resolucion en esta materia."
The papers which were to be sent to LiMn are discussed by
the Council of the Indies' Fiscal in AGI, Charcas 26 8, no.
65.

66,

1

f.

AGI, Charcas 270, no. 3, Archbishop-Viceroy Linan
to the crown, 7. VIII. 1681, 2 fs., "El Arzobispo Virrey del
Peru Responde a la R.l Cedula de 13 de sep.e de 678 sobre
los informes que se piden para resolver el punto de la
mita de Potosi y dice el estado en que tenia la materia en
virtud del que se le mando por la de 8 de jullio de 676 de
66.
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dio quenta en carta de 21
de Abril de 6fin " t-~<
^^""^"^
says that he articulated
thi~st;fn; it
the
mita in his
letter of 21 iv 1680 ^n/i ?^ f^^^""^ °^
"^^^
accom^ed by the
Valera paper
The ^onn^fi
f.;^
hesitated on
the exteS!oA ofmi^a obUaation%^"^'^'
q.

opinions of those named in the 11 ty ^liZ

2

Rodrlgiez ;''pe;aT(n3^2W^ itt^^/ Hanke and
(from Biblioteca
Nacional, Madm Ms 30fi??
f^"^^?
See, also, Zavala, Servicio
personal II,
tt
iiA iik ^^S^^
174-175.
See note 69, below, for m^^.
'

,

^^^^^^^
no. 67, President Gonzalez de
PovlL i-o^Jh
Poveda
to the crown, 11. IV. 1679, 2 fs.
^^^^^^s 268, no. 68, the Gremio de azogueros
1.V.1679, 2 fs.; and AGI, Cha^cas
268
nn^''?n^ l^^'^r^'
azogueros to the crown, Potosi,
^''^'"^2
21 XI.
XI ?fi7Q
21.
1679, 2; ^
fs. (mis-dated "28. XI. 1679" on the
envelope);
It'

4.^

AGI, Charcas 268, no. 69, the Archbishop-Viceroy
LmSn y Cisneros to the crown, 22. IV. 1680, 3 fs
"Da
quenta del cuidado que a aplicado al remedio
de la diminu
cion de Indies que padece la mita de Potosi
de que remiti
restimonio y el papel que a despuesto el D.or
franco
de Valera su Asesor Gen.l sobre se estienda
a mas Provias
de las 16 senaladas."
This is, most likely, the letter
or April, 1680 Linan refers to in AGI, Charcas
270, no
3
(see note 66).
The Council of the Indies' end-of-thecentury summary (AGI, Charcas 273, no. 21~see note
91,
Chapter II) says the issue of extension went to the Fiscal
and Protector general, who opposed the idea. The Viceroy
and Acuerdo decided, at that point, the summary says, to
enforce Lemos 1669 reform directives, but suspended all
action when news of Palata's impending arrival reached
Lima.
The crown was unhappy about the delay, according to
Its letter to the Duque de la Palata of 28. V. 1681; see
Castillo (AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33C~see note 30, Chapter
II)
25-32 for a transcription of that letter.
69.

'

,

70.
AGI, Charcas 270, no. 7A, "Copia de Cedula Gen.l
que se despacho^en 21 de Abril de 1679 a todos los
Arcobispos y obpos de las Indias para que ymbiasen relaci6n
de las ciu,des villas y Poblaciones que huviese en su
diocesis," 1 f. The order reads, in its entirety:
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"El Rey.

Muy R.

Inxpto P.e Arcobispo de la
Iqlesia
^^^'^
las Provas^LT^eru'rcons'o
S'^''
de ellas en ynterlm- nor Vo'l^'^''^^''^^'^^ ^ ^^P'^

-

nodc^y^^'^
Poblaciones
in as

Ss C?u?^e^°??iLf y^^^
^

que huviere en el distrito de
cada
obispado, y la vecindad que
tuviere cada una Li do
^^^^^ Y enSaJguS e^Jese
refac?ord"°"?.^"
relacion
de ello con toda distincion
y claridad en
primera ocasion que se ofrezca;
fha en Buen Retire a
Vemte y uno de Abril de mil
y seiscJentSs y se^enta
^^^=^°^ ^'^^
Rey nro! 'r^D
fran^co
Madrigal
Senalada del Consejo="
have s^en tS^n?^?? responses,
by Bishops in America,
^^r-^L J.u^^
l

f

componen 38B666 almas";
^^'^^^ ^^^^°P °f TucumSn to the
;
crlJ^^t^-^^-l^S^,
VT
fs.,
3
PnSJ^A que ay en aquel "Refiere las ciudades Villas y
Pueblos
obispado, el estado que se halla
^5 havitadores que puedan tomar armas."
President^rnl^^Sr
GonzSlez de Poveda says that he believes such
a
^f^^if^?^ Charcas cannot
be successfully completed in
AGI, Charcas 270, no. 1, President
GonzSlez de Poveda to
the crown. La Plata, 20. VI. 1681, 1 f.;
but I have seen
nothing more for the ecclesiastical census in
Peru.

iT'ctrclTlin^

f

Charcas 268, no. 5 (see note 8); AGI, Charcas
o^q"^^*no.
268,
14 (see note 20); and AGI, Charcas 268, no. 15
(see note 76, Chapter II).
*

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53, "Relacion de lo que
contiene el memorial Inclusso de D. Gabriel fernandez
Guarache y Copia de z.la q.e se m.de juntar con el," 2
fs.
There is no date on the relaci6n, but on AGI, Charcas 267*
no. 53A, Fernandez Guarache 's petition, 4 fs., is
the note
"En M° a 19 de Junio de 1668."
72.

The route taken by the cacique s petition is
explained in AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53 (see note 72), save
for the date that it was sent back to Peru; that is taken
from the note on AGI, Charcas 267, no. 53A (see note 72).
73.

'

AGI, Charcas 267, no. 59A (see note 16) includes a
letter "del Senor Virrey escrita sobre varias materias de
la mita, y particularmente en lo tocante al Cap.n Gen.^ de
Pacajes." No. 59A is merely an index, so I do not know
74.

I
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-rtoj.,

T^rr^^^t

Ser

.

L^narcas ^b/, no.

53A (see note 72)

anri

L?f

''''
(-e
76,
^napter ll)
iir'ln any
^nv^^'
event, it seems clear that the
Conde
de Lemos was aware of the cacique
's petition.

^7.Jf;

f

29

.

m

'

268, no.

Juan Carlos Inga de
"Serenissimo Senor," Lima, sin fecha, 3
fs
64,

^thTlHdies

VIiri68o'%hf envelope

•

oA'

reads "Participando lo q.e ha
5^
Ti;y^Jo*i
:
llegado
a entender
en contra de lo q.e el Governador
y
casique Principal de Jesus de Macha
jurisdicion de
Berenquelilla ha escrito al consejo de Yndias,
sobre el
Padron gen.l de los naturales,
y reduccion de ellos a sus
Pueblos para la mita de Potosi, proponiendo
seryicios con deshonor de los Pobres Indies grandes
sobre q.e
incluye un Processo."
BNP, B575, "Paucarcolla
Autos sobre el despacho
de la mita de Potosi e informaci6n de los
caciques para
su grand disipaci6n.
villa de la Concepcion, Octubre 24
de 1669.
7 ff. utiles y 1 de carStula."
76.

.

ANB, C 1899a, "Carta de don Antonio Ordonez del
Aguila, corregidor de esta provincia, a la audiencia de
Charcas: Que tiene preso a don Ger6nimo Cajiamarca,
cacique governador del pueblo de Macari en esta provincia
por diversos excesos
Entre los excesos la falta de
cumplimiento en el entero de la mita de dicho pueblo para
Potosi," Lampa, 8. IV. 1673, 2 fs. (MC 972; MOM 655).
77.

.

.

.

BNP, B585, "Despacho de la mita de Potosi.
Puno,
Noviembre de 16 73. 5 ff. Notaci6n de caratula al margen
de la primera hoja."
78.

ANB, M 125, no. 21, "Los indios mitayos del cerro
de Potosi contra Joseph Fernandez de Valencia, capitan
mayor que fue de dicha mita, sobre los gravlsimos excesos
que cometi6 en el uso de su oficio," Potosi, 19.11.1677 to
29. VII. 1679, 302 fs. (MC 1028; MOM 670).
An adequate
presentation of such a long and involved case as that
between the capitanes enteradores and Capitan mayor de la
mita is impossible in the space provided by the present
study.
This legal battle will be the subject of a future
work, perhaps in conjunction with others involving caciques
and government officials.
79.

John Rowe mentions the pattern of bringing presents
to the CapitSn mayor in his "The Incas under Spanish
Colonial Institutions," 174. He bases his comments on
80.

'

:
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padecen los Indies lirilTno
\Z,TA'^l^r2{
^^^^<-i-'^ia
1/32), 17.
Canete y Domlnauez nlar-oo %v.« iT^.l^rT
Icentury'contex?!'Lf dol nS?
L^rjrpJLLItr^'rf
"Manlfiesto.. and
^a^^of^^^e^t'^or
,

L

c^^?e^^I/"^

81.

ANB, M 125, no. 21

82.

Ibid

ANB

(see note 79).

.

M

no.

125,
20, "Don Bartolomg Gonzalez,
in^f^ capitSn general
indio,
enterador de la mita de los iueblos
de

Toropalca, Yura, Potobamba
y Chaqui, provincia de Porco
de su oficio en consideraci6n a los
excesos a que se
19.VII.1679, 13 fs^ (MC 1027;

MoTtelr.

ANB, M 125, no. 19, "Capltulos puestos
por los
mdios del pueblo de Asillo, provincia de AsSngaro,
contra el maestro de campo don Francisco de
Castro
corregidor de ella, por el mal uso de su oficio,
particular por la distracciSn de indios de mita y en
en provecho
suyo,
Aslngaro, 6. III. 1674, 60 fs. (MC 984; MOM 658).
84.

85.

Ibid.

For another example of the corregidor- Indian
struggle, see ANB, EC 1677, no. 19, "Residencia que
por
comision del marques de Castellar, virrey del Peru, tom6
don Francisco Bomonte y Robledo al maestro de campo don
Alonso de Ortega y Robles, caballero de Santiago,
corregidor que fue de la provincia de Sicasica, difunto,
y a sus tenientes y ministros, 1677, 287 fs. (MC 1012a;
MOM 664)
Two of the questions asked of the Indians
concerned the improper use of their labor and forced sales
of merchandise.
Nicolas Sanchez-Albornoz says that
correqidores extracted service and money from the Indians
under the "care" (Sanchez-Albornoz, 97)
"Malversaci6n aparte, los entuertos mediante los
cuales los corregidores y sus tenientes se enrique
clan a expensas de los indios eran principalmente"
cuatro:
repartimientos trajines, confiscaci6n de
tierras y alquiler de peones. De ellos, el mas
comun era el primero. Los detalles, mencionados al
pasar, puesto que las preguntas no concernian este
punto, no modifican cuanto se ha dicho de este
abuso tantas veces."
86.

.

,

CHAPTER

VII

1680 TO 1700

A century of evolution in the de
facto mita, and of
the Hapsburg administration's
continual

attempts to keep

pace with it, came to a head during
the last two decades
of the seventeenth century. The
long-awaited and
oft-postponed general census and repartimiento
de la mita
were finally completed during the
1680s under
the

direction of the Viceroy Duque de la Palata.

Long-believed

to be the solution to Potosl's declining
fortunes, and the

controversies swirling about the mita, the new

repartimiento only served

.to

enflame the passions of the

azogueros and the provincial interests alike.
The Viceroy Conde de la Monclova responded to the
hue

and cry over Palata
of his own.

's

program in 1692, with a repartimiento

His distribution of mitayos won the approval

of the Council of the Indies, but it did not end the

controversy over the mita

.

Indeed, despite an outward

appearance of government effectiveness during these
twenty years, the mita continued to elude the viceroys'

attempts to control it.

381
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The Viceroy Duque de la
Palata

When the Duque de la Palata
was appointed Viceroy of
Peru in 1680, Charles II
told him to concentrate his
efforts on the revitalization
of the PotosI mita.l An
October 25, 1680 cedula outlined
the procedure that the
Viceroy was to follow: after
consultations with Linan
and GonzSlez de Poveda, Palata
was to design and then
implement a comprehensive program
for the restoration of
the faltering mita deliveries. ^
The crown was frustrated
by Castellar and LihSn's failure
to carry out its earlier
directives. Palata was a trusted royal
advisor who
had

served on the junta that governed the
Empire during the
King's minority, and Charles was
confident that he would
comply with his instructions."^
Palata acknowledged the receipt of his orders
and

supporting materials from Chiclana on December
15, 1680.^
Eleven months later, on November 7, 1681, he
assumed
office in Lima.

Compliance with his orders was to require

every one of his eight years as Viceroy.

It had been

nearly fifty years since the last repartimiento

,

and the

chasm between the Toledan and de facto mitas was immense.
Palata

's

task was not to reform the mita therefore, but to
,

re-establish it.

In many respects he would have to serve

as another Francisco de Toledo.

The Duque spent the first year of his viceroyalty
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consulting with experienced
officials and the Real Acuerdo
about the mita. Not only did
he request information
from

LiMn

and GonzSlez de Poveda, but
also from Corregidor
Enrlquez, Contador Sebastian de
Collado and the Archbishop
of Charcas, Christ6val de
Castilla y Zamora. These men
held varying opinions about the
propriety of the mita and
the reforms that were required
to reinvigorate it.^

LiMn's defense of the mita

in

1677— that

it kept

otherwise idle Indians busy-had been
an important
counterbalance to the Conde de Lemos' call
for the

abolition of the system.

The Archbishop explained his

performance as Viceroy in his relacion, on
December
1681.

8,

Palata asked him for any additional comments
in

June of 16 82, and although he was about to
leave on a

^^^^^^ of his archbishopric, Lilian set down a few
impressions.

He wrote that the question of the mita

's

justness was now moot, for the crown had repeatedly
issued

orders for its implementation and continuation.
of Palata

's

The focus

attention, he said, should be on the restoration

of Potosi, and the key to that was a census.

LinSn

suggested that Enriquez, Gonzalez de Poveda and the Bishop
of Arequipa, Antonio de Leon, be named to conduct an

enumeration in the sixteen traditionally obligated
provinces.

Their salaries could be paid by fines on the

guilty correqidores and by collections among the azogueros
Lilian

.

disagreed with those who thought that the fourteen

384

other provinces should be
included in the census and the
mita.
He shared their belief that
the sixteen provinces
had been depopulated by Indian
migration into the exempted
provinces, but he thought that the
inclusion of the latter
would only drive the Indians further
away, into unconquered
regions.
The Archbishop argued that the
inclusion of the
forasteros and the yanaconas who were
residents of the

sixteen provinces would probably suffice,
given the reduced
number of viable mills at Potosl, and he
suggested that
stiff penalties be imposed to prevent
future outward
migration.

Only if the total population of the sixteen

provinces was insufficient, he added, would he
condone the
inclusion of two or three more provinces under the
mita.^
The Archbishop of Charcas agreed with

LiMn

that

Potosi needed to be preserved, for the crown had a

substantial investment in the large population, garrison,
mint and royal treasury there.

Like his predecessor, he

said that it was not realistic to expect that silver

production would ever

return

to sixteenth century levels.

But Castilla y Zamora differed with Lihan on how best to

provide the 2,000 Indian laborers that he believed were
required.

Rather than devise a means to include the

fugitives who were living in the fourteen provinces, he
said, those Indians who were found guilty of a civil

— and who were currently punished with the lash
execution — should be sent to Potosi for four-, six- or
offense

or
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ten-year terms.

These sentences would not
constitute the
enslavement of the Indians,
but would be equivalent
to the
assignment of Spanish criminals
to the galleys.
The
Indians and the azogueros alike
would benefit, he argued,
for the azogueros would not
have to pay their workers
and
the Indians would be freed
from mita service forever.
The
government stood to benefit as well,
the Archbishop noted,
because the problems that were
caused by the Indians
traveling to and from PotosI would
be eliminated, as would
be the criticism heaped upon
Spain by other nations because
of the mita.
The Indians might later be required
to pay
two £esos per year apiece, however,
should the abolition
of the mita cause a lowering of the
royal quintos .^
If the Viceroy opted to maintain the
mita, Castilla
y Zamora felt that the fourteen exempted provinces, the

Indians who lived at PotosI, the forasteros and
the

yanaconas should all be included, to spread the
obligation
as thinly as possible.

The prerequisite census, he argued,

could be conducted by a committee within each of the
provinces, composed of the corregidor
and the caciques

,

the local priests

.

Further support for the incorporation of the forasteros
in the mita on an equal footing with the originarios came

from Contador Sebastian de Collado.

He noted that the

current system of secular and ecclesiastical revenue

collection pitted the priests against the government's

tribute collection efforts
and the recruitment of
,nita^.
The priests in the provinces
received one ^eso per year
for every forastero that
they instructed, while their
income for the originarios was
not prorated. They did
their best, therefore, to
minimize the number
of

oric^inarios in their midst,
while welcoming forasteros with
open arms. The problem was
particularly acute at PotosI,
he said, where 20,000 Indians
basked in their exemption

from the mita.

Collado suggested that the Indians
be

deemed "natives" wherever they were
found, and that
one-seventh of them be sent to PotosI to
serve in the
mita
.

Corregidor Pedro Luis Enrlquez provided
Palata with a
point-by-point defense of the mita against the

claims that

were made by the Conde de Lemos in his
July
discourse.

4,

1670

Enriquez argued that Lemos had lacked the

necessary experience in mining affairs, and in the

administration of the Indians, to draw the correct
conclusions from the caciques
treatment by the azoqueros

.

'

complaints about their

Rigorous treatment of the

Indians was required, the Corregidor maintained, because

their nature was such that they obeyed only those whom
they feared.

The complaints that were made by the caciques

furthermore, were not caused by their mistreatment at
PotosI, but by their desire to reserve the Indians for use

m

their own economic enterprises. 12
^1-

•

.

,
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Enrlquez also defended the mita
against the charge
that it had depopulated the
provinces subject to it. His
investigation of baptismal and death
records, which he had
obtained from the priests in PotosI,
had shown that men
died at the same rate as women-both
at moderate

levels-

and that the number of children born
in the villa was well
over twice the number of adults who
died.
Because the
women did not work in the mita, the equal
death rates
showed that the mitayos were not killed
in the mines.
The
high birth rate discredited the claim that
procreation was
hurt by mita service. """^
The Corregidor said that the reports accusing
the

azogueros of involvement with "pocket Indians" and
other
abuses were untrue.

His latest visita had determined that

there were 1,541 mitayos working in the mills and the
mines, while the minga work force totaled 1,713.

number of mingas

,

The high

he concluded, proved that mita service in

silver was being converted into substitute laborers.

Enrlquez was indignant that officials in Lima could consider
their counterparts at Potosi to be so inept that they would

permit the kinds of horrible treatment that Lemos had
described.

Finally, he reminded Palata that Toledo had

made a pact with the original azogueros

,

in which he had

promised that mitayos would be sent to Potosi in
perpetuity.

The crown owed it to the azogueros

to continue the mita

.

,

therefore,

It was also in the royal interest to

do so, for Potosi supported
most of the other economic
enterprises in Upper Peru, in
one way or another.
Thus,
the Corregidor had recounted
the potosino position in
support of the mita, in its
entirety.

President Gonzalez de Poveda had
already responded to
the 1678 cedula when the 1680
order arrived, and
he felt

no compulsion to cover old
ground again.

He and Palata

exchanged correspondence throughout
1682, however, on the
mechanics of a census and some possible
changes in the
mita's design. Gonzalez de Poveda 's
arguments in favor
of the use of the corregidores to
conduct the census

sufficiently persuaded the Viceroy that the
latter asked
him to draw up the guidelines for a corregidor
-conducted
enumeration "'"^
.

Palata also asked the President to comment on
the
idea that the mitayos be provided with a mill
and a mine
of their own at Potosl.

The Viceroy understood that the

voluntary labor force of the pre- and early-post-Toledo
periods had been drawn by the profitability of mining for
the Indians themselves.

He was searching for a way to

restore the economic incentive for the Indians that had

evaporated by the end of the sixteenth century.
from the mitayos

'

Income

mine and mill would be used, according

to the plan, to pay their tribute, rezagos de mita, service
in silver, and any other debts that were incurred by the

Indians or by their capitanes enteradores 16
.
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on balance Gonzalez de Poveda
was attracted to the
concept of a mita^. niining
operation, but he was hesitant
because of the probable difficulties
with its realization.
He noted that the Indians had
always had the legal right to
discover and work their own mines,
but that they had not by
choice.
There would be problems, moreover,
with obtaining
a mine in the first place, the
day-to-day administration of
the mill (i.e., finding someone to
serve as the azoguero
and robberies of ore from the other
mines and mills for the
initaxos' mill.
The capitanes enteradores stood to
benefit
the most from the proposal, he noted,
and they would try to
assign their Indians to their mill and mine
rather than to
those of the azogueros
in deference to the Viceroy, the
)

.

President said that he would not object to suggesting
the
idea to the capitanes to see whether they
wanted
to go

,

forward with

it."""^

The mitayos

'

mining operation was never founded, for

reasons that do not emerge from the documentation.
and Gonzalez de Poveda

'

s

Palata

discussion of the possibility,

however, points to an important theme in the Viceroy's

approach:
the mi tayos

his attempt to return to the balance between
'

work and their profits that was characteristic

of the boom years of the 1570s.

Indeed, as he proceeded

with his investigation, and later with the reforms that he

considered necessary, Palata showed more signs that he was
trying to recapture the elusive magic of the Toledan
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production formula.

Por example, the Viceroy
had hi,h
hopes for a new .ethod
of silver refining that
was both
cheaper and quicker than
the current process.

Like Toledo, Palata drew
upon the advice of those
who
were experienced in Indian
administration and mining, of
all the written opinions,
only that of Archbishop
Castilla
y Zamora suggested that the mita should be
abolished.
Everyone else agreed that it
should continue, with the
ori^inarios and the forasteros
to be included on an
equal
basis.
The only remaining areas of
disagreement were the
number of provinces to be
included and whom to name to
conduct the prerequisite census.
•

While Palata and the Real Acuerdo
were considering the
logistics of a census and a new
repartimiento the Viceroy
received another cedula from Charles
II.
The May 28, 1681
edict not only reinforced the October
25, 1680 directive,
it made the decisions that had
originally been left to the
.

discretion of the Viceroy.

The crown had been strongly

moved by a printed memorial from the
Gremio de azogueros
warning that PotosI would soon collapse
without the prompt
resolution of the long-outstanding issues of
the census
repartimiento.

Gonzalez de Poveda

•

s

The crown told Palata to follow

16 76 plan for a correqidor -conducted

census in all thirty of the provinces, and to add
any

provinces that were needed to gain an effective mita

ordinaria of 4,220 Indians.

-"-^

The 1681 cedula resolved
any doubts as to whether
the
crown wanted the
to continue, how .any
provinces to
include in the census and
whom should conduct it.
it also
showed the crown's displeasure
that the Indians were able
to avoid the
and their tribute obligations
by moving
from one province to another.
This royal disapproval
lent
support to the incorporation
of the forasteros in the
coming re^artimiento and it
reinforced the determination
to conduct the census in
all thirty of the provinces.
The
Real Acuerdo voted, accordingly,
to conduct the census on
June 21, 1682. it then turned
its attention to problems
that could be anticipated with
the inclusion of the
forasteros and to finding the means
to prevent Indian

^

^

,

,

migration from undercutting the mita in
the future.
The Viceroy reported to the crown
about his

plans for

the census and the new repartimiento
on December 15, 1682.
He told the Council of the Indies
that the fourteen

theretofore exempted, as well as the sixteen
obligated,
provinces would indeed be included in the
census.

Then,

if the number of Indians in the latter
was insufficient to

support the mita, he could add new areas without
having to
conduct a second population tally. The count in
the

fourteen provinces would also permit, he said, the
final

resolution of the question whether the Indians had
actually migrated from the sixteen provinces to the
fourteen or not. 21

.
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Palata was concerned,
however, about the use of
the
-rre^idores to conduct the census.
Gonzllez de Poveda
and the 1681 c|dula had
both said that the use of
the
£0££e2idores would allow the
enumeration to be completed
quickly and at a minimal cost,
but they were interested
parties who might try to conceal
the number of Indians
in their provinces, and
thus they were untrustworthy.
The
question was one of prime importance,
Palata argued, for
should the census not be well
done, the impact on the royal
treasury could be disastrous

Sometime after his December 15,
1682 letter, if not
before, the Viceroy decided that
there really was no

alternative but to use the corregidores
if the census and
the repartimiento were to be
completed before he left
office.
In anticipation of the problems
inherent in a

corregidor-conducted census, Palata issued orders
on
April 7, 1683, for the Bishops and Prelates
to instruct
their priests to report on the Indians who
were under their
care.
a

He explained to the churchmen that he needed
to have

clear understanding of Peruvian demographics
if he were

to adjust the Indians' tribute and mita
obligations so

that they would be exacted more fairly.

To ensure that

their accounts would be factual, Palata cautioned, the

priests were not to be told why they were reporting on
their Indian charges.

An ecclesiastical census had been proposed by Juan de

Ibarra and the Conde de
Le.os, and one was
undertaken by
the Archbishop-Viceroy.
Another had been halted in
Charcas
after Gonzalez de Poveda
said that it would probably
not be
successful. 24 The Duque de
la Palata now resurrected
the
idea to serve as a check
on the reports that he
would soon
receive from the corregidores
.

Later, when the correaidor-conducted
census was about
to begin, Palata published
a circular for the priests.
He
told them not to impede the
government census for two
reasons:
a) so that those who
were present in the pueblos
would not have to carry the entire
weight of obligations
that were meant for many more;
and b) so that those who
were hidden or absent might pay
"to Caesar that which is
Caesar's." The Viceroy ordered the
priests to provide
the correqidores with any baptismal,
confession or

marriage records that might help them
to comply with their
instructions. 2^
Palata

reservations about the correqidores led him
to build other safeguards into the
general census
's

as well.

He announced that grave penalties would
be applied to

those who failed to carry out their orders
or impeded the
census by hiding Indians:
Indian officials would not only
lose their posts, they would become mitayos;
Spaniards

would forfeit their offices, encomiendas and any other
privileges.

Those who aided the census, by uncovering

Indians who were not included on the correqidores

'

lists,

would be rewarded:

Indians would be freed
fro. all tribute
and
Obligations, and na.ed to
cacicaz^, Spaniards
would receive the services
of one-seventh of the
Indians.
Printed instructions were
sent to the corregidores
in
July Of 1683, and the census
was scheduled to begin on
October 1, in all of the
provinces at once. Originally
it
was to be completed in one
year, later changed to two,
after
which the results were to be
sent to Lima,
changes in mita
quotas or tribute levels were
not to be initiated locally,
but were to await new orders
from the Viceroy. All
eighty-three of the provinces in
Peru were now included in
the census, for Palata had decided
that an accurate
demographic profile of the realm would
make all of the
government's programs more effective.

^

The instructions that were sent to
the corregidores

were detailed and explicit.

They were to draw up a series

of lists based on sex, age, status
and other factors.

sample entry was provided for their use
as a model.

A
The

uniformity of response was necessary, the
Viceroy said, so
that the various individual reports that
were submitted by
the corregidores might be compiled into a
larger volume by

officials in Lima.

The forasteros were permitted six

months to decide whether they were going to return home
or
stay where they were resident.

Those who did return to

their pueblos were to receive lands if their own had been
sold during their absence.

Palata reported these
developments to the Council
of
the indies on August
21, 1683.
He was confident that
the
general census would provide
a good base upon which
to
determine the new renartinuer^
and the Indians tribute
Obligations. The Council's
Fiscal endorsed the Viceroy's
plan with one qualification:
that fiscales should be
sent
to monitor the activities
of the corre^idores as had
been
done in New Spain. He concurred
with LiMn's contention
'

,

that the justness of the mita
was no longer in question,
because Linan, GonzSlez de Poveda
and Enrlquez had all
argued that the temporal benefits
of the mita for the
Indians outweighed the corporal
rigors that were
characteristic of the system.
On June 10, 1685, Palata wrote to
Madrid with the
news that the census was nearly
completed; only a few
valley regions and the area around
Quito remained. He said
that he had named two contadores Joseph
de Villegas and
Pedro Antonio de Castillo, to compile the
data that was
being sent to Lima by the provincial corregidores
There
had been a few problems, as some of the
corregidores had
,

.

not followed their instructions, but the Viceroy
was

certain that any and all difficulties would be overcome
and that the census would be finished

soon.^-*-

Villegas reported to the crown that he had been

assigned the responsibility for the thirty-three provinces
of Upper Peru, which included the sixteen that were

subject to the nuta and
seventeen others that were
not
The initial results,
he said, suggested
that there had been
an overall increase in
the nuxnber of Indians
since Toledo's
day.
Disease had been less
prevalent in Upper Peru than
elsewhere in the real., and
Villegas believed that this
had
been the reason for the
increase.
Some confusion had

resulted from the fact that
many of the provinces had
not
been inspected since the 1573
census, and one hundred years
had changed the demographic
landscape considerably. Some
pueblos had been founded, while
others had disappeared.
But the greatest problems had
been caused
by the

corregidores who refused to follow
their orders and prepare
the lists that Palata had
required.
The adjustment of their
tallies was delaying the completion
of
the total census.

The Contador noted that an accurate
profile of the
Indian population was needed to
protect the Indians from
the caciques and to protect the
caciques from the Spanish;
and that the success of the repartimiento
hinged on the
,

successful execution of the census.

Accuracy was also

important because such an enumeration would
probably not
be conducted again for some time to come.^^
Ironically, the same day that Palata wrote to the

crown— June

10,

1685— Charles

II signed a cedula that

withheld royal approval from the Viceroy's actions.

The

Council of the Indies had consented to the execution of
the census, but it said that it had reservations about
the

means that he was employing.

Sorre^i^

since the use of the

had been provided for
by the 1681 cedula,
this was not the true
reason for the Council's
reticence
Nine Viceroys had feared
the effects of such a
census, it
noted, because if few
Indians were found, then
both the
mita and tribute levels
would have to be constricted.
Thus, it was its fear of
the potential financial
ramifications of the census that
caused the Council to
advise the crown to wait until
the results of the
enumeration were known before
deciding whether to give its
assent.
Two Councilors-the Conde de
Castellar and Joseph
de Veytia-strongly disagreed.
They argued that the
council should aid the census with
a statement of support,
not cripple it by withholding its
af f irmation
But as
had been the case when Toledo
decided to establish the
mita over a century earlier, the crown
reserved judgement
until it knew the outcome of Palata's
program; it would
support success, but not failure.
.

When the Viceroy received the crown's decision,
in
February of 1686, he was livid. He replied
that his

predecessors had not conducted the census because
of their
personal limitations, not any intrinsic difficulties
with
its execution.

conquer

tough

A government official was supposed to
problems, he argued; that was his job.

Great things, Palata concluded, were never won without

overcoming great problems.
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The crown's refusal to
lend its support to the
census
did not stop it fro. being
completed.
indeed, by the ti.e
that Palata responded to
the 1685 cedula, the
enumeration
was nearly finished. On
April 6, 1686, the Viceroy
wrote
to Madrid that he lacked
only three reports.
So.e problems
had been caused by the
Indians' mobility, he noted,
but
everything for the provinces
that were under the treasury
in Lima was completed and
new tribute levels would soon
go
into effect. The results for
Upper Peru, however, were
being delayed by its distance
from Lima, the resultant
lag in correspondence and a
lack of uniformity in the
corregidores reports.
'

Palata, like Toledo, was sufficiently
confident of
himself that he pushed forward despite
the crown's doubts.
He confessed, however, that he was
uncertain that the
government would be able to prevent Indian
migration in
the future.
He had stripped the cover of "forastero"
from
the runaways, and he had doubled tribute
levels and mita
obligations for anyone who was absent from
his native

pueblo, but he feared that even these measures
would not
be sufficient to immobilize the Indians.
As promised, the Viceroy soon began to issue
reforms

which were based on the census.

On October 16, 1687,

he published an "Aranzel de jornales" that
delineated the

daily wages that the Indians were to receive in various

enterprises and locations.

The new tribute levels for

for the provinces that
were under the Li.a
treasury went
into effect on Christmas
Day, 1687^° The census
was not
completed in Upper Peru
until 1688, but it was
sufficiently
Close to its conclusion by
March to permit Palata to
begin
work on the new repartimiento
de la mita.
He had planned
to have the two contadores
draw up a tentative distribution
of the mita^, but they
were exhausted by their
three-year
struggle with the census and
had fallen ill. The Viceroy
was personally distracted by
the aftermath of the October
20, 1687 earthquake, which had left
the provinces of
Guanta and Angaraes in a shambles.
Palata therefore

instructed Fiscal Juan GonzSlez de
Santiago, of the
Audiencia de Lima, to compose the
tentative repartimiento
based on the results of the census
and any information
that was available in Lima about the
mills
and the

azogueros at Potosl.^-'The Viceroy then sent the tentative
repartimiento to
La Plata and he assigned Archbishop
(and ex-President)

Gonzalez de Poveda, Corregidor Enriguez and
the new

President of Charcas, Diego Christoval Me s la, the
task
of tailoring it to local realities.
The committee
of

three was encouraged, moreover, to make some
major

adjustments of the Fiscal

's

plan.^^

Palata was particularly bothered by GonzSlez de

Santiago's reference to a capitulation by Toledo to the
Indians when he first established the mita

.

The Viceroy

.

.

felt that the mita was
part of the Indians' natural
obligation to work for their
sovereian not ^r..r
o^veitixgn,
.
any agreement
between them and Toledo.
Neither did he believe that
the
one-seventh fraction constituted
a strict quota, nor
that
two rest periods were
absolutely required. He suggested
that the existence of many
resident mingas at Potosl made
it unnecessary for the
mitayos to work on their weeks
off,
One week's rest would be enough,
he argued, if they
actually rested. This would also
ease the burden of the
mita on the provinces, for one-third
of the mita gruesa
could remain at home rather than
travel
to

PotosI— the

aspect of the system that Palata felt
was the most
oppressive. Finally, the Fiscal had not
included any
more provinces than the original sixteen,
and this the

Viceroy considered to be an unwarranted
reward for the
disobedient fugitives
The committee's report to Palata on the
repartimiento

was despatched from La Plata on October
19, 1688.

After

numerous meetings and two consultations with the
Viceroy,
it had composed a repartimiento which reflected
Palata 's

desires closely.

Five provinces— La Recaja, Yamparaes,

Tomina, Pilaya y Paspaya-and Misque--were added, as was
the parroquia of San Pedro in La Paz, and sixteen curatos

and eighteen pueblos within the original sixteen provinces
that had won exemption from the mita earlier in the
century.

From a population base of 56,046 tribute-paying

Indians, 2,829 were included
in each of three nOtas
ordinarias, including the
one that would remain at
home
while the other two served
alternate weeks at Potosl.
Fifty mitay o s were assigned
to each of fifty-seven
mills-an increase of three mills
over Gonzalez de
Santiago's distribution-and
sixteen others were left
without mita labor. The committee
had considered the
possibility Of assigning a mix of
thirty-four mitayos
and sixteen minaas to all of
the mills, but it decided
against the idea because such a
system would have been
unmanageable and the azogueros profit
margin would have
been hurt. The mitayos were assigned
by the committee
in complete ayllus or pueblos
wherever possible, in
'

accordance with a provision of the crown's
1681 cedula.
The committee felt it was necessary,
however, to assign
to each azoguero a combination of
originarios and
forasteros, because the latter would have
to learn their
jobs from the former.
The Viceroy accepted the committee's
recommendations

and on December

2,

1688, he issued an order for the

incorporation of the newly-affected provinces and pueblos
The terms of the new repartimiento were sent to
Potosi
on

January 29, 1689, and to the provinces on February

2.

addition to the provisions that were included in the
committee's plan, Palata provided a one-year exemption
from tribute for the mitayos following their year of

In

service and he reinforced
his predecessors'
prohibitions
Of mita service in silver.
Finally, he placed the nuta
under the exclusive
administration of the Corregidor
de

PotosI, Pedro Luis Enriquez/^

With the orders for the new
repartimiento despatched,
the Viceroy reported to the
crown on February
19,

1689

that the entire program had
been concluded. The census
and the repartimiento that
had so baffled each of his
predecessors, since the Conde de
Chinchon, were finished.
Not only was the census completed,
Palata noted, but the
cost had been kept to a mere
20,000 pesos 200,000 had
been the estimate. He was pleased
to report, moreover,
that the number of tribute-paying
Indians was greater
than it had been a century before.
Migration had caused
the apparent depopulation of the
sixteen
;

provinces-, he

argued, for half of the Indians in Upper
Peru had turned
out to be forasteros.
The Viceroy also said that he had
ordered the compilation of a single tome on
the census and
the repartimiento, to serve as a guide the
next time the

program had to be executed.
Palata was correct when he boasted that he had

succeeded where others had failed.

His willingness to

press forward despite the crown's refusal to support his
actions and his determination to finish the process before
his successor arrived were unusual.

reasons for his success.

But there were other

First, he had been provided with
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direct, unequivocable
orders to put the census
and the
new renartimiento before
all other matters.
The 1681

cidula had removed any doubt
about the crown's support
for the mita and it had
answered the outstanding
questions
about the general census.
The Council
of the Indies'

doubts were expressed only
after the process was nearly
done.
second, the Duque had profited
by the advice of
Gonzalez de Poveda and LiMn,
both of whom had extensive
experience in Charcas and with
the mita.
Third, no one
in Potosi was opposed to his
program. Fourth, and perhaps
more important than these other
factors, Palata was Viceroy
of Peru for eight years.
Six of those years were required
to complete the census in Upper
Peru, after a year
of

preliminary investigation.

Palata 's viceroyalty was

longer than the usual six years because
his successor had
died en route to Peru, and the search
for a willing

replacement had taken time.

By the time that the Council

decided to transfer the Conde de la Monclova
from his
post as Viceroy of New Spain, therefore, the
Duque de la
Palata had been afforded a bonus year or two,
and had

had

the time to complete the repartimiento

,

rather than leave

it to the whim of his successor.'*^

Developments in the de facto Mita

During the seven years that were required to design
and execute the general census, the traditional battles
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among the caciaues, the
correHidores

,

the azo^ueros,

the priests and the
Indians had continued.

Those

confrontations had underscored
the need for a clear
determination of the extant
population in the provinces
and the completion of a
new repartimient o de la
mita.
The caciques of Pacajes
had objected to their role
in the mita for what seemed
to be an eternity.
On

August

e,

1681, they wrote to the crown
to complain that

the azogueros were still
demanding that they deliver
mita^ under the terms of the 1633
repartimiento despite
the fact that the tribute-paying
population of their
province had fallen from 10,675 to
1,510 Indians.
The
number of mitayos that was required
from Pacajes, they
argued, should be lowered accordingly,
when this petition,
and others like it, reached the
Council of the Indies,
they were put to one side. The Fiscal
promised that the
general census, then being undertaken,
would solve all
such problems. The Council may not have
supported Palata's
program, but it did expect his census to
settle complaints
such as that of the caciques of Pacajes.
.

As we have seen, other caciques also had
a difficult

time delivering the quotas of mitayos that
were demanded
of them.

Some of them went to extraordinary lengths over

a single Indian.

From 1682 to 1683, for example, the

capitan enterador for Caquiavire (Pacajes)

,

Francisco

Quispi, tried unsuccessfully to extract Pasqual Guanca from

405

the San Francisco convent
at Potosl.

The Franciscans'

president and £rpcurador foiled
Quispi's efforts with a
series of legal ploys based
on the pretense that because
Guanca was married to the
daughter of a yanacona and
Toledo had ordered that husbands
were to live with their
wives'
then he too should be considered
a yanacona
Pasqual Guanca was released from
the CapitSn mayor
,

a^^,

de la

mita's jail when his father-in-law
pledged that he would
produce him when a judgement was
reached in the case.

Corregidor Enrlquez then ruled that
Guanca should serve in
the mita while the Audiencia de
Charcas determined whether
he was a yanacona, but by that time
he was nowhere
to be

found.

Quispi had to hire a minga for every week
that
Guanca was missing, and he appealed to the
Audiencia to
force the father-in-law to pay the cost of
the substitute.
The dispute went on for over a year, and
although the
final decision is not included in the documentation,
the

frustrations that Quispi suffered are testimony to
the

difficulties that the capitanes enteradores faced when
they competed with other interests for Indians to deliver

m

the mita.
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If the capitanes had a difficult time delivering the

originarios to Potosi, they were not shy about including
the forasteros when they could.

In 1680, the Corregidor

de Porco ordered the caciques of Puna to leave Pedro

Mamani alone.

Mamani complained that he had been forced to

.

serve in the mita despite
his being a forastero.
The
Corregidor's ruling did not
end the matter, however,
for
Pedro Mamani had to petition
the Audiencia de Charcas
in
1684 to obtain a reinforcement
of the earlier decision.
The ca£itanes enteradores
had their problems with
other caciques as well. The
capitln for Puna, Juan
Bautista Catari, complained to
the Audiencia de Charcas
that gobernador Pedro Anava
was diverting some mitayos
for his own use, and that he
was committing other abuses
as well.
Bautista Catari was not alone.
1690, on
orders from the Viceroy Conde de la
Monclova (1689-1705),
Corregidor Enrlquez questioned the
capitanes about the
problems that they faced in the delivery
of the mitayos
To a man they charged that other
caciques prevented them
from bringing as many mitayos in
person and

m

.

—

they could otherwise have delivered.

in silver-as

The caciques used

some of the reserved Indians in their own
enterprises, but
they rented the majority to estancieros and
chacareros in

exchange for the Indians' mita service in silver
and
their tribute.

The institution of indios maharaques

(described in Chapter

V)

was not peculiar to Pacajes,

therefore, but common in the sixteen obligated provinces.
The lands that were left vacant by the Indians, the
c apitanes said,

Spaniards.

were rented to forasteros or sold to

The sums of money that were raised by these

means, they claimed, were well in excess of those that were

.
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needed to meet their obligations,
but the caciaues kept
much of the money for
themselves
The testimony of the capitanes
in 1690 lends credence
to the suggestion offered
in Chapter V:
that the cacigues
were able to pass some of the
financial burden of mita
service in silver down onto the
Indians who were living in
their pueblos.
indeed, the capitanes also
claimed that
the caciques used collectors
to gather service in silver
and tribute contributions from
the Indians who were absent
from their villages.
The Effects of the New Repartimiento
The completion of the census and the
new repartimiento

were significant accomplishments, and clearly
they were
needed.
But the Duque de la Palata's claim to ultimate
victory was premature. He had designed a new
mita that

would ostensibly return equity to service at
Potosi and
provide most of the azogueros there with an adequate,
inexpensive, work force.

Yet as Palata prepared for his

return to Spain, he began to learn a central lesson of
the Hapsburg administration of Peru:

that which was

planned in Lima was rarely what happened in Charcas.
The implementation of the new tribute levels and the

reformed mita began in Upper Peru during 1689.

The

Indians were supposed to be sent to Potosi under the new

repartimiento in June, and the new system was to be
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operational by .uly 1.54

^^^^^^

^^^^
practices that were novel,
and he had included
some regions
under the rnita for the
first time. The detailed
orders
that he sent to the
corre^idores about the new
tribute and
mita requirements, like
those for the census a
few years
earlier, stressed the themes
of fairness and equality.

From afar-from Lima-the
process and the reforms seemed
fair, and quite logical.
practice, however, the
cacigues and the Indians learned
of the changes in their
obligations in bits and pieces,
and only months before
those alterations were scheduled
to go into effect.

m

The

tribute and mita quotas increased
dramatically with the
inclusion of the forasteros, and
neither the Indians nor
their caciques could see any
benefits for them in the
new regime. No sooner had Corregidor
Enrlquez sent out
the new mita orders than the complaints
about the

repartimiento, the tribute levels and
ultimately the census
began to pour down off the altiplano and
into Lima.^^
The caciques, the corregidores and the
priests argued,
in unison, that the reforms that
Palata was attempting to

introduce were both unrealistic and impractical.

The

caciques were particularly upset with the
incorporation of
the forasteros, and they balked at the reduction
of the

mita to two shifts.

The corregidores and the priests

claimed that the Indians were emigrating, en masse, out of
their provinces in terror.

.
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one source of the
problems was that the census
was
Six years oia by the
time that the reforms
that were based
upon it were introduced.
Many of the forasteros
who had
been included in the
enumeration had moved away
and some
Indians now discovered that
they had been included
on lists
in four or five different
locations,
other Indians had
died in the epidemics of
the mid-1680s. The
once-thriving
mining center at Porco was
now abandoned. But the
caciques
were nevertheless held
responsible by their corregidores
and the c orreqidores by
Corregidor Enrlquez, for deliveries
of mita^os and tribute that
were based on the out-dated
census

Greater difficulties stemmed from
the inability of
the caciques to control the
forasteros even when they were
still living where they had been
documented.
.

The

forasteros had no property to tie them
down and no
tradition of loyalty to anyone, and the
first attempts by
the caciques to subjugate them
resulted in their prompt
departure.
Some forasteros who were living in the
cities
moved into the countryside; some in the
country went into
the cities; and some from each migrated
into unconquered
territory.

if the caciques tried to follow the
forasteros

or if they tried to collect from the Indians
who were

absent from their pueblos, they then had to compete
with
the estancieros and chacareros for whom the Indians
worked

or other caciques who also laid claim to them.

Thus, they
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soon proved to be hopelessly
incapable of meeting their
new Obligations, an.
their correaidores tossed
the. in
jail to protect themselves
from retribution. Prom
their
cells, the caciaues pleaded
with the Viceroy to allow
them
^"^
to resign.
The imposition of mita
obligation on the previously
exempted frontier provinces
created other problems
The
Spanish residents of those areas
complained that their
safety was threatened, for the
Indians who lived in their
settlements served as a buffer
between them and the enemy
Indians.
Each of the frontier provinces
had been spared
from mita service by Toledo for
that reason, and their
Spanish inhabitants pleaded with
Palata to respect that
58
precedent.
.

In April of 1689, the Duque de
la Palata tried to stem
the tide of confusion and opposition
that his reforms had

caused with printed "Advertencias

.

"

He explained that no

Indian was required to pay more tribute
or serve in the
mita more often than he had under Toledo's
ordinances.
The tribute and mita quotas for the pueblos
had not

increased per capita, he argued, for now the
forasteros
the originarios would share the responsibilities
of

the villages in which they lived.

The one week of rest

in the mita was for the Indians' benefit as well,
he said,

because twenty Indians could now meet

a

pueblo's required

ten per week; and ten others could therefore stay home

With their families and
work their lands. The
Viceroy
also defended the incorporation
of the forasteros in
the
mita-again from a sense of
fairness-but
he cut their

tribute payments in half, and
he allowed a 40 per cent
reduction in the number of
mita^ that was required from
a pueblo based on their
number.
The "Advertencias" did very
little good.
They were
legal arguments to support
earlier legalisms, and they
simply confused matters further.
The modifications of
the tribute and mita obligations
of the forasteros were
not enough to quiet the voices
of opposition
The
overwhelming reality that the "Advertencias"
were unable
to counter was that Palata's
design and the de facto mita
could not be reconciled. The Viceroy
had banned service
in silver and he had included the
forasteros -albeit now
at a reduced percentage.
The caciques had to deliver
their full contingents of mitayos in
persons, including
the forasteros over whom they exercised
little or no
.

control.

The various means that they had developed
over

the previous ninety years to meet their
obligations in

silver were now obsolete.

The caciques were the key to

the mita in both its forms, but Palata's reforms
had made
it impossible for them to perform that role.

With most

of the caciques in jail or in hiding, the corregidores

tried to take up the slack by using their Spanish or

mestizo subordinates to deliver the mita

,

but they proved

Dust as unable as the

caci^

to deliver the
required

number of Indians to
Potosl.
Other historians have
argued that Palata's hard
work
was undermined by the
weaknesses in the Hapsburg
government or by his replacement
by the Conde de la
Monclova only a few months
after his reforms were
introduced. Palata had only
been successful, however,
to
the point where theory had
ended and implementation had
begun.
Then his claim to parity
with Francisco de Toledo
had faded. Toledo's mita,
it should be remembered,
"worked" only because three
other production elements kept
it from having to serve as
a forced labor system.
For
Palata there was no technological
breakthrough, and there
were no piles of desmontes, and
thus there was no 1680s
boom to attract the Indians to
Potosl.
other things had
changed since the 1570s as well.
Palata, unlike Toledo,
had to contend with the increased
abilities of the priests,
the corregidores the caciques and
especially the Indians
to protect their interests.
Potosi, meanwhile, was no
longer the economic monolith that it
had once been.^^
,

The Council of the Indies had reserved
judgement on

the census and the repartimiento until
the results and the

effects of the Viceroy's program were known.

By 1689, that

decision was beginning to look very propitious.

When the

Duque de la Palata boarded ship at Callao, he left
Peru

with the intention of personally defending his actions

,

the council against the
complaints that had been
leveled
against the™. He carried
with hi. a copy of the
volume
that he had ordered to
be compiled on the census
and the
iSEartiHiento, a copy of his relaci6n
and other pertinent
materials." But while he was
en route to Spain-in
Portobelo, Panama-the Duque
died." His side of the story
would have to be told, thereafter,
by those
docuxnents

alone
The council of the Indies did
not have the opportunity
to review Palata's materials
until 1692. The ship that was
carrying his possessions arrived
in Cadiz late in 1690, but
the late Viceroy's belongings
were not brought ashore,
despite the continual efforts of his
secretary to obtain
his papers.
Early in 1692, however, the Council
was able
to obtain copies of the volume
on the census and
the

repartimiento and Palata's relacion from
Contador Pedro
Antonio de Castillo. Thus, by the time
that the Council
began its deliberations on the 1683 enumeration
and the

1689 repartimiento. the Conde de la Monclova had
been the

Viceroy of Peru for two years.

Indeed, he had already

reversed most of the reforms that his predecessor
had
tried to institute, and he had drastically reduced
the

number of Indians in the mita ordinaria at Potosi.

Palata

had been able to finish his repartimiento because of
the

delay in the arrival of a successor; the two years that
the Council had to wait to see his records had provided
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Monclova with ample time to
disassemble it.
The Viceroy Conde de la
Monclova
The conde de la Monclova
sent his first report from
Peru on March 15, 1690.
addition to the problems that
the realm was having with
pirates, a mercury shortage
and
the aftermath of the 1689
earthquake, the new Viceroy
noted
the general commotion that
had been caused by the 1683
census and the reforms of the
Duque de la Palata. He did
not elaborate, but he did show
a marked aversion to
the
PotosI mita. Monclova questioned
the need for draft labor
in mining operations, for he
had just come from New Spain
where no such system existed. He
argued, furthermore, that
any man-whether an Indian or
not-was destroyed more by
one month of forced labor than by
a year of voluntary,
paid, work.^^

m

When the news that a new Viceroy had
arrived in Lima
reached Upper Peru, the already hefty
volume of complaints
about Palata 's program from the provinces
increased.

Added to the themes that were characteristic
of the
earlier letters was a particular emphasis on
the

Indians'

flight into the yungas

.

The priests were quick to point

out that the loss of the Indians to "infidel"
territory
not only hurt the Peruvian economy, it also damaged the

crown's claim that it was christianizing the Indians.

The

correqidores and their lieutenants reported that they had

been forced to resort
to search-and-capture
raids to round
up the nuta^, often
returning after dar. to
apparently
deserted villages to pick
up the handful of Indians
who had
hidden during the day. The
corre^idores also said
that it

was impossible for the.
to provide the forasteros
who were
returning to their pueblos
with lands, as Palata had
promised; the Spanish titleholders
refused to vacate their
properties unless they were paid
for them.^'^

Interspersed among the common themes
of the complaints
from the priests, the caciques
and the corregidores were
some particularly poignant
portrayals of the horrors
of

the mita.

One priest recounted, after a
round-up of his
Indians for the mita, that one of
the men that he had been
instructing came before him and other
priests in chains
and screamed, "Look Fathers at the
beneficent God that you
have brought to our land!"^^

The complaints from the provinces found
a receptive
ear in the Viceroy Conde de la Monclova,
but the provincial
groups were not the only ones that were unhappy
with

Palata

's

reforms.

The Gremio de azogueros— the group that

ostensibly stood to benefit the most from the new

repartimiento— was also upset.

The azogueros objected to

the fact that sixteen mills had been denied mitayos

,

to

the assignment of the Indians in complete ayllus and to
the 2,829-Indian mita ordinaria

.

Like the other interests,

the azogueros looked to Monclova to rectify what they

considered to be an unfair
reformation of the ^ita."
Did the a^oaueros have
a reason to complain?
Palata
said that the effective
mita ordinaria had fallen
to
1,608 Indians before his changes
were introduced.^" An
increase to 2,329 would seem,
therefore, to be
a

significant improvement, but only
from a distance.
The
azoqueros had argued
for years
vears that
that- the number
u
y =u j.ur
of mltayos
at PotosI was low to prove
the need for a census and
a new
repartimiento all the time understating
the number of
nitaios that they received in
silver.
Corregidor Enrlguez
reported that 1,541 mitayos and
1,713 mingas were working
in the mines and the mills in
1682, or a total work
,

force

of 3,253 Indians.

Assuming that the mingas were hired

with the money that the caciques
delivered for service in
silver, then the 2,829 mitayos that
Palata had provided
for in his repartimiento represented
a drop of 400 Indians,
not an increase.
The inclusion of the forasteros, whose

inexperience and absenteeism were quickly
apparent,
combined with the lowered official mita ordinaria
to drive
the effective number of mitayos still lower.
Furthermore,
the ban on service in silver cut off an
important source

of capital and it prevented the azogueros from
hiring

skilled mingas with the mita in silver contributions.
azogueros were also left without any leverage to use

against the capitanes enteradores

.

With the complaints about Palata

's

census and his

The

reforms coming in from
all quarters, Monclova
called a
junta to consider these
issues for December 16
1690."
The a^oaueros agreed
to send Corregidor
Enrlquez at a
cost Of 35,000 eesos, to
represent their interests.'^
He
was joined by Oidor XimSne.
Lobaton, Oidor GonzSlez de
Santiago, Fiscal-Oidor
Matlas Lagflnez Fiscal-Protector
MarquSz Luis Antonio de
Oviedo and Contador Joseph
de
Urquiano." The junta met
thirty-three times from
December 18, 1690 to May
12, 1691.'6 ^
^^^^
prepared and later read to a
larger group of officials,
including other oidores, the
alcaldes del crimen and other
contadores , on the last day of May.
Monclova then asked
Lagfinez and Protector Pedro
de Flgueroa DSvila (who had
replaced MarquSz) to draft proposals
to deal with the
problems that had been caused by
Palata's program, which
had been outlined in the relaoiSn.
Figueroa's offering
was read to the assembly in the three
meetings that
followed July 20.
Lagfinez began to read his statement
on August 3, but because it was 668
folios
,

,

,

,

^^^^

long, the

Viceroy grew impatient and on August
brief.

7,

ordered him to be

When Lagfinez refused, Monclova directed the

monstrous missive to the relatores for editing.^'
Lagfinez did summarize his thoughts, however,
in a

letter to the crown.

He said that he had read all of the

complaints about Palata's census and the subsequent
reforms,
and that he had considered the arrival of Monclova to
be an
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opportunity to correct the
situation.

LagQne. accused the

-oaueros of pure deceit in their
correspondence with
Madrid, and of subjecting
the unfortunate Indians
to an
oppression worse than slavery,
indeed, he said that if
the aitayos were slaves,
then the azogueros would
treat
them better, for they would
then have an economic stake
in their survival.
The Viceroy was impressed
with Lagunez' arguments,
if not With the length of
his discourse, and he herded
the
assembly toward the adoption
of these twelve proposals:
^*
2

3.

^*

q

°f the Duque de la Palata,
based ""on
reformed.
Thf^ i-hS
t ^r^J^^
^^^^1 another decision
on thP
the L?r^
matter was reached,
on the 33,423
originarios in the sixteen provinces
historically obligated to the mita. that were
That the same not be true for the~31
031
forasteros that were listed as residents
of
tne sixteen provinces.
^.^""^ additional provinces, the
parroquia
o$^cSan Pedro, the
of
sixteen pueblos and the
curatos be freed from mita obligation.
^t^^^^^""
That a new census be conducted of the
forasteros
to determine the amount of tribute
that
would pay, and that until that time they they
pay the same amount as yanaconas not to would
exceed
seven pesos per year.
That the mita continue to be determined on
the
basis of one-seventh of the population that
was subject to it.
That two weeks of rest be reinstituted in
the
place of the one week introduced by the Duaue
de la Palata.
That in the place of fifty Indians for each
mill,
the sum of forty be provided, and therefore that
thirty-four or thirty-five mills receive mitayos.
That the decision as to which would receive them
and which would not be based on information
provided by experienced but disinterested persons.
That the figures included for the originarios in
the Palata census remain the basis of government
,

6.

7.

'

8.

9.

at the established rate

allowances

These twelve points were
sent to the Contador de
retasas on April 24, 1692,
and they were despatched in
printed form to the provinces
three days later.
The new
repartimiento was drafted by the
Contador as well, and it
was issued as a general order
on May 8, 1692.
Following
the instructions of the Viceroy
and the guidelines that
were provided by the twelve
points, mita obligation fell
only on the 31,707 priginarios
who were resident in the
sixteen provinces. The resultant
1,367-Indian mita
ordinaria was divided among the owners
of thirty-four mills
according to information that was provided
by Enrlquez,
Oviedo and Ximenez Lobaton. Twenty-three
mills were left
without any mitayos at all. The remaining
seven mitayos
per week were assigned to the maintenance of
the lagunas
.

Monclova also ordered that travel allowances were
to be
paid to the mitayos at the rate of two reales for
every
four leagues traveled, and he lowered the mingas

'

wage to

the same thirty reales that the mitayos were to receive.

^"^
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The azo2ueros had protested
when Palata assigned them
2,829 mita^ per week.
They now found themselves
with
less than half that number,
and with twenty-three of
their
mills denied any access to
mitayos. This was hardly
what
they had in mind when they
contributed 35,000 pesos to
send Corregidor Enrlquez to
Lima.
He took the precaution
Of breaking the bad news to
them in a letter from Lima of
April 28, 1692. One can only
imagine what might have

happened to him had he been in
Potosi at the time.
Corregidor explained that the Viceroy

The

and the junta had

agreed with Lagunez on four basic
points:

a)

that the

present generation of azogueros could
not claim credit for
the quintos that had been produced
in the
past;

b)

that the

pretension that the azogueros worked only to
serve the
crown was absurd, because everyone worked
for himself
first;

c)

that the mitayos

,

and their low wages, had been

a gift to them from the crown,

not their right; and

d)

that

the azogueros were not as indispensable as
they believed.

Enriquez said that Lagunez thought that other mining
centers were more important than Potosi, and that he
had

noted that they had no mitas.

The Corregidor conceded that

the azogueros would be hurt, especially by the increase in
the mitayos

'

wage, but he insisted that

lie

had been unable

to prevent the reforms.^^

Bartolome de Arzans would later write that the
azogueros had misplaced their faith in putting it in
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Enrlquez, but he aid
did creditcredit t-K^
the n
Corregidor with preventing
the complete abolition
of the
.^cording to ArzHns,
Monclova and Lag.nez were
determined to extinguish
the
system, and they had
already agreed upon its
abolition when
Enriquez convinced the.
that the impact of such
an act on
the royal treasury would
be too great.
The azo^ueros apparently
learned of the assembly's
decisions even before they
received the Corregidor' s
letter,
for on April 1, 1692, they
proposed to the crown that
Archbishop Gonzalez de Poveda
be named to replace Monclova
as Viceroy. 34 On August
19, 1692, they complained

^.

to the

latter that the thirty-real
wage for the mitayos would
ruin them financially ^5 The
azogueros told Charles II
that they would not be the only
ones who would be hurt by
the Viceroy's actions; his royal
income would suffer as
well, and the originarios would
now have to bear the full
weight of the mita while the disloyal
forasteros would be
unjustly freed from that obligation.
Palata's six years
of diligent effort had been undermined,
they
.

argued, by

the ignorance of the government officials
in Lima.^^

Monclova sent Enrlquez back into the PotosI
lions' den
on June 10, 1692, with orders to enforce
the assembly's
resolutions. Arriving on October 26, the Corregidor
also

carried a secret commission that provided him with
alter
ego status to the Viceroy, and therefore with the
power
to adjust the repartimiento in any fashion that
he deemed
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was necessary.

Enrl,uez published the
ter.s of the April
27 edict, and he
that the cafiitanes
enteradores and
the Gre.io de azogueros
respond to its twelve
points. He
also ordered the veedores
and the CapitSn .ayor
de la „ita
to report on the owners
of the thirty-four .ills
that had
been assigned jota^
those of the twenty-three
that
had not.^^

asW

Enrlquez found the capitanes
and the azogueros locked
in a struggle over which
repartimiento they had to comply
with.
The azogueros insisted
that Palata's quotas of
-ita^os be delivered, and when
the capitanes failed to meet
those levels, the azogueros
demanded rezagos
The
.

^^P^^^"^^ considered the Monclova repartimiento
to be in
effect, and they accused the
azogueros of not paying the
mita^^ the increased wages to which
they were entitled.
The veedores and the CapitSn
mayor reported that the
twenty-three mills that had been stripped
of mitayos were
owned by widows, absentees and others,
and that they had
a long history of abuses.
The twenty-seven azogueros who
owned the thirty-four mills, on the other
hand, had viable
refining operations and mines.
Thus, the decisions that
Enrlquez and the others had made in Lima,
regarding which
mills should receive the mitayos were
confirmed by the
,

veedores and CapitSn mayor's report.
The Viceroy responded to the azogueros

'

August 19

memo rial on October 22, 1692, by ordering that the
twelve

.

points were to be obeyed
without a.en..ent. The
Corre.i.or
gathered the azo^ueros
together on Nove:„ber
24, and he read
them the Viceroys letter.
They responded that it
was
Simply impossible to pay
the increased wage to
the mita^
They would wait for a
reply to the Archbishop's
October 18
petition to Monclova on their
behalf, they said, before
commenting further.

When Gonzalez de Poveda
died two days later, the
-oaueros understood that their chances
for redemption had
perished with him. They went
to Enrlquez and proposed a
compromise:
a twenty-four-real per
week wage for the
nitaYos.52
corregidor had already conferred
with his
advisors and concluded that thirty
reales was unrealistic,
so he accepted the azogueros'
offer.
Enrlquez explained
to Monclova that It would be
unwise to force them to break
the law by insisting that they
comply with an impossible
directive
The azogueros wrote to the crown
on December

1692

9,

to report that they were still under
siege by the ignorant

government officials in Lima.^^

The royal treasury

officials of Potosl found themselves in the
peculiar

position of supporting the azogueros in their
complaint
about the twenty-three mills that had been
deprived
of

mitayos.

The Viceroy had told them, the officials said,

in a letter of May 29,

1692, that the collection of debts

from the owners of the twenty-three mills would have to

-it

untiX t.e Shoe, of
his .efo^s had .een
a.sor.e.
the ajoaueros.
The officials complained,
nevertheless,
that any stoppage of
silver production in the
twenty-three
^iXls would permanently
prevent them from collecting
those
debts. ^
The azo2ueros got some
relief in June of 1693,
with
the arrival of a new
Corregidor de Potosl, the
Conde de
Velayos. He had been kept
waiting in Lima for three
years
by Monclova, so that
Enrlquez might complete the
process
Of introducing his reforms
for the mita and the
collection
of tribute.
The Viceroy's gambit had
been important, for
no sooner had Velayos
arrived in Potosi than he began
to
parrot the azogueros arguments.
He reported to the crown
that the azogueros treated
the Indians very well, and
that
they paid the mitayos their
wages promptly and without
incident.
The mita should be returned
to the status quo
ante, the Corregidor argued,
because the number of Indians
that Monclova had assigned was
woefully inadequate. The
^aci^Hes, the corregidores and the
priests, he contended,
had unduly influenced the Viceroy.
The two-week rest
period, for example, was not necessary;
the mitayos
'

currently worked during their off weeks
as mingas
and
quite voluntarily. The mills that Monclova
had denied
Indians, moreover, would cost the crown some
,

300,000

£esos in lost quintos every year that they were
out of
production.

The Conde de la
Monclova's attack on the
azo^ueros
and on the de facto
was not over.
an interi.
report to the crown of
August 15, 1692, the Viceroy
had
not only defended the
twelve points of the April
27 order
he had proposed that
the rait, be abolished
altogether.
Monclova argued that Lagunez
had proven beyond any
doubt
that Potosi was no longer
important enough to warrant
the
continuation of such an oppressive
institution

m

as the

mita.

The Viceroy left the final
decision to the Council
of the indies and the King,
but he strongly suggested
that
all Of the problems that
were caused by the mita could
best
be solved by its extermination.
included with his proposal
was an account of his correspondence
with Archbishop LihSn
during the early part of 1692,
which Monclova claimed
showed a change of opinion on the
Archbishop's part against
the mita.
This was particularly important
because Linan's
arguments while Archbishop of Charcas
had helped to defuse
the abolition movement led by the
Conde de Lemos fifteen
years earlier.
The Viceroy repeated his call for the

elimination of the mita when he sent the crown
an account
of Enrlquez' activities at Potosi on
1693.^^
October
21,

The various post-Palata representations
about the mita,

from all sides of the issue, began to arrive in
Madrid

during 1693.

In March,

the Council's Fiscal responded to

Monclova's March 15, 1690 comments on the commotion that
had been generated by Palata's reforms.

He suggested that

the council adopt a
wait-and-see attitude until
further
reports were received.
The Fiscal was decidedly
opposed
to the mita, however,
for he amplified the
Viceroy's
co:nment that there were
no mining repartinuen^
in New
Spain, and he dwelt at
length on the unsavory means
by
which the Indians were dragged
to PotosI and kept there.
on April 2, 1694, the Council
of the Indies ordered
that all of the materials in
its archives on the mita,
from LinSn's viceroyalty
forward, be brought together.
Soon thereafter, on July
13, Charles II responded to the
azo^ueros' latest petition by
ordering the Council to
resolve the conflict between them
and the Conde de la

Monclova once and for all

time.-'-^"'-

The decision that the Council faced
was not whether it
should confirm Palata's repartimiento
or that of Monclova.
Rather, once it had received the latter's
August 15, 1692
report, it had to find a compromise
between Palata's

reformed mita and Monclova
abolished.

's

proposal that the system be

Given Charles' preoccupation with his quintos

,

which was more than evident in his July 13, 1694
edict,
the Council decided to confirm the twelve
points in

Monclova

's

April 27, 1692 directive.

continue, and thus the royal quintos

The mita would

but at a lower level

,

than Palata had provided for and hopefully free of the

problems that his program had created

"''^^
.

The Council of the Indies passed final judgement on the

the matter in January
of 1697.

The Viceroy's twelve

points were transformed
by the Councilors into
nine of
their own:

2
3

That the mitayos and the
mingas were to r^r^Ur.
^^^^"^^
the same wage, without
ex^i^fen.
^°
service in silver
Th^^ ^H^""^
That
the substitutes were to be n;,iH
^^"^ thf ^^"^^
wage as the mitayos
That the travel allowances
were to be paid
four^Llgues
?ra^^led1er°d^y^?^-^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^ allowance was to be
ITil toHh^Jr''^^^^""^
^^^^^ departure for
^
Po^osl?
.

4

^'

^*
7
8
».

Wo

^^;^"^^tayos were to be paid directly,
^ Corregidor de PotSsi and a notary.
^hft ^h^
treasury officials at Potosi
ll^l
"^^intam lists of the mitayos
^h^^
That I?,
the Indians were not to work
hours or period of their obligationbeyond the
/under
unuer
^
any
.

pretense.

^'

'

^^^^ °f obligation had been
completed, ^^f^""
the mitayos were to return home. 103

A significant addition to this list
was the Council's
proposal that the office of Corregidor

de PotosI no longer

be sold.

Enrlquez' performance had made it clear,
it said,
that the post was too important to
be trusted to the
highest bidder. Those who had been nominated
to fill the

office in the future, the Council argued,
should be

reimbursed for the donations that they had made
to win
nomination; and in the future, the corregidores de

Potosi

should be named solely on the basis of ability

"'^'^
.

The crown sent the Council's rulings to Peru in
a

series of cgdulas of February 18, 1697.

The response to

the nine points in Peru was generally pdsitive, with the

exception of rne
the tirst.
firc;+-

mv,^
The

j.
Audiencia
de Charcas, the

^

tv

royal treasury officials
and others noted that
the
would not work for the
lower wages that the mita^
received, and they argued
that skilled laborers
should be
paid more than unskilled
workers.

Previous royal and viceregal
decrees had been ignored
in Charcas, and it would
be a mistake to assume that
the
1697 cidulas resolved all of
the outstanding issues
concerning the mita. indeed,
the Audiencia de Charcas
said that the lowering of the
mingas wages really would
mean very little, because the
Indians were all paid
'

according to quotas, not by the
day.

The azogueros were

more unhappy than ever, for the
two repartimientos of
the preceding decade had disrupted
the de facto mita to
such an extent that confusion was
the order of the day
in the provinces -"-^^
.

One problem that the Palata repartimiento
had created
was the involvement of non- caciques in
the delivery of the

niita^.
(Chayanta)

In 1693,

for example, the caciques of Aymaya

complained to the Audiencia de Charcas that

Monclova and Enrlquez had required them to deliver
more
Indians to Potosi than they were accustomed to
sending.

Their corregidor had answered their protests to him
by

sending two judges to their village to round up the
Indians
for the mita
to strike.

.

They and their men waited for Easter Sunday

Once everyone was at mass, they blocked all the
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means of escape fro.
the church and began
arresting the
Indians. Many were chased
up, down and around
the altar
itself. With the judges
using the gated baptismal
area as
a Dail for those
that they had already
captured.
The
caciques were outraged by
the judges' behavior,
and they
said that it would be
a very long ti.e
before the Indians
returned to Aymaya, let
alone went to mass.

Another problem was the
question of immunity from the
inita for the forasteros.
They had been involved in
the
system extralegally even
before Palata incorporated
them
in his repartimiento,
either in person or via
contributions
Of money for service in
silver.
The exemption from mita
obligation that Monclova had ordered
for the forasteros on
April 21, 1692, and which the
Council had confirmed in the
1697 cedulas, took some time to take
effect.

in 1698,

four

forasteros who were residents of
Paria-Alonso Chui,
Pascual Parejava, Felipe Canasa and
Alonso Choque-were
taken to Potosi as mitayos by capitan
enterador Martin
Challapa.
They were set free only after a
protracted legal
battle in the Audiencia de Charcas."^^^
On the whole, however, the reforms that
the Conde de
la Monclova introduced in 1692 created
an official mita

that was a miniature of the system that
Toledo had founded
120 years earlier.

With only thirty-four of the mills

receiving the 1,367 mitayos each week, the ratio that
Toledo had used was paralleled (he had assigned
4,000
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Indians to 100 ™iU3,
the de facto

^

More importantly,
„onclova allowed
to function once again.
He permitted
.

service in silver, he
exempted the forasteros
and he
reduced the caciques,
quotas of ^itaios to levels
that were
possible to .eet. The
Viceroy did not destroy
Palata-s
^SE^££iaiento; it was in the process
of self-destructing
When he arrived in Peru.
Monclova tailored a new
official
Mta to fit the realities of late-seventeenth
century Upper
Peru,
in so doing, he guaranteed
that the system would
survive into the eighteenth
century.
Summary
The reign of Charles II has
been characterized by some
as the epitomy of Hapsburg
decadence.
The Council of the
Indies is supposed to have been
ineffective, the colonial

bureaucracy is said to have been inept
and corruption is
alleged to have pervaded all the

levels of the government.

From the limited perspective that is
provided by the
administration's approach to the PotosI mita,

however, the

opposite seems to have been true.

The Duque de la Palata

completed an eighty-three province census,
and he drew up
a new repartimiento— a goal which
had eluded nine of his
predecessors.

The Conde de la Monclova chaired a lengthy

investigation of the problems that had been caused by
Palata 's program, and he designed a repartimiento
of
own.

his

The Council of the Indies studied both repartimientos

and it then produced
a compromise
solution of its own.
The Hapsburg government
of Peru functioned;
it may not
have solved all of the
mita's problems, but it
did a
rather remarkable job.
The Duque de la Palata
completed the general census
through Sheer persistence.
His reEartimiento , however,
included too many novelties
and it was implemented
much
too quickly.
The changes that he
Introduced were

complicated and largely
misunderstood by the caciques
and the Indians that they
affected, and the speed with
which the alterations were
enforced created a crucible
effect.
The Indians- flight and
the caciques inability
to deliver the mitayos in
persons were accentuated.
-

The

abolition of service in silver
and the inclusion of the
"^'^^

"

impossible for the caciques to meet

their obligations at all.

Palata had been motivated by a
sense of justice—of
parity of the forasteros with the
originarios -and direct
royal orders to increase the number
of mitayos that was
serving at Potosi. His repartimiento
incorporated those
elements into its design. But because it
was based on
the premise that the Toledan mita
could be re-established,
the Palata repartimiento ignored the fact
that the caciques
made the system work. They delivered the
Indians
and the

silver that met the obligations of their
provinces.

inclusion of the forasteros and the ban on service
in

The

Silver

,,.3 „aae the

made it fail.

^
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„ore fair, ... the,
aXso

The Conde de la Monclova
arrived in Peru after a
successful tenure as viceroy
of New Spain.
The lack of
iSEartimlento labor for the Mines
of that real™ led hi.
to question the need
for the PotosI ^ita.
His initial
doubts about the system
were reinforced by the
avalanche
Of complaints about
Palata's reforms that was
waiting for
him upon his arrival.
Those complaints were
transformed
by an equally unsympathetic
Fiscal LagOnez into a
668-fclio
Indictment of the mita, and they
eventuated in the

Viceroys twelve points of April

27,

1692.

The official

mita was reduced to a mere
third of what it had been under
Toledo, the forastercs were
freed from mita obligation
and
service in silver was permitted.
The caciques were again
able to play their traditional
role, and the mita lived on.
The twelve points were not the
Conde s final statement
on the mita, however. They
were soon followed by
his

proposal that the system be abolished.

Charles II assigned

the Council of the Indies the
responsibility for

reconciling the azoqueros

complaints about Monclova 's

actions and the viceroy's call for the
abolition of the
mita. Because the King was concerned
that his quintos
from PotosI should continue, the Council
chose to adopt
the twelve points as a compromise between
potosino

interests and viceregal policy.

"
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a la
execucion de lo que resultase Y embia el informe
que S
hecho en racon desto, de que dice remitio Dup.do
al dho
15.

Virrey como se le
m ^O"

Charcas 270, no.
crown. La Plata,

o

^^Jf^egidores"

;
and AGI
de Poveda to ths

pfelids^^ r
24 XII tffl?
4,

670 sxendo Virrey de
estos

ReyLfde?

p|ru!"°

"'""forme sobre si
combi;ne''hazer''pf??icfn^; T;
doles „ina e
"^^^
yngenL"erio?osr"^sen?\^\'^
GonzSlez Poveda to tht. n„„,,= i'
by President
16. VIII. 1532, 12
P^l^ta, La Plata,
fs
th^^^^
AGI, Charcas 270,
"-"^ioned in
ni!
(Ke'^ote
,

.

U

17.
18.

if,

AGI, Charcas 270,
no. 12A (see note
16).
Crahan, 397.

^""-ribed In
"note
??f"ij°^<A=l"charc\rl70?'no'%3'c""
J3C—
see
II)/ 25-32.
30, ChaotPr
The Cr-^m^r^ a

Charcas 268, L"?
AG?^"
aifSfi^i
tie between the two
P^l^ta notes the
LrT^r^^T^'
5) and AGI, charcls 270
^^^^ ^°te
^f'th 'n°'
to the crown, Lima,
P^l^ta
19 li ?68q
^"^T^
No.
Virrey del Peru
^
34.
El
I
de la'^mi^a df Potos?
reintegiacion
de que remite Cop?a' ITlTfl.'^^''
^^^^iene el Despacho
que es ?odo
a podido aplicasse
de indios a los
Mineros e Inaen?n ^^""^
acompana la consul ta que
^ ''''l^' ^
se h^zo no^^
'''"'''^^
Ministros en la Ciudad de
^^^^
la Plata v
dio este expediente:
^^^^^
^odo se
pLa
y
aue
presente lo
obrado en esta materia
Semite
co^a
d^^?
por Agosto de 1683 en
escrivio
qul d^o notizia
no?^zif
d^\^^^^^
de
hazerse la
numeraz.on „ 1"^^ r.Jt
^
^^e Viceroy-s
"Advert^ncils pa?a ife^ecuc^f
despachos de la
nueva retasa y ?epar?iml^n^n^
""'''^^
tener presentes !os co^^! ?
han de
^"tender
a los
indiosT" LiJ^a? 29 IV ?6m' .""T-^ ^^"^ "
Palata-s
^"
(see note 1) ^ VI," 2^-239
"Relaci6n"
Anof^"^*^
"Advertencias" is BNB, wis 4 ?= ?n?°PLf ^""^

%Tl,i%lliri%
'

w'/

^

'

Potos., ,.e han

^l^^^^^d^^^^^^^^

-
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"2-495.

Th5-TO:iber;tions o^\h=V^'^'''""" ^^'^la,
outlined by Palata in h7=
® "^^^ Acuerdo are
,
221-229, and in Cas"uo (1??'^=;="" '^^
1'
VI,
'^''"^^^ 270, no.
note 30, Chapter II),
33C-see
32v-44^
'

"'^---^
Chapter
°K
given in Palata's'-AdvertencLs"
(sL^no^;,^

f

AGI, Charcas 270, no.
14

21.

-te

"

30,

(see note 5).

such'; fiil^o in^Napl"^'
P""=iP^ted in just
oTIh^J
census
Kea^^aliend": sSrSorduo^^^s p\\^

OTie

^e^L'^^^

carta"q.fei Du^^de'Ia'p^?-."'

"'^"P" de

los obLpos
'
y P?elados'les?e'Reyno Para
q.e
p;ra
T/'^'^
los curas y Doctrinpr^= h7,7
encargasen S
su filigressia V la
Indios de
Prelados
en 7 de
Abril lis!?" 4
?hr^n^'^" ^
the ViH5?5;-s sfc^etarv
Vernal,
pll.'fj'^"^^
the priest| why

L

th^er^^'^^ere^^^^d^tin-r^he"^^^:!^^
'

porqe'^se !el

Curaf^ot?bo

'

SiSre?"p''r"
el Padron, porqe en
publioandolo
,ueL\^ in°L^L%"lar e",^^^SeTsl\^^
d^^^^e^SJ^-y^
seguir,
en las Irov^n^tff

assi conviene ae

nar;.

<.T

y
i
la
tenga VS. reserbada
""^^^ reciviendo los Padrones
de
remita para qe aqui me sirban de los
Libro
^

\,

curL

^^04-=,

r-^v^-,
Carta

rna^o?'
mayor por
no. donde pueda reconocer
hacen los Corregidores I quienes las diliqencias an^
se ha de cSme^er
la r5 HL'iend:
S'coste^?^
^'^^''^ ^""^^^ grabar con ellos
S los
Pnfnf^^
Pueblos de cuyo alivio,
"
remedio
y
se trata
Ezquerra Abadia, 491-492, briefly
notes this process.

irr^

'

24.

AGI, Charcas 270, no.

25.

AGI

(see note 70, Chapter VI).

1

Charcas 270, no. 15, second item (see
note
the quote there)

23— especially

.

AGN, Sala IX, 14-8-10, f. 244, "A los
cvras de las
^i--'
20.VII.1683
(by the Duque de
la
l^Pa^at^'f
Palata), ^^K^-^Z'"
1 f.
see AGI, Charcas 270, no. 15, second
Item (see note 23) for the same sentiments.
aIso o?
value:
AGI, Charcas 270, no. 16 (see note
2); and AGI,
26.

,

439

Charcas 270, no Ifl
council Of the indies
^^^"^ °^ the
on
that letter, Madrid,
°" tS'?».^°'
3 fs.
18. V. 1685,

n

27.
AGI, Charcas 270 nn
qve han de gvardar
^^em, "Instrvccion
los Corr=;J
"
general que se ha de
""""^cion
hazer
^of?
jurisdicion," by the
™°
su
Suque dl la pf
Lrma,
24.VII.1683,
14-f
ASN,
.n^?K
another instruction hi Sa!a r^ IX '1^-10- fs. 242-243.
general census a^d
^^^^^ «'^°"t tAe
those toat'^^i?
completion
SmI? 24!vir?683^"^??^^^
P?l^i^t"9.^"<^i^"-'
Palata's "RelaciSn"
(see noie 1), vi,'
2t7!l28f
28.
AGI, Charcas 270 nn i
f ^
and AGN, Sala IX,
'"^^
^8)
14-8-10,
242^2!? r'*^"
the change to two
'^^
^8)
For
years-^hilh took i^?
'

S

T

•

'

=;

.

.

3b 36, describes
Palata's deei=!-ir.n= „

^^^8-229.

Holmes,

repartimiento
^^"^"^ ^"<3 the
The Vicerov^s
^
2i.VIII.1683"(AGI Cha?r^«
°f
discusses this pJicess
2' ^1^°
lee ;
Council of the
Indies' end-of-the-cln^urv
'
21-see note 91, Chapter Ilf^nS^J?"^'
^73, no.
^""^
*'
Charcas
32 (see note 19)
270, no.
.

29.

^

AGI, Charcas 270, no.
15, first item (see note
27).

Charcas
'
27o!°no.*?^'(L'e"Sote'2'6°,'."°ndlG^^'^."°*^
'
^""^
Charcas 270, no.
'
(see note 19) .
32
to the croi^A,'Lima?'lo"Sf
Tsk'^i
Da quenta a
d del e^J^H^
general de los'indios fremiti
'

xitt:\T,.rrH

^•V

^^^^tdel Peru,
numerazion

^^^^
El Virrey

-^^^^-,^L^?frdu^daTq;i

^^l"

repa^^idrpa'?: L"\°ltfss^!" numeraziones que si le h^^^
32.

AGI, Charcas 270, no

?ror.e-:z%°n --.^^

20A

J-L-r
1^

"Potm-

=>

i

-,

-"re\-L^^ra

numeracion g.l de los
Indios," Lima 12 VI leT^
(?--the copy is dated, by Bernal,
10.VI.1685r lo ?;
v^?
Villegas said that one of the other
results of ^ho.
appeared that there were
more priests
mure
priefts in some places than were
necessary. Perevra
""'^"^""^ ^ "transfojmaciln^^'^^'
de^ogkffc"! gene^ri!"

L^n^r

33.

AGI, charcas
270, no. 20A <see
note 32)

end-of-the-Sentury^sSllSa^r"?.^'^ °^ ^'^^ ^"-^i" in its
note 91, Chapter
''''""^ ^73, no.
L)
21-see
SLt^^''
270 no. 21, the Dug^e
1^^^?""^
Charcll
de la Pa
Palata
to
16.11.1686, 2 fs
the
crown,
,,7
"PI
Lima
se le^ofre^e Jon
^^P-sen?;
l^^^e
;.islt lllVest^l
<^el ano pasado
,ue trata^L'^f^Le^a^i^;
^-^^

"

•

fr.^.'^

19/the Council orthe'lndr^^?^^'
1685,

270 no
fs.;
Madrid "'25 V
2
"A 25 de Mavn
Pone en las R.s
^Los d^^v
de la Palata, en
que da auenta ^1 1 ""^^ ad junta del Duque
en orden al mejor
^^^^ disponiendo
cobro de ?a nifn S
el Cons.o dice lo
^^^^^
que se
ofreof

^L^T/t'^^^'

•*

•

L

sxgn and "Co.o parlce
a? conL' •o^:^.itf
a'^^br^c!'^
AGI, charcas 270,
36.
no. 21 (see note
34).

^

to th^ croln.'iZi:%'l^\Tse
J""^ ^^^^
Palata
'I'
Da guenta a v.M.
'^^ ""^^^^^
Peru.
d^l b^en
en que se halla la
Numeracion g.l y acomn^S= estado f^"'
Retasa de lis que se
Provision de
han dr/''^"^^^^^
las de la Provide
hechas ya
v^^cas
ofreze en esta matLia "
^°
le
Thf^n
^/i"^
270, no. 22A, "Nueva P^ovic^nn
Charcas
S^^n"""^^^
de pagar los
'^^^^^^^
lndiorderRepa??i^Ln^^%"^
Prova de Vilcas guaman
° '^^ ^^^"^ ^^^^^^
la
que
f
estuM
Juan Palomino como subzesor^o
fncomendados
en Don
t
en la r1 hazienda por
^^1°^^^° Y oy lo estan
f!l?I
ilt"!
" sin fecha,
fs.
For another defense o?
25
270, no. 26, the Duque le
la Pallta'to
-La
Faiata to the crown, Lima,
11. X. 1687, 1 f
"Fi ^TiTt
estado en que s4 hflla^^^ del Peru. Represents a V.M: el
de los indios de ^as Prn...- ^^^^^S"^^
Numeraci6n g 1
primer aviso remii^r/un manf^ ^T""^
el
^
'

f

t

.

deste negocio.-'^Th'ougrnot'^erLc?
'?a?ata'"" '
has gone better than
he had expected.
38.

AGI, Charcas 270, no. 22

(see note 37).

indio^ assrvo'luntarios
'ITnllZs''^^^^^^
^^'^uilas
las Haziendas de E™?ni'oo

^

4

T^^^
^^"^^^

'

•

,

^^'^^ ^
y agregados I

ae la Palata ... en virtud
de Cedula de su Magestad

and reproduced as an
the John Carter Brown a^pilfS^
^^""^"^
^°Pi^ in
EibraJ^ Prnl^
NO. 22).
It is not Sated save
^^^^ L
fo? ihr^^^'
for handwritten dates
(spaces
left
are
^
.P^""
Sala IX, 14-8-10, fs ?8-44bllLf
^^^^^^^
is
AGN,
^^PY
?hi;
^^^t ^°Py is dated Los
16.x. 1687.

W^'r/^'

^

Reyes,

Zavala, Servicio personal,
ii, 180-183.

40.

2^A. ^Copia de Carta ,.e
ex.mo^-s.o?^Ou^:i:--J
el
^scrivio
al s.or
Arzobispo de los ch;,rn;,=
juntandose
con el
Presste^de aquella rJ a^!^,^^^^
^^^^^^'^^
de Potosi
confiriesen la reoartic^ni^^^?' ^
a aquellos AzogSI?:rc'Sn?SrL'
'^^^^^^
l^s
*

ereS'dr!

de cada uno." Lima, 18
haziendas
III Tfifta
no. 29, President
''^^^^^^ ^70,
ihrisJav^l Me^fa fo-;H''^''
crown.
La Plata,
21.1.1689, 1 f
"Tnfn^^=
en
^f^ando
Potosi
desp.o de Arm da
en el

VirLy Duc^rde l^'pa^L^fpra'^
r'^^.
t^^^alT'l'''
sese en su Comp.a
aq.lla
a

enrriquez correg.or de aa

ciu d a?

Ua

1

v7i ?^

i
°-

S^""^^
^'^
^^i^

ymportava

poner este
punta^ a PntnlT
fjuntax
r el.^^^^
Potosi p^^
dpc;r';:^or^im to
- ,
pr faita
®^
halla
^
de Inos". ACT rLr-^=o
??A
Charcas
270,
no.
31, the Duque de la i'aiata
Palat^
to the crown, ' Lima, 18 it ifiSQ
u
^
i
i
ri,

'

L

Ministros de
j^Ata
^econocimiento
de todo lo
obrado^n
if M
^f""
obrado
en la
Numeracion g.i
de los Indies para la
Potosi," La Plata, 19 .X.1688,
6 fs ^^Pa?a?a
no.'^ "^t^l
/^i^ta notes
that the census took longer than had
Ll^'
"Advertencias" (see note^9)
Ezquerra
Ai^adla,
^aSia 4Sf
d?.''''
492, discusses the impact of the earthquake.
d^ la

?
Sudaf de'lfpf
^^^^

.

1^' <^u-^^^^ relates the work of the committee in his
"o
Relaci6n
(see note 1), VI, 230; and in AGI, Charcas
270,
AGI,
Charcas 270, nos.
5?*J^ 0?^/""°^^ ""^^^
^^^^^
^^ote
^^^^
the crown soon
u

L

•

after his arrival that he believed the general
census would
solve Potosi 's problems, and that he felt
fifty mitayos

AGI, Charcas 270,
no 27a
^/ "u.
^ /A ^o««
(see note 41).
44.
AGI, Charcas 270,
^?22Heros said fifty-seven no =3?a ^f^^ "^^^^
43.

•

The

Gremio de azogueros
<^ Deputies of the
to the c^own* III
fs.
Potosi,
Palata said 2 821 Tn^^f
21.vili.i692 10
^^in-ri. in AG?,'6ha'rcaf 27r
nr%2'"f
Crespo, "La 'Mita,'"
^^^^
19);"^
182
^
uses
^h^^
figure,
"Relaci6n" (see note
his
1) Pa^f^!
figure (VI, 230)? NOTE.
^'^^^ ^^^i^^s
ihe%;^^^^
Hanke and Rodriguez
is incor?^^f^?S''^S^^°^ provided by
mark thousands has
^^^^^^
^^ed to
bein ren^^^o^*
2,829 Indians in the Sta
""^^^ ^ "°"
thus the
nr^?
20,829.
"^^'^^P^^sented as
The Viceroy
the areas added by
later note
Palata in ap? ""^JJ^^^^^
declaration by the Conde de
273, no. 4A, a
m'
1692, 2 fs.
5"^^^'
^he Council ol the ?ndiel?'
summary (AGI, Charcas
^nd-of-the-century
273 no
2^^!
provides the total of 56
Chapter A)
04e
;.J
~u^
break-down of that
figure.
Ezquerra Abadla 49? f
^^^^2,829 Indians were
included in the mita
ordlnar?; fnf
the newly added
regions on 495-49Tr Se
mtta -nr^?
a strict
one-third of one-seventh ^,T^^^^^^ ""^^
Toledo's
"see
n:te'45
f^ti"
the varying
45 for
percentages)
7
The thr<=o
ento, over those !den?ilied
£epJti|ibv
gSL^I^^
Gonzalez
de
Santlii^^^
included a second nwn^J k . ?
d^GuzmSn
(AGI, Chapels 270
Maldon^do
nS 32I
""^^^
^o^ld later
figure in a battle ^^ly. It"^^^
usi Of those'll^f
Antonio de Gu zmgn Ma ldonado MllT'to''
don
Lhrf'ilos cuarenta capitSn
indios
mita de su ingenio de r^n^l
de
"'^^^^
que le ha qu??a3o el
conSne'vel'.v"
villa," Potosi, x.iv
^T^^^^gi^^^ de dicha
l.IV-?9
iy.V.1699,
V 16 9 9 91
ir?^'
fs. (MC 1148; MOM 694)
'

m

^e^^l~¥

T

re^LIS^s
.

1

.

,

'

f
'

se extiende la obligaci6n de
dar
las minas e ingenios de Potos? T^r..
pueblos que hasta ahora estaban
exL?os y
sefi^L el

?n^?oo mitayos para
mdios

L

orden general que en ec;<=
^4servicio," Lira!,
^^te
2.Klt%ls fMl\lT°L''''
percentages of Indians
The
reoui^=S I
required
of residence:
depended upon their
place
per
17
cent (service once
every six years) -al,
•

'

Po?:s??"cL\''i"
Porco
16 per cent-

1^1

"

P^if?
'

^"'^

^--ty

leagLs^'f

S^P^"^^®^' Chayanta,

Carangas

^l!rI^—a- :Sd^ia^ p-t-f-and^PaSi; ^^^-^

15 per cent

-

(service once every seven
years)
Asillo and Lampa
„^
ij
14 per cent (-rvice once
Ivery seven years)
Canas y Canches
.
The Re;,!
^|E2£ti2iento its sta^p of
Of 4Tro^Tx''"%TletT
Indies' end-of-thel^entu^v^,™ "5,*° "'^^ Council of the
21-see note 91, Chapter II '
^''^
"3, no.
'

7\

Albornoz?°76-?7?'^diLuss;s"?his',letter.
Council's end-of-t^r^ff?

"

"

^^nchez-

See, also, the

ll;rih%"°^"^°' -^pte"'i^r/"^es^o,'^^j; '^^^^'i^^
"BTHlg^Le^^?fl33^^??!^^1e^?hlf^°2,^^^-"

----

n^T^ro^i-rrin^^the^

^^^^i^^^^^^

correct, but one must^; <n
5 """^^ ^""^ Basadre ari
from th^ sixteen oblLaK^
migration
^^"''^^
offset by an increase^?^
l"^"^ possibly,
provinces
of Uppe^
Peru.
sLcSez-Mbornor ^^^f"^""?
Toledo's 1573 census"a°nd
the'l'ssr^ntf-for t^n^'^

f Of ^^^s/^tz^:

ri^
ti\^\arl""r
^•^^

--in\^bo\\'ir! ee
noli Ty'.'c^lTtl^^l
however, that
Toledo-; 1573 IL^ks are nl^^K K?^^
Probably inaccurate, just as the
1683 figures a^e!
success of"thl^Dugue"ria'p;!^ta"°'?L^I;^ comparative
that the entire process
his successor arrived in would'be'^;ompJltIrby°Le"'^trml''
Charr;^^ 7in
cnarcas
^-^'^ AGI
no. 27 7(see note
TPr^v.
41
^-u^
u
4i)
For
the chain
of events which resulted in the
nomination of the Conde de la Monclova
as Viceroy of Peru
see Hanke and Rodriguez, Los
virreyes Peru VII (nof 286^'
•

^

.

,

444

48.
AGI, Charcas 270, no 2 i-h^
the crown, 6.VIII.I68I,
°^ Pacajes to
que reciven del gremio 2 fs'- '^nl^t.—i^
^^'^
vejaciones
de los acoat^f
quales ynstan en que
Potosi,
los
el entero So^?
ultimo repartimto^ue
^^^^
el
hico ll a^n
''''
sandi
empadronando en aauel
y
Carvajal,'
tributaries, siendo as? auf^n tS.
Yndios ^
?
hallaron 1B510 y aSnque
680 se
an sonit/^"^^^
revisita no lo an consLn?^^
conceda
^^'^^
de q.e remiten
^^P^^^^^
?esam?o"?^the ??80
"Mfo de campo Juan
conducted
by
B^la^ques de OviH^I^
'

i-^-

origiAartf del puebl^de'r

sobre que don
de Pacajes,
pL^nciLo^oSi^^inS^
^^terador
de la mita de
^7'
dicho pueblo, no e^v-i-r-^, !
n
San Francisco at lotosl^
convento de
^
<iondr^^?"f
para mandarlo a las llborf^^^
sirviendo,
^^""r*^
^^"^ ^""^ P°tosI,
23. VI. 1683, 32 fs
(MC iSfo. MOM^???'
"^f
SSnchez-Albornoz,
92-95, conuients on the
pro?4ct?on afforded to runaway
Indians by hacendado,
they reached with
cacigHes;^s ernotfgl be^o^^^f
^I^J!"*^
:

en ll-puTlo de'puna"°;ro;i:c?fS

T'"''

-sldente

similar import, see ANB, EC 1689,
no. 31, "Capltulos
Fernandez, gobernador del pueblo de
Laja, corregimiento de
census, arrendamientos de tierras,
servlcio personal v
"'^'"^
Iflos "^itayos
m!tfvordI?''"
H? de Laja por^ esfuerzo •• Au^ento
del pueblo
del
K
gobernador
FernSndez, f. 163, 229v.
Privilegios de hijos
^
424, 446,"'
ll8r?fi?r%^?V^'r^^^
1685-1689, 346 fs. (MC 1093a; MOM 682). 423,
In this instance.

'

l'nliat"h'rh!f L\^'?orcIblv\'»t'^°"f ^

was then denied the

'^MT^^.t

^ disgruntled

lt,lil,^lT^°

Of th^
'''^ co.,,.,nts
""^
P"^ovides a full
transcription of the ou lstto., -^
on pages 113-149 (froS
^" ^PP^ndix
Sala
xt??^"??',^
23-10-2).
Servicio person al II 190-1 Q?
Zavala,
describes
the
t55tK5Hy^f-thS^Aaoi;;,n»=
The
took plaL in'potlff^l|Si£ff2£S|.
questioning
was produced on 24 Ill
iSS^hf EscJivfno

=SSi'abour^-^s"'a^rr"^^

T

^

.

53.

.

'

jSn de^fff^

Ibid .

ooInp^;ints^lbout"^^f "^"^ ^'"^^ ^"

ne^^S^l^'^i

•=°<3i" of

?r:f?a\'=Bo"?h^;r:^en?!t^?^r'

^"^^

"?9-169^?^:;i'^are housed
in^?L^^lSN'^<se°f
'^'^^^^^'^
The first is AGN,
Sala IX, 10-3-7 6^9 f='
'"^^ provinces of
La Paz, Tomina P??avf A,-;""^

LL^ff^^;;

•

it

perSned

L

^«'"°^^d because

^^^^^^^^^

e-kin
?
af ™ --"-en?aI1e^^=,^^?r:4
transcribing complaints by rural
Priests 'about Vh^
""f^
=e^ t:
h'r„ir--/--ir^

H

-

^^^^ ir-^^^r^-^B.

he^

r?a"^o-io^-L?-c^^caV3,^?? iS.%^-^cij°
"^""^

^'"^

e^

If Monclova Virrey
destos Reynos sobre la numeracion Gen.l
del afto de 683 y
19. III. 1691, 2 fs.
A cover letter
foTttt. T"''"^^""^ ^°
is AGI, Charcas 271, no.
«
M
1
S?^'
8, Manuel
Obispo
de Cuzco to the crown, Cuzco, 3. X.
1692?
Bishop says that the corregidores
^^"sus; that many Indians had been counte d many
^-J !
^^"^
"^^^^ obligations failed to take into
.i^^V^^?^
T""
account the demographic changes of six years;
and that the
Indians were fleeing to live with the infidels.
The
response to Palata's reforms requires much more
attention
than that which I can give it here; I have
copious notes on
the two AGN tomes, and suspect that others will
be found

Ll\
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for the second volume 'c? -Fr^i-;^^
""^"^'^ "4 77" forward,
once Dr. Villanuev^s
Ltlrltl
fnt
the AGN documentation
>^e"nited with
1 hone
study Of the provinci^i^e^^L-

^olhe^^ia^^^^^elor^^r

54)!'•pa:a^r::?L''?rcorLS^
^
"Relacien"
(see note

1)

activities in his
SSnchezL^^'^^^^""" ^° novelties

5?^^^^

Albornoz, 77, comments on
in colonial PeruTlnera^L
that such balanceI?"|"omon-like

'

^^^^

^LSIIS.
r h J^r^

enemies of the mita

^^^'-^"O" (^eenote

"so^itionf

^^^^

caciques as the

.

-^^n;. .1-see

re-%^I-^a-te^Sr™^^^^
56.

"Representaciones y gueias J-&89-1690
lfiftq-i^;Qn«i
(see note
The problem with i-h^
3
Ezquerra
Abadia, 492-495
^^^^^
Dobyns 509-IlO^^^
54)

/

.

i'

quejas, 1689-1690"
54)^^*Hoi'm^?''^?r^^''f°''^^ ^

(see note

^"^^
had certainly opened the
donr in
door
to their incorporation with
its 1681 cidula ?
'

^^^58.

"Representaciones y quejas, 1689-1690"

(see note

the various sources for the
°- 24!lV Ld
21 Viri?89'';"
^^'^•^^^''^^^^
Palata's reforms,
bu^ Jo'rPdn;. ^h""^ originarios
tribute by one-third and
the forasteros
fora^t^rn.^^by one-half, according to
the Council of
^"?-°f-the-century summary (AGI, Charcas 2?3,
no 21—
no.
21
til note 91, Chapter II).
see
'

'

60.
Palata observed that his "Advertencias" had
been
ineffective
his "Relaci6n" (see note 1), VI, 238
His
successor, the Conde de la Monclova, echoed
that fac^t when
""^""^ °^ Palata -s reforms:
BNB,
MSS 4, fs. 279of-v^'^M^''^^'^
287,
Provisi6n del virrey (Monclova): Senalase nuevo
orden
para el regimen de la mita de Potosl, abandonando
el que

m
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que
27T/?2i^^^^"
27.IV.1692 (MC lUO;sobrevinferon
MOM 685K

en

T

nume^osos
^Plicaci6n," Lima,
'

caused by^Hapsburg'goee^'il^e^t'^^
structures; that he -re
have been more
would
successf urh?^
^^^^^^ ^"^er Charles
rather than Charles
in
that Paiata's
^^2-495,
says''
chances'for s^'e^: ^f^^'
by his replacement
^^^^^^^^^
lowered
so
soon ^^ter
a?ter his
hT reforms
^ "^^^^
duced.
were intro-

IIp^

62

AGI, Charcas 270,
no.

Antonio

secretary to the Couni
Duque de la Palata's irorj^rTn^'"''''
secretary!
'

San'Mhian'^o^'-Seftor
to "Senor Sec^eta^io"
<=^f^nr'^i-::,-^A ^»
la cap na ,e
GaIeonls!"=^^?^^J?l.
.^ciix

^^^""^^

'

°f i^f'^

° ^^^^ii^.o ae
"^^

entrego y endandole el
libro y pap.s que se le oe^if
'^'^'"""^ ^1 Cons.o como
se le ordeno";^AGI
Charcff ^7}
;senor Secretario,
'°
Sdi::%o"xii??69
•'•

la Palata d?1o irava nar.

f^r

P^Pa^<J"^ ^1 S.r ouque de

"1,

3A,

Contadir PedJo 'Antonio d^' r
CSdiz, 25.1.1692 I f
A?T rK

is

Antonio de Ca^tjj^rto^oi^^o^'dfvln^t^

no.

'^°=^Ph Bernal,

??ii^?69r^rf

hand, and that h?s iopy was
."^ ''^
servTn"^'
"'^^ original.
See /also? AGI,
i-narcas 271,
Chlrcal
2n^ nf
no. 9A, Joseph Bernal to Antonio
Ortiz de

•
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Otalora, Madrid, 27 x

IfiQ^

i

^

65.
AGI, Charcas 270 nn 7-:>
to the crown, Lima,
15 lii ?690
l fi^
de la Monclova da
quenta i'xm^'
?
a hallado el GovL?no
Peru." The letter is d^ es^Ss
!
§eruano. Documentos transcrfhf^
para sS hiSfn^'''^

^
^"""^^

Monclova
Virrey Conde
^° General^en que
^ Provincias del
included in Virreinato
goleccion de^iHii"
virrei^eJT-C^Hd^df^
1^
Paz-SoldSn Sind~G^i^7rr TJ^
Manuel M^ri^iF^
^
Lima:
Castillo (3 vols!
Publicaciones de? fnllf^^l
Hist6rico del PerG,
1954-1955), I, i?-23.
i^''^^
Pertinent
material is on paaes
17-18.
Th4 letter ?; ^
.

ReiLf

fef^Ae-century sLtarv
note

°' thiTHdlis

(AGI °rH^''

•

91, Chapter L)
^l-see
For th^ r.^^??^ Fiscal
to the repor?, AGI,
's response
charcas
^narcas 270,
270 no.
no'^'i^?
33A,
Madrid,
1693, 4 fs.
27.

m.

^--il

in ^ts

end-of-Se-c:nturrsS^'"'^.^^
21-see note 9f cSfpter^ir^^^L^^f

^^^^^^^ 273, no.
azocjueros observed that
'

the complaints from the
D^ovi'noo=
"
sympathetic ear In AG^? ?ha^cas
^"^^^^^^ 27r'nn''?^r^
no.
^^1/
7B
see
note 44).
Joseph Bernal c;;=.ir!
correc^idores
had
suspended
orders from Pa?ajf un??/?K^
Monclova
could
arrive in ir-eru
Peru (AGI,
UGI chL^^^
Charcas 5??^^
271, no. 9— see note
64)

^"^^
°f two volumes of the
"Reor^sen^^Aio^^^
quejas,
^
1689-1690"-see note 54) 562I
565V, Manuel
de Ribero Leal to the Conde
de la Monclova
nonciova,
Sipe-sipe, 11. XI. 1690.
.

azoqueros were jubilant
5^' ^^^^ t^^t
bni-^^Ao/^'^"'^^'
but
they were not.
See AGI, Charc as 271, n o. 7B (see
nSte
^^^"^P'^
unhapplness.
^^^^^
The three
offif^^l''''^
officials
who °r
drew up the repartimiento (Enrfmi^.
Mesl!
and Gonzalez de Poveda) sa id^he
azogue ros we?e u^set w?th
th^^fiFF^AGI , ChLcas^N'S,
no! 32A--^Iee'n:L'4?)?^'^
70.

AGI, Charcas 270, no.

32

(see note 19).

449
/I.

Ezquerra AbadT;:^ aqo
three (Enrlquez,
^^^^
committee of
Mesla and rA
the 2,829 IndiaAs
noted that
in
ord!n/" represented
increase of 1,401-1/2 the mi?a .^^^^^^^
an
overrf
1.427-1/2.
The Dugue de
^^^^^^^Y of only
included that
comparison in his "Relacifin" Palatf'^^f
"°te 1), vi, 230noted in note 45
?
t
and Rodriguez copy
^^^^^^^
°'
in the Hanke
is in^erro

L

AGI, Charcas 270, no.
5 (see note 9).
73.
BNB, MSS 4, fs
27q-9Q-7
AGI, Charcas 273, ko
^0)
See, also,
3
IL
cIJT^
crown, Lima, 31 .kll
^°"^lova to the
.iel[ ^^Tl fs
"e?
^^rrey Conde de la
Monclova Da quenta a V.M
2;;.^^
del
de Potosi, effectos
^""^
Mita
que
indios que mando hacer caus6 t.^
tiene vno y otro neaocinsu Antecesorv^^?'^".^^^"^'
^ ^"^ estado que oy
«n^K?
vn papel firmado de
Relatores que asistin a
los
ia S^^? °
mandado
sobre ambas materias nor
formar
dondf ^""^
reconocen
mas
individualmente!"
72.

/

.

^

BNB, MSS 4, fs
27q-9P7
says that the idea wf^^hl
74.

f

^^^^ ""^^^ ^0^' Monclova

-

irL^ZLl'li ^6^o!^l^°L.^?f
--"^

-'^ao

cha^geTSl'^^all^inl
llfaueros. request that ,°oLtet

3f Pov:da's;c°:;ed°to'the
,

Canilla's 'b^t

fofthe slke°of"=Lrit^^"'ha:r
or Clarity I have stayed
t"^^
with his

sir name.

273, no. 21 (the Council of the
thi^'
end-of
end
of-the-century
summary-see note 91 Chapter II)! Indies'
76.

BNB, MSS 4, f s

.

279-287 (see note 60).

^'i^^^roa's offerings are included in

AGI^'6harcir2?2
^narcas 272, ^f.
as the first item:

Reducese 5 los escritos de Alegaciones "Quaderno 2
que die?on el Fiscal
de la Audiencia de Lima,
el
Protector General de los
y
Naturales de el Reyno de el Peru en
defensa de los Yndios

450

^^"^f^i:'t/J^!r'''\r
item, "Al Rey Nfo
""^^^^as
SefioJ
En
of'
El Virrey de el ?eru
^oide Se L m "^^^'^^^

one of
271, last
Yndias.

entero de la Mita
executado sobre el
dl^Potosi v^^i''^ ^
Provincias afectas I e?^a
tributes en las
v^^T^^f^^^
^^^^^^ dividido en
tres quadernos quaderno'lo
cnlt^
de los Autos de la
Memorial ajustado
de el Virrey Duque Nu^eracion Gen l^""^
executo de orden
PaJata
v'!"^?^
hechas sobre los Despachos
^epresentaciones
in^^^
su
®^
virtud.
Coordinado En 1;, t,,«?
third vo?Smf is'inSuderL'Ll^^^ ^^"^ reconocerlos" the
273, last item,
"Quaderno 3q Comp^ehende
en la Junta para quf
"^'^^^^ P^°P^-o
iSs MlnLfrnf '
compusieron
diLssen su parecer ^ ^^0^"'
-^^^
dieron.
se le
Y lo aue con
5
ff*
Lima, y resolvio ervirJe^
Arzobispo de
.n^^^^°\^^^°
1692 y RepartimLnto de Mita
qSr^'dL^"
se dispuso en conformidad
de lo resuelto
Al fin
t ? quaderno
estS impreso el
Despacho cftadi, y vn refL^n
los Curas de Yndios ?o df^
^""^
P^^^ que
sus Dotrinal.
^ todos los de
Y ?a clrt IT ^
Testimonio haziendo succinta
Y dize su parecer en a?m^no= ""^^f^ion de lo que contiene.
han
determinado?"
o? ?hS
i^^^^ed,
and
those indices are transcrL^d""^^ n°i^r
fuentes
en el
Archivo General de indf^^^^ k
t:
^tlrcll
BNB, MSS 4, fs. 279:287
(see'no?! 6
aSd AG^'cha?cas''^

dHa

;

'

L

-

iLh

—^^

^^i^.^SfraffoT^

f,f\--\^f^^T;
:

15

vx??:i^,^^L'?s'^ ^E\'^i"°^^V°^V°

Remite a

VM^ te'^tf^oniof d^tolo^s^L^

:fhLiLo™^

^i-s-n ^-^S-pa^h-

--

fpa1eL%^°a"Ss\°do%

l^l^^^^

.^e

™f

In
que se execut6 el ano de 1683
haziendo re^acion succinS'dP
todo lo que contienen,
y dlHi su
sob^ealgSnos
puntos que no se han determinado parecer
"
Lagunez' pace? ?s also
discussed by the Council of the Indies?
end-of-?he-cen?irv
supry (AGI Charcas 273, no. 21-see note
The condensed version is AGI, Charcas 91 'chapter
273, no. 2,
;
"TLie.
D. Joseph de ... de Garrica
... y Lie. D. Ber do'
Romero" to the Conde de la Monclova,
Lima, 26.XIl!^691
.

.

AGI, Charcas 273, no. 5, Oidor Mathlas
LagQnez to
crown, Lima, 15. IX. 1692, 10 f s ; "El
Lizenciado Don
^las Lagunes Oidor de la Real Audiencia
de Lima da quenta
78.

.

the^^;unSro%^?L\^L\^e^t\^-i/- 4, fs. 279-2S7; and in
Charcas 273, no.
^^^^Y (AG^?
21-serno?e 9? ^^^"r''^^^^
Quaderno 30"
^^^P^er II).
See/also/

(see note 77°.

Monclova. bnb, mss
de la
Pointed £rovisi6n of 4? fs 279
1?°^^
the
27.iv 1692
th^^?^^^^^^
Ezquerra AbidIi7~495-496
is
noted by
Th! ;
described in Aci, Charcfi
involved are
^^^^^^^^^
271
the Archbishop of
Lima^s discuss?in of
Charcas 271, no.
°^ ^he process, agi,
6, Melcho^
Lima, 1. IX. 1692, 20
^^"^^
the crown,
fs
Refiere el expediente
dado en q.to al aiust^'^^ "Lff'^^T
que se a
gen.l de In.os de
que le dio pte
^J^^^^^^^ion
e?'virrev
^""^ ^'^^"^
"Quaderno 3q" (see nlll^^V
"^^^i^"'* ^nd

^

'

37-53\*

"Lp^^Ken'^o^ fSifli^dj: T'
PoCsI
^ "'^^^ P^^^
Monclova, virrey del Pe?f" hechn
Lima ^t^^."^^?/^^
MOM
^^^^

mmas

e ingenios de

1^

(MC 1111;
686).
For the general' o^:^
'J^'
8.V.1692, AGN, Sala^ix
^^^^^^a, dat^d
50-145v.
Albornoz, 79-83, refer^
SSnchezto the irM^A
''^^
ordinances that azogue ros w^r^
to fn??^^''^
fs
53-64, "Provliliirfil virrey?
deta^f' las
ordenanzas con arrealo a ill Z^i* Se detallan
'

•

?4-f?lF^

f

deciding wh?ch mUls ™uld hf^ ^^^isjed responsibility for
their pirforraance to d«f» ''^ assigned m ltayos -based on
in-^luded in
AGI, Charcas
^^"^ "^"^^
no ?n Vo
de azogueros,
^""^3":? '° ^'^^
is
Jsgf'z
?S
^""^
Council of
the Indies' end-o? thl
'
f
^^arcas 273,
no. 2?--sle nSte qI rhrr"''?Tf™'^^
P*,"
Zavala,
Servicio
personal TT iQc a,

lL?
,

bS^fthe''"'"-

•

that-the".??a™:fcS2

Ca-^te%^^.fH-t-gf.-n^ir^.\"o^%^^Lie"-

452

provinces were o.U^atea
un.er Monclova.s
r,,arti^.
82.
AGI, Charcas ^'-L,
271, no.
no 7n
/D (see note
81).
83.
ArzSns, Historia, ii,
363.
to the crowA,^Potos£/riv''l6
republica de Potosi"
9 2^S"i^
en el Gov.o superior
^up.ca se ponga
deaaueno:
de Poveda, Arcobpo
^^^'"'^ ^^^^-^
de cha?cas L^^^^" ^
de los minerales,
""^^^^^
descaecim.to
por ?a practic^ w
se hallava."
^"'^^''^^^^^^^
Also, agI €^0^^971
of the Gremio de
^'
Deputies
a^ogue^os
1692, 6 fs.; "Refie^In
20. IX.
con la entrada de los ^os dano^
experimentando
ln?os^de ^^"^^-^^
ceduL'I/^"
las Prov.as
destinadas a las minas rl^i n
^
Charcas 271, n^? 7B tsee
notn4)
expresses the
azogueros unhappiness wi^h r
u

S

'

'

•

Monclova, Potosi it viA^tly^
'^^ la
^"^"^"^ ^^eir
complaint in AGI Charcas
'273 'no
fi'
.k'^^X
^'^^
Deputies of the
Gremio de azoaueros to ?L
9-XIia693, 3 fs.
(sent after ?heir pleas to
The conde de la Mo^cfo^a
describeftheir'net"^"
their petition in AGI,
Charcas 273, no in i-ul ^^^^ripes
la_Monclova to the crown.
Lima, 21.x. 169 3: Tfi
IrS?^^.
Virrey
Conde de la Monclova
Da quenta a V M ^1
'

•

i"

y

r^pa^rtLionl; tl MltTlT'^'nts'l

IT'' '""T

^'''^^^

^-a-^ii-— ^^^^^
™iaf^inra\so\r€K^

With a
allowances, the shift back to two
exclusion of forasteros (that they weeks rest tnri Ihl
considered Responsible
for leaving the twenty-three
mills without mitayo Tbor)
86.

rr.

T'^

AGI, Charcas 271, no. 7B

Charcas 273, no.

4

(see note 44).
(see note 77).

For the

-tline of Enriquez' activities? and
%
^^^^^^1'
'

the date o?
AGI, Charcas 273, no.
note ssf
Pni?
85).
Enrlquez wrote the crown that everyone 10 see
in PotosT
indirectly-in th^ mita?
cL\cas 27r'no""'ir%'H^
Charcas
271, no. 11, the Corregidor Conde de CaKTTTas
to

Tg^

'

the crown, PotosI,
10 xil ifiQ^
^ ^
discussed his report to
viceroi m ^• ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^Iso
copy of it)
^^^^ included a
AGlf Charcas
^^S''^
Canillas to the Conde dP 27r^nn
Conde de
?'
m'
5.fs.
Enrlquez.'cS^ifLo^ irAcrchr'^^'^.^'
^^^2
Lima, 7. VI. 1692, 2
^A,
fs.
k''''^^
discusses the comolai n^-<=(a
^^"chez-Albornoz
79-83
to PotosI; al do^s
returned''
councxfof tf"?Indies'
century sununary (agi
end-of-theCharr^i o??
;

'

'

% Sodv)^/

,

*

Chapter li)
88.

aL ^Ar z^ns'^^JJIo^

;

,

llZTel

Tl\

AGI, Charcas 271
no IIB
nn (see note 87).
^/i, no.
/

Enrlquez
did^mive'^to'collec^^he^deb?; of
ANB, M 116, no. 5,
twenty-three
mills:
"iestimnn?^ 5 ?^
las
diligencias
obraron en Potos£ en
que se
c^p??^l°
la
coinisi6n que el
conde de la Monclova,
^^re^de
Li^^
Canillas, corregidor de
"^^"^^
PotL?
^^T'
que expidi6 el licenciLo
dictamen
don Matias
m l<
Lagunez,
Real Audiencia de Lima
en ^f.^^^^^lta hecha fiscal de la
por los
oficiales reales de df^h!
cobranza de las
cantidades que en raz6n de^'nL? '^''^^
las veintit?gs cabezas d^ in
^ azogues estSn debiendo
^^^^^^on sin indios
de mita en e? a??i^o
reparJE?n
virrey," PotosI 5 tv-r f/ ^^oi
^1 "^encionado
^''^
^1^^'
This dicumen?
^88).
viJv uJfnl h'
P^^^^^es a complete
description of thl relat^onsh^rK^'r
^^t^e^n
silver merchants
and azggueros a profile
o? t^^
*

:

271 no.
nA
^'±,

if
the
12, IL

"""^^
^GI, Charcas
r
-J ^^^^
Corregidor
Conde de Canill^Q
-^i.^
°™'
'

'

PotosI, 10.XII.1692, 6 fs.,
provides the Correaidor's
account.
Enrique^ sent along to the crown
evidence ?hat
the a^oaueros were happy with
the compromlsrahey denied
that they were pleased) as AGI,
Charcas 271, no. La
Acogueros de vde de pitosi cerca de
Ha!L?^rr°"r
Partimiento de Yndios Por El
5^
ex mo" r^connf^
Monclova
Virrey Governador Y Capp.an
r^^ 1 ^'
f

^

^/i, no. 12B,

5

fs.

(the summary is dated 11. XII.
1692, and

reads

tesSonifae°Lirf=°L"l?:u"i'%^

Declaraciones del
^"^^

mas Breve ynteligenc^a
^
dl lsJas
Cavezaf^» ^^^^^a^iones Consta aver treoe

Azogueros que unaH? n^l "fgestad, Y otras de
travajan Por cuyt rrLon
gi^e
tenido
arrendados
Sus Yndlos a o^^^="
consta assi mesmrdr^?rarct°r"'^'""" ""^"^
javezas quitadas
a cinco Azogueros
aue
duplicadas Y
an quedado Lda vn^con
vna
^"^enio cuyos
Seflos tHntTMLli""° "r""^

f

?nI.o°

r a%€

?ro^i oV"'"-

—

ei-n-^f^f--

^
^

lun^o-ll^o-de

doy fee oons^ravlr^Ma^da'do^s:
eKc"L'°cla'

PqSle--J||n.e-e

^Se^r

-

L% vpeTtiel c^-lffde-Y^-i-l
quedado sin

la

IT

-^T"

repartimiento en el qie tiene
excelencia el Senor Virr^y Co^de
de
iTMon""^
rrazones de sLorref erks
.

Y

assrirc;.?°?-'^'

Canillas de
Justicia
y
mayor de esta
^^^^ declaraciones en
Poto^r''^"'^'^'-^^^^"^^ ^
' seiscien?os
TnolLi: Hos'lnol^r^^^
More supporting evidence follows
as AGI, Charcas 271, no.

^or-nL^
torneros corregidor

92.

94.

AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10

AGI, Charcas 273, no.

6

(see note 85).

(see note 85).

^h^^^^s 271, no. 10, the Oficiales reales
de
.^^h
vr.J^<
PotosI to the crown, PotosI, 10. XII. 1692, 2
g.ta
fs.; "Dan

455

haverse suspendido
el Duque de la Pal,
la Moncloba a 34
i]
hallavan con i^Tos
^ntes
de'mlla^^Z^Z''\''"''
le an hecho p.ra
representaciones que
cobras lo4
embian testiS.o de lo
resultas,
que estan entendiendo ll^'ln lTol^ ordeno executar en
en
con 0^^^^^
conseguir." Monclov^TLt^e?
P^^^^
to^^^^^"^^
AGI, Charcas 271,
^^^^^
^^^h
in
no. lOA
!?
Oficiales reales de PotosT
t°
the
°
frnS
Lima, 29. V. 1692, If
Monclova,
The r^??
forward, as sho^n by
^^^^^
9°
^-^^^ no. 5 (see note
^ ANB m*
^ Jie^^'ni^^^f
in 1693.
89)
but

~

T

,

^^^'^ oficio.
Ynforma el estado de la
,
MLf
S^ f ^"
For more, AGI, Charcas
V-^"
273
no I tt'^r
Antonio Ortiz de Otalora,
Velayos to
5 x
5-X.1693,
1 f.,. agI,
Charcas 273, no. 9 "Mpm a Potok
i
endo La Press.a de'chlfS'v ^^^^^^
estan slrvl
Corregimiento
de Potosi, y a "
las que estan da nL f,^: ^
2 fs? (thi lirff?«o'p:gerinvo?ee°t\f?'^?^'"
Velayo-s arrival in Potosi
vi JmI^^TT^^ ?^
'

^

^?ix??6B6rVso^^,

?aXls\c\^: cL^a^r2?r^

the crown, pitos^S .Xl":i??3
de la Mita, y lo dem;:i<^ rmo

promptly (see H^lFfl
97.

98.

fo°r

,
i

'.f^ ^-fier^
Refiere
^

°'

ANB Tl2*?,Pn^^

AGI, Charcas 273, no.

4

AGI, Charcas 273, no. 10

Tsep

nn-»-o

el estado

77^

r.

(see note 85).

AGI, Charcas 270, no. 33A (see
note 65)
for th^
s comments in Madrid.
The material arri;inqi^
Spam included AGI, Charcas 273, no. 14,
"Los cIcJaues v
fecha (e^vllo^e
has "1694-r
can
1694 ), 2 fs.;""'^f
"Sup.'?a5^^
conf irii-lFTiiolucion cue
cerca del serv.o personal de los In.os
de la mi?a de aqSel
99

Fiscal

.
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causa pu.ca ^ que an\^^r.^^^

nat.s y

t' J"^^"^

la

by the council of the
received
iLlll fol\h^^ ^^^^
Charcas 273, no. 15, the
^^^^ °f AGI,
Grimif
azogueros to the crown
Potosi, sin fecha, io
fs
"Renr^^

no ynnobe, ni altere
planta y repartim to aue
la
!
enlorespectibo a'la Mita l^?o no^"^
^^l^ta
^^^^^
con mas conocim.to
^^^^^^^
^
y pJena aberC^°''^ '^^
a podido tener el
motibos
que
Conde de ?a Mnn^?oi°''
dispuesto por su anteclso'r^
ll T.llTnL fo^Lf c^^^^e^S

"^^^'^ ^ ^ de Ab.l
de'?694 '''Busquense\^^^;
1 ''I
Tos
Vir?i7-y del Duque de la PaJL?^"^;, ^ ^"^^^^^^ del-Arzobpo.
de Charcas D. Bart ml con^
f^^^^^^' Y del Pres.te
correx.r de
Potosi D P.o Luis henrr?a s /?eT^^^^
reintegrac.n
de la
Mittas de Potosi Tiu.t^
f:
Indies c,%'Telok loT.r.ToTe
LTur^"
™°' ^ °tro ejecuto
®"
el Virrev Dua e rie i= d = iT I ^
'

\

(-bricado,

Th'islrthI- entire docS^ieL:''"^ ^"

.

d^ugueros to the crown sin f prh;:! 9 -Fo
"o^^t
conde de la Monclova virfif Hff;.^
f^b^raza^'L'^^^^^Lf
y forma de Mita para las labores de la ribera de aauel
•

,

^^^^^

"

hLo'^ef Duque
^
:o?°^e^^^^°
^^^^ suspenson es interesado
-^J
vL ad en
!n los qumtos,
VMg
Suppa a VMg.d se sirva de mandar
que
en el interim que se Justifica su
racon y la del Conde se
por El Duque de la Palata"? and
M AGI, Charcasdispuesto
b)
273, no. 17B, the Deputies of the iremio
de azogueros to the crown, sin fecha,
2 fs.
See, also'
AGI, Charcas 273, no. 15 (see note
99)

TeT. Pai^tf
1

'

the minutes of the Council's deliberations,
i^rr^^nu
AGI,
Charcas 273, no. 19B, 18.1.1697, 2 fs.:
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continue la mlta qe el

mdi.

e

travajo y los de ida
^^^^
Vuelta
y
sefn
f
Voluntarios y tamn en el
los Indies
?ravaio v ^^^^^^ ^
la vltima Providencia
capitulos de
or^
dada
tar reduciendo
^^^^u
y arJeg^ando'^cad^'''''^''^
Ser de mas alivio
P^eda
y convenLn^fS T^^^
que qdo esten enfeLos
^es ^sista
asista v%^"^'°^
cuydado, Se guarden los Ie
y Cure con todo
q^i^f
Minas los delinquentes al
apliquen a las
?^
i^''^^
de los de esta caUdad
^^^e numO
Senalen Indios Mitayos minor.r^^''"^^^"
^
se
T^nl
tuvieren Minas en
Vso, y qe no Se repl^ta
mas
^i^z y Seis
^
Provincias (Iv:)
•

las mismas
o?de^\r^e^,^^ ^^^^
Guancavelica

ellas los capitulos
Conde de la Monc^nh°
Moncloba
a

Baraez
.

f,^ """I?*^""^

?

y se adapten
Providencias dadas por el
,

"^t^ Sin diferencia de los

Travajo poniendo
cota Solamte ^ la" leaual oe hf"!
se arreglen los
f.^To tt ^a^p 1 Idosf -^'^ '
Bustamte
espana 3 B - qumtales de
Azogues
Solorzano Lo mismo

Camargo
v°i^\'^''^^^

"^^^^

^^g^ el salario del

respecto de cinco RS Leguas se
excuse la miL de if
^^^^^^ (2:) y las demas qe esLn
f^^r^'i^
modif'i^cio^ls
^
de la

juntf

—————
Sierra

Se quite la mita, y si la huviere
de haver
sea en los Indios qe estan en
Potosi, ^y las
siete leguas en contorno
|

No se quite y se igualen los
salaries Se
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extenssion de deniegue

^^^"^

as
'''''^^

^^^^^ Y la

ConssO 18 de en^o 1^:0-711
The search fHr I
document.,
cLprMfie if^lsfl/^^^"
Charcas 273, no. 21
'^^^^'^ibed in AGI,
(the
Chapter 11); and Holmes Cnni^<?. sunmary-see note 91,
56-5?
?
given his anti-mita
observations in AGI "rf"
33A (see note 65T7"the
Charcas 270, no.
Pi q^^t"
strongly in favor of
abolition: AGI charcas 2?f
the envelope),
''^""^
"Respy^rdel s
Pap.s tocantes a los
r&J^r-t^l'tnl^^^'^'"^ "^^^ta de los
numoracion Gen.l qui dt^tllo^'tt
^i^^' Y
quales algunos an estado
^^^^^ 1°^
en
nJ
i""?
del Ror clballos?
^^1^^^' ^ otros
y asf ser/hf^''
q.n ^e an
de entregar.
y si su IM^f^ere s.f-f ^'^^^ a
nuebo," Madrid, 18.iv
encomenderlos de
1696
^i'^^
de Tobar, and his
^^teo
option Is a cind?^
f^^^^^
^^^^^^^^tion
of
the
abolitionist sentiments
«nT:iments of fhf
the previous thirty
years.
103.
AGI, Charcas 273. no 1 Qr »-d^.p
en los doce puntos,"
^ prevensiones
sin fecha, 2 fsf^
.

'

,

f

"reser^

Is - si han de correr
las retasas
Si i©s se han de guitar
de las 16
Provmcias las qe estan distantes.

Se conserven por ahora
en la misma
conformd qe lo dispuso
Moncloba
Si han de correr en los
forasteros,
excluyda con el punto 2q.
do
? S
4Q - sobre
las Seis Provincias nuevamte
52
7o
/2
(iv:)

sa

9S

10
11

atfectas excluydo
- como se han de Volber
a numerar los
i^dios, como lo dice Moncloba.
~
1^ Septima como viene.
c? f^^''^^^^
- Si
los Yndios han de tener dos
Sems
Se confirma.
- Si han de Ser
50, o, 49 Ind^ pra
cada cabeza de Yngenios Sean 40
y Si
por accte de Cesar Mina el nrnnero
de
los 4 0 Se repartan con igualdad
en
las demas.
Si convendrian las revissitas
Corra
se haga de executar Sea con
y q
acuerdo del Govno Superior y ha de
dar qta dellas qe despachaze.
Augmto de Salaries con el Voto
faltriquera y con las prevenciones de

'
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12

Guancavelica
Leguage a 4 leguas Por dia
y mi tad de Jornal.

Se conste'^e ellovno^Se'-pI^osf
funae
Provission de SMcd no
las futuras volvienSo
^ ''"^

^

'^

=

'

'^^

'^"'^^^
canftl'^
S"^^"
"t'^"
°'
ejempXo correspte ^^^^^v^
"i
Se?vo
porqfci
pSrae
tfi'
se
les
concedio la
futura "
^TK-!^
^^^^^^
document.)
The
xne council
Council of
nf l^t
r'-^-^^l
the Indies'
(agi, ^narcas
07^
Charcas 273,
„^
no.
21— see note 91, Chapter II)summary
li^-t-l it^^
decisions;
and
resultant nine points are TLt,^^^
the

iL

•

sources Included^ii'^^^e'lOS;
illlt^/'

see note 91, Chapter II)

'

.

^narcas 273, no.

21—

^"^^ ^^^^ 103); AGI,
the crown to the Vicerov and th^
Audiencia de Lima, Madrid, 18. II.
1697? 14ls^ "Srdenan
executar en el repartim!to de ?a Ml
ta
d^'p".^°.^^^
q.ta de lo que en ello
^
obraren".
3^?
tcT r^^^'
2^^'
ps^;
^^^f^^^
RS de Potosi sobre los 24, "Informe de el Correg?do? ; off s
9 puntos en alibio de los
Indies
comprehende la Cedula de 18 de ?eb o
tli^" t
Charcas 27^, no!
'
2I
"lAfor^^T'i'-I'^-i'''' Charcas
sobre Los nuebe puntos
^n'.i?K^
en alibio de los Indies mitayos de
Potosi que Comprehende

Charc^s 27l'
t-narcas
nn^""???
273, no.
23A,

Z

1698,

10 fs.; AGI, Charcas 273, no. 26, "Informe
de el
Arcobispo de la Plata sobre los 9 puntis
en

alTbio de los
comprehende
La cedula de 18
f'l?.o^
de febo
de rct.'^t
1697 " Tomina de la frontera, 3. VII. 1698, 3
fs.;
AGI, Charcas 273 no. 29, the Oficiales
reales de Potosi to
the crown, Potosi, 14. IV. 1699, 1 f., "Avisan
del R,vo de la
cedula que se embio tocante a la forma en que
se havia de
hacer el repartim,to de la Mita de Potosi
y paga de los
Jornales y dice obserbaran lo mandado segun
las ordenes y
las que les diese el Virrey
y que hasta la fecha no
determmado y que luego que llegase darian el devido lo havia
cumplim,to. BNB, MSS 4, f s 156-157, "Cedula real
al
corregidor de Potosi: Lo que se ha de observar para el
bienestar de los indios y la marcha regular de las labores
y el beneficio de minas e ingenios en la aplicaci6n del
nuevo orden adoptado para el regimen de la mita de esta
villa," Madrid, 18.11.1697 (MC 1138; MOM 691); BNB, MSS
4,
f. 155, "Cgdula real a los oficiales reales
de Potosi:
Que

Z

.
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orden adoptado para el
rgaim^n
cover letter from the crown
I believe, AGI,
Charcas

+-A

.

^

4-^

27^, no!

Con

^^^tro del nuev

""^^"^^^^

^

°^

!7?Tl.f

18.11.1697
^---^ov. is

occasion de este Aviso remito
S v F

excuse el .nandaLe DS ge a v
I
a 18 de febrero de 1697"

"° .
"s^^s^c^:!^ I"^"^^^^"^
"

ta or Monclova.

M 126, no

Los
a de

de
nuevo

vxirey conae de la Monclova,"
24. III-?. 1693, 6 fs. (MC 1113;
MOM
Audiencia's ruling is obscured by
"^"^-^

^^m;^^^ ^r,^""7
tfiqf
r^H
a wix ieal.^

°'

ANB, M 126, no. 12, "Alonso Chui,
Pascual Pareiava '
""^^^^^
originarios de^ '
lult^^ S^""?'^ ^
provincia de Asangaro
Martin ChJf^''^'^^P^^^^ enterador de la sobre que don
mita del pueblo
de ^J^n^^il?^^' provmcia de Paria,
los a traido indebida
mL^o
"
108.

,

'

"^^^^
consideraci6n a
Ti^/^^'Y''.^''
forasteros," Paria, 10-12 .XII 1698 6 fs.
^M.^
(MC fi^f
1146; MOM 693).
.

,

109.
For the investigation undertaken by Phillip
v in
the late 1720s and early 1730s, see Ezquerra
Abadla's
article.
Two works he employs are:
a) "Juicio, que sobre
ei aumento, conservaci6n o extinci6n del
servicio personal
de la Mita q. embian las Provincias de Cochabamba,
Chaianta,

Azangaro,
^^^5^^, Pacajes,
y Omasuyo/nara 1^
^ ;
^^to^I
y sus Viveras, hac^ e^ Lizdo nn"" t^^ ""j^^^^^
Garcia, Fiscal de la Rl AnS.'.
^2^^?^ Casimiro G6mez
Plata, 30. VII 1730 r^iA Audiencia de las Charcas," La
Biblioteca Nacional
^'225,
'"Soblr/T'^'
exclusi6n
P°tosI
y
de Sangleyes de Phn?
Ygnacio Antonio del CastilTn
^^^""5^ ^
n
de La Plata, ProviicJ^de
-^-ncia
lo^ c^f^caf d^

AjIu;,''S?Schar^icas?cr'Tin^
Chucuito
:

\S

^

*

'

105 o. t.e sa.e^L^-scr!p??
-g^i.^^elor^^ a\^s^M

io^,

CHAPTER

VIII

CONCLUSIONS

Alberto Crespo was right.
riah^
y

m,, suggestions
lUs
about the

nature of the mita at
aiz Poto^T
i^otosl in t-h
the seventeenth century,
which he advanced in his
195S
lybb article, were
correct.
The
syste™ was not responsible
for the demographic
decline in
Upper Peru, and the Indians
were indeed able to escape
their mlta obligations by
fleeing fro. PotosI and from
their home pueblos. Thus,
this dissertation is
less a

revision or refutation of
previous knowledge about the
Eita than it Is the confirmation
and expansion of another
historian's thesis.
The implications of this study
of the PotosI mita
go beyond our understanding
of the system itself, however.
The mita is more than a topic;
it is also a tool which
can
be used to observe the patterns
of Hapsburg government,
and to examine the character of
seventeenth century Peru
in general.
Certainly mucJi more can be said about
PotosI
in the light of this dissertation.
fact, most of the
questions that were raised by D. A. Brading
and Harry E.
Cross in 1972 can now be answered.

m

Let us look first at the three most
over-worked queries

actuau, ..u the x„..ans.

aia the

^

contribute to
the depopulation of
the provinces that
were subject to
^t? and c) did the
systen. cause Indian
flight and social
disruption in those provinces-?
provinces? tv,^
The answer to all three

were true that is really
important.
There is little doubt
that some of the Indians
who served in the mita
at PotosI
died in the mines. Mining
is a dangerous occupation,
and
miners are killed in the
course of their labors.
But the
death Of mitaios in the
mines at PotosI was not a
Significant demographic
phenomenon-because the Indians
did not permit it to be.
They could escape from the
mlta
too easily for it to have
been a direct cause of
the

depopulation of the obligated
provinces
The number of
Indians that actually worked
in the cerro during the
seventeenth century, moreover, rarely
exceeded 2,000. The
mitaxos were only a small fraction
of the Indian population
of PotosI, let alone Upper
Peru.
.

The Indians migrated away from
their home provinces to
free themselves from mlta service,
tribute obligations and
the oppression that they suffered
under their corregidores
'^^''^'^"^^

^"<3

priests.

,

Many of the Indians moved to areas

that were completely outside the zone
of Spanish

colonization.

Their abandonment of their pueblos was
their

most effective means of opposing their
condition.

Because

the Indians did not
fight back with ar.ed
resistance
their opposition to
the Spanish invaders
was ,uiet and
unspectacular. But we
should not consider the.
conquered
or portray the. as
passive victims. Their
flight did
cause the depopulation
of the sixteen obligated
provinces,
but it was the imposed
lifestyle that they abandoned,
and
the imposed social
order that they disrupted.
The questions of the
mit^os. working conditions
and
the alta-s responsibility
for the demographic
decline in
the provinces were not the
objects of the seventeenth
century struggle over the
system. They were, however,
the rhetorical tools that
the provincial interests
used
their battle with the azogueros
of PotosI for access
to Indian labor.
Those interests accused the
azogueros
of abusing the mita^os, and
the mita of depopulating the
provinces, with the hope of lowering
the quotas that were
required from their regions, or
winning the system's
abolition. The a zogueros accused
them-the corregidores
caciques priests, chacareros and
others-of strangling
the mita and thus of undercutting
the production of royal
c[uintos.
The battle was not over loyalty to
the crown or
the depopulation of the provinces;
it was over who would

m

,

receive the services of the Indians.
Once the real cause of the seventeenth
century debate
has been identified, then the de facto mita
can be

examined objectively, and two more of Brading and
Cross'

questions

.e answered:

persist until 18i2,
while
niines of New ^n^-in

century, and

"Place the

/^a

a,

~

„H. ai. the PotosI
™,.a

renarti^

i,,,,

PFtidrea during the
seventeenth

aia a class of volunteer
laborers not
^^^^
^^^^ ^^^^^

GarricK Wilson Holies,

P

The reason why the
aita

continued throughout the
seventeenth century was
that it
was both a necessary
capital subsidy, in
service in
Silver, and a ™eans of
forcing the Indians to
work in
the cerro against their
win.
33„ice in silver
provided the azo^ueros with
an ability to withstand
water
and mercury shortages,
deteriorating ore quality and
the
crown's refusal to grant
the. any new concessions.
Mita
service in person was needed
because, by the time

^

that

forced labor was required
at PotosI in the 1580s,
the
mines were deep and the
working conditions were appalling.
Thus, the ralta was not
replaced by minaa labor because
part of it was service in
silver, and the other part
involved work that volunteers
refused to do.

Silver production was the sole
reason for PotosI 's
existence. The mita was therefore
responsible for
supporting the viUa-its convents,
its mint, its garrison
and its large population-long
after raining and silver
refining there would otherwise have
been unprofitable.
The need for forced labor and a
capital subsidy both
stemmed, ultimately, from the high
cost of living at

Potosl.

The Villa. geographic
s
isolation and altitude
-ant that provisions were
very expensive, and
that
volunteer workers required
unusually high wages.
Production costs were
therefore higher at PotosI
than they
were elsewhere. Once
fining was no longer
profitable
Without the ^ita, PotosI
was too important as an
economic
and strategic center to
permit the abolition of
the system
upon which it was so
dependent.

The 2ita did not, contrary
to what Brading and
Cross
suggested, allow silver
production at PotosI to soar.
The
boom Of the 1570S was caused
by a unique co^J^ination of
desmontes, a new amalgamation
technology, a large capital
investment on the part of the
potosinos and Indian
labor,

once the desmontes were
exhausted, the boom ended and
the
rtiita had to serve
as a forced labor system for
the first
time.

AS it had been designed by
Toledo it was unable to
perform its intended function.
The de facto mita did,
however, keep the PotosI silver
industry in business long
after it would otherwise have
collapsed.

A word of caution:
Peruvian norm.

PotosI does not represent the

It was unique-geographically,
geologically

and in many other ways.

Comparisons between New Spain and

Peru should not be made on the basis
of PotosI.

Rather,

those scholars who are looking for centers
to compare with
Guanajuato, Zacatecas or San Luis PotosI should
turn their
attention to Oruro, Puno, San Antonio de
Esquilache, Castro
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Virreyna, Porco and
other Peruvian .inlng
areas.
This dissertation
also holds so^e
Implications for the
theoretical model presented
by John Leddy Phelan
in his
I960 article,
"Authority and Flexibility
in the Spanish
Imperial Bureaucracy."
while a thorough discussion
of the
relationship between the
model and the specific
case of
the Hapsburg administration
of the
i-iie mita would
wo„i^ require more
than the few pages
allotted here, l would like
to offer
some tentative observations,
with the promise that they
will be developed more
fully elsewhere.

central to the Phelan model
is the contention that
the
crown employed contradictory
and mutually exclusive
orders
to maintain its authority
over the colonial bureaucracy
in
America. The example he used
in the "Authority and
Flexibility" article was that
of the Indian labor question
in Mexico at the end of the
sixteenth century. Phelan
argued that the crown's incompatible
orders for
the

protection of the Indians and for
the promotion of mineral
production were two such mutually
exclusive orders. The
official who received them, he said,
was therefore compelled
to determine what the true
intentions of his sovereign were,
and to enforce the orders to the
extent that he believed
they were applicable.
The local government official was
therefore afforded

degree of flexibility by the crown to shape
government
policy to local circumstances, but he remained
subject to
a
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«vie„-by

vlsltadores, other government
officials whose
.ur.sdiotions overlapped with
his and ultimately
by the

-Si^encia conducted at the end
of his tenure-fro.
above

Because he was unable to
comply with all of his
orders
Phelan noted, he regained
vulnerable to dismissal or
some
other form of reprimand,
and thus he remained
attentive
to the wishes of the
crown.
'

The crown's cSdulas were,
in Hegelian terms, the
thesis, and the official's
response to them was the
antithesis; the government
policy that resulted from
their
exchange was, therefore, the
synthesis.
Phelan said that
the continual thesis-antithesis
interchange did more than
maintain the crown's authority,
that it also created a
bureaucracy that was very conservative
and very unreceptive
to new ideas or reforms.

certainly the 130 years of Hapsburg
administration of
the mita described in this
dissertation have provided many
examples of the bureaucratic processes
that are outlined
in the Phelan model.
But there are also

two or three areas

where

I

believe the model might be modified.

Again, my

suggestions are speculative and tentative.
The incompatibility of the crown's
orders had another
purpose, which is not necessarily inconsistent
with the
one identified by Phelan.

The simultaneous orders for the

protection of the Indians and for the expansion
of mineral
production were also used, in the case of Peru,
to advance
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the „ow„.s position
vis-a-vis local interest
groups.
Xn
h.s later work. The
Kinados of Quito in the
Seventeenth
^Sntus^ (1967)
Phelan argued that the

bureai;^;:;;^

,

the local elite in
i^erica-that there was no
equivalent
to the medieval nobility
that the crown had to
contend
With for supremacy,
save for the bureaucrats
themselves
in the jurisdiction of
the Audiencia de Charcas,
that was
"°t so. The encomenderos
(whom he dismisses in the
case
Of Quito) and the _azogueros_
were very much like the
independent-minded nobility of
medieval Europe, especially
with regard to protecting
their privileges.
The crown had created these
American "nobles" in the
course of its efforts to expand
its Empire and to
increase the economic benefits
that it received from the
colonization of America, in order
to colonize the Indies,
for example, the Catholic
Kings had to rely upon a "conquer
now, pay later" formula,
whereby prominent conguistadores
received encomiendas in exchange
for their service to the
crown.
The struggle between the crown
and the encomenderos
that followed, during the sixteenth
century, was not a
struggle for justice, but the crown's
effort to regain the
ground that it had conceded to the
encomenderos

— to

'

reassert the authority that it had lost
with the granting
of the earlier concessions.
In the case of PotosI and the mita

,

the crown had

temporarily lost sight of its priorities.

In a moment of

enthusiasm over the
= o^^
T:ne in<-T-o
increased
production of silver at
Potosi during the
1570s, the crown dropped
its long-held
opposition to forced Indian
labor in the ™ines and
consented to the establishment
of the mita. As a result
it conceded privileges
to another group of
colonists:

the

^Hoaueros.

They received mitayos

i^^unity from

imprisomnent for debts and
other rights from Viceroy
Francisco de Toledo in exchange
for their capital
investment in new amalgamation
processing
mills.

As with

the encomendero s, the
government had to grant the
Moaueros concessions to win their
cooperation. Unlike
the encomienda, however,
the mita was part of a

partnership between the crown and
the azogueros for the
future.
They would share the benefits
of mita labor in
the form of Potosi silver.
The crown controlled mercury
and the administration
C11.J.UI1 ui
of Tine
th(= mi4-a
mita
The azogueros owned
the mills and the mines.
.

Once the crown had confirmed Toledo's
agreement with
the azogueros in 1589, it began
to learn that the mita
was not working as Toledo had said
that it would.
.

As the

silver boom at Potosi faded, the azogueros
began to turn
the system to their advantage, by
renting or selling the
Indians that were assigned to them, and
later by

encouraging the appearance of the mita service
in silver.
The struggle that developed between the crown
and the

azogueros during the seventeenth century was a dispute

between partners over
one's aouse
abuse of
ot th.
the .agreement between

them.

The crown struck back
against both the enco^enderos
and the azoaueros with
its 1601 cSdula b.nnl^^^l^^
personal service for the
former and abolishing
the ^ita.
The cMula was adamant
and couched in absolute
ter„s to
permit the Viceroy, Luis
de Velasco, to employ
it as
leverage over the colonists.
coloniQ^c
t*.
It
may have been meant to
push him toward action,
but it was primarily
designed for
employment against the local
"nobility." The terms of
the order clearly show
that the crown's motivation
was to
limit individuals' access
to Indian labor while
preserving
those forms of forced labor
from which it benefited; and
the inclusion of a chapter
empowering the Viceroy to alter
the edict as he deemed necessary
demonstrates that it was
not meant to move him alone.
The crown held the ultimate
trump card with regard to
the mita:
its possible abolition.
But because the crown
was interested in silver production
at Potosi, and the

continued existence of the villa for
fiscal and military
purposes, that weapon was essentially
useless.

The

abolition of the mita would have to be
an act of last
recourse; when the benefits of the mita
were no longer
worth the costs. The azogueros in turn,
held the cerro
and the mills hostage, and they could use
violence
,

to

prevent any serious attempt to reform the de facto
mita.

.

it was the a^oaueros
who were

PotosI

reaUy

In control at

The crown had to rely
upon its viceroys in
Ll„a to
fight its battles for
it, because its
geographical and
temporal isolation in
Spain prevented it fro.
having any
direct role in the
administration of the
aita.
The
viceroys were scarcely
„ore effective than the
crown
however, in controlling
the behavior of the
azogueros
They were hampered, in
part, by the failure of
the crown
to concede them sufficient
authority. As Phelan noted,
there actually were two
centers of authority, one in
Lima
and one in Madrid. The
orders that were issued by
these
two centers were often
contradictory and often served
to
neutralize one another.
The viceroys' effectiveness
was also hurt by their
own reliance upon "government
by proxy" mechanisms, and
the division Of responsibility
for the mita among various
government officials in Charcas.
That division was
designed to prevent their subversion
by the azogueros and
to ensure a steady flow of
information to Lima and Madrid.
The battles that were waged
between the Audiencia de
Charcas and viceregal officials in
Lima, between the
'

,

Audiencia and the corregidores de
PotosI, between the
presidents of Charcas and the corregidores

de PotosI, and

between everyone and any visitador who
arrived in Charcas
prevented those officials from performing
the duties that

were assigned to them.
Perhaps the ™ost important
reason why the government
could not respond to the
development of the de facto
™ita
the refusal of the two
centers of authority to
assume
responsibility for important
decisions,
indeed, if there
is a central reason
why the Hapsburg government
was not as
effective as it might have
been-within the limits of its
power-it is that nobody would
assume responsibility. The
Viceroys, for example,
employed a myriad of
bureaucratic
delaying tactics when they
feared that their execution
of
the council of the Indies
two-part program would cause
Silver production at Potosl
to fall, and they would
be
blamed.
Then, when the Conde de Lemos
proposed that the
Hita be abolished, the Council tried
to pass the
responsibility for the decision to
the Queen, and later
returned it to the viceregal
office with the Conde de
Castellar.
•

To sum, the Phelan model seems
to need expansion to
include the American "nobility"
among those that strong,

and often incompatible, orders were
meant to control. It
also needs to take into account,
therefore, the relative
power lessness of the crown vis-a-vis
its own colonists.
Finally, the miniature versions of the
system described
by the model, which were used by the
viceroys to direct
their subordinates, require closer inspection
as well.
One more observation:

the degree of control that was
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exercised over the Indians
by the azoaueros,
the
and the caciques has
been overestimated,
P-itio„ o. the

^oWores

,,0^

-Oh

xhe

^^^^^

the same as that between
the crown and themselves
The a^oaueros. use
of the caciques was
also a parallel to
the crown.s use of
its bureaucrats to
keep some se^lance
Of control over the
colonists. The azoaueros
appear to
have been more successful
in their employment
of the
S£iaH£s, because their means of coercion
were more
effective: at first financial
penalties and later
physical torture.

The azoaueros. need to
resort to the physical abuse
of
the
demonstrates, however, the
effectiveness of
the Indians in evading
their mita responsibilities.
The
-2£ueros exercised a degree of
control over the Indians
via the caci^Q^; the crown
exercised a degree of control
over the azoaueros via its
bureaucrats; and the viceroys
and the crown exercised a
degree of control over the
bureaucracy with their orders.
When the Indians migrated
away from their provinces, however,
the azogueros and the
government were forced to adapt to
their action.
it was
the Indians, therefore, who were
ultimately in control.

caci^

It is time for a few questions of
my own, most of

which

would have liked to have answered in
this study
but could not. First, I wonder what
Indian labor was
I

like at other mining centers in Peru.

What were the
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wor.i„, conaitions
U.eP How ™uch „e.e the
Xn.ians pa.a.
D.d they exercise any
direct control over
productionP
second, I am curious
who the original
a.ogueros were
and how their ranks
changed over time. How
often did thi
™llls Change hands, why
were the Basgues such
a prominent
group by the 1620s?
Third, What was the
economic role of PotosI in
the
seventeenth century? was
it the force that had
helped to
create support industries
and economic enterprises
in the
sixteenth century, and then
was supported by them during
the 1600s, Via service
In silver? Was PotosI
a drain on
the capital that was
produced elsewhere in the realm
in
the seventeenth century?
Fourth, why did the cacicues
continue to meet the
demands of the azogueros? Were
they all like PernSndez
Guarache, too heavily involved
in personal enterprises of
their own to leave their provinces
and escape from service
as capitanes enteradores ?
,

Fifth, why did the chacareros and
the estancieros not
figure more prominently in the
documentation on the
Potosi mita? The complaints about
the 1689 repartimiento
and reforms were written by the
caciques corregidores and
priests. Did the hacendados leave the
complaining to
,

them?
The answers to these questions, and many
of the

details about the seventeenth century mita, are
to be

found in the local archives
of Bolivia, Argentina
and
Peru (I know that the
documentation exists for Oruro
and
Cochaba„*a) and In the
wealth of material tucked
away In
the Archive de Indias.

Answers will also come from
careful work with the
vast amount of quantitative
material that is available on
the Potosi mlta. The
analysis of visitas, testimonies,
rgfia rtimiento s and similar
materials should^l^^I^to
determine, for example, the
profit ratios of the azocueros
and it should allow more
definitive statements about the
uses to which the mitai^os-in
silver and in person-were
put.
It is my sincere hope that this
dissertation has

provided the framework, the frame of
reference, that will
permit more specific work to be done.
There
will, no

doubt, be many instances where
the role of a stalking horse,

will be useful to others.

I
I

have erred.

But even in

expect that this study

.
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GLOSSARY

meeting of the Audiencia for
the
purpose of counseling the viceroy
on a question of major Import;
also
called an Acuerdo consultivo.
^

alcabalas

sales taxes.

alcalde mayor
de minas

....

altiplano

magistrate charged with mining
matters.

.....

high plain; the large flat plain
between the ridges of the Andes.

^^^^^

Indian who worked in the mines,
carrying ore out of them.

Audiencia

High Court of Appeals within a
geographic area, composed of a
president and oidores (judges)
That in Lima was chaired by the
viceroy

aviadores

moneylenders.

^y^^^

clan group of Indians, based on a
common ancestor (often legendary)
with economic, social and political
functions

azogueros

owners of amalgamation mills
azogue mercury), and mines.

—

barreteros

....

(from

workers who stripped ore from the
walls of the mines with iron bars;
usually well-paid mingas
.

Cabildo

town council.

cacicazgo

a

position as an Indian noble
495

(

cacique

)

.

.
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''^''^'i'^^

Indian nobleman; natural lord.

''^^''^^

the right of mitayos to work
in the
Saturday evening
ui???
"^o^ning, for their own
^
profit

capitan de la
""""^^

also ca^itSn enterador:
an Indian,
usually a cacique responsible
for
delivering a contingent of mitayos
to
Potosl. A capitan general de la
mita
was responsible for those f?3m~in
entire province. Toledo provided
for
four "capitanes de la mita" to
oversee
work at Potosl.
,

CapitSn mayor
de la mita

.

.

official, apparently subordinate to
the Corregidor de PotosI, responsible
for overseeing the delivery and
assignment of mitayos to azogueros

.

.

carta cuenta

.

.

documented and armed shipment of
silver from Potosi.

.

cedula

royal edict.

mountain; hill— especially the mountain
of Potosi.

chScara

farm; agricultural enterprise
chacra)

chacarero

owner of a chacara.

^h^^h^

alcoholic drink made from fermented
corn

^h^^o

freeze-dried potatoes.

(modern

a plant,

the source of cocaine, from
which leaves are taken, dried and
chewed as a stimulant.

conquistadores
Consulado

.

.

conquerors.

self-governing guild, which is
empowered to settle disputes within
its own membership.
a
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consulta

consultation; debate.

corregidor

fortafrnf^''^^^'
DSsticS^'^tc

responsible
^^-^-^t-tion Of

comptroller.

dejacion

abandonment; surrendering.

^"'"""""^

not refined, because of
Ill
Its low quality, and placed
in slag
^
neaps

f-^
.

"^^^^""^

one-tenth; a royal share of mineral
production equal to 10 per cent.

encomenderos
encomienda

.

.

.

....

recipients of encomienda grants.
grant, temporary, of the right to
collect royal tribute from vassals
withm a distinct geographic region.
The encomendero was responsible
for
protecting the Indians under his
jurisdiction, as well as providing
for their religious instruction.

delivery; compliance.
Really no good
translation. The entero de la mita
referred to the degree to which"!
province complied with its mita
obligation; and to the total delivery
of mitayos
Enterar was the verb.
The entero en persona was the number
of Indians delivered in persons; and
the entero en plata was that which
arrived in Potosl in the form of silver
.

escrivano

notary.

estancia

ranch; livestock operation.

estanciero

....

owners of an estancia

.

extractos

extracts.

fiscal

official of the Audiencia or the
Council of the Indies responsible for
guarding the crown's interests,
especially vis-a-vis royal revenue.

I

.
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forasteros

....

^^^^^so

disaster.

^^^^"^

gobernador

"foreigners"; outsiders; the
Indians
who were absent from their
original
villages, and often resident
in others

P°tosI where the Indians
l^l^^^^^^
traded in unmarked and raw
silver.

....

governor of a village, usually a
cacique
.

^fjits of currency,

small fractions
the circulating, un-assayed peso; of
term was used at Potosi to idiHtifythe
the mitayos contribution of
one-half
£eso per week each to pay the
veedores
and alcalde mayor de minas.
'

Gremio de
azogueros

....

mine/mill owners guild at Potosi.

"^^^y^^

small wind-using oven employed to
refine the highest-quality silver ore
at Potosi; the dominant technology
before amalgamation was introduced.

hacendado

owners of a landed estate.

hanasaya

one of two parts of a village, each
called a parcialidad and composed of
members of one or more ayllus
The
other parcialidad was hurinsaya
.

.

hatunruna
indios de
faltriquera

rural Indian who paid his tribute in
labor

.

.

.

"pocket Indians"; those mitayos that
were delivered in silver, ostensibly
to hire substitute laborers, and used
instead to cover production costs and
the azogueros personal expenses.
'

informaciones

informe

.

.

.

bodies of testimony on a specific set
of questions; usually used to document
a legal case presented in a petition,
report, etc.
an individual's report on an issue.

,

.
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jornal

.

daily wage.

.

.

laguna
^
lamas

reservoir; lake.
.

±.u^

.

°' amalgamation
<=°™P°-"e of mercury

processlnf
InTslltaV.

"""P""^ °f documentation in an
archive,

leguas

.

.

^

'

limefio

'

.

.

.

.
•

.

.

pertaining to Lima; resident
of Lima.
ovf»r<;*^«roverseer;
foreman.
j

e.^--,^
stamping
mechanism in
J

.

"'^"'^''^^^

mercaderes
de Plata

,

allowances paid according to
lul
the number of leagues
(literally
1|2H||) traveled per day to and from
r^^^-j-^j

.

mayordomo
mazo

'

refining mill.

a

personal account, report; espeically
of one's tenure in office.
Also, an
account of historical nature.

....

silver merchants.
"^^^^yos who were required to
work on
their weeks of "rest" in the
repair
of the reservoirs and in other
public

works; later sent into the mines
and
to the mills.
""^^^^^^

half-breed:

"'Stales

raw ore.

^^"^"ja

free, volunteer,

^^^^

turn,

mita gruesa

half-Indian; half-Spaniard.

Indian laborer.

time of service, or system of
draft labor in turns.

....

total number of Indians required to
come to PotosI each year to serve in
the mita
.

mita ordinaria

.

.

weekly number of mitayos one-third
of the mita gruesa (by design^
;

.

.

.

500

mitayo
^

.

tt,^,- ^

Indian serving in the mita.

.

"^ontdn

pilg^

""""^^^^

half-breed:

nervio principal

.

half -Spaniard; half-Black.

principal nerve; .est important
organ.
factory; textile shop.
one-eighth; royal share of mineral
production at 12-1/2 per cent.
judge on an Audiencia; "hearer."

originario

....

mdian living
village.

P^'^^^^

parcialidad

in his original

census; population tally.

....

parroquia

half of a village; see hanansaya

.

parish; neighborhood; each province
involved in the Potosi mita had its
own parroquia in the viTTaT
coins; units of currency.
suits; litigation; complaints.

"pocket Indian"

.

.

see indio de faltriquera

.

Indian overseer; taskmaster.

potosino
procurador

pertaining to Potosi; resident of
Potosi

....

attorney; legal representative.

protector

protector; official assigned the duty
of advocating the Indians' position.

quebrado

broken.

quintal

unit of weight used for mercury and
ore

quinto

one-fifth; royal share quinto real
of production at 20 per cent of
mineral output.
(

)

.
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rancheria

small settlement; also
a synonym for
roqRarrocTuIa
in the potosino
context!

reales

units
uiixuis or
of currenrv
^-Litincy #=rrnai
equal 4-^
to one-eiqhth
^
r,f
^„ assayed
^
of an
peso.
.

Recopilaci6n de
las leyes
.

.
•

.

.

.

.

.

reducci6n

relaci6n
.

.

.

.

relator

recompilation of laws.
small pueblo to which
Indians
been brought for resettlement; have
also
""^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
and ^f???^^
settled. A reductor was thegathered
one
who conducted the process.
A reduccion
2|n|ial was a comprehensive resettlemiHt
etfort in a large geographical
area.
report; summary; overview.

official responsible for writing
brief
summaries of material on a given
subject relaciones
(

repartimiento

.

.

,

)

assignment of Indians to work in an
enterprise; the group of Indians so
assigned. A repartimiento de la mita
was the distribution of Indians"
to
individual miners, soldados and
azoqueros
.

rescates

the bying and selling of raw silver
in the ghatu plaza at Potosl.

revisita

re-inspection; re-count of the
population in an area.

rezagos

debts owed for failure to pay tribute
in earlier years; rezagos de mita were
the debts owed by caciques because they
had not met their quotas of mitayos in
previous years.

sacadores

Indian collectors used by the azoqueros
to qather money for service in silver
from the caciques
.

soldados

Spaniards who had served in a military
campaign, but who had not been rewarded
with an encomienda grant.

.
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tacana

•

.

.

.

extremely rich ore.

testimonio

....
....

tindaruna

....

Indian who was compelled to report
to
a central location for
hiring.

tomines

....

units of currency; parts of the
common
peso

tarea

.

.

quota; daily task.

notarized copies of documents
used
to buttress a legal case,
petition,
government report, etc.

.

veedores

....

officials charged with monitoring
work inside the cerro at Potosl.

vicuna

....

animal, camelid, native to Peru and
Bolivia.
The Vicunas were an alliance
of non-Basque Spaniards and Creoles
involved in the "civil war" at Potosl
during the 1620s.

villa

....

usually a village, but used in
connection with Potosi because it was
known as the Villa Imperial after
purchasing that title from the crown
in the sixteenth century.

visita

inspection.

visitador

an outside official sent to inspect
a particular area, group, official or

institution.

yanacona

Indian who was spared mita obligation
by Toledo, but who had to pay tribute
each year. Yanaconas were originally
tradesmen who were displaced by the
conquest, but the term was later used
for Indians who were assigned to
agricultural enterprises by Toledo,
their descendents, and other Indians
who adopted the name to escape mita
service and other obligations.

yungas

lowlands, on the eastern slope of the
Andes

zambaigo

half-breed:

half-Indian, half-Black.

APPENDIX II
VICEROYS OF PERU, 1544-1705

^

Blasco Nunez Vela assumed
office on Mav 17
died on January 1, 1546.

'

i^aa
^^^^

^

Antonio de Mendoza assumed
office
^^"^emoer 12
iz,
1551 and died on July 21, 1552. on November
^""^"^^
^--^e, assumed
"""offLf
Office on
on'june%f
June 29, "f???'
1556 and died on September
14,

Diego L6pez de ZQniga
y Velasco, Conde de Nieva
''''
^^^^
?Ibr^LVl'9'^1564/^^^^^^^

-

'^l?69'\^Sd1e??^rorMaTi;i5^r

'

Martin Enrlquez de Almansa assumed
office on May
liJbi and left it on March
12, 1583.

4

Fernando de Torres y Portugal, Conde de
Villar,
assumed office on November 21, 1585 and
left it
on January 6, 1590.
Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, Marques de Cafiete,
assumed office on January 6, 1590 and left
it on
April 4, 1596.
Luis de Velasco assumed office on June
23, 1596
and left it on December 8, 1604.

Caspar de Zuniga y Acevedo, Conde de Monterrey,
assumed office on December 8, 1604 and died on
February 10, 1606.
The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head of
government from February 10, 16 06 to December
21, 1607.
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It on December 18, 1615.

-^"j-j

December 31, 1621.

ana lert it

Diego Fernandez de CSrdoba,
Marques de GuRri;.inS.^
assumed office on July 25,
lllTlnTllTt lt °^
tn
January 14, 1629.

^

'

Luis Geronimo Fernandez de
Cabrera
conde de Chinch6n, assumed office y Bobadilla
on January'l4
1629 and left it on December
18, 1639.

Pedro de Toledo y Leiva, Marques
de
assumed office on December 18, 1639Mancera
and left it
on September 20, 1648.

Garcia Sarmiento de Sotomayor, Conde
de
assumed office on September 20, 1648 Salvatierra,
and left it
on February 24, 1655.
Luis Enrlquez de Guzman, Conde de
Alba de
assumed office on February 24, 1655 and Aliste
left it
on July 30, 1661.

Diego de Benavides y de la Cueva, Conde
de
Santisteban, assumed office on July 30, 1661
and died on March 17, 1666.
The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head
of
government from March 17, 1666 to November 21,
166 7,

Pedro Fernandez de Castro, Conde de Lemos, assumed
office on November 21, 1667 and died on December
6,

1672.

The Audiencia de Lima served as interim head of
government from December 6, 1672 to August
15.
^
1674.

Baltasar de la Cueva Enriquez Conde de Castellar,
assumed office on August 15, 1674 and left it
on July 7, 1678.
,

—

21.

Melchor de
1,

LiMn

y Cisneros assumed office on
Julv
1678 and left it on November
7, 168l!

^

22.

Melchor de Navarra
y RocafuU, Duque de la Palata
assumed office on November
1, 16
and left ?t'
on August 15, 1689.

23.

Melchor Portocarrero Lasso de
la Vega, Conde de
la Monclova, assumed office
on August 1? 1689
and died on September 24,
1705.

Source:

Lewis Hanke and Celso Rodriguez,
eds
Los
virreyes_ espanoles en America
durante el
gobierno de la Casa de Austr£a7"^ibnot^ca
de Autores Espanoles, nos. 273-277,
280-286
Ediciones Atlas, 1978.
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APPENDIX III
MAPS
NOTE:

iier.

iires de Divers Autheurs et de
diverse^c; R^^i^-t-.-^r,^
Par N Sanson d Abbeville Geogr
ord?? du Roy
A ParJs
Chez Pierre Mariette Rue S
lacque a l'Esper;nce Aveca*
Privilege du Roy pour vingt Ans
1656 " ri ? r^^
survey Library NoT 10601, 'fror^he
L^p^Division ofSe'""'
Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.
Each of the maps in the series of
five is an
P^-vlous one (marked in
dSt^efTSes?"
boundaries
on Map 3, "Provinces, of
5^
Upper PeJu "
Crespo, and should be considered
tentative
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MAP 2
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